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Abstract
Publicly verifiable outsourced computation (PVC) allows devices with restricted resources
to delegate computations to external servers, and to verify the correctness of results.
Servers may be rewarded per computation, and so have an incentive to cheat rather than
devote resources to a computation. Also, within an organisation, it is likely that individual
user permissions will vary and so outsourced actions should be restricted accordingly. This
gives rise to two interesting problems in the PVC setting addressed in this thesis: finding
a method to revoke and punish cheating servers; and enforcing access control policies that
restrict the computations each entity may outsource, compute or read the results of.
In this thesis, we use primitives traditionally used to cryptographically enforce access
control policies to construct secure PVC systems that meet these requirements. We first
extend prior PVC schemes based on key-policy attribute-based encryption (ABE) to ac-
commodate a broader system model where servers may compute multiple functions and
be prevented from performing further computations if found cheating. We then show how
a key assignment scheme can provide flexible access control over entities. Finally, we
consider an alternative scenario in which input data is held by the server rather than the
client, and construct a provably secure instantiation based on ciphertext-policy ABE. We
conclude by showing that dual-policy ABE can accommodate both models of outsourced
computation and provide a level of access control within a single system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Author Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
This chapter provides the motivation for, and structure of, the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
It is increasingly common for mobile devices to be used as general purpose computing de-
vices and for low-power sensors to be deployed to collect and analyse data. There is also
a trend towards cloud computing and performing computations over enormous volumes
of data (“big data”), which means that many computations of practical interest may re-
quire considerable computing resources. In short, there is a growing discrepancy between
the computing resources of end-user devices and the resources required to perform com-
plex computations on large datasets. This discrepancy, in part, has led to the increasing
use of software-as-a-service, where computing applications are provided by an external,
potentially untrusted, cloud service provider.
Consider, for example, a company that operates a “bring your own device” policy, or where
employees must be able to perform work duties when not in the office; thus, employees
may use devices such as smartphones and tablets for work purposes. Due to resource
limitations, it may not be possible for these devices to perform complex computations
locally, as perhaps would have been the case on a company-issued desktop device. Instead,
the company subscribes to a cloud service provider offering software-as-a-service and allows
employees to outsource their computations over some network to the more powerful cloud
12
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servers. Computational results are returned to the client device. More precisely, given a
function F to be computed by a server S, the client sends an input x to S, which should
return y = F (x) to the client. However, there may be an incentive for the server (or an
imposter) to cheat and to return an invalid result y′ 6= F (x) to the client. The server
may wish to convince a client of incorrect information, or the server may be too busy or
may not wish to devote resources to perform the computation, particularly if servers are
rewarded per computation performed. Thus, it is important that the client gains some
assurance that the result y returned by the server is, in fact, F (x).
Another example arises in the context of battlefield communications [57] where a setup
operation is performed by a trusted server within a military base and then each member of
a squadron of soldiers is deployed into the field with a reasonably light-weight computing
device. The soldiers gather data from their surroundings and send it to regional servers
for analysis before receiving tactical commands based on results. Those servers may not
be fully trusted, e.g. the servers may be hosted in enemy territory or the soldiers may
be part of a (weak) coalition. Thus, soldiers must have an assurance that the command
has been computed correctly before making tactical decisions. A final example is that
of sensor networks where lightweight sensors transmit readings to a more powerful base
station that computes statistics that can be verified by an experimenter.
Solutions to the above problems are known as verifiable computation (VC) schemes. VC
schemes enable the outsourcing of computation requests to a more powerful server and
verification of the results of such computations. In particular, the outsourcing and verifi-
cation stages (both run by the client) must be more efficient (require less computational
resources) than computing the function itself. Otherwise there is little to gain from out-
sourcing such computations; indeed, it is assumed that client devices lack these resources.
These efficient outsourcing and verification operations may follow an expensive, one-time
setup phase to initialise the system, the aim being to amortise this cost over many out-
sourced computations. For example, the setup phase could be performed on an employee’s
desktop device so that a lightweight, mobile device can be used outside the office environ-
ment, or the setup could be performed by a trusted server within a military base [57].
Recent work in this area has led to the notion of publicly verifiable computation (PVC)
where, once a system is initialised, any entity may outsource computations or verify com-
putational results using only public information. PVC distributes the heavy setup cost
13
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by allowing many users to reap the benefits of one client’s effort, rather than every sin-
gle user having to exert the effort themselves; thus PVC provides a more practical and
cost-effective alternative to VC. PVC schemes in particular lend themselves to practical
environments such as those discussed in the examples above wherein multiple users (e.g.
employees, soldiers or sensors within a network) may wish to outsource computations and
do not wish to each perform the expensive setup operation. Indeed, it may well be the
case that it is difficult to amortise the cost of setup over the computations outsourced by
a single client device but, when distributed over multiple clients, the joint cost is easier to
justify. Additionally, particularly in a multi-user environment, many users may be inter-
ested in the same results and may all wish to verify correctness before using the results in
further work; PVC allows a single computation to be performed, the results of which can
be used by all interested clients. In this thesis, we focus on PVC as a desirable alternative
to VC and aim to enhance the existing solutions in terms of practicality and functionality.
1.2 Thesis Structure
In this thesis, we aim to explore PVC in more detail. In Chapter 2, we introduce rele-
vant background material and notation that is required throughout the remainder of the
thesis. We then, in Chapter 3, take a closer look at the system architecture considered in
current PVC schemes and see that there exists a distinguished client that must perform
the system setup operations. This client, in effect, becomes an authority on computa-
tional servers that may be used by other clients. Current schemes consider only a single
server, whereas we believe it to be a realistic model that multiple, competing, cloud ser-
vice providers may be employed by a large set of clients, e.g. a company may wish to
change providers without re-initialising the entire system, or may prefer certain servers
for particular computational tasks (e.g. based on cost, latency to the current location of
a mobile device, or the security classification of the computation in question). Thus, we
extend the current schemes to allow multiple servers to be certified for multiple functions,
and allow the distinguished client, as the authority on servers, to add new servers and
to revoke misbehaving servers, preventing them from performing further computations if
they are known not to be trustworthy. This chapter is based on a paper by Alderman et
al. [5].
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In Chapter 4, we consider the need for access control in PVC systems, building upon our
revised system model from Chapter 2, where we consider multiple clients outsourcing com-
putations to multiple servers, each of which can be certified to perform multiple functions.
As a multi-user, distributed system operating over potentially sensitive data and results,
we believe the cryptographic enforcement of access control policies is both a natural and
necessary requirement. We discuss policies that limit:
• the operation of clients such that they can only outsource computations that they
are authorised to perform locally (given the necessary resources) or to require clients
to hold a valid subscription for the computation (based on the required resources to
perform the computation);
• the set of computations a server may perform;
• the set of computational results a verifier may read (as such results may reveal
sensitive information).
We discuss how these requirements can be expressed in terms of graph-based information
flow policies and provide appropriate security models for their cryptographic enforcement.
We also provide an example instantiation which uses a symmetric key assignment scheme
(KAS) as the enforcement mechanism. As the distinguished setup entity is an authority
on servers within the system, we again extend its duties to be authoritative on all entities
in the system and to issue keys corresponding to appropriate access rights. Since the
proofs of security for this scheme are quite similar in their line of argument, we include
one exemplar proof in full in the main body of this thesis, and then include the remaining
proofs in Appendix A to avoid repetition. The work presented in this chapter is based on
a paper by Alderman et al. [3].
In Chapter 5, we extend the PVC construction to consider a reversed model of outsourced
computation. Previously, we considered client devices that were data owners but lacked
the resources to perform expensive computations on their data and so outsourced the
relevant input data, along with a request for a particular computation, to an external
server. In contrast, in Chapter 5, we consider servers that own some data and make it
available for specific sets of public queries. We discuss this reversed system architecture
and relevant security notions, and see that it has natural applications to verifiable queries
on remote databases and verifiable parallel processing using the MapReduce framework.
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This notion is similar in some regards to notions such as memory delegation [42]; in this
thesis, we observe that the techniques used in the constructions of PVC can be adapted
to this setting too.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we unify the work in prior chapters using the new notion of hybrid
PVC (HPVC). An HPVC scheme requires only a single setup stage but provides a flexible
outsourced computing solution. The notions of security for HPVC generally combine
notions from the previous chapters with updated notation; as such, to avoid repetition,
we defer these and their proofs to Appendix B.
We also show that HPVC provides a natural application for dual-policy attribute-based
encryption (DP-ABE). In fact, we will require a new primitive which we call revocable
key dual-policy attribute-based encryption scheme which combines DP-ABE with a revo-
cation mechanism to disable decryption keys. We introduce and define this primitive in
Section 6.3.1 but defer the construction and proof of security to Appendix B due to the
length and the fact that the construction of HPVC can be followed only with knowledge
of the definition. Chapters 5 and 6 are based on a paper by Alderman et al. [4].
To date, DP-ABE has not attracted much attention in the literature, which we believe to be
primarily due to its applications being less obvious than for other forms of attribute-based
encryption (particularly in regards to the cryptographic enforcement of access control
policies). Thus, one outcome of this thesis is to show that DP-ABE can be a useful tool in
other settings (namely in outsourced computation protocols as well as in cryptographically
protected file systems).
Indeed, a theme throughout this work is to look at expanding the applications of primitives
(both symmetric and asymmetric) primarily designed for cryptographic access control.
Such primitives are generally only considered in a static, file-system environment where
files are encrypted and users granted decryption keys that allow them to read only those
files for which they are authorised. In this work, we show how such primitives are also of
practical use in interactive (dynamic) protocols to protect messages sent between entities.
Furthermore, we use these primitives not only to prove authorisation to perform specific
operations within the system (in effect, using read access control to enable a form of
execution access control), but also as a proof mechanism for the outcome of an outsourced
computation of a Boolean function.
16
1.3 Author Contributions
1.3 Author Contributions
The work presented in this thesis is derived from three published papers [3–5] which I
co-authored with three others; Crampton and Cid acted in a supervisory role to Christian
Janson and I, as PhD students. The contents are therefore derived (although in many
cases edited) from collaborative work with Christian Janson, arising from joint discussions,
proof-reading and iterative editing by both. This section is intended to indicate instances
where I was the main author or had a significant contribution.
The idea, first arising in Chapter 3, to use labels to enable servers to perform multiple
functions (without allowing them to use an evaluation key for an alternate function to
cheat) was my own, as was the novel use of dual-policy attribute-based encryption to both
enable computation and enforce access control in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 3, the security model and proof for public verifiability and vindictive managers
were primarily developed by me, whilst the definition and construction of revocable PVC
was developed during joint meetings. I was responsible for the formulation of access control
policies in Chapter 4 with guidance from Jason Crampton. I also created the security
model and proof for the notions of authorised outsourcing and weak input privacy.
The notion of verifiable delegable computation, and the resulting definition, in Chapter 5
arose from discussions with Christian Janson about whether ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption could be used in a similar fashion to the key-policy variant used in
previous chapters. I was the main author of the instantiation of VDC and the discussion
of the system model in Section 5.3 (with input from Jason Crampton).
Finally, as mentioned, I had the idea to combine the notions of the prior chapters and to
instantiate Hybrid PVC using dual-policy attribute-based encryption (DP-ABE). Thus,
the definitions and instantiation are mainly my own work. The instantiation relies on a new
primitive known as revocable DP-ABE; this was mainly developed by Christian Janson
(and hence many of the details can be found in Appendix B.1 rather than the main thesis
body), however I was heavily involved in discussions to formulate the definition and basic
ideas, as well as in completing the details of the security proof.
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This chapter introduces the notation, cryptographic primitives and security notions that
will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis. We defer discussion of the security
notions for each primitive to Section 2.8 where we introduce the format of the notions that
shall be used throughout the thesis.
2.1 Notation
First we introduce some notation to be used in the remainder of this thesis. The set of
integers is denoted Z, the set of non-zero integers is denoted Z? = Z \ {0}, the set of reals
is denoted R, and we let the set of natural numbers be the set of non-negative integers,
denoted N = {z ∈ Z : z ≥ 0}. We write [i, j], for integers i 6 j, to denote the set of
consecutive integers {i, . . . , j}, [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n} for n > 1, and ∅ to denote
the empty set. When X is a set, we denote the powerset of X by 2X which is the set
of all subsets of X. A partially ordered set, or poset, is a set L equipped with a binary
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Figure 2.1: Example Hasse diagrams
relation 6 such that for all x, y, z ∈ L the following conditions hold: x 6 x (reflexivity);
if x 6 y and y 6 x then x = y (anti-symmetry); and if x 6 y and y 6 z, then x 6 z
(transitivity). We may write x < y if x 6 y and x 6= y, and write y > x if x 6 y. We say
that x covers y, written y l x, if y < x and no z exists in L such that y < z < x. The
Hasse Diagram of a poset (L,6) is the directed acyclic graph (L,l) wherein vertices are
labelled by the elements of L and an edge connects vertex v to w if and only if wl v. We
write Cn to denote the chain (total order) on n elements and Tn to denote the temporal
poset ({[i, j] : 1 6 i 6 j 6 n},⊆). Figure 2.1 shows Hasse diagrams for C4, 2[2] and T4.
For the purposes of this thesis, a binary Boolean operator O : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → {0, 1}
takes two bits as input and outputs a single bit result. We use the notation 1 and true
(and similarly 0 and false) interchangeably to denote the outcome of such operations.
We denote by ∨ the binary OR operator which returns 1 if at least one input is 1, and
denote by ∧ the binary AND operator which returns 1 if and only if both inputs is 1. A
Boolean function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} of arity n takes n bits as input and outputs a single
bit result. Every Boolean function can be written as a propositional formula made from
binary Boolean operators over n variables where the truth value of the result is determined
by assigning truth values to each variable and evaluating each Boolean operator. Two such
formulae are equivalent if and only if they express the same Boolean function (i.e. agree on
the output of F for all possible inputs). If F evaluates to true on a set of input variables
I, we say that I is a satisfying input set. F can also be completely described as a set
of satisfying sets, which we shall term an access structure. We say a Boolean function
is monotone if, for any satisfying input sets, changing any input values from false to
true does not change the truth of the function. That is, adding additional true variables
to a satisfying input set, or increasing the Hamming weight of the input, does not cause
the set to become unsatisfying. We denote by Fn the family of n-ary monotone Boolean
functions closed under complement — that is, if F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} belongs to Fn then
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F , where F (x) = F (x)⊕1, also belongs to Fn. When n is clear from the context, we shall
refer to Fn simply as F . A more formal mathematical treatment of Boolean functions can
be found in [47]. We denote the domain of a function F by Dom(F ) and the range by
Ran(F ). A function, f : N → R, is negligible on its input if, for every non-constant real-
valued polynomial p(·), there exists an N such that for all integers n > N , f(n) < 1p(n) .
Throughout this thesis, we shall denote an arbitrary negligible function by negl(·).
When specifying algorithms, we write y ← x to denote assigning the value x to the
variable y, and write y
$← S to denote choosing an element from a finite set S uniformly
at random and assigning it to the variable y. If A is a deterministic algorithm, we write
y ← A(x1, . . . xn) for the action of running A on the inputs x1 to xn and assigning the
result to an output y. Similarly, if A is a probabilistic algorithm, we write y
$← A(·) to
denote the output of A being assigned to the variable y. This can be read as sampling an
output y from the range of possible outputs of A according to a distribution defined by
the input arguments — that is, for a particular input x, A may produce one of a set of
outputs Sx, and we sample y
$← Sx. Equivalently, one can consider A taking an additional
input R of random coins which determine the outcomes of probabilistic choices during the
algorithm execution — in this case, we would write y ← A( · ;R) since the explicit choice
of R renders A deterministic.
For a particular cryptographic scheme we denote the message space by M, the keyspace
by K, the security parameter by ` ∈ Z? and its unary representation as 1` (that is, a
bitstring of length ` where all the bits are 1). Often the keyspace will be all bitstrings of
length ` and ` can be increased to asymptotically strengthen the cryptographic primitive.
Informally, a larger security parameter defines a larger keyspace and hence increases the
cost of performing an exhaustive search of possible keys. We let  denote the empty string
(or an empty list where relevant), ⊥6∈ M denote a distinguished failure symbol output by
an algorithm, and PPT denotes probabilistic polynomial-time.
2.1.1 Terminology for Binary Trees
A tree is a connected acyclic graph (i.e. a unique path exists between all pairs of vertices
in the graph). We may produce a directed tree by orienting each edge to flow from a
parent to a child vertex, and then consider the in-degree (resp. out-degree) of a vertex v
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as the number of edges beginning (resp. ending) at v. A binary tree is a directed, rooted
tree (i.e. a unique vertex exists with in-degree 0) where each vertex has at most 2 children
(i.e. each vertex has out-degree at most 2) such that there exists a unique path from the
root to each vertex. A leaf is a vertex with out-degree 0.
Let L = {1, . . . , n} be the set of leaves of a tree. Let X be a set of labels labelling each
vertex in the tree according to some ordering, and we can identity a vertex with its unique
label.. For a leaf i ∈ L, let Path(i) ⊂ X be the set of labels for vertices on the (unique)
path from the root to i (including i and the root).
For R ⊆ L, let Cover(R) ⊂ X be defined as follows [16]. First mark all all the vertices in
Path(i) if i ∈ R. Then Cover(R) is the set of all unmarked children of marked vertices. It
can be shown that Cover(R) is the minimal set that contains no vertex in Path(i) if i ∈ R
but contains at least one vertex in Path(i) if i /∈ R.
2.2 Verifiable Outsourced Computation
Verifiable computation (VC) may be seen as a protocol between two polynomial-time
parties, a client, C, and a server, S. A successful run of the protocol results in C being
provided with a (correct) proof of the computation of F (x) by the server for an input x
supplied by the client. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the need for such protocols is motivated
by resource constrained devices that need to perform computationally intensive tasks, and
so employ a more powerful, yet potentially untrusted, computational server. In many
settings, the client must be assured of the correctness of the computation before results
can be used in further computations to ensure accidental or malicious errors have not
been introduced. A malicious sever may wish to convince a client of incorrect results to
affect future client behaviour or, if it believes incorrect results will not be detected, the
server may try to avoid expending computational resources to perform the computation
and instead return a random result.
Some solutions to this problem rely on auditing [21,79] (that is, the client will either employ
multiple servers or recompute itself some portion of the computation) to verify correctness.
However, such solutions may be infeasible for the client (which is assumed to have limited
resources), require detailed knowledge of the server hardware [88] (which is impractical
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in many cloud environments), or require redundantly employing multiple servers (thus
increasing the cost) which are required not to collude. Other solutions [39] rely on the
computational servers holding trusted platform modules [70] or other secure computing
environments, which clearly restricts the cloud servers that may be employed and adds to
the cost of employing them. Finally, some VC solutions use interactive proofs [61, 63, 75]
or the more efficient probabilistic checkable proofs (PCPs) [11, 23] (where the verifier is
able to check a proof in only a small number of places).
Non-interactive verifiable computation was introduced by Gennaro et al. [57]. Non-interactivity
requires that there be only one round of interaction between the client and the server each
time a computation is performed, and thus rules out approaches based on repeated prob-
abilistic challenge-response protocols.
Definition 2.1. A non-interactive VC scheme to compute a single function F comprises
four algorithms as follows:
• (EKF , SKF ) $← Setup(1`, F ): takes as input the unary representation of the security
parameter and the function F to be computed, and outputs a public evaluation key
EKF which the server will use to compute F and a key SKF which is kept secret by
the client;
• (σF,x, V KF,x) $← ProbGen(x, SKF ): takes as input an input value x and the secret
key SKF and generates a public encoded input σF,x and a verification key V KF,x
which is kept secret by the client;
• θF (x) $← Compute(σF,x, EKF ): takes the encoded input σF,x and the evaluation key
for F and computes an output θF (x) encoding the result F (x);
• y ← Verify(θF (x), V KF,x, SKF ): takes the encoded output θF (x), the verification key
V KF,x and the secret key SKF as input and generates an output y which is either
F (x) if θF (x) is valid, or else a distinguished failure symbol ⊥ if the result is incorrect.
The operation of a VC scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Note that Setup is performed
once whilst the remaining algorithms may be performed many times. Setup is run by
the client and may be computationally expensive but the remaining operations should
be efficient for the client. In other words the cost of the setup phase (to the client)
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2. σF,x
3. θF (x)
4. Verify
Figure 2.2: The operation of a verifiable computation scheme
is amortised over multiple computations of F . The cost of outsourcing a computation
must, in particular, be cheaper than performing it locally. Different VC schemes are able
to evaluate different families of functions, denoted F (e.g. Boolean circuits, arithmetic
circuits etc.).
A VC scheme is correct if the client will always accept and recover the value F (x) if all
algorithms are run honestly. A more formal correctness definition follows.
Definition 2.2. A verifiable computation scheme for a family of functions F is correct
if for all functions F ∈ F , for all inputs x ∈ Dom(F ),
Pr[(EKF , SKF )
$← Setup(1`, F ),
(σF,x, V KF,x)
$← ProbGen(x, SKF ),
θF (x)
$← Compute(σF,x, EKF ),
F (x)← Verify(θF (x), V KF,x, SKF )] = 1.
A VC scheme is secure if a malicious server cannot convince a client of an incorrect result.
This is defined more formally in Section 2.8.1.
A trivial solution to verifiable computation is to redundantly outsource the same com-
putation to multiple servers and compare the results, taking the majority answer to be
correct. Most VC schemes [9,18,19,26] attempt to improve on this solution to remove the
redundancy, improve collusion resilience and to use only a single server per computation.
Gennaro et al. [57] introduced a construction based on Yao’s garbled circuits [97] which
provides a “one-time” verifiable computation scheme allowing a client to outsource the
evaluation of a function on a single input. It is, however, insecure if the circuit is reused
on a different input; thus the cost of Setup cannot be amortised. Moreover, the cost
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of generating a new garbled circuit is approximately equal to the cost of evaluating the
function itself. The authors suggest using a fully homomorphic encryption scheme [59] to
re-randomise the garbled circuit for multiple executions on different inputs, but this too
is currently impractical.
In independent and parallel work to that described in Chapter 3, Carter et al. [34] intro-
duced a more powerful third party to generate garbled circuits for such schemes. However,
they required this entity to be online throughout the computation and modelled the sys-
tem as a secure multi-party computation between the client, server and third-party. We
do not believe this solution is practical in general since trusted third parties may not
always be available to take an active part in computations. For example, VC schemes are
sometimes motivated in the context of battlefield communications where soldiers deployed
with a reasonably light-weight computing device gather data from their surroundings and
send it to regional servers for analysis [57]. In this setting, the trusted third party could
be physically located within a high security base or governmental building and soldiers
may receive relevant keys before being deployed. However, it may not be feasible, or desir-
able, for a remote soldier to contact the headquarters and maintain a communication link
with them for the duration of the computation. It seems a reasonable assumption that
in a VC system there could be many available servers but only a single (or small number
of) trusted third parties. The third party, then, could easily become a bottleneck in the
system and limit the number of computations that can take place at any one time.
Some authors have considered the multi-client case in which the input data sent to the
server is jointly formed by multiple clients, where notions such as input privacy become
more important. Choi et al. [40] extended the garbled circuit approach [57] using a proxy
oblivious-transfer primitive to achieve input privacy in a non-interactive scheme. Recent
works [60,60] allow multiple clients to provide input to a functional encryption algorithm.
Parno et al. [84] introduced another notion of VC termed multi-function verifiable com-
putation to allow servers to apply multiple functions to a single input, as opposed to the
above notions defined for a single function F . Thus, a client can encode an input once,
yet request multiple functions to be evaluated upon it. This is clearly useful if the client
data is likely to remain static and be used multiple times for different purposes.
Definition 2.3. A non-interactive, multi-function verifiable outsourced computation (MF-
VC) scheme consists of five algorithms as follows:
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• (PP,MK) $← Setup(1`): takes as input the unary representation of the security pa-
rameter, and outputs some public parameters PP and a secret key MK which are
independent of any function to be computed;
• (EKF , SKF ) $← KeyGen(F,MK,PP): takes a function F to be computed, the master
secret key MK and the public parameters PP and outputs an evaluation key EKF
and a secret verification key SKF for F ;
• (σx, V Kx) $← ProbGen(x,MK,PP): takes as input an input value x, the master
secret key and the public parameters, and generates an encoded input σx and a secret
verification key V Kx. Note that the inputs to this algorithm are independent of F ;
• θF (x) $← Compute(σx, EKF ,PP): takes an encoded input σx for input x and both
public values (the evaluation key for a function F and the public parameters), and
computes an output θF (x) encoding the result F (x);
• y ← Verify(θF (x), V Kx, SKF ): takes the encoded output θF (x), the secret, input spe-
cific verification key V Kx and the secret, function specific key SKF as input, and
generates an output y which is either F (x) if θF (x) is valid, or else a distinguished
failure symbol ⊥ if the result is incorrect.
Definition 2.4. A non-interactive, multi-function verifiable outsourced computation (MF-
VC) scheme for a family of functions F is correct if for all functions F ∈ F , for all inputs
x ∈ Dom(F ),
Pr[(PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`),
(EKF , SKF )
$← KeyGen(F,MK,PP),
(σx, V Kx)
$← ProbGen(x,MK,PP),
θF (x)
$← Compute(σx, EKF ,PP),
F (x)← Verify(θF (x), V Kx, SKF )] = 1.
Parno et al. [84] introduced publicly verifiable computation (PVC) which we will extend
in this thesis. This notion extends the prior VC notion to include multiple clients. A
single client C1 computes EKF , as well as publishing information PKF that enables any
other client to encode inputs, meaning that only one client has to run the expensive pre-
processing stage. Each time a client submits an input x to the server, it may publish
V KF,x, which enables any other client to verify that the output is correct. Thus, in PVC,
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σF,x1
θF (x1)
σF,x2
θF (x2)
PKF , V KF,x1 V KF,x2
Verify Verify
Figure 2.3: The operation of a publicly verifiable computation scheme
outsourcing and verifying computations rely only on public information, and Setup need
only be run once per function rather than once per function per client; we say that PVC
achieves public delegation and public verification.
Definition 2.5. A non-interactive publicly verifiable outsourced computation (PVC)
scheme to compute a single function F comprises four algorithms as follows:
• (EKF , PKF ) $← Setup(1`, F ): takes as input the unary representation of the security
parameter and the function F to be computed, and outputs a public evaluation key
EKF which can be used to compute F and a public key PKF which allows delegation
of computations of F ;
• (σF,x, V KF,x) $← ProbGen(x, PKF ): takes as input an input value x and the public
delegation key PKF and generates a public encoded input σx and a public verification
key V Kx;
• θF (x) $← Compute(σF,x, EKF ): takes the encoded input σF,x and the evaluation key
for F and computes an output θF (x) encoding the result F (x);
• y ← Verify(θF (x), V KF,x): takes the encoded output θF (x) and the verification key
V KF,x as input and generates an output y which is either F (x) if θF (x) is valid, or
else a distinguished failure symbol ⊥ if the result is incorrect.
The operation of a publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme is illustrated in
Figure 2.3 and can be compared to the standard version of VC illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Note that in both this definition and Definition 2.1 for ‘standard’ verifiable computation,
the Setup operation is run by the client for a single function F and can be expensive
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(approximately the cost of executing the function F itself). Given that the client is
assumed to have restricted resources (to motivate the use of VC in the first place) and
that a client is likely to be interested in computing multiple functions, this definition is
somewhat restrictive. The primary differences between the two definitions are that the
secret key SKF generated in Setup for a VC scheme is published in a PVC scheme to allow
any entity to outsource a computation of F , and that the verification key V KF,x is also
published as a result of ProbGen to allow any entity to verify a result.
A PVC scheme is correct if, as with VC schemes, a honest run of the protocol will always
return the correct value of F (x).
Definition 2.6. A publicly verifiable computation scheme for a family of functions F is
correct if for all functions F ∈ F , for all inputs x ∈ Dom(F ),
Pr[(EKF , PKF )
$← Setup(1`, F ),
(σF,x, V KF,x)
$← ProbGen(x, PKF ),
θF (x)
$← Compute(σF,x, EKF ),
F (x)← Verify(θF (x), V KF,x)] = 1.
Parno et al. motivate PVC in the setting of a scientific lab where the lead researcher
determines the complex data analysis function that should be computed whilst a team
of researchers decide the inputs for each trial and verify results. Results could also be
verified by interested third parties, e.g. patients or funding bodies.
Public verification leads to a stronger notion of security since any entity, including the com-
putational server, can perform verification. Thus, the server itself is able to tell whether
a result will be accepted or rejected by a client. In some constructions of non-publicly
verifiable VC (meeting Definition 2.1), this knowledge could lead to an attack (known
as ‘the rejection problem’) — knowledge of whether previous proofs were accepted could
reveal information about secret verification keys that would aid future forgeries [62].
Some prior work also allows public delegation [30, 61, 62] but are mostly in the random
oracle model or rely on non-standard assumptions; public verifiability does not seem to
have been considered prior to the work of Parno et al. (with the exception of a scheme
limited to set operations [82]), but has been since [53, 83]. Parno et al. mentioned that
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a VC scheme could be multi-function, publicly verifiable or both, but left it as an open
problem to find a multi-function PVC scheme.
2.3 Access Control Policies
Throughout this thesis we will make extensive use of cryptographic primitives primarily
designed to enforce access control policies. As mentioned in Chapter 1, one theme of this
thesis is to consider the use of such primitives in new settings and to protect messages
transmitted during an interactive protocol (rather than static documents in a file system).
In this section, we briefly review current access control policies that are of practical interest
which will inform both our choice of policy representation in Chapter 4 and the description
of attribute-based encryption later in this background chapter. More detailed general
introductions to access control can be found in [28,87].
Let U be a set of users or entities within a system, O be a set of objects or resources
that should be protected from unauthorised access, and A be a set of actions that may be
performed by a user on an object. An access control request is a tuple of the form (u, o, a)
representing the user u ∈ U requesting to perform action a ∈ A on the object o ∈ O.
An access control policy dictates whether such a request should be considered authorised
or unauthorised. A request is generally made to some form of policy enforcement point
(PEP) that employs an access control mechanism to respond to requests. When the access
control mechanism is some form of cryptographic primitive, it is usual to restrict A to be
the read action, and then objects can be identified with performing the read action on
the object, and requests become a pair (u, o).
Early access control policies were formulated directly on the members of the sets U and
O. For example, access control lists [28, 87] are defined over objects in O and define for
each o ∈ O, a set of authorised users Uo ⊆ U . Any user u within this authorised set may
read o — that is, a request (u, o) is deemed authorised if and only if u ∈ Uo. Similarly,
capability lists [28, 87] are defined over users in U . For each user u ∈ U , a capability list
Ou is defined as a set of objects that u may read — Ou ⊆ O. A request (u, o) is authorised
if and only if o ∈ Ou.
More recent forms of access control policies have attempted to be more flexible and fine-
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grained by introducing levels of indirection between users and objects in the form of
attributes. The set of attributes is called the attribute universe, U .
2.3.1 Information Flow Policies
One example of such attribute-based policies are information flow policies [28] where the
set of attributes is an ordered set of security labels, one of which is associated to every
user and object. Let λ : U ∪ O → U , where U is the set of labels, be a labelling function
assigning attributes to users and objects. The access control policy then states that a
request (u, o) is authorised if and only if λ(u) > λ(o) according to the ordering relation
on labels.
Example 2.1. An example information flow policy is the Bell-LaPadula model [22] for
multi-level security policies. Consider a totally ordered set (chain) of security labels
{Unclassified < Classified < Secret < Top Secret}. A user with label Secret
is permitted to access (read) all objects associated with the labels Secret, Classified and
Unclassified, but not any objects labelled as Top Secret.
2.3.2 Role-based Access Control Policies
Another example of policies being defined over attributes is role-based access control
(RBAC) policies where the set of attributes is now a set of roles, U . Users are per-
mitted to act in certain roles, and objects may be acted upon only by specified roles. In
core RBAC (or RBAC0) [6, 86], an access control policy is defined by a user-role assign-
ment relation, UA ⊆ U × U , and an object-role assignment relation, OA ⊆ O × U . Note
that RBAC policies generally define UA and PA, where PA ⊆ P ×U is a permission-role
assignment relation, and a permission is defined to be an object-action pair. Since we
consider only read actions, we can associate permissions with objects and define OA as
above. A request (u, o) is authorised if and only if there exists a role r ∈ U such that
(u, r) ∈ UA and (o, r) ∈ OA.
Equivalently, define a labelling function λ : U ∪ O → 2U . For users u ∈ U and objects
o ∈ O, let λ(u) = {r1, . . . , rn} ∈ 2U and λ(o) = {r′1, . . . , r′m} ∈ 2U . Then a request (u, o)
is authorised if and only if there exists a role r ∈ U such that r ∈ λ(u) and r ∈ λ(o) i.e.
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λ(u) ∩ λ(o) 6= ∅.1 Further, as with information flow policies, we may define a (partial)
order relation over U , resulting in hierarchical RBAC (or RBAC1) [6,86]. A request (u, o)
is authorised if and only if there exists roles r, r′ ∈ U such that (u, r) ∈ UA, r > r′, and
(o, r′) ∈ OA.
Definition 2.7. Let (L,6) be a poset and X ⊆ L. The downset of X is ↓ X = {l ∈
L : ∃x ∈ X such that l 6 x}. Similarly, the upset of X is ↑ X = {l ∈ L : ∃x ∈
X such that x 6 l}. For singleton sets, we denote ↓{x} as ↓x and ↑{x} as ↑x.
Given these definitions, one can again write λ : U ∪ O → 2U where (2U ,6) is a partial
order, and say that a request (u, o) is authorised if and only if ↓λ(u) ∩ ↑λ(o) 6= ∅.
2.3.3 Attribute-based Access Control Policies
A more general formulation of access control policies defined in terms of attributes is known
as attribute-based access control (ABAC) [68], as used in the XACML 3.0 access control
markup language [95] for example. This is motivated by the observation that in many large
distributed systems, the user and object populations cannot feasibly be described explicitly
in terms of individual identifiers (as in access control lists for example). Generally, ABAC
schemes associate either the user population or the object population with policies and
the other with attribute sets. When policies are associated with objects, we refer to them
as object-centric and when policies are associated to users we term them user-centric. The
attributes sets are also generally unordered (in contrast to information flow policies for
example), and policies are usually satisfied based on subset inclusion — as we shall describe
below, a policy can take the form of an access structure which comprises a collection of
satisfying attribute sets; a set of attributes should be a subset of the access structure in
order for access to be granted. As such, we usually consider only monotonic policies in
this setting, where any superset of an authorised set of attributes is also authorised —
granting additional attributes does not revoke access.
Example 2.2. Consider a university system with attribute universe U ={Professor,
Admin, Student, Mathematics, Computer Science, Information Security}. The re-
source space, O, is all publications, lecture notes and assignments, while the user space, U ,
is all students and staff. Both of these spaces could be too large, or change too frequently,
1Notice that users and objects can be assigned to multiple roles.
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to formulate policies over individual identities. Thus, policies are defined as Boolean
formulas over U , e.g. the policy Admin ∧ (Mathematics ∨ Computer Science) defines
authorised users to be administrative staff in the Mathematics or Computer Science groups.
A policy can be represented in many forms (e.g. access trees, monotone span programs
or Boolean formulae). In this thesis, we will primarily consider policies represented as
monotone Boolean formulae F : 2U → {0, 1}, which is a very natural way to describe
authorised sets of users in terms of logical AND and OR gates.
Any policy (represented as a Boolean formula F defined over a subset of an attribute
universe U) can be written as a set of satisfying sets — that is, the satisfying sets A = {Si}
where Si ⊆ U for all i where F (Si) = 1 (i.e. the policy is satisfied by inputs Si) for all
Si ∈ A, and F (Sj) = 0 for all Sj /∈ A. This says that the formula F is satisfied by the
inputs S1 or S2 or . . . or S|A| i.e. it has been written in disjunctive normal form. A non-
empty collection of satisfying sets, A ⊆ 2U \{∅}, is called an access structure [20, Definition
3.5]. Note that, equivalently, A can be said to be an element of the set 22U \ {∅}.
A is monotone if S′ ∈ A whenever S ∈ A and S ⊆ S′ i.e. all supersets of satisfying sets are
also satisfying. Equivalently, one may say that a monotone access structure is an order
filter in (2U \ {∅},⊆) [49, Definition 1.27]. If U is finite then an access structure can be
uniquely defined by the set of minimal elements (those Si that are not supersets of any
other Sj ∈ A). These minimal elements may be viewed as an antichain in (2U \ {∅},⊆).
Example 2.3. In Example 2.2, the minimal elements of the access structure are
A = {{Admin, Mathematics}, {Admin, ComputerScience}}.
We may associate each user with a set of descriptive attributes. Each object (or resource
to be protected) may be associated with a policy, effectively specifying the attribute sets
(and hence the users assigned such attribute sets) that should be considered authorised
to access the object. In other words, for such “object-centric” policies, we can define a
labelling function λ : U ∪O → 22U \{∅}. Then, each user u is assigned a label λ(u) = {A}
for some attribute set A ⊆ U \{∅}. Each object o is assigned a policy, or access structure,
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λ(o) = A = {S1, . . . , Sn} ⊆ 22U \ {∅}. An access control request (u, o) is authorised if and
only if λ(u) ∈ λ(o) (if A is the full access structure) or if and only if A ∩ Si = Si for some
1 6 i 6 n (if A is represented by its minimal elements).
Similarly, we can define “user-centric” policies wherein objects are associated with a de-
scriptive attribute set (describing their contents and classification levels) and users are
associated with policies (describing which sets of attributes, and therefore associated ob-
jects, they should be allowed to access). Such policies can be formulated in terms of a
labelling function as above with the roles of the user and object reversed.
2.3.4 General Representation of Access Control Policies.
We have seen that, by using an appropriate labelling function, RBAC policies can be
written in the same format as information flow policies — that is, access is granted if
and only if λ(u) ∩ λ(o) 6= ∅. It is trivial to see that access control lists and capability
lists fit this format. Crampton [44] has also shown that by redefining the poset order
relation appropriately, ABAC policies can also be written in this form. Thus, assuming an
appropriate order relation and labelling function, we have a simple way to describe many
forms of flexible access control policy in terms of information flow policies. Additionally,
efficient, symmetric cryptographic enforcement mechanisms for information flow policies
exist in the form of key assignment schemes, which we introduce in Section 2.4. For this
reason, when discussing access control policies in the setting of PVC in Chapter 4, we
focus our attention on information flow policies only.
2.4 Key Assignment Schemes
Let (L,6, U,O, λ) denote an information flow policy (see Section 2.3) on a set of users U
and a set of objects O with a labelling function λ assigning labels from the poset (L,6).
The policy can be represented by the Hasse diagram H(L,6). Henceforth we may refer to
such policies as graph-based access control policies. The policy requires that information
flow from objects to users preserves the partial ordering relation; a user u ∈ U may read an
object o ∈ O if and only if λ(u) > λ(o). Equivalently, there must exist a directed path from
λ(u) to λ(o) in the Hasse diagram. Note that this statement is the simple security property
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of the Bell-LaPadula security model [22]. The enforcement of a graph-based access control
policy prevents an entity assigned clearance label x from accessing objects classified with
label y if x 6> y. Posets of the form shown in Figure 2.1 have been used extensively as
the basis for graph-based access control policies, notably in the Bell-LaPadula model [22]
(Figure 2.1a) and in temporal access control [45] (Figure 2.1c).
A key assignment scheme provides a generic, cryptographic enforcement mechanism for
graph-based access control policies in which a unique cryptographic key is associated
to each node (representing a security label) in the graph H(L,6). Akl and Taylor [1]
introduced the idea of a KAS to manage the problem of key distribution by allowing
a trusted setup authority to distribute a single cryptographic key, κ(x), to each entity
assigned label x ∈ L. The entity may then combine knowledge of this secret key with
some publicly available information to derive all additional keys κ(y) that he is authorised
to hold. Henceforth, we write κx to represent the cryptographic key κ(x).
Definition 2.8. A key assignment scheme (KAS) for an information flow policy over the
poset (L,6) is defined by the following four algorithms [46]:
• κL $← MakeKeys(1`, (L,6)) : takes the security parameter and the label poset as input
and returns a labelled set of cryptographic keys {κx : x ∈ L}, denoted κL;
• ωL $← MakeSecrets(1`, (L,6)) : takes as input the unary representation of the security
parameter and the label poset and returns a labelled set of secret values {ωx : x ∈ L},
denoted ωL;
• Pub(L,6) $← MakePublicData(1`, (L,6)) : takes the security parameter and the label
poset as input and returns a set of data Pub(L,6) that is published by the trusted
setup authority to aid key derivation;
• K ← GetKey(x, y, ωx, Pub(L,6)): takes as input x, y ∈ L, the secret information ωx
for x, and the public information, Pub(L,6). The algorithm returns a value K which
is either κy if y 6 x, or a distinguished failure symbol ⊥ otherwise.
Definition 2.9. A key assignment scheme is correct if for all posets (L,6), for all x ∈ L
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and for all y 6 x,
Pr[κL
$← MakeKeys(1`, (L,6)),
ωL
$← MakeSecrets(1`, (L,6)),
Pub(L,6)
$← MakePublicData(1`, (L,6)),
κy ← GetKey(x, y, ωx, Pub(L,6))] = 1.
A well-known KAS construction, known as iterative key encrypting (IKE) KAS [46], pub-
lishes encrypted keys. In particular, for each directed edge (x, y) in the Hasse diagram,
Enc(κy, κx) (i.e. the encryption of κy under κx) is published. Then for any x > y, there
is a (directed) path in the Hasse diagram from x to y and the key associated with each
node on that path can be derived (in an iterative fashion) by an entity that knows κx.
Specific choices of the poset of security labels give rise to the information flow policies made
famous in the Bell-LaPadula model [22] and temporal access control policies, wherein an
entity is permitted to derive cryptographic keys referring to specific intervals. A survey of
existing generic schemes is given in [46] whilst further details of temporal access control
and more general interval-based schemes can be found in [45] and [13]. Notions of security
for KASs are discussed in Section 2.8.
2.5 Encryption Schemes
Encryption is a technique primarily for preserving the confidentiality of messages ex-
changed between a sender and receiver (or writer and reader respectively). As such, it is
often a key component of cryptographic enforcement mechanisms for access control poli-
cies to prevent unauthorised entities from reading the contents of protected objects. In
this section, we review several forms of encryption that we will make use of, or build from,
later in the thesis.
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2.5.1 Symmetric Encryption Schemes
Symmetric encryption [69] relies on a secret key k held by both the sender and recipient
(or writer and reader) of a ciphertext.
Definition 2.10. A symmetric encryption scheme comprises three algorithms:
• k $← KeyGen(1`): takes the security parameter as input and randomly selects a sym-
metric key k from K;
• CT $← Encrypt(m, k): takes the symmetric key k and a message m from M as input
and outputs a ciphertext CT ;
• m ← Decrypt(CT, k): takes the ciphertext CT and the symmetric key k as input
and returns the message m encrypted in CT . Note that the decryption algorithm is
deterministic.
Correctness of a symmetric encryption scheme requires that for all security parameters
and all messages, decryption of an honestly ciphertext using an honestly generated key
will return the correct message. More formally,
Definition 2.11. A symmetric encryption scheme is correct if for all security parameters
` and all m ∈M,
Pr[k
$← KeyGen(1`),
CT
$← Encrypt(m, k),
m← Decrypt(CT, k)] = 1.
A symmetric authenticated encryption scheme is syntactically almost identical to Defini-
tion 2.10, but considers integrity as well as privacy of messages. That is, it is possible to
detect if a ciphertext has been modified since encryption (e.g. by a malicious eavesdrop-
per or through a faulty/noisy transmission medium). Authenticated encryption therefore
assures the integrity of received messages, and also provides data origin authentication
(i.e. assurance that a particular entity generated the ciphertext) since it should not be
possible for anyone other than the alleged encryptor to create a valid ciphertext, else an
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adversary could similarly create modified ciphertexts. The only change to Definition 2.10
is that Decrypt returns an element PT which is either the correct plaintext message m or
a distinguished symbol ⊥ if the ciphertext is deemed ‘inauthentic’.
2.5.2 Asymmetric Encryption Schemes
Asymmetric, or public key, encryption (PKE) [71] removes the requirement (from symmet-
ric encryption) for both the encryptor and decryptor to share the same key. Instead, each
entity A is associated with two keys: a public key used by an encryptor to send a message
to A; and a private key used by A to decrypt messages encrypted using A’s public key.
Thus, the sender is not required to know the decryption key. Additionally, the public key
may be transmitted or published in the clear so there is no requirement for confidential
channels before transmitting a message (although, distribution channels for the public key
must still be authenticated).
Aside from easing key distribution, PKE also leads to increased functionality as it is pos-
sible to write objects (encrypt) without being authorised to read (decrypt) such objects.
It also allows a recipient to receive messages from multiple senders whilst keeping only
a single secret decryption key. However, in general, public key cryptosystems are signif-
icantly slower than symmetric key schemes and, as a result, hybrid encryption is widely
adopted. In hybrid encryption, an object is (efficiently) encrypted using a symmetric en-
cryption scheme (this is termed the data encapsulation mechanism) and the symmetric
key used for object encryption is itself encrypted using a public key scheme (termed a key
encapsulation mechanism). Thus, the slower public key scheme is only used to encrypt a
reasonably short symmetric key, whilst the more efficient symmetric key scheme is used
to encrypt the larger object.
Public key schemes are defined in a very similar way to symmetric schemes, but the key
generation algorithm outputs two keys: a public key and a private key. Correctness is
defined analogously and must hold with all but negligible probability.
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2.6 Attribute-based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a public key primitive that allows the decryption
of a ciphertext if and only if the encrypted data and decrypting entity satisfy certain
properties defined in terms of attribute sets. As such, it is well-suited to the cryptographic
enforcement of attribute-based access control policies (see Section 2.3.3). We define a
universe U of “attributes” which are labels that may describe data or entities. We then
form a set of attributes A ∈ 2U and a policy or access structure A ∈ 22U \{{∅}}. Decryption
succeeds if and only if {A} ∈ A. Recall the example access structure in Examples 2.2
and 2.3.
There exist several variants of ABE that vary in the association of attribute sets and
access structures to ciphertexts and decryption keys. In key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [66],
a policy is associated with the decryption key and a set of attributes is associated with each
ciphertext. Conversely, in ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [27], a policy is associated to
a ciphertext and decryption keys are associated with sets of attributes. Finally, in dual-
policy ABE (DP-ABE) [15], both ciphertexts and decryption keys are associated with both
a policy and an attribute set, and the key attributes must satisfy the ciphertext policy
and vice versa.
2.6.1 Key-policy Attribute-based Encryption
In KP-ABE [66], each private key is associated with a family of satisfying attribute sets
A = {A1, . . . , An}, while each ciphertext is computed using a single, system-wide public
key and associated with a single subset of attributes A. Decryption succeeds if the access
structure A associated with the private key includes the attribute set under which the
message was encrypted: that is Ai = A for some i ∈ [n]. Since the access structure
describes objects that the key may be used to access, such policies are referred to as
objective. In most schemes, the access structures considered are monotonic, meaning
A′ ∈ A whenever there exists A ⊂ A′ such that A ∈ A. A notable non-monotonic scheme
was given by Ostrovsky et al. [80].
Definition 2.12. A key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme comprises the following
algorithms:
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• (PP,MK) $← ABE.Setup(1`,U): takes the unary representation of the security pa-
rameter ` and the attribute universe U as input and outputs public parameters PP
and a master key MK;
• CT $← ABE.Encrypt(m,A,PP): takes as input a message m, a set of attributes A
and the public parameters PP, and outputs a ciphertext CT ;
• SKA $← ABE.KeyGen(A,MK,PP): takes as input an access structure A, the master
key MK and the public parameters PP, and outputs a private decryption key SKA
for this access structure;
• PT ← ABE.Decrypt(CT, SKA,PP): takes as input a ciphertext CT of a message m
associated with a set of attributes A, a decryption key SKA and the public parameters.
It outputs a plaintext PT which is either the message m encrypted in CT , if A ∈ A
(i.e. if A is a satisfying set of A), or a distinguished failure symbol, ⊥, otherwise
(i.e. ⊥ is returned if the policy is unsatisfied).
We do not give the correctness or security properties in this background section as we
will be interested in using a revocable extension of KP-ABE, which we introduce in Sec-
tion 3.2.2. The reader is referred to the cited prior literature for more details.
2.6.2 Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based Encryption
In CP-ABE [27], attributes are used to describe users and each ciphertext is associated
with an access structure. In this regard, CP-ABE may be more closely related than KP-
ABE to traditional access control policies such as access control lists and RBAC that
describe authorised entities for each protected object. The policies in CP-ABE are said
to be subjective.
Definition 2.13. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme comprises four
algorithms as follows:
• (PP,MK) $← Setup(1`,U): takes the security parameter and the attribute universe U
as input and generates public parameters PP and a master secret key MK;
• CT $← Encrypt(m,A,PP): takes a plaintext m, an access structure A and the public
parameters and outputs a ciphertext CT ;
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• SKA $← KeyGen(A,MK,PP): takes as input an attribute set A, the master secret
key and the public parameters, and outputs a secret decryption key SKA for this
attribute set;
• PT ← Decrypt(CT, SKA,PP): takes a ciphertext for an access structure A, a secret
key for an attribute set A and the public parameters as input, and outputs a plaintext
PT which is m if and only if the attribute set A satisfies the access structure A (that
is, A ∈ A), and the distinguished failure symbol ⊥ otherwise.
Definition 2.14. A CP-ABE scheme is correct if for all messages m ∈M, access struc-
tures A ⊆ 2U \ {∅} and attribute sets A ⊆ U where A ∈ A,
Pr[(PP,MK)
$← ABE.Setup(1`),
SKA
$← ABE.KeyGen(A,A,MK,PP),
CT
$← ABE.Encrypt(m,A,PP),
m← ABE.Decrypt(CT, SKA,PP)]
= 1− negl(`).
2.6.3 Dual-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Recall that KP-ABE enforces objective policies whilst CP-ABE enforces subjective poli-
cies. Dual-policy attribute-based encryption (DP-ABE), introduced by Attrapadung and
Imai [16], combines these approaches such that both the ciphertext and the decryption
key comprise an attribute set and an access policy. Thus, the ciphertext is associated with
both a subjective access policy (as per CP-ABE) detailing which entities may decrypt it
and an objective attribute set describing the data. Decryption keys comprise an objective
access policy (as per KP-ABE) and a subjective attribute set. Decryption succeeds if and
only if both attribute sets satisfy their corresponding access policies.
Definition 2.15. A dual-policy attribute-based encryption scheme comprises four algo-
rithms as follows:
• (PP,MK) $← Setup(1`,U): takes the security parameter and attribute universe as
input and generates public parameters PP for the system, and a master secret key
MK which is kept by the executor of this algorithm;
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• CTω,S $← Encrypt(m, (ω,S),PP): takes a message m to be encrypted, an objective
attribute set ω, a subjective access policy S and the public parameters PP, as input.
The algorithm outputs a ciphertext CTω,S;
• SKO,ψ $← KeyGen((O, ψ),MK,PP): takes as input an objective access policy O and
a subjective attribute set ψ, as well as the master secret key MK and the public
parameters PP. The algorithm outputs a secret decryption key SKO,ψ;
• PT ← Decrypt(CTω,S, SKO,ψ,PP): takes as input a ciphertext CTω,S and a secret
key SKO,ψ as well as the public parameters PP. The algorithm outputs a plaintext
PT which is the correct plaintext m if and only if the set of objective attributes
ω satisfies the objective access structure O and the set of subjective attributes ψ
satisfies the subjective policy S — that is, ω ∈ O and ψ ∈ S. If not, PT is defined
to be a distinguished failure symbol ⊥. We assume throughout that the policies and
attributes are implicit from the relevant keys and ciphertexts (otherwise these can
also be given as arguments to this function).
Definition 2.16. A DP-ABE scheme is correct if for all messages m ∈M, for all access
structures O, S ⊆ 2U \ {∅}, and for all attribute sets ω, ψ ⊆ U where ω ∈ O and ψ ∈ S,
Pr[(PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,U),
SKO,ψ
$← KeyGen((O, ψ),MK,PP),
CTω,S
$← Encrypt(m, (ω,S),PP),
m← Decrypt(CTω,S, SKO,ψ,PP)]
= 1− negl(`).
2.6.4 Instantiating Attribute-based Encryption Schemes
Many ABE schemes choose a secret value uniformly at random during the encryption
or key generation algorithms and use a linear secret sharing scheme to split this secret
over a set of attributes or clauses in a policy. They then use Lagrange interpolation to
reconstruct the secret if and only if a satisfying set of attributes are provided to the
decryption algorithm. Additionally, many schemes are built using bilinear pairings which
give rise to hardness assumptions based on the Diffie-Hellman problem in bilinear groups.
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In Appendix B.1 we shall construct a new revocable DP-ABE primitive. In this section,
we introduce some additional preliminary notions that we shall require to do so. We first
provide more details regarding secret sharing schemes and Lagrange interpolation, as well
as bilinear maps and the associated hardness problems we shall use to prove security of
our primitive. We end by discussing some terminology for binary trees which we shall
use to determine the appropriate update material to issue such that revoked user keys are
rendered useless.
2.6.4.1 Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
Secret sharing is a fundamental cryptographic tool that enables a secret value s to be
divided amongst a set of entities in such a way that all authorised sets of entities may
combine their individual shares to reconstruct the value of s, for example, any k out of the
n entities may form an authorised set. Any set of entities that does not form an authorised
set learns nothing more than their respective shares, and cannot reconstruct s. A secret
sharing scheme is linear if the reconstruction operation is a linear function of the shares;
almost all known secret sharing schemes are linear [20].
Recall from Section 2.3.3, the definition of an access structure as a collection of satisfying
sets of a Boolean formula. Equivalently, an access structure can be generically defined as
follows [20].
Definition 2.17. Let P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} be a set of parties (or attributes). A collection
A ⊆ 2P is monotone if for all B,C, if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. An access
structure (resp., monotonic access structure) is a collection (resp., monotone collection)
A ⊆ 2P \ {∅}. The sets in A are called the authorised sets and the sets not in A are called
the unauthorised sets.
A linear secret sharing scheme can then be defined as follows [92].
Definition 2.18. Let P be a set of parties. Let M be a matrix of size l × k. Let
pi : {1, . . . , l} → P be a function that maps a row to a party for labelling. A secret
sharing scheme Π for a monotone access structure A over a set of parties P is a lin-
ear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) in Zp, and is represented by (M,pi), if it consists of two
polynomial-time algorithms:
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• Mv $← Share(s, (M,pi)): takes as input s ∈ Zp to be shared and the LSSS (M,pi). It
randomly chooses y2, . . . , yk ∈ Zp and sets v = (s, y2, . . . , yk). It outputs Mv as a
vector of l shares. The share λpi(i) := Mi · v belongs to party pi(i), where we denote
the ith row in M by Mi;
• {(i, µi)}i∈I ← ReconS, {λpi(i)}pi(i)∈S , (M,pi): takes as input an authorised set S ∈ A,
the set of shares for this set, and the LSSS (M,pi). Let I = {i : pi(i) ∈ S}. It outputs
reconstruction constants {(i, µi)}i∈I such that the secret can be linearly reconstructed
as s =
∑
i∈I µi · λpi(i). The set {µi}i∈I can be found in polynomial time in the size
of M [20, 92].
In Appendix B.1,we will require the following fact [92]:
Proposition 2.1. Let (M,ρ) be an LSSS for an access structure A over a set of parties P,
where M is a matrix of size l× k. For any authorised set S, the target vector (1, 0, . . . , 0)
is in the span of I = {i : pi(i) ∈ S}. For all unauthorised set S /∈ A, the target vector is
not in the span of I, and there exists a polynomial time algorithm that outputs a vector
w = (w1, . . . , wk) ∈ Zkp such that w1 = −1 and for all i ∈ I it holds that w · Mi = 0.
In Appendix B.1, we will make use of a particular reconstruction algorithm for LSSSs
known as Lagrange interpolation. This formed the basis for Shamir’s well-known secret
sharing scheme [89] for threshold policies (requiring k out of n shares to reconstruct the
secret). The reconstruction procedure can be defined as follows [14].
Definition 2.19. For i ∈ Z and S ⊆ Z, the Lagrange basis polynomial is defined as
∆i,S(z) =
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
z − j
i− j
.
Let f(z) ∈ Z[z] be a d-th degree polynomial. If |S| = d+ 1 then, from a set of d+ 1 points
{(i, f(i))}i∈S , one can reconstruct f(z) as
f(z) =
∑
i∈S
f(i) ·∆i,S(z).
In Appendix B.1, we will use Lagrange interpolation for a first degree polynomial. In
particular, if f(z) is a first degree polynomial, one can obtain f(0) from two any points
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(i1, f(i1)), (i2, f(i2)) where i1 6= i2 by computing
f(0) = f(i1)
i2
i2 − i1 + f(i2)
i1
i1 − i2 .
2.6.4.2 Bilinear Maps and Hardness Assumptions
Most ABE schemes are built over groups with efficiently computable bilinear maps. These
allow various parameters to be combined together in a secure fashion. In this section,
we define bilinear maps and groups [14] , as well as a cryptographic hardness assump-
tion [15, 33] upon which we shall base the security on our revocable DP-ABE scheme in
Appendix B.1.
Definition 2.20. Let G and GT be multiplicative groups of prime order p, and let g be a
generator of G. A bilinear map (of type 1 [56]) is a map e : G×G→ GT such that:
1. e is bilinear: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab
2. e is non-degenerate: e(g, g) 6= 1
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group action in G can be computed efficiently and
there exists GT for which the bilinear map e : G×G→ GT is efficiently computable.
Definition 2.21. Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p. The Decisional q-Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman Exponent problem (q-BDHE) in G is stated as follows. Given a vector
(
g, h, ga, g(a
2), . . . , g(a
q), g(a
q+2), . . . , g(a
2q), Z
)
∈ G2q+1 ×GT
as input, determine whether Z = e(g, h)a
q+1
. For ease of notation, we write gi to denote
ga
i ∈ G. Let yg,a,q = (g1, . . . , gq, Gq+2, g2q). An algorithm A that outputs b ∈ {0, 1} has
advantage  in solving the Decisional q-BDHE problem in G if
|Pr[0 $← A (g, h,yg,a,q, e(gq+1, h))]− Pr[0 $← A(g, h,yg,a,q, Z)]| ≥ ,
where the probability is over the random choice of generators g, h ∈ G, the random choice
of a ∈ Zp, the random choice of Z ∈ GT , and the randomness of A. We refer to the
distribution on the left as PBDHE and the one on the right hand side as RBDHE. We say
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that the Decision q-BDHE assumption holds in G if no polynomial-time algorithm has a
non-negligible advantage in solving the problem.
2.7 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures provide a proof of message integrity, as well as data origin authentication
(since keys can be associated to particular users). A message is signed using a private
signing key owned by a particular entity, and a public verification key can be used to
verify that the signature was actually generated using the corresponding signing key and
that the contents of the message have not changed since the signature was computed.
A digital signature scheme Sig comprises three polynomial-time algorithms Sig.KeyGen,
Sig.Sign and Sig.Verify defined as follows [74]:
• (SK, V K) $← Sig.KeyGen(1`): takes as input the security parameter and generates a
signing key SK and a verification key V K;
• γ $← Sig.Sign(m,SK): takes as input a message to be signed and the signing key,
and outputs a signature γ of m;
• D ← Sig.Verify(m, γ, V K): takes as input a message and corresponding signature to
be verified as well as the verification key, and outputs a decision D which is accept
if γ is a valid signature on m and reject otherwise.
Definition 2.22. A digital signature scheme is correct if for all security parameters `
and all m ∈M,
Pr[(SK, V K)
$← Sig.KeyGen(1`),
γ
$← Sig.Sign(m,SK),
accept← Sig.Verify(m, γ, V K)] = 1.
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2.8 Notions of Security
Thus far in this chapter, we have defined several cryptographic primitives and associated
notions of correctness that will be required throughout the remainder of this thesis. As
well as being correct, a cryptographic primitive must be secure. In this section, we define
notions of security for a number of the previously discussed primitives (some primitives,
such as KP-ABE are not discussed here as we will define and use variants of these in later
chapters instead).
We will define notions of security for each cryptographic scheme as a game (or algorithm)
written in pseudo-code. The game is run by a entity known as the challenger, C. The
execution of the game is designed to reflect realistic system evolution and threats. Each
game takes as input the particular construction being proved secure and the unary repre-
sentation of the security parameter.
An adversary against a particular scheme is modelled as a PPT algorithm A which is
called at relevant points by C. The inputs to the adversary are chosen to represent the
knowledge a real attacker may learn by observing the execution of the system and by
corrupting relevant parties. The adversary algorithm may be multi-stage (i.e. be called
several times by the challenger, with different input parameters) and may maintain state
between invocations. This represents the adversary performing tasks at different points
during the execution of the system. For simplicity and generality, we do not explicitly
provide the state as an input or output of the adversary or distinguish between single-stage
and multi-stage adversaries; we also refer to both simply as A, noting that a multistage
adversary could be thought of as a single adversary A = {A1, . . . ,An} comprising sub-
algorithms for each stage.
The challenger may provide oracle access to an adversary for a specified set of functions.
This allows the adversary to query C for the results of these functions run over inputs
chosen by the adversary as well as secret values only known to C. Thus, the adversary
is able to learn the outcome of some functions without holding the secret values needed
to run them itself. This models the adversary monitoring the system to observe various
messages and activity, as well as corrupting entities to learn their local secrets (e.g. in the
case of querying a user key generation algorithm) or to cause particular events to occur.
Providing the adversary with oracle access to a function F on inputs x1, . . . , xn held by the
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challenger is denoted AOF(·,...,·,x1,...,xn); we use the notation · to denote parameters where
the adversary has free choice of input value. Sometimes, when providing oracle access to
multiple functions, we will use the notation AO and describe the specific functions in the
accompanying text.
Many oracles simply run the relevant algorithm and return the result to the adversary. If
the challenger is required to perform additional steps (e.g. to perform ‘housekeeping’ on
its state to reflect changes arising from the query or to check whether the result of a query
would lead to a trivial win for A) then the oracle is given as an additional pseudo-code
algorithm alongside the relevant games. No oracle query should allow the adversary to gain
information that it would not usually be able to observe in practice or that would lead to a
trivial win (e.g. an oracle should not issue the decryption key for a challenge ciphertext as
the adversary would be able to win the game, even though this does not model a realistic
attack as the adversary would not be an authorised decryptor in practice).
Each game ends with the challenger outputting either 1 or 0 based on the output of the
adversary algorithm; the output 1 (synonymous with true) denotes that the adversary
output was ‘correct’. In some games, we may write return (b′ = b) to denote the output
of the game; this denotes an equality comparison between the variables b′ and b, and the
game will return true if and only if these variables are identical.
Formally, we write ExpXA[Y, 1`, args] to refer to a game for a security notion X, inter-
acting with an adversary A, against a construction Y when run with security parameter
` and additional arguments args. We denote the advantage of such an adversary A as
AdvXA(Y, 1`, args′). For each game, we define the advantage of A in terms of the probabil-
ity that the security game results in true (i.e. the adversary was correct) which we denote
Pr
[
1
$← ExpXA[Y, 1`, args]
]
. Informally, the advantage is defined to be the difference be-
tween the adversary’s success probability and the probability of success one would expect
to achieve by making a simple guess. We usually define a scheme to be secure if all PPT
adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in terms of the security parameter.
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Game 2.1 ExpVerifA
[VC, 1`, F ]
1: (EKF , SKF )
$← Setup(1`, F )
2: x
$← AOProbGen(·,SKF )(EKF )
3: (σF,x, V KF,x)
$← ProbGen(x, SKF )
4: θF (x)
$← AOProbGen(·,SKF )(σF,x, EKF )
5: y ← Verify(θF (x), V KF,x, SKF )
6: if ((y 6=⊥) and (y 6= F (x))) then return 1
7: else return 0
Oracle 2.1 OProbGen(z, SKF )
1: (σF,z, V KF,z)
$← ProbGen(z, SKF )
2: return σF,z
2.8.1 Verifiable Outsourced Computation
As mentioned in Section 2.2, security notions for VC schemes have focussed on verifiability
— that is, ensuring that a server cannot return an incorrect computational result and have
it accepted by a client. This is shown for the VC setting in Game 2.1 and Oracle 2.1 for
a function F in the family of admissible functions F , where the ProbGen oracle simply
runs the ProbGen algorithm and returns the σF,x part of the result. The adversary is
given the public parameters from the Setup algorithm and access to the ProbGen oracle
(to simulate the adversary observing client behaviour in a real system). The adversary
chooses an input x and the challenger honestly produces an encoded input and verification
key, both of which are given to the adversary. We require the challenger to perform this
step to ensure that it knows the correct verification key corresponding to the computation.
The adversary wins if it can produce an encoded output which is accepted by the Verify
algorithm but does not in fact encode the value F (x).
Definition 2.23. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the Verif game for a VC
construction VC and a function F is defined as:
AdvVerifA (VC, 1`, F ) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpVerifA
[VC, 1`, F ]].
A VC scheme, VC, is verifiable for a function F if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvVerifA (VC, 1`, F ) 6 negl(`).
Gennaro et al. [57] also consider notions of input and output privacy such that an adversary
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Game 2.2 ExpPubVerifA
[PVC, 1`, F ]
1: (EKF , PKF )
$← Setup(1`, F )
2: x
$← A(EKF , PKF )
3: (σF,x, V KF,x)
$← ProbGen(x, PKF )
4: θF (x)
$← A(EKF , PKF , σF,x, V KF,x)
5: y ← Verify(θF (x), V KF,x)
6: if ((y 6=⊥) and (y 6= F (x))) then return 1
7: else return 0
cannot distinguish from σF,x which input value x was encoded, and that θF (x) does not
reveal the value F (x).
Verifiability in the PVC setting is defined similarly in Game 2.2. Compared to Game 2.1,
this game does not require a ProbGen oracle as the outsourcing of computations is based
purely on public information and hence can be run by the adversary itself. Again, the ad-
versary wins if it can produce an encoded output which is accepted by the Verify algorithm
but is not in fact a valid encoding of F (x).
Definition 2.24. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the PubVerif game for a
PVC construction PVC and a function F is defined as:
AdvPubVerifA (PVC, 1`, F ) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpPubVerifA
[PVC, 1`, F ]].
A PVC scheme, PVC, is publicly verifiable for F if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvPubVerifA (PVC, 1`, F ) 6 negl(`).
2.8.2 Key Assignment Schemes
Atallah et al. [12] proposed two fundamental security properties for KASs — key recovery
(KR) and key indistinguishability (KI). Key recovery is the weaker of the two notions and
requires that the derivation of κv? from a set of keys κv1 , . . . , κvn should be possible if and
only if there exists i such that vi > v?. This property asserts that a set of users cannot
recover a key that no one of them is not already authorised to derive. An interactive key
encrypting KAS is known to be secure against key recovery provided that the encryption
function is chosen appropriately [12].
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Game 2.3 ExpKIA
[KAS, 1`, (L,6)]
1: κL
$← MakeKeys(1`, (L,6))
2: ωL
$← MakeSecrets(1`, (L,6))
3: Pub(L,6)
$← MakePublicData(1`, (L,6))
4: Q← 
5: v?
$← AOCorrupt(·,⊥)(Pub(L,6))
6: for all vi ∈ Q do
7: if (v? 6 vi) then return 0
8: b
$← {0, 1}
9: if (b = 0) then κ? ← κv?
10: else κ?
$← K
11: b′ $← AOCorrupt(·,v?)(κ?, Pub(L,6))
12: return (b′ = b)
Oracle 2.2 OCorrupt(vi, v?)
1: if (vi > v?) then return ⊥
2: Q← Q ∪ vi
3: return (κvi , ωvi)
Key indistinguishability requires that, given a set of keys κv1 , . . . , κvn , an adversary should
not be able to distinguish between the key for a challenge node v? (not a descendent of
any vi) and a randomly chosen key. This property is crucial if derived keys are to be used
in other cryptographic protocols.
Both notions can be viewed in terms of static or adaptive adversaries. A static adversary
will be provided with the graph H(L,6) and must first select a node v? ∈ L that will form
the challenge before the challenger has initiated the KAS and hence before receiving the
public and (appropriate) secret information. An adaptive (or dynamic) adversary, on the
other hand, may make oracle queries to the challenger to request keys and secrets for nodes
chosen in an adaptive fashion before selecting the challenge node v? (subject to v? not being
a descendant of any queried node for which secret information was given, to avoid a trivial
win). The adversary may similarly make such oracle queries after choosing the challenge
node (again requiring that the returned values do not allow the trivial derivation of the
challenge key κv?). Adaptive key indistinguishability is presented formally in Game 2.3,
with the associated oracle being given in Oracle 2.2.
The game begins with the challenger running the setup algorithms for the KAS scheme
and initialising an empty list Q of queried nodes. The adversary algorithm is then called
with the KAS public information as input. The adversary algorithm may make oracle
queries to the Corrupt algorithm, given in Oracle 2.2, for the adversary’s choice of input
vi. For this query phase, the challenger fixes the second input parameter, v
?, to be a
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distinguished symbol ⊥ (to identify that this is the first query phase, in which the second
parameter is not required). The oracle first performs a check as to whether the query
would lead to a trivial win (if vi > v?). As v? has been fixed to be ⊥, these elements are
incomparable and the if statement is not satisfied. The queried node is added to the list
Q and the key and secret for the node is returned to A.
After making a polynomial number of queries, A will output a choice of challenge node v?.
The challenger then checks if this choice is a valid challenge — that is, it is not a descendent
of any queried node, as this would trivially allow the adversary to derive the challenge
key and win. If the choice is invalid, then the adversary loses the game and the game
returns 0. Otherwise, the challenger chooses a bit b uniformly at random. If b = 0 then
the challenge key κ? is set to be the real key, κv? , for the challenge label. Otherwise, the
challenge key is chosen uniformly at random from the keyspace. The adversary algorithm
is then called again, this time with inputs κ? and the public information again, and given
access to the Corrupt oracle again. This time, the second input to Corrupt is set to be the
challenge node v? chosen by A such that the oracle can check whether responding to a
query would lead to a trivial win (if the queried node is an ancestor of the challenge node
and therefore would allow derivation of the key κv?).
Finally, the adversary returns a bit b′ which is its guess of the bit b chosen by C — that is,
whether the challenge key was a real key or a randomly chosen key. If this guess is correct
then the challenger returns 1 as the output of the game, and otherwise C returns 0.
The advantage of an adversary is defined to be the difference between the probability that
the adversary guesses whether the key is real or random correctly (that is, the probability
that the game outputs 1) and the probability of an adversary randomly guessing the correct
outcome (which occurs with probability 12). For a KAS to be secure in the sense of key
indistinguishability, we require this advantage to be negligible in the security parameter
— the adversary should almost certainly not do better than randomly guessing.
Definition 2.25. The advantage of a PPT adversary A against the KI game for a par-
ticular KAS construction KAS is defined as:
AdvKIA (KAS, 1`, (L,6)) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpKIA
[KAS, 1`, (L,6)]]− 12 .
A KAS construction, KAS, is secure in the sense of key indistinguishability against adap-
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tive adversaries if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvKIA (KAS, 1`, (L,6)) 6 negl(`).
As observed by Freire et al. [55], it is straightforward to see that the static and adaptive
notions of key indistinguishability are polynomially equivalent. A dynamic adversary can
clearly choose its oracle queries and challenge node to be consistent with that of a static
adversary. A static adversary can also be constructed that, before the KAS is instantiated,
makes a guess for the node v? that a corresponding adaptive adversary would choose. Such
a guess is correct with probability at least 1|L| (where L must be polynomial in size for the
KAS to be efficiently instantiable), and the static adversary aborts the game if the guess is
revealed to be incorrect. Thus, the static adversary succeeds with probability at least 1|L|
times the success probability of the dynamic adversary, and hence a scheme secure against
static adversaries is also secure against dynamic adversaries (with a polynomial loss in
the advantage). As a result, many papers focus only on static adversaries. In this thesis,
however, we will primarily consider adaptive adversaries as this is more straightforwardly
applicable to the interactive protocol settings we consider.
Freire et al. [55] introduced the notions of strong key recovery (S-KR) and strong key
indistinguishability (S-KI) to reflect realistic attacks where the keys for nodes vi > v
?
may leak (through key misuse or cryptanalysis, for example). Thus, the adversary is able
to learn all keys κvi for vi 6= v? and the secret information ωvi for all nodes where v? 6 vi
and, respectively, must recover κv? or distinguish between κv? and a random key. Strong
key indistinguishability is shown for an adaptive adversary in Game 2.4 and Oracle 2.3.
The game proceeds as in Game 2.3 except for the Corrupt oracle which now returns (only)
the key for nodes vi > v
?.
Definition 2.26. The advantage of a PPT adversary A against the S-KI game for a
particular KAS construction KAS is defined as:
AdvS-KIA (KAS, 1`, (L,6)) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpS-KIA
[KAS, 1`, (L,6)]]− 12 .
A KAS construction, KAS, is secure in the sense of strong key indistinguishability against
51
2.8 Notions of Security
Game 2.4 ExpS-KIA
[KAS, 1`, (L,6)]
1: b
$← {0, 1}
2: κL
$← MakeKeys(1`, (L,6))
3: ωL
$← MakeSecrets(1`, (L,6))
4: Pub(L,6)
$← MakePublicData(1`, (L,6))
5: Q← 
6: v?
$← AOCorrupt(·,⊥)(Pub(L,6))
7: for all vi ∈ Q do
8: if (v? 6 vi) then return 0
9: if (b = 0) then k? ← kv?
10: else k?
$← K
11: b′ $← AOCorrupt(·,v?)(k?, Pub(L,6))
12: return (b′ = b)
Oracle 2.3 OCorrupt(vi, v?)
1: if (v? 6 vi) then
2: Q← Q ∪ vi
3: return (κvi , ωvi)
4: else if (vi > v
?) then
5: return κvi
6: else
7: return ⊥
adaptive adversaries (S-KI) if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvS-KIA (KAS, 1`, (L,6)) 6 negl(`).
Although Freire et al. formally separated the notions of key recovery and strong key recov-
ery, Castiglione et al. [35] showed polynomial equivalence between key indistinguishability
and strong key indistinguishability. However, as we shall see in Chapter 4, the format of
the adaptive S-KI game is well suited to some settings, particularly security reductions
for interactive protocols where keys must be used before the challenge period, and so we
shall continue to consider the strong key indistinguishability game.
2.8.3 Symmetric Encryption
There are many notions of security for symmetric encryption (see [11] for relations amongst
four notions of security). Perhaps the most commonly discussed, and the one that we
shall use later in this thesis, is indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-
CPA). This notion requires that an adversary running in polynomial time, and with the
ability to request the encryptions of arbitrary messages, can not distinguish which of two
messages of his choice has been encrypted. Informally, the encryption scheme should hide
52
2.8 Notions of Security
Game 2.5 ExpIND-CPAA
[SE , 1`]
1: b
$← {0, 1}
2: k?
$← KeyGen(1`)
3: b′ $← AOLoR(·,·,k?)(1`)
4: return (b′ = b)
Oracle 2.4 OLoR(m0,m1, k?)
1: if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then return ⊥
2: else return Encrypt(mb, k
?)
Game 2.6 ExpIND-CCAA
[SE , 1`]
1: b
$← {0, 1}
2: L← 
3: k?
$← KeyGen(1`)
4: b′ $← AOLoR(·,·,k?),Decrypt(·,k?)(1`)
5: return (b′ = b)
Oracle 2.5 OLoR(m0,m1, k?)
1: CT
$← Encrypt(mb, k?)
2: if (m0 6= m1) then L← L ∪ CT
3: return CT
Oracle 2.6 ODecrypt(CT,k?)
1: if (CT ∈ L) then return ⊥
2: return Decrypt(CT, k?)
all information about the underlying plaintext so that a ciphertext reveals nothing about
which message was encrypted.
The IND-CPA notion is formally defined in Game 2.5, Oracle 2.4 and Definition 2.27.
The game begins with the challenger choosing a bit b uniformly at random and running
the KeyGen algorithm to generate a challenge key k?. The adversary algorithm is then
called with the security parameter as input, and it is given access to an LoR oracle, which
implements the encryption functionality. This oracle takes two messages of the adversary’s
choice. It first checks that the messages are of the same length and then chooses one of
the messages according to the bit b which is encrypted under the key k? and the resulting
ciphertext returned to the adversary. Eventually, the adversary returns a bit b′ and the
game outputs 1 if b′ is the bit b chosen by the challenger. Note that the adversary may
generate challenge ciphertexts using the LoR oracle by submitting two distinct messages
of the same length, but may also use LoR as a simple encryption oracle by submitting the
same message twice, m0 = m1.
Similarly, one can consider Indistinguishability against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (IND-
CCA) defined in Game 2.6 and Oracles 2.5 and 2.6. The game proceeds as in Game 2.5 but
the challenger additionally maintains a list L of ciphertexts which is initially empty. As
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shown in Oracle 2.5, the LoR oracle is modified to add generated ciphertexts to the list L
if the input messages are distinct — that is, if the query forms a challenge ciphertext based
on the value of b (which clearly is not the case if both message options are identical). The
adversary is additionally given a decryption oracle (Oracle 2.6) to which it can submit
ciphertexts to recover the corresponding plaintexts. However, to avoid trivial wins, a
distinguished failure symbol ⊥ is returned if the queried ciphertext has previously been
generated by the LoR oracle as a result of a query for two distinct messages. Clearly,
given the decryption of such a ciphertext, it would be possible to determine the value of
b based on which message is returned.
For both notions, we define the advantage of an adversary to be the difference between
the probabilities of the adversary guessing the bit b correctly (indicating which message
was encrypted) and randomly guessing (which is correct with probability 12).
Definition 2.27. The advantage of a PPT adversary A against a notion
X ∈ {IND-CPA, IND-CCA}
for a symmetric encryption scheme SE is defined as:
AdvXA(SE , 1`) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpXA
[SE , 1`]]− 12 .
A symmetric encryption scheme, SE, is secure in the sense of notion X if for all PPT
adversaries A,
AdvXA(SE , 1`) 6 negl(`).
The choice of security property for a symmetric encryption scheme will depend on the
context in which the scheme is used and what information an adversary is likely to observe
in practice. Security in the sense of IND-CPA and IND-CCA can also be defined for the
public key setting where the adversary is given the challenge public key and can use this
as an encryption oracle to select the challenge messages.
2.8.4 Symmetric Authenticated Encryption
Bellare and Namprempre [24] considered two notions of integrity for authenticated sym-
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Game 2.7 ExpINT-PTXTA
[SE , 1`]
1: L← 
2: k?
$← KeyGen(1`)
3: CT ?
$← AOEncrypt(·,k?),Ver(·)(1`)
4: return ((Ver(CT ?) = 1) and (Decrypt(CT ?, k?) /∈ L))
Oracle 2.7 OEncrypt(m, k?):
1: CT
$← Encrypt(m, k?)
2: L← L ∪m
3: return CT
Oracle 2.8 OVer(CT ) :
1: if (⊥6← Decrypt(CT, k?)) then return 1
2: else return 0
metric encryption schemes: integrity of plaintexts (INT-PTXT) and integrity of cipher-
texts (INT-CTXT) under chosen message attacks. INT-PTXT requires it to be hard to
create a ciphertext which decrypts to a message never encrypted by a legitimate sender,
while INT-CTXT requires it to be hard to create a ciphertext that was not previously
generated by a legitimate sender (regardless of the underlying plaintext). We will only
require the first notion in this thesis, which is given in Game 2.7 and Oracles 2.7 and 2.8.
The challenger initialises a list of queried messages L which is initially empty, and gener-
ates a symmetric key k?. The adversary is given the security parameter and access to both
an encryption oracle and a verification oracle. The encryption oracle, Oracle 2.7, encrypts
the adversary’s choice of message m under k? and adds m to the list of queried messages,
L. The verification oracle, Oracle 2.8, attempts to decrypt a ciphertext provided by the
adversary. It returns 1 if the queried ciphertext is deemed authentic (i.e. Decrypt does not
return ⊥) and 0 otherwise; thus the adversary is able to tell whether a given ciphertext
would be accepted in the game or not, without being given the functionality of a decryp-
tion oracle (it cannot learn the plaintext for a given ciphertext using Oracle 2.8). The
adversary wins if it can produce a ciphertext that is deemed authentic and that decrypts
to a message not previously queried to the encryption oracle (i.e. not stored in L).
Definition 2.28. The advantage of a PPT adversary A against the INT-PTXT game
for an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme SE is defined as:
AdvINT-PTXTA (SE , 1`) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpINT-PTXTA
[SE , 1`]].
An authenticated symmetric encryption scheme, SE, is secure with respect to INT-PTXT
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if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvINT-PTXTA (SE , 1`) 6 negl(`).
In this thesis, we will require an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme that is secure
in the sense of IND-CPA∧INT-PTXT. As noted by Bellare and Namprempre [24], such a
scheme can be constructed from an IND-CPA symmetric encryption scheme and a weakly
or strongly unforgeable message authentication code MAC [72] using the generic compo-
sition techniques of MAC-then-Encrypt or Encrypt-then-MAC. As this latter composition
is shown to be secure for all security choices of the encryption and MAC schemes, we will
adopt this construction in this paper. Thus, let SE = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be a sym-
metric authenticated encryption scheme constructed from a symmetric encryption scheme
SE ′ = (KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) and a MAC MAC = (KeyGen′′,Tag,Verify). KeyGen
outputs two keys: SKE corresponding to KeyGen
′ and SKM relating to KeyGen′′2. The
key for the authenticated encryption scheme is defined to be the concatenation SK =
SKE‖SKM . The encryption operation is defined as Encrypt(m,SK) = C‖Tag(C, SKM )
for C
$← Encrypt′(m,SKE).
2.8.5 Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based Encryption
As CP-ABE is an encryption mechanism, the security goals are very similar to those for
symmetric (and in particular asymmetric) encryptions schemes — namely, the adversary
should not be able to distinguish which of two messages was encrypted.
Recall that different CP-ABE keys grant access to different classes of documents; cipher-
texts are no longer generated with a particular user in mind but rather a class of users.
An important consideration in ABE schemes, therefore, is that users may not collude in
order to decrypt a ciphertext which no one of them could decrypt alone. In the CP-ABE
setting, consider a ciphertext encrypted with the policy Professor ∧ Maths; two users
assigned attribute sets {Professor, Physics} and {Student, Maths} respectively should
not be able to pool their Professor and Maths attributes to decrypt the ciphertext as
neither of them actually satisfy the policy. To model collusion between users, we provide
2Note that when keys are derived from a KAS, the KAS could simply output strings that can be split
into SKE and SKM .
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Game 2.8 ExpIND-CPAA
[CPABE , 1`,U]
1: A? ← {∅}, Q← 
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,U)
3: (m0,m1,A?)
$← AOKeyGen(·,MK,PP)(PP)
4: if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then return 0
5: for all A ∈ Q do
6: if (A ∈ A?) then return 0
7: b
$← {0, 1}
8: CT ?
$← Encrypt(mb,A?,PP)
9: b′ $← AOKeyGen(·,MK,PP)(CT ?,PP)
10: return (b′ = b)
Oracle 2.9 OKeyGen(A,MK,PP)
1: if A /∈ A? then
2: Q← Q ∪A
3: return KeyGen(A,MK,PP)
4: else
5: return ⊥
Game 2.9 ExpsIND-CPAA
[CPABE , 1`,U]
1: A? $← A(1`,U)
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,U)
3: (m0,m1)
$← AOKeyGen(·,MK,PP)(PP)
4: if ((|m0| 6= |m1|)) then return 0
5: b
$← {0, 1}
6: CT ?
$← Encrypt(mb,A?,PP)
7: b′ $← AOKeyGen(·,MK,PP)(CT ?,PP)
8: return (b′ = b)
the adversary with an additional KeyGen oracle so that he can request multiple decryp-
tion keys for different attribute sets. To avoid trivial wins, we require that all queried
attribute sets do not satisfy the challenge policy (else the adversary holds a valid key and
can decrypt the challenge ciphertext himself).
Security for ABE schemes in general can be classed as full or selective security. Full
security is the ideal notion that we would like to achieve, whilst selective security has
traditionally been more readily achievable and gives more of a sense of heuristic security.
The notions differ based on whether the adversary is given the public parameters before
or after making a choice of challenge. The selective notion (where the challenge access
structure in CP-ABE or challenge attribute set in KP-ABE) allows the challenger to
partition the system into queries that it must be able to answer and those it will not
(as some queries will be restricted to avoid giving the adversary a trivial win); thus, the
challenger is able to embed secrets for a reductive proof, for example, a Diffie-Hellman
challenge group element, such that it need not know the corresponding trapdoor.
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Oracle 2.10 OKeyGen(A,MK,PP)
1: if (A /∈ A?) then return KeyGen(A,MK,PP)
2: else return ⊥
The full notion of indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) for a
CP-ABE scheme is given in Game 2.8 and Oracle 2.9. The selective IND-CPA notion
(sIND-CPA) given in Game 2.9 and Oracle 2.10. The full game begins with the challenger
initialising the challenge access structure and an empty list Q of queried attribute sets.
The selective game, on the other hand, begins with the adversary algorithm, given the
security parameter and attribute universe, selecting an access structure A? that it will
attempt to attack. Then, in both games, the challenger runs the Setup algorithm and calls
the adversary with the generated public parameters as input. The adversary is also given
access to a KeyGen oracle which returns a valid decryption key for the adversary’s choice
of attribute set A only if A does not satisfy the challenge access structure A?. Otherwise,
a distinguished failure symbol ⊥ is returned to avoid allowing the adversary a trivial win.
After a polynomial number of queries, the adversary will return two messages of equal
length (if the lengths differ then the adversary loses the game). In the full IND-CPA
game, the adversary also chooses the challenge access structure A? at this point. If A?
is satisfied by any attribute set queried to the KeyGen oracle (i.e. listed in Q), then the
adversary loses the game as it has not found a valid attack target.
The challenger chooses a bit b uniformly at random and uses this to choose one of the
two messages to be encrypted under the challenge access structure. The adversary is
called again with the resulting ciphertext and again given access to the KeyGen oracle.
Eventually, A must return a guess b′ of the value b (i.e. which message was encrypted).
The game returns 1 if this guess is correct, and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.29. The advantage against a notion X ∈ {IND-CPA, sIND-CPA} of a
PPT adversary A for a CP-ABE construction CP-ABE is defined as:
AdvXA(CP-ABE , 1`,U) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpXA
[CP-ABE , 1`,U]]− 12 .
A CP-ABE scheme, CP-ABE, is secure with respect to X if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvXA(CP-ABE , 1`,U) 6 negl(`).
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Game 2.10 ExpsIND-CPAA
[DPABE , 1`,U]
1: (ω?,S?) $← A(1`,U)
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,U)
3: (m0,m1)
$← AOKeyGen((·,·),MK,PP)(PP)
4: if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then return 0
5: b
$← {0, 1}
6: CT ?
$← Encrypt(mb, (ω?,S?),PP)
7: b′ $← AOKeyGen((·,·),MK,PP)(CT ?,PP)
8: return (b′ = b)
Oracle 2.11 OKeyGen((O, ψ),MK,PP)
1: if (ω? /∈ O or ψ /∈ S?) then return KeyGen((O, ψ),MK,PP)
2: else return ⊥
2.8.6 Dual-policy Attribute-based Encryption
Security for DP-ABE is defined similarly to security for CP-ABE. Selective security for
DP-ABE is defined in Game 2.10 and Oracle 2.11. As before, a full notion of security
(or adaptive security) can be defined where the adversary receives the public parameters
before selecting the challenge input. Note that notions of sIND-CPA for both KP-ABE
and CP-ABE can be defined by ignoring the relevant attribute sets and access structures.
Definition 2.30. The advantage of a PPT adversary A against the sIND-CPA game
for a DP-ABE construction DP-ABE is defined as:
AdvsIND-CPAA (DP-ABE , 1`,U) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpsIND-CPAA
[DP-ABE , 1`,U]]− 12 .
A DP-ABE scheme, DP-ABE, is selectively secure in the sense of indistinguishability
against chosen plaintext attack (sIND-CPA) if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvsIND-CPAA (DP-ABE , 1`,U) 6 negl(`).
2.8.7 Digital Signatures
We define a signature scheme to be existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen
message attack (EUF-CMA) if an adversary, given polynomially many signatures on
messages of its choice, cannot create a message m? with a valid signature where m? was
not one of the messages that it saw a signature for. More formally, this is defined in
Game 2.11 and Oracle 2.12.
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Game 2.11 ExpEUF-CMAA
[SIG, 1`]
1: Q = 
2: (SK, V K)
$← Sig.KeyGen(1`)
3: (m?, γ?)
$← AOSign(·,SK)(V K)
4: if (accept← Sig.Verify(m?, γ?, V K) and m? /∈ Q) then return 1
5: else return 0
Oracle 2.12 OSign(m,SK)
1: Q← Q ∪m
2: return Sig.Sign(m,SK)
Game 2.12 ExpInvertA
[
1`, g
]
1: w
$← {0, 1}`
2: z ← g(w)
3: w′ $← A(1`, g, z)
4: return (g(w′) = z)
Definition 2.31. The advantage of a PPT adversary A against the EUF-CMA game
for a particular digital signature construction SIG is defined as:
AdvEUF-CMAA (SIG, 1`) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpEUF-CMAA
[SIG, 1`]].
A digital signature construction, SIG, is existentially secure against chosen message at-
tacks (EUF-CMA) if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvEUF-CMAA (SIG, 1`) 6 negl(`).
2.8.8 One-way Functions
A one-way function g is characterised by being easy to compute, but hard to invert. The
first condition is given by the requirement that g is computable in polynomial time. The
second condition is formalised by requiring that it is infeasible for any PPT algorithm to
invert g (that is, to find a pre-image of a given value y) except with negligible probability.
This requirement is captured in the inverting experiment (Game 2.12) where we consider
the experiment for a function g. The challenger chooses an input uniformly at random
from the domain of g, applies g to this input and gives the adversary both the result
and a description of the function. It suffices for A to find any value of x′ for which
g(x′) = y = g(x).
Definition 2.32. A function g is one-way if the following two conditions hold [74]:
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1. (Easy to compute) there exists a polynomial-time algorithm Mg computing g; i.e.
Mg(w) = g(w) for all w ∈ Dom(g);
2. (Hard to invert) for every PPT algorithm A, there exists a negligible function negl
such that
Pr
[
1
$← ExpInvertA
[
1`, g
]]
6 negl(`).
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This chapter looks at the setting of publicly verifiable outsourced computation (PVC) in
which it has been shown that attribute-based encryption can be used, not as an access
control enforcement primitive, but instead to prove correctness of a computation. We
investigate the current proposal and propose improvements to achieve a more practical
system model, including a simple method for servers to compute multiple functions and a
method to revoke misbehaving servers.
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Section 2.2, verifiable outsourced computation (VC), has attracted a lot
of attention in the community recently. VC aims to allow a single client with limited
resources to outsource computations to an external server and to verify whether returned
results are correct. Publicly verifiable computation (PVC) [84] aims to provide a more
practical VC solution wherein only one client must perform an expensive setup operation
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and subsequently any other entity may use only public information to outsource compu-
tations and to verify results; thus PVC aims to be a multi-client system. However, in our
opinion, the current PVC schemes do not support multiple servers computing multiple
functions particularly well.
We believe that both of these are important requirements for many PVC systems that
might be used in practice. It may be desirable for a set of clients to be able to choose from
a set of servers on a per computation basis. For example, certain computations may re-
quire different computational resources (e.g. a certain amount of RAM or processor cores)
that are only found in some cloud service providers, or clients may wish to outsource a
computation to servers which are geographically nearby to minimise latency (if compu-
tation/retrieval time is important). If multiple servers are able to provide computational
services within a PVC system, they may compete amongst themselves to reduce costs
or may be able to bid on computations based on whether they currently have resources
readily available; as a client is assumed to set up a PVC system and is therefore the sys-
tem owner, it is in the client’s interest to introduce multiple servers to enable this cost
reduction.
We believe that it is unlikely that a client would be willing to expend the resources to
initialise a PVC system (in terms of computational resources, and in terms of the monetary
cost of contracting a cloud server provider) to outsource computations of only a single
function. Indeed, we also believe it unlikely that an outsourced computation solution
for a single function would provide the level of functionality required in practice — if
company employees are to rely only on mobile or lightweight devices, then any provided
PVC solution should enable them to perform all of their duties. In existing schemes,
to outsource a second function, either an entirely new PVC system would need to be
initialised or more complex primitives must be used to instantiate the scheme [84].
It is also conceivable that multiple sets of clients (e.g. multiple companies) will be largely
interested in outsourcing similar sets of computations (e.g. common statistical computa-
tions), albeit on different, client-specific input data. In current PVC proposals, it is likely
that each group of clients would have a distinguished client that performs the expensive
Setup operation and issue delegation and evaluation keys for specific functions on behalf
of their own group. Given that the functions of interest to these groups may overlap,
it could be that much of this effort is redundantly replicated by multiple distinguished
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clients. In addition, the introduction of multiple computational servers and multiple func-
tions to PVC systems results in an increase workload for the distinguished clients (who
must issue evaluation keys to servers for each function); the role of these clients becomes
akin to an authority on entities within the system. We therefore suggest the introduction
of a single trusted party which we call a key distribution centre (KDC); the KDC initialises
the system and issues evaluation keys on behalf of all entities in the system.
Finally, given that we have enabled multiple untrusted servers to enrol in a PVC system,
we may wish to revoke servers that are detected as misbehaving (either maliciously or
through poor performance which introduces errors to computations) such that they are
prevented from performing future computations. In the traditional, single-client setting of
VC, the client itself would simply choose to no longer use the server, and in both VC and
prior PVC schemes, a new system would need to be initialised. However, in the multi-
client setting, it is important that all clients are informed that a server is known not to
be trustworthy. In our new model of PVC, the system may include other servers that can
still be used, so initialising a new system is not a desirable option. Note that if other
clients were to outsource a computation to a misbehaving server, any errors would still
be detected due to the verification property, but we wish to prevent clients wasting their
(limited) resources delegating to a ‘bad’ server and to discourage servers from cheating in
the first place, as they know they will be detected, revoked and therefore potentially incur
a significant (financial) penalty from not receiving future work.
Our main contribution in this chapter, then, is to introduce the new notion of revocable
publicly verifiable computation (RPVC). We allow multiple servers to enrol in a PVC
system and allow the outsourced computation of multiple functions within a single PVC
system. In some sense, enabling the evaluation of multiple functions can be seen as a
shift from SIMD- to MIMD-style (that is, single instruction, multiple data to multiple
instructions, multiple data [54]) PVC environments, where servers can compute multiple
functions on multiple inputs provided by clients, albeit not necessarily in parallel. We give
a rigorous definitional framework for RPVC that we believe more accurately reflects real
environments than existing proposals. This new framework both removes redundancy and
facilitates additional functionality, leading to several new security notions.
In Section 3.2, we briefly review the PVC construction of Parno et al. [84] and the revo-
cable key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme of Attrapadung and Imai [14], both
64
3.2 Background Material
of which will inform our construction of RPVC later in this chapter. In Section 3.3, we
define our system model and framework for RPVC and in Section 3.4 we define relevant
security models. In Section 3.5, we provide an overview, technical details and a concrete
instantiation of our framework using attribute-based encryption and finally, in Section 3.6,
we provide full security proofs for our construction.
3.2 Background Material
3.2.1 Construction of Publicly Verifiable Computation Schemes
Parno et al. [84] provide a PVC construction using key-policy attribute-based encryption
(KP-ABE) [66], for the family of monotone Boolean functions.1 Our construction of RPVC
will be based on this construction, and therefore we discuss the basic principles here.
The idea of Parno et al. was to use the KP-ABE decryption functionality as a proof
that a monotone Boolean function is satisfied (i.e. outputs 1) on a given input. Recall
that in KP-ABE, decryption keys are associated with access structures and ciphertexts
are associated with attribute sets. Decryption succeeds if and only if the attribute set
in the ciphertext satisfies the access structure in the user’s decryption key. Recall also
that an access structure is a collection of satisfying attribute sets, and that any monotone
Boolean formula F can also be written in a similar form (the set of all inputs x such that
F (x) = 1). If inputs to Boolean functions can be written as attribute sets then we may
identify monotone access structures and monotone Boolean formulas. In the PVC setting,
we can view functions to be computed as access structures and issue computational servers
with corresponding decryption keys. Note that there may be exponentially many x such
that F (x) = 1 and, thus, the initial phase can indeed be computationally expensive for the
client. Input data can be represented as an attribute set and associated with ciphertexts;
we shall discuss this representation shortly.
To outsource a computation of F (x), Parno et al. select a random message m0 from the
message space of the ABE scheme and encrypt it under the attribute set Ax, corresponding
to x. A computational server is issued an evaluation key in the form of an ABE decryption
1If input privacy is required then a predicate encryption scheme could be used in place of the KP-ABE
scheme.
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key for the access structure encoding F . If the server can correctly decrypt the ciphertext
and return the correct message then the client can be assured (by the correctness and
security of the ABE scheme) that F (x) = 1. If the message space is large enough (which
it must be for the ABE scheme to be secure) then the server is unable to guess the correct
message to return with significant probability.
However, a malicious server could return the distinguished symbol ⊥ in the hope of con-
vincing the client that F (x) = 0 — that is, the input attributes did not satisfy the access
structure. Therefore, Parno et al. initialise a second ABE system and perform the same
operations as above to encrypt a random message m1 under the input set corresponding
to x, and to issue the server a decryption key corresponding to the complement function
F (x) = F (x) ⊕ 1, which always outputs the opposite result to F (x). Thus, exactly one
of F (x) or F (x) will output 1 and therefore exactly one of the messages will be output
by the decryption algorithm. By observing which message is returned and which ABE
system the message was encrypted with, the client can determine whether F (x) or F (x)
was satisfied and therefore whether F (x) = 1 or 0 respectively. A valid response from a
server, therefore, comprises the outputs (d0, d1) from two decryption operations and is of
the following form:
(d0, d1) =

(m0,⊥), if F (x) = 1;
(⊥,m1), if F (x) = 0.
(3.1)
Note that because KP-ABE is a public-key encryption primitive, any entity can form
ciphertexts and hence the construction achieves public delegability. Public verifiability,
on the other hand, is achieved using a one-way function g (e.g. a pre-image resistant
hash function). When outsourcing a computation, a client publishes a verification key
comprising the result of applying g to each randomly chosen message m0 and m1. On
receipt of a computational result from the server (i.e. exactly one ‘decrypted’ message),
any entity may apply g to the returned message and compare this with the verification key
to verify correctness. Note that a malicious server gains no advantage from the verification
key as it cannot invert g to recover either message. The mapping between PVC and KP-
ABE parameters is shown in Table 3.1.
As mentioned above, we must be able to define input data to outsourced computations as
attribute sets. Parno et al. did not state how this should be done; in this thesis, we perform
66
3.2 Background Material
Abstract PVC parameter Parameter in KP-ABE instantiation
EKF SKAF
PKF Master public key PP
σF,x Encryption of m using PP and Ax
θF (x) m or ⊥
V KF,x g(m)
Table 3.1: Mapping between PVC and KP-ABE parameters.
the following encoding procedure. Define a universe U of n attributes and associate V ⊆ U
with a binary n-tuple where the ith bit is 1 if and only if the ith attribute is in V . We
call this the characteristic tuple of V . Thus, there is a natural one-to-one correspondence
between n-tuples and attribute sets; we write Ax to denote the attribute set associated with
a characteristic tuple x. An alternative way to view this is to let U = {A1, A2, . . . , An}.
Then, a bit string v = v1 . . . vn of length n is the characteristic tuple of the set V ⊆ U
where V = {Ai : vi = 1}. A function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is monotonic if x 6 y implies
F (x) 6 F (y), where x = (x1, . . . , xn) is less than or equal to y = (y1, . . . , yn) if and
only if xi 6 yi for all i ∈ [n]. For a monotonic function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, the set
AF = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : F (x) = 1} defines a monotonic access structure.
Throughout this thesis, we shall mainly refer to monotonic Boolean functions, in line
with the majority of the ABE literature which refer only to monotonic access structures.
However, we note that the use of a non-monotonic KP-ABE scheme [80] could easily
accommodate general Boolean functions, and hence our outsourcing schemes would be
able to outsource the NC1 class of functions. As the KP-ABE scheme is used in a black-
box manner in both our construction and that of Parno et al. [84], this change should
be largely transparent. A simple alternative to such schemes is to adjust our encoding
scheme for input data, as 0 values in the input bitstring can now affect the outcome of
the computation. Doing so is a straightforward extension where U is defined to have 2n
attributes {A0i , A1i }ni=1. Then, a bit string v of length n is the characteristic tuple of the
set V ⊆ U where V = {Aji : vi = j}. By applying De Morgan’s laws to a non-monotonic
Boolean function F , any negations within the function can be moved such that they apply
only to the input variables, and hence by choosing the value of j ∈ {0, 1} for each attribute
appropriately in the input attribute set, a non-monotonic function can be satisfied.
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3.2.2 Revocable Key-Policy Attribute-based Encryption
Revocation is a key problem in cryptography, particularly in the attribute-based setting
where many users hold keys for the same functionality (that is, keys which grant access
to the same objects). Revocation mechanisms aim to disable this functionality for certain
users, for example, if they are dishonest or if they leave the system. In the attribute-
based setting, revocation can either target specific attributes (to disable certain policies
within the system) or specific users (to account for a changing user population). In this
thesis, we shall focus on the latter as we wish to prevent misbehaving servers (users) from
participating in the PVC system at all; not just to revoke certain functionality. User
revocation itself leads to two different modes [14]:
• Direct revocation allows users to specify a revocation list during the encryption
algorithm which lists all currently revoked users. Hence periodic rekeying is not
required, but encryptors must have knowledge of the current revocation list;
• Indirect revocation requires ciphertexts to be associated with a time period (as an
additional attribute) and for a key authority to issue key update material at each
time period. The update material enables non-revoked users to update their key to
be functional during the relevant time period. A revoked user will not be able to use
the update material and thus their key will not decrypt ciphertexts associated with
the current time period attribute. With indirect revocation, users need only know
the current time attribute during encryption, but increased communication costs are
incurred due to the dissemination of the key update material.
In this thesis, we use the indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme of Attrapadung and Imai [14],
itself a more formal definition of a scheme due to Boldyreva et al. [31]. This choice will
enable the revocation of misbehaving servers in a PVC scheme such that they cannot
perform further computations. We choose indirect revocation to minimise the workload
(in terms of maintaining synchronised, up-to-date revocation lists) of the weak client
devices. Indirectly revocable KP-ABE schemes define the universe of attributes to be
U = Uattr ∪ Utime ∪ UID where:
• Uattr is the normal attribute universe for describing ciphertexts and forming access
control policies;
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• Utime comprises attributes representing time periods;
• UID contains attributes encoding user identities.
Definition 3.1. An indirectly revocable key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme
comprises the following algorithms:
• (PP,MK) $← ABE.Setup(1`,U): takes the security parameter and the universe of
attributes as input and outputs public parameters PP and master secret key MK;
• CT $← ABE.Encrypt(m,A, t,PP): takes a message m, an attribute set A ⊆ Uattr, the
current time period t ∈ Utime and the public parameters, and outputs a ciphertext
that is valid for time t;
• SKid,A $← ABE.KeyGen(id,A,MK,PP): takes as input an identity id ∈ UID for a
user, an access structure A encoding a policy, as well as the master secret key and
public parameters. It outputs a decryption key for the user id;
• UKR,t $← ABE.KeyUpdate(R, t,MK,PP): takes a revocation list R ⊆ UID containing
the identities of currently revoked entities, the current time period t, as well as the
master secret key and public parameters. It outputs updated key material UKR,t;
• PT ← ABE.Decrypt(CT, SKid,A, UKR,t,PP): takes a ciphertext, a decryption key,
an update key and the public parameters as input. It outputs a plaintext PT which
is either m if the attributes associated with CT satisfy A and the value of t in the
update key matches that specified during the encryption of CT , or ⊥ otherwise to
denote decryption failure.
Correctness of a revocable KP-ABE scheme is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2. An indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme is correct if for all m ∈M, all
id ∈ Uid, all R ⊆ Uid, all A ⊆ 2Uattr \ {∅}, all A ⊆ Uattr and all t ∈ Utime, if A ∈ A and
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id /∈ R, then
Pr[(PP,MK)
$← ABE.Setup(1`,U),
CT
$← ABE.Encrypt(m,A, t,PP),
SKid,A
$← ABE.KeyGen(id,A,MK,PP),
UKR,t
$← ABE.KeyUpdate(R, t,MK,PP),
m← ABE.Decrypt(CT, SKid,A, UKR,t,PP)]
= 1− negl(`).
The schemes [14, 31] mentioned above use the complete-subtree method to arrange users
as the leaves of a binary tree such that the size of the required key-update material can be
reduced from the naive method of O(n− r), where n is the number of users and r is the
number of revoked users, to O(r log(n2 )). This approach works as follows for a revocation
list R. For a leaf node l ∈ UID, let Path(l) be the set of nodes on the path between the root
node and l inclusive. Then, for each l ∈ R, mark all nodes in Path(l). Define Cover(R)
to be the set of all unmarked children of marked nodes, and generate update material for
just these nodes.
Note that the time parameter in the above algorithms could be a literal clock value where
all entities have access to some synchronised, network clock. In this case, rekeying must
occur at every time period regardless of whether a revocation has occurred in the prior
period. Alternatively, the time parameter could simply be a counter that is updated when
a revocation takes place and the ABE.KeyUpdate algorithm is run. This would be more
akin to a “push” system where entities should be notified by the key authority when
newly updated key material is required. For generality, we assume a time source T from
which the current time period t (be that a literal time value, counter or otherwise) may
be efficiently sampled as t← T.
Attrapadung and Imai [14] defined several notions of security for revocable KP-ABE
schemes. The security property we will require in this thesis is indistinguishability against
selective-target with semi-static query attack (IND-sHRSS) [14], presented in Game 3.1
and Oracles 3.1 and 3.2. This is a selective notion where the adversary must declare at
the beginning of the game the set of attributes (t?, A?), including the time attribute t?, to
be challenged upon. It is also possible to define a stronger, full notion of security whereby
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the adversary may receive the public parameters and make oracle queries before selecting
the challenge attributes (provided no query would lead to a trivial win). As we use the
revocable KP-ABE scheme as a black box in our construction, it should be easy to change
to a fully secure scheme if found; to the best of our knowledge, current primitives for
indirect revocation in the KP-ABE setting only achieve selective security.
In Game 3.1, after the adversary chooses its challenge attributes (t?, A?), the challenger
runs Setup and gives the adversary the resulting public parameters. The adversary must
choose a target revocation set R which is the set of entities that should be revoked at time
t?. The semi-static restriction requires that this revocation list must be chosen before the
adversary is given oracle access to the ABE.KeyGen and ABE.KeyUpdate functions. Again,
a stronger notion of an adaptive adversary may be defined where the adversary may choose
the revocation list at the time of the challenge instead.
To prevent trivial wins, for a key generation query, the adversary may not query for any
key SKid,A where the target attribute set A
? satisfies A and the identity is not revoked at
time t?. If this restriction was not enforced, the adversary would hold a secret decryption
key and would also receive update material for the challenge time period (as the identity
is not revoked) and could therefore successfully decrypt the challenge ciphertext.
Similarly, for an update key request, the adversary is prevented from learning an update
key UKR,t? for the challenge time period t
? for a less restrictive revocation list R than
the challenge list R. Otherwise, an update key could be issued which the adversary could
combine with a queried secret key to form a functional decryption key for a server that
the adversary claimed would be revoked.
As in a standard IND-CPA notion, the adversary outputs two messages of equal length
and the challenger chooses one of them at random to encrypt and passes the resulting ci-
phertext to the adversary. The adversary, again given oracle access as before, then guesses
which message was encrypted. The advantage of the adversary is given in Definition 3.3.
Definition 3.3. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the IND-sHRSS game for an
indirectly revocable KP-ABE construction KP-ABE is defined as:
AdvIND-sHRSSA (KP-ABE , 1`,U) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpIND-sHRSSA
[KP-ABE , 1`,U]]− 12 .
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Game 3.1 ExpIND-sHRSSA
[ABE , 1`,U]
1: (t?, A?)
$← A(1`,U)
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,U)
3: R
$← A(PP)
4: (m0,m1)
$← AOKeyGen(·,·,MK,PP),OKeyUpdate(·,·,MK,PP)(PP)
5: if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then return 0
6: b
$← {0, 1}
7: CT ?
$← Encrypt(mb, A?, t?,PP)
8: b?
$← AOKeyGen(·,·,MK,PP),OKeyUpdate(·,·,MK,PP)(CT ?,PP)
9: return (b′ = b)
Oracle 3.1 OKeyGen(id,A,MK,PP):
1: if ((A? ∈ A) and (id /∈ R)) then return ⊥
2: return KeyGen(id,A,MK,PP)
Oracle 3.2 OKeyUpdate(R, t,MK,PP):
1: if ((t = t?) and (R 6⊆ R)) then return ⊥
2: return KeyUpdate(R, t,MK,PP)
An indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme is secure in the sense of indistinguishability
against selective-target with semi-static query attack (IND-sHRSS) if for all PPT adver-
saries A,
AdvIND-sHRSSA (KP-ABE , 1`,U) 6 negl(`).
3.3 Revocable Publicly Verifiable Computation
As previously mentioned, our main goal in this chapter is to enhance the existing PVC
system model to reflect a more practical, multi-user, multi-server, multi-function setting.
We allow multiple servers to compute multiple functions in a secure manner. In particular,
a server cannot use an evaluation key for a function G to return a valid result for a
computation of F (x).
In the remainder of this section, we discuss in more detail the introduction and role of
the KDC and the mechanism by which we allow servers to compute multiple functions.
The introduction of a single trusted entity known as a key distribution centre (KDC)
that is an authority on entities enrolled in the system aims to make entity management
more straightforward. We also discuss two example system architectures that motivate
our construction, which we call the standard model and the manager model.
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3.3.1 Key Distribution Centre
Existing frameworks assume that a client or clients run the expensive phases of a VC
scheme and that a single server performs all outsourced computations. We believe that
this is undesirable for a number of reasons, irrespective of whether the client is sufficiently
powerful to perform the required operations. First, in a real-world system, we may wish to
outsource the setup phase to a trusted third party. In this setting, the third party would
operate rather similarly to a certificate authority, providing a trust service to facilitate
other operations of an organisation (in this case outsourced computation, rather than au-
thentication). Second, we may wish to limit the functions that some clients can outsource.
In other words, we may wish to enforce some kind of access control policy where an inter-
nal trusted entity will operate both as a facilitator of outsourced computation and as the
policy enforcement point. We will examine the integration of RPVC and access control in
Chapter 4.
The KDC that we introduce could, in fact, still be a distinguished client device (which
has the additional resources required to perform the expensive setup operations), but here
we consider it to be a separate entity to emphasise the distinction between the clients
that request computations, and the KDC that is authoritative on the system and users.
The KDC could be authoritative over many sets of clients (e.g. at an organisational level
as opposed to a work group level), and we minimise its workload to key generation and
revocation only.
It may be tempting to suggest that the KDC, as a trusted entity, performs all computations
itself. However we believe that this is not a practical solution in many real world scenarios,
e.g. the KDC could be an authority within the organisation responsible for user authori-
sation that wishes to enable workers to securely use cloud-based software-as-a-service. As
an entity within organisational boundaries, performing all computations would negate the
benefits gained from outsourcing computations to the cloud.
The basic idea of our scheme is to have the KDC perform the expensive setup operation.
The KDC provides each server with a distinct set of keys that allow the computation of
a set of functions. A client may request the computation of F (x) from any server that is
certified to compute F .
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3.3.2 Handling Multiple Functions
Recall that in the PVC model of Parno et al. [84], the system is initialised for a single
function, and that a new system must be initialised if a client wished to outsource the
computation of a different function. Recall also, from Definition 2.3, that Parno et al.
also introduced multi-function VC for the non-publicly verifiable setting; the authors
left it as an open problem to devise a multi-function PVC scheme. In multi-function
VC, the system is initialised independently of any functions, and evaluation keys and
delegation information for different functions can be generated separately. Input data can
be encoded once and used as input to multiple computations of different functions. To
instantiate multi-function VC in the non-publicly verifiable setting, Parno et al. used a
primitive known as KP-ABE with outsourcing where a trusted party can perform most of
the decryption process on behalf of a user.
In this chapter, we move towards a solution for multi-function PVC. We take a different
viewpoint than Parno et al. [84] did for multi-function VC and consider a ‘middle-ground’
model. In contrast to Parno et al., we require that clients encode their input per compu-
tation they outsource. We believe that, given an efficient outsourcing procedure, it is not
unreasonable for clients to perform some work per outsourcing request. Indeed, in some
cases, it could be that the data held by a client is updated as the result of each computa-
tion and so a persistent encoding would not be useful. As a result, we achieve a solution
which uses a “plain” ABE scheme (of which there are many efficient, well-studied con-
structions) instead of the somewhat more unusual ABE with outsourced decryption [67]
used by Parno et al. for the VC setting.
3.3.3 Standard Model
Our standard model extends the PVC architecture of Parno et al. [84] with the addition of
a KDC. The entities comprise a set of clients, a set of servers and a trusted KDC. The KDC
initialises the system and generates keys to enable verifiable computation. Keys to delegate
computations are published for the clients, whilst keys to evaluate specific functions are
given to individual servers. Clients submit computation requests, for a given input, to
a particular server and publish some verification information. Servers receive encoded
input values from clients and perform computations to generate an encoded result. Any
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party can verify the correctness of a server’s output. If the output is incorrect, the verifier
may report the server to the the KDC for revocation, which will prevent the server from
performing any further computations.
Figure 3.1 gives a table illustrating which entities are responsible for running each algo-
rithm in normal verifiable outsourced computation (VC), publicly verifiable outsourced
computation (PVC), the standard model of RPVC detailed in this section, and finally
RPVC in the manager model which we will discuss next. The figure also includes an
illustration of how the entities interact in the standard and manager models.
3.3.4 Manager Model
The manager model, in contrast, employs an additional entity known as the manager who
“owns” a pool of computation servers. Clients submit jobs to the manager, who will select
a server from the pool based on workload scheduling, available resources or as a result of
some bidding process if servers are to be rewarded per computation. A plausible scenario
is that servers enrol with a manager to “sell” the use of spare resources, whilst clients
subscribe to utilise these resources through the manager.
Results are returned to the manager who should be able to verify the server’s work. The
manager forwards correct results to the client; a misbehaving server may be reported
to the KDC for revocation, and the job assigned to another server. Due to the public
verifiability of current schemes, any party with access to the output and the verification
token can also verify and learn the result. However, in many situations we may not
desire external entities to learn sensitive computational results; yet, even so, there remain
legitimate reasons for certain entities, such as the manager, to just verify correctness,
without learning the result. Thus, we allow blind verification such that the manager (or
other entity) may verify the validity of the computation without learning the output —
that is, blind verification can determine whether a result should be accepted or rejected,
but does not reveal the value F (x). The delegating client generates an additional piece of
information, known as a retrieval key, which can be shared with authorised entities and
which enables the actual computational result to be learnt.
The interaction between entities in this model is illustrated in Figure 3.1b, where the
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Algorithm Run by
VC PVC RPVC Standard RPVC Manager
KeyGen C1 C1 KDC KDC
ProbGen C1 C1, C2, . . . C1, C2, . . . C1, C2, . . .
Compute S S S1, S2, . . . S1, S2, . . .
Verify C1 C1, C2, . . . C1, C2, . . . –
Blind Verify — — — M
Retrieve — — — C1, C2, . . .
KDCS1 S2 S3
PublicC1 C2
EKF,S1 EKF,S2
EKG,S3
σF,x1 θF (x1)
σF,x2 θF (x2)
σG,x3
θG(x3)
V KF,x1
V KF,x2
V KG,x3
Revoke PKF , PKG
Verify
Verify
(a) Standard model
KDCS1
M
S2
Public
C1
C2
EKF,S1
EKG,S2
σF,x1
θF (x1)
τθF (x1)
σ
G,x
2
θG(x2)
τθ
G
(x
2 )
V KF,x1
PKF
PKG
V KG,x2
Revoke
BVerif
Retrieve
Retrieve
(b) Manager model
Figure 3.1: The operation of a revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation
scheme
manager is denoted by M . The manager and computational servers are shown within a
dashed region to illustrate the boundaries of internal and external entities — that is, the
entities not within the dashed region could all be within an organisation that wishes to
utilise the external resources provided by the manager to outsource computational work.
Notice that in Figure 3.1b the manager performs a blind verification operation (denoted
BVerify) but only entities within the organisation may run the output retrieval algorithm
to learn the actual result of the computation; there is a distinction between the capabilities
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of entities external to the organisation (servers and the manager) and those internal entities
(such as the clients).
3.3.5 Formal Definition
Our scheme comprises four types of entity. Firstly, a key distribution centre is responsible
for setting up the system and being authoritative on other entities within the system. The
KDC is trusted by the other entities to act honestly. Note that in the prior PVC scheme
of Parno et al. [84], this role was played by a client device and would also be assumed to
act honestly on behalf of all other clients. In this work, we have expanded the duties of the
KDC to allow revocation of malicious servers and have referred to it as a distinct entity,
rather than a client device, to make the separation of duties explicit, however we have not
changed the underlying trust assumption regarding this entity. We assume that the KDC
can maintain state between the execution of each algorithm but, to ease readability, do
not explicitly show this as an input and output of each algorithm run by the KDC.
Secondly, the system includes a set of clients (which are assumed to possess limited com-
putational resources). These clients wish to outsource computations that they lack the
resources to compute locally. Each client is assumed to act honestly regarding a compu-
tation that they themselves outsource (as they wish to gain from a correct computation)
but need not trust each other.
Thirdly, the system includes a set of computational servers that are willing to perform
some set of computations on behalf of clients. These servers are not trusted by the clients to
perform the computation correctly and so the servers are required to produce an efficiently
verifiable proof of the correctness of their computation. We will assume that servers have
unique identifiers in the form of natural numbers (note that arbitrary identifiers can also
be efficiently mapped to unique natural numbers by a hash function or look up table).
The final type of entity within our system is verifiers. Verifiers can either be client devices
or other entities; they trust the client that outsourced a particular computation but do
not trust the server that actually performed the computation.
We now present a formal definition of the algorithms in a RPVC scheme.
77
3.3 Revocable Publicly Verifiable Computation
Definition 3.4. A revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme (RPVC)
comprises the following algorithms:
• (PP,MK) $← Setup(1`,F): run by the KDC to initialise the system and establish
public parameters PP and a master secret key MK for a family of functions F ;
• PKF $← FnInit(F,MK,PP): run by the KDC to generate a public delegation key,
PKF , allowing clients to outsource computations of a function F ;
• SKS $← Register(S,MK,PP): run by the KDC to enrol a computation server S in
the system and generate a signing key SKS used to identify S;
• EKF,S $← Certify(S, F,MK,PP): run by the KDC to generate an evaluation key
EKF,S enabling the computation server S to perform computations of a function F ;
• (σF,x, V KF,x, RKF,x) $← ProbGen(x, PKF ,PP): run by a client to delegate the com-
putation of F (x) to a server. The output values are: the encoded input, σF,x, of x
for the function F ; a verification key, V KF,x, that is used (only) to verify correctness
of the result; and a retrieval key RKF,x which will enable the output value F (x) to
be read by authorised parties;
• θF (x) $← Compute(σF,x, EKF,S , SKS ,PP): run by a server S holding an encoded
input σF,x of x for the function F , an evaluation key EKF,S for F and a signing key
SKS . The algorithm outputs an encoding, θF (x), of F (x);
• (y, τθF (x))← Verify(θF (x), V KF,x, RKF,x,PP): verification comprises two sub-algorithms
(which could be performed together in a single Verify operation as written here if
the blind verification property is not required). The sub-algorithms are:
– (RTF (x), τθF (x))← BVerif(θF (x), V KF,x,PP): run by any verifying party (in the
standard model), or by the manager (in the manager model), in possession of an
encoded output, θF (x) and a verification key V KF,x. The output is a retrieval
token, RTF (x), which encodes the actual output value (this can be thought of as
a partial translation from θF (x) to F (x)). It also outputs a token τθF (x) which
is (accept, S) if the output is valid, or (reject, S) if S misbehaved;
– y ← Retrieve(τθF (x) , RTF (x), V KF,x, RKF,x,PP): run by an authorised verifier
holding the retrieval key RKF,x to read the actual result y from the retrieval
token RTF (x). The value of y is either F (x) or the distinguished symbol ⊥ (i.e.
the algorithm fails if an invalid result is returned);
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• UM $← Revoke(τθF (x) ,MK,PP): run by the KDC to generate update material UM
if a misbehaving server is reported i.e. that the Verify algorithms returned a token
τθF (x) = (reject, S). If τθF (x) = (accept, S) then UM is set to be a distinguished
symbol ⊥ as no user is required to be revoked. Otherwise, this algorithm revokes
all evaluation keys EK·,S of the server S, thereby preventing S from performing any
further evaluations. The update material UM is a set of updated evaluation keys
EK·,S′ which are issued to all servers.2
Although not explicitly stated, the KDC may update the public parameters PP during
the execution of any algorithm. This reflects any changes that may be required to reflect
changes in the user population (e.g. servers are added or removed from the system, or
granted the ability to compute additional functions).
Note that if a server is not given the retrieval key RKF,x then it too cannot learn the
output value F (x) and we gain output privacy. In the above, we assume that RKF,x is
distributed to all authorised readers of the resulting value F (x) by the client that performs
ProbGen to outsource the computation. As an example, this could be performed using a
broadcast encryption scheme to the set of authorised users [52].
Intuitively, we say that a RPVC scheme is correct if, when all algorithms are run honestly
in any arbitrary execution sequence and the result is computed by a non-revoked server, the
verifying party always accepts the returned result and the result is correct. We can model
this as a cryptographic game between a challenger and a PPT adversary; the adversary
aims to find an (honestly generated) encoded output (from a non-revoked server) which
either does not encode the correct result, or which does encode the correct result yet which
will not be accepted by the verification algorithm.
The adversary is given access to a set of oracles; for each algorithm in Definition 3.4,
the adversary is given a corresponding oracle. Each oracle executes the corresponding
algorithm on arguments provided by the adversary, and returns the output of the algorithm
to the adversary, as well as maintaining some internal lists, which we shall detail below.
The adversary may call the Setup oracle only once (before making any other oracle queries),
but can thereon call the remaining oracles any number of times and in any order.
2In some instantiations, it may not be necessary to issue entirely new evaluation keys to each entity. In
Section 3.5, for example, we only need to issue a partially updated key.
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The challenger maintains two lists, LReg and LF ; LReg is a list of tuples comprising server
identities, S, and the resulting signing keys, SKS , that have been queried to the Register
oracle, whilst LF comprises tuples of the form (S, F,EKF,S) denoting that the server S
has been queried to the Certify oracle for the function F and that EKF,S was generated —
that is, S has been certified to compute F . When the adversary makes a Revoke query with
a revocation token that identifies a server S to be revoked (that is, if τθF (x) = (reject, S) is
given as input to the Revoke oracle), the challenger removes all entries of the form (S, ·, ·)
(i.e. all entries for S for any function) from LF .
The challenger also creates and maintains a table T which records the parameters and
values relating to each computation performed through the oracle queries. T is updated
in the following oracles:
• ProbGen: the challenger creates a new row in T comprising 8 components, all of
which are initialised to be empty; it then assigns x, F , the result F (x) (computed
by the challenger itself), σF,x, V KF,x and RKF,x to the first 6 components;
• Compute: the challenger first searches T for all rows that contain the queried σF,x in
the 4th component and where the 7th component is empty (i.e. those rows relating
to computations on this encoded input that have not yet been performed). For each
such row, r, the challenger takes the second component (the function identifier, F˜ ),
and checks that there exists a server identity S˜ such that the tuple (S˜, SKS˜) ∈ LReg
(where SKS˜ is that given as input to the Compute oracle) and such that the tuple
(S˜, F˜ , EKF,S˜) ∈ LF (where EKF,S˜ is also that given as input to the Compute oracle).
This check ensures that there is a currently un-revoked server (as the entries of LF
for S˜ have not been removed) that holds the signing key and evaluation key being
used to perform the computation and which is certified for a function F˜ for which
the encoded input σF,x for this computation was generated
3.
The challenger then performs the Compute algorithm on the queried σF,x, EKF,S
and SKS to produce an output θF (x). For each of the rows r of T found above,
the challenger writes θF (x) and S˜ to the 7
th and 8th components of r respectively.
Thus, a row of T will only have a (non-empty) value in the 7th component if there
3Note that there could be multiple such identities S˜ satisfying this check, if the parameters SKS and
EKF,S are both generated for multiple identities; in practice, good randomised algorithms should ensure
that there is a negligible chance that this actually occurs. We are only interested in ensuring that there
exists at least one non-revoked server with these parameters to perform the computation, and so if multiple
such server identifiers are found then the challenger may choose S˜ from this set at random.
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exists a non-revoked, certified server to perform the computation for which σF,x was
generated.
Thus, when complete, the entries of T will be of the form
(x, F, F (x), σF,x, V KF,x, RKF,x, θF (x), S).
After a polynomial number of queries, the adversary will return a value θ?F (x) which he
believes either encodes an incorrect computational result or which encodes a correct com-
putational result yet which the Verify algorithm will reject (that is, an output for which
the protocol execution will not be correct). The challenger first performs a look up in T
for all entries containing θ?F (x) in the 7
th position of the tuple, and stores any such entries
as another table T˜ . Note that this means that θ?F (x) must have been honestly generated
by the Compute oracle (else it would not be in T ).
For each such row4, the challenger uses the 5th and 6th components of the row (the verifi-
cation key and retrieval key) to run Verify on θ?F (x) to generate the outputs y and τθF (x) .
The challenger first checks whether y matches the 3rd component of the row (that is,
whether y is the correct computational result F (x)). If so, it then checks whether τθF (x) =
(reject, S), and if so it ends the game by returning 1 to indicate that the adversary has
won the game (the adversary has found a valid encoding of a correct result, computed by
a certified, non-revoked server, that the Verify algorithm is incorrectly rejecting).
On the other hand, if y did not match the correct value of F (x), the challenger also ends
the game by returning 1 to indicate that the adversary has won the game (the adversary
in this case has found an incorrect result that was computed honestly by the algorithms).
If no row in T˜ allows the adversary to win, then the challenger outputs 0 to indicate
that the adversary has lost. An RPVC scheme is correct if, for all PPT adversaries, the
probability that the adversary wins the game described above is 0.
4Again, in practice it is unlikely that randomised algorithms will produce the same encoded output on
different inputs but we allow it in the correctness definition.
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3.4 Security Models
The introduction of the KDC, multiple servers and the ability to compute multiple func-
tions, and the subsequent changes in operation give rise to several new security concerns:
• Public verification. Since multiple servers may be certified to compute multiple
functions, it is important to ensure that servers cannot collude or otherwise cheat in
order to convince a client of an incorrect output;
• Revocation. We must ensure that neither an uncertified nor a revoked server can
convince a client to accept an output;
• Vindictive servers. We must ensure that a malicious server cannot convince a client
that an honest server has produced an incorrect output;
• Vindictive manager. We must ensure that, in the manager model, a malicious man-
ager cannot convince a client of an incorrect result;
Given these security concerns, we define four notions of security for RPVC, each mod-
elled as a cryptographic game. In the cases of public verifiability, revocation and vindic-
tive managers, we also define weaker notions of security which we term selective, semi-
static notions. This is due to the particular IND-sHRSS indirectly revocable key-policy
attribute-based encryption scheme we use in our construction, which requires similar re-
strictions. In other words, given the current primitives we use in our construction, we
cannot achieve full security for these notions, but can achieve the slightly weaker variants
presented here. As our construction uses the KP-ABE scheme as a black-box, if stronger
primitives are found it should be easy to swap to using these to achieve full security. In
this section, we will first introduce the ideal notions of security we would like an RPVC
scheme to achieve. We then, in Section 3.4.2, discuss the necessary modifications to the
above notions to define the selective and semi-static notions that we can currently achieve.
We also discuss their relation to the IND-sHRSS game, although it may be helpful to
refer back to this discussion after the construction has been introduced in Section 3.5.
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Game 3.2 ExpPubVerifA
[RPVC, 1`,F]
1: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
2: (F, x?)
$← AO(PP)
3: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
4: (σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x?)
$← ProbGen(x?, PKF ,PP)
5: θ?
$← AO(σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x? , PKF ,PP)
6: (y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, V KF,x? , RKF,x? ,PP)
7: if (((y, τθ?) 6= (⊥, (reject,A))) and (y 6= F (x?))) then
8: return 1
9: else return 0
3.4.1 Ideal Security Properties
In this section we discuss the ideal security notions we would like to achieve in the RPVC
setting. Even though we cannot currently achieve all of these notions completely, we
include them for completeness.
3.4.1.1 Public Verifiability
We extend the public verifiability game of Parno et al. [84] to formalise that servers should
not be able to cheat or collude to gain an advantage in convincing any verifying party of
an incorrect output (i.e. that Verify does not return accept on an encoded output θF (x)
that does not in fact encode the correct output F (x)).
Recall that Parno et al. [84] considered the case where the adversary is limited to learning
only one evaluation key (as the system is initialised for only one server and one function).
The motivation for this updated game is that there is a now a trusted party issuing keys
to multiple servers who may collude. Each server can request evaluation keys for multiple
functions and must not be able to use an evaluation key for a function G to produce a
valid looking result for a computation request for F (x). Thus, in our game, we allow
the adversary to learn multiple evaluation keys for different functions and associated to
different servers (since evaluation keys are server-specific in our setting to enable per-
server revocation). In our setting, it is likely that the set of servers will be performing
computations on behalf of multiple clients simultaneously, and so the adversary is also
able to learn multiple encoded inputs by performing the ProbGen algorithm.
The ideal notion of public verifiability for RPVC is presented in Game 3.2. The game
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Game 3.3 ExpmPubVerifA
[RPVC, 1`,F]
1: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F);
2: {(Fi, x?i )}i∈[n] $← AO(PP);
3: for i = 1 to n do
4: PKFi
$← FnInit(Fi,MK,PP);
5: (σFi,x?i , V KFi,x?i , RKFi,x?i )
$← ProbGen(x?i , PKFi ,PP);
6: θ?
$← AO({σFi,x?i , V KFi,x?i , RKFi,x?i , PKFi},PP);
7: if (∃i ∈ [n] s.t. (((y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, V KFi,x?i , RKFi,x?i ,PP))
and ((y, τθ?) 6= (⊥, (reject,A))) and (y 6= Fi(x?i )))) then
8: return 1
9: else return 0
begins with the challenger setting up the system. The adversary, A, is given the result-
ing public parameters and given oracle access to FnInit(·,MK,PP), Register(·,MK,PP),
Certify(·, ·,MK,PP) and Revoke(·,MK,PP), denoted by O. All oracles simply run the
relevant algorithm. This models the adversary observing an existing RPVC system and
corrupting various servers to learn their evaluation keys.
Eventually, the adversary will finish this query phase and outputs a choice of challenge
function F with input x? — the adversary will attempt to convince the challenger of
an incorrect result for the computation of F (x?). The challenger will then run FnInit to
initialise the challenge function F and generate a challenge by running ProbGen on this
input, and give the resulting encoded input to A. The adversary is again given oracle
access and wins if it can produce an encoded output that verifies correctly but does not
encode the value F (x?) — that is, the challenger accepts an incorrect result.
Definition 3.5. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the PubVerif game for an
RPVC construction, RPVC, for a family of functions F is defined as:
AdvPubVerifA (RPVC, 1`,F) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpPubVerifA
[RPVC, 1`,F]].
An RPVC scheme, RPVC, is secure with respect to public verifiability if, for all PPT
adversaries A,
AdvPubVerifA (RPVC, 1`,F) 6 negl(`).
In practical environments, a server may be interacting with multiple clients simultaneously
and it could be that having multiple simultaneous interactions could provide an advantage
against any one of the computations. Thus, when modelling this scenario as a game, we
may wish the adversary to choose a polynomially sized set of n input values to be challenged
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upon to model these simultaneous inputs, and for the adversary to win against any one of
the inputs. This is shown for the case of public verifiability in Game 3.3. However, it is
easy to see that this is polynomially equivalent to the case where the adversary chooses a
single challenge input, as in Game 3.2.
Theorem 3.1. Let n ∈ N be polynomial in the security parameter `. Then public verifi-
ability where the adversary may target an arbitrary set of n challenge inputs (Game 3.3)
is polynomially equivalent to public verifiability where the adversary chooses a single chal-
lenge input (Game 3.2).
Proof. It is trivial to show that security with multiple choices implies security with a single
choice, since an adversary with multiple choices could simply choose n = 1 and output a
single choice.
To see that security with a single choice also implies security with multiple choices we can
perform the following reduction. Suppose that RPVC is an RPVC scheme secure when the
adversary AS makes a single choice of challenge input. In order to obtain a contradiction,
suppose AM is an adversary with non-negligible advantage δ against RPVC when it can
make multiple challenge choices. We show that AS could use AM as a sub-routine to gain
a non-negligible advantage against RPVC even with just a single challenge choice. Let C
be the challenger playing Game 3.2 with AS who in turn acts as the challenger for AM in
Game 3.3.
1. C runs Setup and sends the resulting public parameters to AS who simply forwards
them to AM .
2. AM makes oracle queries which AS passes to C and forwards the response to AM .
3. AM will return a set of n challenge inputs {(Fi, x?i )}i∈[n].
4. AS chooses one of these challenges at random, (F, x?) $← {(Fi, x?i )}i∈[n], and sends
this to C.
5. C returns the results of running FnInit and ProbGen on F and x? respectively and
provides oracle access to AS .
6. AS can query the FnInit oracle for all other PKFi and run ProbGen for the remaining
inputs {x?i }i∈[n] \ x? (as ProbGen relies only on public information), and returns
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the whole set to AM . Since no other query was made between C generating the
challenge and these ProbGen queries, the system parameters have not changed and
all challenges are consistent.
7. AM makes oracle queries which AS again forwards to C, and then outputs a challenge
output θ?.
8. Let x?j be the challenge input that θ
? corresponds to — that is, since AM is assumed
to be successful, Verify(θ?, V KFj ,x?j , RKFj ,x?j ,PP) does not return (⊥, (reject, ·)) and
hence θ? is a valid encoding of F (x?j ) for some x
?
j . If x
?
j = x
? then AS forwards θ?
to C as its result. Otherwise, AS stops.
Hence,
AdvPubVerifAS (RPVC, 1`,F) = Pr[x? = x?j ] ·AdvmPubVerifAM (RPVC, 1`,F) =
δ
n
.
Now, since we assumed δ was non-negligible and n is polynomial, we conclude that
AdvPubVerifAS (RPVC, 1`,F) is non-negligible. However, we assumed that RPVC was se-
cure against a single challenge and hence the adversary making multiple challenges with
non-negligible advantage may not exist.
A similar argument holds for the remaining games, and henceforth we only consider single
challenges.
3.4.1.2 Revocation
The notion of revocation requires that, if a server is detected as misbehaving (i.e. a server
S returns a result that causes the Verify algorithm to output (⊥, (reject, S))), then any
subsequent computations by S should be rejected (even if the result is correct). We aim to
remove any incentive for an malicious server to attempt to provide an outsourcing service
since it knows the result will not be accepted, and we may punish and further discourage
malicious servers by removing their ability to perform work (and earn rewards). Finally,
from a privacy perspective, we may not wish to supply input data to a server that is known
to be untrustworthy.
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Game 3.4 ExpRevA
[RPVC, 1`,F]
1: chall← false
2: QRev ← 
3: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
4: (F, x?)
$← AO(PP)
5: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
6: chall← true
7: (σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x?)
$← ProbGen(x?, PKF ,PP)
8: θ?
$← AO(σx? , V KF,x? , RKF,x? , PKF ,PP)
9: if ((((y, (accept, S))← Verify(θ?, V KF,x? , RKF,x? ,PP))
and (S ∈ QRev)) then
10: return 1
11: else return 0
Oracle 3.3 OCertify(S, F ′,MK,PP)
1: if (chall = false) then QRev ← QRev \ S
2: return Certify(S, F ′,MK,PP)
Oracle 3.4 ORevoke(τθF ′(x) , F ′,MK,PP)
1: UM
$← Revoke(τθF ′(x) , F ′,MK,PP)
2: if (UM 6=⊥ and chall = false) then QRev ← QRev ∪ S
3: return UM
The ideal notion of revocation, presented in Game 3.4, begins by declaring a Boolean flag
chall which is initially set to false and an (empty) list QRev which servers will be added
to when revoked and removed from when re-certified. The chall flag will be set to true
when the challenge is created, and after this point QRev is no longer updated. Thus QRev
will comprise all servers that are revoked at the challenge time and hence all servers that,
if an adversary can output a result ‘from’ one of these servers and have it accepted, will
count as a win for the adversary.
The game proceeds in a similar fashion to public verifiability with the challenger running
Setup to initialise the system and providing the public parameters to the adversary. The
adversary is also given oracle access to the functions FnInit(·,MK,PP), Register(·,MK,PP),
Certify(·, ·,MK,PP) and Revoke(·,MK,PP), denoted by O. All oracles simply run the
relevant algorithms with the exception of Certify and Revoke which additionally maintain
the list of revoked entities as mentioned above and as specified in Oracles 3.3 and 3.4
respectively. After the adversary has finished this query phase, it outputs a choice of
challenge function F and challenge input x?. The challenger runs FnInit for F and sets
the chall flag to true. It then generates the challenge by running ProbGen on x? and
gives the resulting parameters to the adversary along with oracle access again (however,
since chall is set to true, QRev will no longer be updated). Eventually, the adversary
outputs a result θ? and wins if Verify outputs accept for a server that was revoked when
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Game 3.5 ExpVindSA
[RPVC, 1`,F]
1: QReg ← 
2: Qchall ← 
3: S˜ ←⊥
4: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
5: (F, x?)
$← AO(PP)
6: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
7: (σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x?)
$← ProbGen(x?, PKF ,PP)
8: S˜
$← AO(σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x? , PKF ,PP)
9: if (S˜ ∈ Qchall) then return ⊥
10: θ?
$← AO,OCompute(σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x? , PKF ,PP)
11: (y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, V KF,x? , RKF,x? ,PP)
12: if (((y, τθ?) = (⊥, (reject, S˜))) and (⊥8 Revoke(τθ? ,MK,PP))) then
13: return 1
14: else return 0
the challenge was generated (even if the result is correct).
Definition 3.6. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the Rev game for an RPVC
construction, RPVC, for a family of functions F is defined as:
AdvRevA (RPVC, 1`,F) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpRevA
[RPVC, 1`,F]].
An RPVC scheme, RPVC, is secure with respect to revocation if, for all PPT adversaries
A,
AdvRevA (RPVC, 1`,F) 6 negl(`).
3.4.1.3 Vindictive Servers
This notion is particularly relevant in the context of the manager model. Recall that
clients submit ‘jobs’ to a manager who distributes the work to a server selected from
a pool of available computational servers. Thus, the client may not a priori know the
identity of the selected server. Since an invalid result can lead to revocation, this reveals
a new threat model (particularly if servers are rewarded per computation). A malicious
server may return incorrect results but attribute them to a different server ID leading to
the revocation (and punishment) of an honest server. The pool of available servers for
future computations is therefore reduced in size, potentially to advantage of the malicious
server.
In Game 3.5, the challenger maintains a list of currently registered entities QReg, a list
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Oracle 3.5 ORegister(S,MK,PP)
1: if (S = S˜) then return ⊥
2: if (S, ·) /∈ QReg then
3: SKS
$← Register(S,MK,PP)
4: QReg ← QReg ∪ (S, SKS)
5: Qchall ← Qchall ∪ S
6: return SKS
Oracle 3.6 ORegister2(S,MK,PP)
1: if (S, ·) /∈ QReg then
2: SKS
$← Register(S,MK,PP)
3: QReg ← QReg ∪ (S, SKS)
4: return ⊥
Oracle 3.7 OCompute(σF ′,x, EKF ′,S˜ , SKS˜ ,PP)
1: if ((x = x?) and (F ′ = F )) then return ⊥
2: return Compute(σF ′,x, EKF ′,S˜ , SKS˜ ,PP)
Qchall of entities for which the adversary has learnt the signing key, and defines S˜, the
target server identity, to be initially ⊥ until the adversary chooses its target. The game
proceeds like the previous ones except that, on lines 8 and 10, the adversary selects the
ID for a target server, S˜, and then generates an encoded output that he hopes will result
in the revocation of S˜. He is given oracle access to FnInit(·,MK,PP), Register(·,MK,PP),
Register2(·,MK,PP), Certify(·, ·,MK,PP) and Revoke(·,MK,PP), denoted by O. These
oracles, described below, must ensure that the adversary is never issued the signing key
SKS˜ as he would then trivially be able to act like S˜ and win the game. For the same
reason, when choosing the target server S˜ on line 8, the adversary loses the game if he has
previously learnt the signing key SKS˜ (i.e. S˜ is listed on Qchall). On line 10, the adversary
is also given access to a Compute oracle OCompute(·, EK·,S˜ , SKS˜ ,PP) which allows the
adversary to view evaluation results generated (only) by the target server S˜; this models
the adversary observing S˜ prior to attacking.
The Register oracle, presented in Oracle 3.5, returns a failure symbol ⊥ if queried for
the challenge identity S˜, and otherwise adds the queried server S to the list Qchall (as
it will issue the signing key SKS). On line 8 the adversary is additionally given access
to a modified Register oracle, defined in Oracle 3.6. This Register2 oracle performs the
Register algorithm but does not return the resulting key SKS (it may, however, update the
public parameters to reflect the additional registered entity). The adversary may query
any identity to Register2 (including S˜). The purpose of this oracle is to allow the adversary
to enrol servers in the system without learning the corresponding server specific secrets;
this models the adversary observing uncorrupted servers within the RPVC system which
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he can target for revocation. Clearly, if the adversary corrupts a server and learns the
signing key, then it can output an incorrect answer and trivially cause the server to be
revoked; the goal in this game is to cause an honest, uncorrupted, server to be revoked.
Both Oracle 3.5 and 3.6 first check whether the queried server S has already been added to
the list QReg; if not, both algorithms run Register and add the server identity and signing
key to QReg. If the server was already listed in QReg then the Register oracle returns the
stored signing key for the server, whilst the Register2 oracle will return ⊥. Thus, both
oracles will, together, generate a single signing key per server.
Finally, to prevent a trivial win in which the adversary simply forwards a prior result
actually generated by S˜, we restrict queries to the Compute oracle in Oracle 3.7. The
adversary cannot ask for the evaluation of the challenge computation F (x?) from S˜. Note
that for all other servers, the adversary can run Compute itself using parameters learnt
from other queries.
The adversary wins if the challenger believes S˜ generated y and revokes S˜.
Definition 3.7. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the VindS game for an RPVC
construction, RPVC, for a family of functions F is defined as:
AdvVindSA (RPVC, 1`,F) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpVindSA
[RPVC, 1`,F]].
An RPVC scheme, RPVC, is secure with respect to vindictive servers if, for all PPT
adversaries A,
AdvVindSA (RPVC, 1`,F) 6 negl(`).
3.4.1.4 Vindictive Managers
The notion of vindictive managers is a natural extension of public verifiability to the
manager model where a vindictive manager may attempt to provide a client with an
incorrect answer. If clients subscribe to a pool of servers maintained by a manager, the
manager may not wish to own up to incorrect results to avoid losing business, but also may
not have the available resources within its system to recompute an incorrect computation.
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Game 3.6 ExpVindMA
[RPVC, 1`,F]
1: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
2: (F, x?)
$← AO(PP)
3: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
4: S
$← UID
5: SKS
$← Register(S,MK,PP)
6: EKF,S
$← Certify(S, F,MK,PP)
7: (σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x?)
$← ProbGen(x?, PKF ,PP)
8: θF (x?)
$← Compute(σF,x? , EKF,S , SKS ,PP)
9: (RTF (x?), τθF (x?))
$← AO(σF,x? , θF (x?), V KF,x? , PKF ,PP)
10: if ((y ← Retrieve(τθF (x?) , RTF (x?), V KF,x? , RKF,x? ,PP))
and (y 6= F (x?)) and (y 6=⊥)) then
11: return 1
12: else return 0
Thus, occasionally, the manager may try to send an incorrect result to the client with
supposed assurance that it is correct.
We remark that instantiations may vary depending on the level of trust given to the
manager; a completely trusted manager may simply return the result to a client, whilst an
untrusted manager may have to provide the full response from the server so that the client
can execute Verify (in this case, security against vindictive managers will reduce to public
verifiability since the manager would need to forge a full encoded output that passes a full
verification step). Here, we consider a middle ground where the manager is semi-trusted
but clients would like a final, efficient check.
The ideal notion of security against vindictive managers, presented in Game 3.6, be-
gins with the challenger initialising the system as usual. The adversary is given oracle
access to the functions FnInit(·,MK,PP), Register(·,MK,PP), Certify(·, ·,MK,PP) and
Revoke(·,MK,PP), denoted by O. Each oracle simply runs the relevant algorithm. After
a polynomial number of queries, the adversary outputs a challenge function F and input
x?. The challenger runs FnInit and selects a server identity uniformly at random from the
space of all identities UID; this identity will be used to generate the challenge. It runs
Register and Certify for this server (if not already done during the oracle queries), creates
a problem instance by running ProbGen on x? and finally runs Compute on the generated
encoded input. The adversary is then given the encoded input, verification key, the output
from Compute and oracle access as above. The adversary must output a retrieval token
RTF (x?) and an acceptance token τθF (x?) . The challenger runs Retrieve on RTF (x) to get an
output value y, and the adversary wins if the challenger accepts this output and y 6= F (x?)
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(i.e. the retrieved result is incorrect).
Definition 3.8. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the VindM game for an RPVC
construction, RPVC, for a family of functions F is defined as:
AdvVindMA (RPVC, 1`,F) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpVindMA
[RPVC, 1`,F]].
An RPVC scheme, RPVC, is secure with respect to vindictive managers if, for all PPT
adversaries A,
AdvVindMA (RPVC, 1`,F) 6 negl(`).
3.4.2 Restricted Security Notions
As mentioned, using current primitives, we cannot achieve the ideal notions of public
verifiability, revocation or vindictive managers. We therefore introduce slightly weakened
versions of these security notions to reflect the similar restrictions placed on our construc-
tion by the IND-sHRSS indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme we use (see Section 3.2.2).
As we use this primitive as a black box, it should be easy to achieve the ideal security
notions if a fully secure primitive with the same functionality is found; this will be the
subject of future work.
These variants introduce two additional restrictions on the adversary. Firstly, a selective
restriction requires the adversary to declare the set of input values to be used in the
challenge stage before seeing the public parameters. This is in contrast to the full game
where the inputs are chosen after the adversary has oracle access to the system. As
mentioned in Section 2.8.5, this restriction has similarly been used in many ABE schemes
to give a heuristic level of security when full security is difficult to achieve, as it allows the
system to be initialised with a particular attack target in mind. A possible motivation for
this restriction in practice is when there are high-value targets within the system which
are most likely to be attacked.
Secondly, a semi-static restriction requires the adversary to declare a list R of servers
that must be revoked when the challenge encoded inputs are generated from ProbGen.
The adversary must do this before receiving oracle access. This restriction arises from
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the revocation mechanism of the revocable KP-ABE scheme and means that oracles are
able to refuse to respond to queries that would lead to a trivial win, e.g. that would issue
functional keys to users that should be revoked for the challenge time period.
To remove the first (selective) restriction, we require a fully secure indirectly revocable
KP-ABE scheme. To remove the second (semi-static) restriction, we require an adaptive
notion of revocation. At present, instantiating such a primitive is an open problem.5
To implement the semi-static restriction, we must add some additional steps to each
security notion. The challenger must now define two additional parameters: t and QRev.
The variable t models system time and is initialised to 1. It is incremented each time a
revocation query is made to illustrate that keys generated at prior time periods may no
longer function.
In the IND-sHRSS game [14], update keys are associated with a time period and queries
can be made for update keys for arbitrary time periods. However, in our setting, we
consider an interactive protocol; as such, time must increase monotonically. The time
period is important in the consideration of the revocation functionality — a user should
not have access to a secret decryption key and an update key for any time period which
together would form a functional decryption key for the challenge ciphertext and would
allow a trivial win. The adversary in the IND-sHRSS game selects a time period for the
challenge as well as a challenge input. In our game, however, we parametrise the adversary
on the number, q, of queries he may make to his oracles and define security over all choices
of q. In particular, we restrict the adversary to make qt 6 q queries to the Revoke oracle in
its first query phase (before the challenge is generated). Since t is incremented only when
a Revoke query is made, the challenge will occur at time t? = qt, and hence the challenger
may select t? as its challenge time in a reductive proof.
The other additional parameter, QRev, is a list (initialised to be empty) comprising all
servers that are revoked during the current time period. Servers are added to the list
when the Revoke oracle is queried with a reject token, and are removed from the list if
subsequently certified for a function. Thus, unless one server is added or removed as
mentioned, the revocation list remains consistent over consecutive oracle queries to model
realistic system evolution (whereas, in the IND-sHRSS game, the revocation list can be
5Attrapadung and Imai [14] defined a notion with adaptive queries but did not provide an instantiation.
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Game 3.7 ExpsPubVerifA
[RPVC, 1`,F]
1: (F, x?)
$← A(1`,F)
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
3: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
4: (σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x?)
$← ProbGen(x?, PKF ,PP)
5: θ?
$← AO(σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x? , PKF ,PP)
6: (y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, V KF,x? , RKF,x? ,PP)
7: if (((y, τθ?) 6= (⊥, (reject, ·))) and (y 6= F (x?))) then
8: return 1
9: else return 0
dynamically changed per query). By the semi-static restriction, the adversary must choose
a revocation list R detailing all servers that should be revoked at the challenge time. If
the actual list of revoked servers, QRev, at the challenge time t
? is not a superset of this
list (i.e. there exists a server that the adversary claimed would be revoked but actually is
not) then the adversary has not requested a suitable sequence of oracle queries and loses
the game to avoid a trivial win — the oracles that responded to queries based on R may
well have issued key material that would allow the adversary to respond trivially to the
challenge.
To avoid other trivial wins, we must restrict the oracle queries that the adversary may
make such that he cannot obtain both a secret key and an update key (i.e. a full evaluation
key in our terminology) for a server that is revoked at the challenge time. Otherwise, if the
adversary could obtain a valid update key for the challenge time and a secret key, he can
form a full, functional evaluation key which will evaluate the challenge encoded input and
form a correct result; clearly, a revoked server would not have such an ability in practice.
Note that unlike the oracle queries in the IND-sHRSS game, both “KeyGen” (Certify)
queries and “Update KeyGen” (Revoke) queries include a notion of identity and Revoke
queries cannot be made for arbitrary time periods. Hence the oracle restrictions in these
games differ slightly from those in the IND-sHRSS game but capture the same principle.
3.4.2.1 Selective Public Verifiability
We define a selective notion of public verifiability in Game 3.7. The only difference between
this and the ideal notion in Game 3.2 is that, in the selective notion, the adversary chooses
the challenge inputs F and x? before Setup is run. Note that in this notion, we do not
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Game 3.8 ExpsSS-RevA
[RPVC, 1`,F , qt]
1: (F, x?)
$← A(1`,F , qt)
2: QRev ← 
3: t← 1
4: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
5: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
6: R
$← A(PKF ,PP)
7: AO(PKF ,PP)
8: if (R 6⊆ QRev) then return 0
9: (σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x?)
$← ProbGen(x?, PKF ,PP)
10: θ?
$← AO(σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x? , PKF ,PP)
11: if ((((y, (accept, S))← Verify(θ?, V KF,x? , RKF,x? ,PP))
and (S ∈ R)) then
12: return 1
13: else return 0
Oracle 3.8 OCertify(S, F ′,MK,PP)
1: if ((F ′ = F and S /∈ R) or (t = qt and R 6⊆ QRev \ S)) then return ⊥
2: QRev ← QRev \ S
3: return Certify(S, F ′,MK,PP)
require the semi-static restriction since the revocation mechanism is not considered as part
of the winning condition.
Definition 3.9. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the sPubVerif game for an
RPVC construction, RPVC, for a family of functions F is defined as:
AdvsPubVerifA (RPVC, 1`,F) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpsPubVerifA
[RPVC, 1`,F]].
An RPVC scheme, RPVC, is secure with respect to selective public verifiability if, for all
PPT adversaries A,
AdvsPubVerifA (RPVC, 1`,F) 6 negl(`).
3.4.2.2 Selective, Semi-static Revocation
The selective, semi-static notion of revocation is given in Game 3.8 and Oracles 3.8 and 3.9.
Recall that an adversary wins in this notion if it can output any result that is formed
by a revoked entity yet is accepted by the challenger. Since revocation is an inherent
requirement in the winning condition, we require both the selective and the semi-static
restrictions to accommodate the IND-sHRSS game.
The adversary first selects an input value and function F to be outsourced. The challenger
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Oracle 3.9 ORevoke(τθF ′(x) ,MK,PP)
1: t← t+ 1
2: if (τθF ′(x) = (accept, ·)) then return ⊥
3: if (t = qt and R 6⊆ QRev ∪ S) then return ⊥
4: QRev ← QRev ∪ S
5: return Revoke(τθF ′(x) ,MK,PP)
initialises an (empty) list of currently revoked entities QRev and a time parameter t before
running Setup and FnInit to create a public delegation key for the function F (lines 2
to 5). The adversary is given the generated public parameters and must output a list
R of servers to be revoked when the challenge is created. It is then, on line 7, given
oracle access to the functions FnInit(·,MK,PP), Register(·,MK,PP), Certify(·, ·,MK,PP)
and Revoke(·,MK,PP), denoted by O.
The challenger responds to Certify and Revoke queries as detailed in Oracles 3.8 and
3.9 respectively, whilst all other oracles simply run the relevant algorithm and return the
results to the adversary. C must ensure that QRev is kept up-to-date by adding or removing
the queried entity, and in the case of revocation must increment the time parameter. It
also ensures that issued keys will not lead to a trivial win. In Oracle 3.8, for the Certify
algorithm, this amounts to not issuing an evaluation key EKF,S for the challenge function
F and for a server S that may not be revoked at the time that the challenge is generated —
otherwise, an issued key may be valid and functional for the challenge and the adversary
can trivially evaluate the challenge computation as a non-revoked server.
Recall that the adversary is parameterised to make exactly qt revocation queries and that
the time period is incremented only during the revocation algorithm; the challenge time
period is therefore when t = qt. An evaluation key for a server S should also not be issued
by Oracle 3.8 if requested during the challenge time period qt and if there exists a server
(other than S as it is about to be certified and removed from QRev) that should be revoked
according to challenge revocation list R chosen by the adversary but has not actually been
revoked (is not listed on QRev). The intuition behind this restriction is that Certify issues
an evaluation key which is functional for the current time period (it may only be disabled
by revoking the server but this would increment the time period too). In particular, as
in our construction, Certify may reveal update material (such as that generated by the
latest revocation procedure) that enables evaluation keys to be functional for the current
time period. Therefore, if such update material is issued, any non-revoked evaluation key
may be updated for the current, challenge time period qt and may be used to evaluate
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computations and return valid results that are accepted by the challenger. If the updated
evaluation key belongs to a server that was listed on R, then this would count as a win
for the adversary (as the adversary claimed this server would be revoked at this point).
This counts as a trivial win as the accepted result was not generated by a revoked server.
Oracle 3.9 first increments the time parameter t and returns ⊥ if the queried token is
(accept, ·) i.e. there is no server to revoke; this replicates the expected behaviour of the
Revoke algorithm. Since t is still incremented, the adversary may query acceptance tokens
to Revoke in order to progress the system time without altering the revocation list if
desired. To avoid trivial wins, if a query is made at the challenge time i.e. t = t?, the
challenger must return ⊥ if the challenge revocation list R is not a subset of the current
revocation list QRev (including the queried server S as this is about to be revoked). That
is, ⊥ is returned if there exists a server, other than S, listed on R (and hence that should
be revoked at the challenge time period i.e. the current time period), but is not actually on
the list of currently revoked servers. This requirement stems from the same issue regarding
update material as above.
The adversary finishes this query phase on line 7 after making a polynomial number of
queries, q, including exactly qt Revoke queries. It does not return a value other than sig-
nalling the challenger that it may proceed with the remainder of the game. The challenger
checks that the queries made by the adversary has indeed generated a list of revoked en-
tities that is a superset of R. If not (i.e. there is a server that the adversary included on
R but is not currently revoked), then the adversary loses the game as it did not choose R
or its queries appropriately. Otherwise, the challenger generates the challenge by running
ProbGen on x?. The adversary is given the resulting encoded input and oracle access again,
and wins if it outputs any result (even a correct encoding of F (x?)) that is accepted as a
valid response from any server that was revoked at the time of the challenge, which the
adversary chose to be (at least) those servers on R.
Definition 3.10. The advantage of a PPT adversary A making a polynomial number,
q, of oracle queries, of which qt are Revoke queries, in the sSS-Rev game for an RPVC
construction, RPVC, for a family of functions F is defined as:
AdvsSS-RevA (RPVC, 1`,F , qt) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpsSS-RevA
[RPVC, 1`,F , qt]].
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Game 3.9 ExpsVindMA
[RPVC, 1`,F]
1: (F, x?)
$← A(1`,F)
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
3: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
4: S
$← UID
5: SKS
$← Register(S,MK,PP)
6: EKF,S
$← Certify(S, F,MK,PP)
7: (σF,x? , V KF,x? , RKF,x?)
$← ProbGen(x?, PKF ,PP)
8: θF (x?)
$← Compute(σF,x? , EKF,S , SKS ,PP)
9: (RTF (x?), τθF (x?))
$← AO(σF,x? , θF (x?), V KF,x? , PKF ,PP)
10: y ← Retrieve(τθF (x?) , RTF (x?), V KF,x? , RKF,x? ,PP)
11: if ((y 6= F (x?)) and (y 6=⊥)) then
12: return 1
13: else return 0
An RPVC scheme, RPVC, is secure with respect to selective, semi-static revocation if,
for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvsSS-RevA (RPVC, 1`,F , qt) 6 negl(`).
3.4.2.3 Selective Vindictive Managers
As with the public verifiability notion, vindictive managers does not rely on revocation for
the winning condition and so we only require the selective restriction, which is presented
in Game 3.9.
The adversary first selects its challenge pair of F and x?. The challenger sets up the
system, runs FnInit for F and then selects a server uniformly at random from the space
of server identities UID. This server will be used to generate the challenge parameters
for the adversary. The challenger registers and certifies S for F , and runs ProbGen on
the challenge input, before finally running Compute to generate an encoded output θF (x?).
The adversary is then given the encoded input, verification key and θF (x?), as well as
oracle access to the functions FnInit(·,MK,PP), Register(·,MK,PP), Certify(·, ·,MK,PP)
and Revoke(·,MK,PP), denoted by O. It must output a retrieval token RTF (x?) and an
acceptance token τθF (x?) . The challenger runs Retrieve on RTF (x?) to get an output value
y; the adversary wins if the challenger accepts this output and y 6= F (x?).
Definition 3.11. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the sVindM game for an
RPVC construction, RPVC, for a family of functions F is defined as:
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AdvsVindMA (RPVC, 1`,F) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpsVindMA
[RPVC, 1`,F]].
An RPVC scheme, RPVC, is secure with respect to selective vindictive managers if, for
all PPT adversaries A,
AdvsVindMA (RPVC, 1`,F) 6 negl(`).
3.5 Construction
We now provide an instantiation of an RPVC scheme. Our construction is based on that
used by Parno et al. [84] (summarised in Section 3.2.1) which uses key-policy attribute-
based encryption (KP-ABE) as a black-box to outsource the computation of a (monotone)
Boolean function. We restrict our attention to (monotone) Boolean functions closed un-
der complement, and in particular the complexity class NC1 which includes all circuits of
depth O(log n) [10]. Thus, functions we can outsource can be built from common opera-
tions such as AND and OR gates, NOT gates (if using a non-monotonic ABE scheme [80]),
equality and comparison operators, arithmetic operators and regular expressions. Note
that although our scheme only admits Boolean functions (with single bit output) and
therefore seems somewhat restrictive, it is possible to outsource the evaluation of func-
tions with n-bit outputs by outsourcing n different functions, each of which returns the
single bit in position i, 1 6 i 6 n.
Clearly, different function families will require different constructions from that presented
here for Boolean functions. As a trivial example, verifiable outsourced evaluation of the
identity function may only require the server to sign the input. On the other hand, despite
it seemingly being a natural choice for outsourcing, it is not clear how a VC scheme
for determining if a statement is in an NP-complete language could be instantiated. A
solution for such problems is by definition difficult to find so should be outsourced, whilst
a candidate solution can be verified efficiently. However, a malicious server could simply
claim that a solution cannot be found for the given problem instance, and the restricted
client could not verify the correctness of this statement without searching the solution
space itself.
Recall from Section 3.2.1 that, using a single ABE system, if a computational server returns
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⊥ in response to a Boolean computation request then the verifier is unable to determine
whether F (x) = 0 or whether the server misbehaved. To avoid this issue, we restrict the
family of functions F we can evaluate to be the set of Boolean functions closed under
complement. That is, if F belongs to F then F , where F (x) = F (x) ⊕ 1, also belongs
to F . The client encrypts two random messages m0 and m1 and the server must decrypt
each using keys associated with policies for the functions F and F respectively. Since
exactly one of F and F will be satisfied by any given input, exactly one plaintext will be
successfully recovered by the Decrypt algorithm. Note that, to achieve blind verification in
our construction, the retrieval key RKF,x will be a single bit b which permutes the order of
the ciphertexts in σF,x and hence the order of the plaintexts in θF (x). Thus, a well-formed
response θF (x), comprising recovered plaintexts (db, d1−b), satisfies the following:
(db, d1−b) =

(mb,⊥), if F (x) = 1;
(⊥,m1−b), if F (x) = 0.
(3.2)
Hence, the client will be able to detect whether the server has misbehaved or deduce the
value of F (x) otherwise.
3.5.1 Technical Details
We use an indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme comprising the algorithms ABE.Setup,
ABE.KeyGen, ABE.KeyUpdate, ABE.Encrypt and ABE.Decrypt. We also use a signature
scheme with algorithms Sig.KeyGen, Sig.Sign and Sig.Verify, and a one-way function g.
Let U = Uattr ∪UID ∪Utime ∪UF be the universe of attributes for the ABE scheme, formed
as the union of the following ‘sub-universes’:
• Uattr comprises attributes that form characteristic tuples for input data, as detailed
in Section 3.2.1;
• UID comprises attributes representing entity identifiers;
• Utime comprises attributes representing time periods output by a time source T;
• UF comprises attributes that represent functions in F .
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3.5.1.1 Handling Multiple Servers
The PVC scheme of Parno et al. [84], which permitted the evaluation of only a single
function, required a one-key IND-CPA notion of security for the underlying KP-ABE
scheme. This is a more relaxed notion than considered in the vast majority of the ABE
literature, in which the adversary is limited to learning just one decryption key. Parno et
al. could use this property due to their restricted system model where a single server is
certified for a single function per set of public parameters (the client must set up a new
ABE system per function and per server).
In our setting, we aim to accommodate multiple computational servers and the outsourced
evaluation of multiple functions, and as such the adversary is given a KeyGen oracle which
allows the generation of polynomially many decryption keys for different servers and differ-
ent functions. The scheme must prevent collusion between holders of different decryption
keys and prevent keys for a particular function being used to ‘compute’ different func-
tions and have the results accepted by a client. Collusion is prevented by the standard
IND-CPA notions of security for ABE schemes, whereas the misuse of evaluation keys for
different functions in discussed in the next section.
3.5.1.2 Handling Multiple Functions
As we discussed in Section 3.3.2, we wish to handle multiple functions within a single
PVC system. To achieve multi-function VC (in the non-publicly verifiable setting), Parno
et al. required the somewhat complex primitive of KP-ABE with Outsourcing [67]. In
this work, we take a different approach. We believe that, in practical environments, it is
unrealistic to expect a server to compute just a single function (as this would presumably
have limited marketable applications for a cloud service provider), and we also believe
that it is a reasonable expectation of cost to prepare an encoded input per computation
(assuming the cost of doing so is reasonably low), especially given that the input data to
different functions may well differ. Thus, whereas Parno et al. use complex primitives to
allow an encoded input to be used for computations of different functions on the same
data, we apply a simple encoding trick which allows servers to hold decryption keys for
multiple functions in the publicly verifiable setting and which requires the more standard,
well-studied multi-key notion of security usually considered for ABE schemes.
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We now describe our encoding to ensure that an adversary holding an evaluation key for
a function G cannot use this to forge a valid looking result for F (x). First note that
if one were to extend the scheme of Parno et al. trivially using KP-ABE and allow an
adversary access to multiple keys (through a KeyGen oracle), then this solution would
indeed be vulnerable to the above attack. A client would encrypt two random messages
both associated with the same attribute set x within different ABE systems. The malicious
server must successfully decrypt exactly one of these messages using its evaluation key
(comprising decryption keys for G and G). Now, any such pair of keys for a function and
its complement will be able to decrypt exactly one ciphertext because on a given input,
either G or G is satisfied. Thus, even without an evaluation key for F , a malicious server
can still decrypt one message and return the result G(x) which the client will accept (as
the plaintext matches the verification key) as the outcome of F (x).
Let us instead assume a bijective mapping φ : F → UF that maps functions in the
acceptable function family F for the RPVC scheme to attributes in the sub-universe UF .
We then add a conjunctive clause (an additional AND gate) to each Boolean function
F ∈ F requiring the presence of the appropriate function label φ(F ) in the input attribute
set — that is, the Boolean function F is encoded in a decryption key for the policy F∧φ(F );
the complement function F is similarly encoded as an access structure for F ∧ φ(F ).
Finally, we add an additional attribute φ(F ) ∈ UF to the characteristic attribute set Ax
representing the input data x for the function F — that is, the input x is represented as
Ax ∪ φ(F ).
Notice that the client must perform the ProbGen stage per computation as the function
label in the input data will differ (either the input data or the function label will change,
otherwise the computation is a repeat of a previously outsourced computation). Servers
can be certified for multiple functions and may not use a key for a function G to compute
on data intended for another function F since the evaluation key it holds is for the two
policies G ∧ φ(G) and G ∧ φ(G), whereas the input is associated with the attribute set
Ax∪φ(F ); as φ(G) is not in Ax, neither policy is satisfied and the malicious server cannot
return any correct plaintext. As a result, and unlike the single function notion of Parno et
al., we are able to provide the adversary with oracle access in our security games using
only a simple KP-ABE scheme.
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3.5.2 Instantiation
Our RPVC scheme operates as follows.
1. VC.Setup, presented in Algorithm 3.1, first forms the attribute universe for the func-
tion family F and establishes the public parameters and a master secret key by
calling the ABE.Setup algorithm twice. We require two distinct ABE systems to
enable the security proof to go through; one system will, informally, be linked to the
function F and the other to the function F . To avoid trivial wins in the security
proof, oracle queries are restricted such that the adversary cannot query a KeyGen
oracle for a key for a function (or policy) that is satisfied by the challenge input
(attribute set). Thus, we initialise two ABE systems such that one is maintained
by the challenger (and hence requires oracle access) and the other is maintained by
the adversary itself. We choose these systems carefully so that the one maintained
by the challenger is ‘linked’ to the unsatisfied function F or F and therefore ap-
propriate keys can be provided by the KeyGen oracle. We distinguish the public
parameters and master secret keys for these two ABE systems with a superscript 0
or 1 respectively.
VC.Setup also initialises a time source6 T, an empty list of revoked servers LRev,
and a two-dimensional array LReg indexed by server identities — for a server S,
LReg[S][0] will store a signature verification key for S and LReg[S][1] will store a list
of functions that S is authorised to compute.
The public parameters PP for the RPVC system are set to be the two sets of public
parameters MPK0ABE,MPK
1
ABE for the ABE systems, the array LReg and the time
source T such that any entity may check the current time period. The master secret,
MK, for the system is defined to be the two ABE master secrets and the revocation
list LRev.
2. VC.FnInit, presented in Algorithm 3.2, simply outputs the public parameters and is
the same for all functions. This step is not required in our particular construction,
but we retain the algorithm to maintain consistency with prior definitions; note that
other instantiations may require this step.
3. VC.Register, presented in Algorithm 3.3, is run by the KDC and creates a signature
6T could be a counter that is maintained in the public parameters or a networked clock.
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Algorithm 3.1 (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
1: U ← Uattr ∪ UID ∪ Utime ∪ UF
2: (MPK0ABE,MSK
0
ABE)
$← ABE.Setup(1`,U)
3: (MPK1ABE,MPK
1
ABE)
$← ABE.Setup(1`,U)
4: for S ∈ UID do
5: LReg[S][0]← 
6: LReg[S][1]← {}
7: LRev ← 
8: Initialise T
9: PP← (MPK0ABE,MPK1ABE, LReg,T)
10: MK← (MSK0ABE,MSK1ABE, LRev)
Algorithm 3.2 PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
1: PKF ← PP
key pair by calling the KeyGen algorithm of a digital signature scheme. It gives the
signing key to the server S (privately) and updates the public list LReg to store the
verification key for S.
Algorithm 3.3 SKS
$← Register(S,MK,PP)
1: (SKSig, V KSig)
$← Sig.KeyGen(1`)
2: SKS ← SKSig
3: LReg[S][0]← V KSig
4. VC.Certify, presented in Algorithm 3.4, creates the evaluation key EKF,S that enables
a server S to compute F . It first updates the lists to remove S from the revocation
list and to add F to the list of functions S is authorised to compute. It reads the
current time t from the time source T and calls the ABE.KeyGen and ABE.KeyUpdate
algorithms twice — once for the policy encoding F and the ABE system parameters
indexed by 0, and once for F and the ABE parameters indexed by 1.
As mentioned previously, to prevent a server certified to perform two different func-
tions, F and G (that differ on their output) from using the key for G to retrieve the
plaintext and claim it as a result for F , we add an additional attribute to the input
set in ProbGen encoding the function the input should applied to, and add a con-
junctive clause for such an attribute to the key policies. Thus an input set intended
for F (including the label attribute φ(F ) corresponding to F ) will only satisfy a key
issued for F (including the φ(F ) label conjunctive clause), and the policy in a key
for G will not be satisfied as the label φ(G) is not in the input set. The evaluation
key comprises the decryption keys and the update keys for the current time period.
5. VC.ProbGen for a computation F (x), presented in Algorithm 3.5, first samples the
current time period t from the time source T in the public parameters. It then
samples two (equal length) messages m0 and m1 uniformly at random from the
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Algorithm 3.4 EKF,S
$← Certify(S, F,MK,PP)
1: LReg[S][1]← LReg[S][1] ∪ F
2: LRev ← LRev \ S
3: t← T
4: SK0ABE
$← ABE.KeyGen(S, F ∧ φ(F ),MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE)
5: SK1ABE
$← ABE.KeyGen(S, F ∧ φ(F ),MSK1ABE,MPK1ABE)
6: UK0LRev,t
$← ABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE)
7: UK1LRev,t
$← ABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSK1ABE,MPK1ABE)
8: EKF,S ← (SK0ABE, SK1ABE, UK0LRev,t, UK1LRev,t)
message space and a bit b uniformly at random. This bit will form the retrieval key
and will randomly permute the ciphertexts within the encoded input such that the
position of a successfully recovered plaintext will not reveal whether F or F was
satisfied and therefore whether F (x) = 1 or 0 respectively.
The encoded input σF,x comprises two ciphertexts which we denote by cb and c1−b.
The ciphertext cb is formed by encrypting the message mb with attributes Ax∪φ(F )
where Ax is the characteristic tuple encoding of the input data x and φ(F ) ∈ UF is
the attribute representing the function F . This encryption is performed using the
public parameters MPK0ABE for the first ABE system. Similarly, c1−b is formed by
encrypting the message m1−b under the same attributes Ax ∪ φ(F ) and the public
parameters MPK1ABE for the second ABE system.
The verification key V KF,x is created by applying a one-way function g (such as a
pre-image resistant hash function [48,73]) to the messages. The verification key also
includes a copy of LReg from the public parameters incase the list is modified between
the current time period and the time of verification, e.g. a server is revoked. This
copy may be removed if verification is likely to be imminent or if results computed
even before a malicious server was revoked should be rejected.
Algorithm 3.5 (σF,x, V KF,x, RKF,x)
$← ProbGen(x, PKF ,PP)
1: t← T
2: (m0,m1)
$←M×M
3: b
$← {0, 1}
4: cb
$← ABE.Encrypt(mb, (Ax ∪ φ(F )), t,MPK0ABE)
5: c1−b
$← ABE.Encrypt(m1−b, (Ax ∪ φ(F )), t,MPK1ABE)
6: σF,x ← (cb, c1−b), V KF,x ← (g(mb), g(m1−b), LReg), RKF,x ← b
6. VC.Compute, presented in Algorithm 3.6, is run by a server S given an encoded input
σF,x and evaluation key EKF,S which it parses as (SK
0
ABE, SK
1
ABE, UK
0
LRev,t
, UK1LRev,t).
S attempts to decrypt each ciphertext using the relevant keys. It returns (m0,⊥) if
F (x) = 1 or (⊥,m1) if F (x) = 0 (ordered according to the random bit RKF,x chosen
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in VC.ProbGen), along with the server ID and a signature on the output.
Algorithm 3.6 θF (x)
$← Compute(σF,x, EKF,S , SKS ,PP)
1: Parse σF,x as (cb, c1−b)
2: db ← ABE.Decrypt(cb, SK0ABE,MPK0ABE, UK0LRev,t)
3: d1−b ← ABE.Decrypt(c1−b, SK1ABE,MPK1ABE, UK1LRev,t)
4: γ
$← Sig.Sign((db, d1−b, S), SKS)
5: θF (x) ← (db, d1−b, S, γ)
7. VC.Verify either accepts the encoded output θF (x) = (db, d1−b, S, γ) or rejects it. It
can be viewed as two algorithms as follows. In VC.BVerif, presented in Algorithm 3.7,
the verifier parses the verification key as V KF,x = (g(mb), g(m1−b), LReg) and checks
whether the server S that (it is claimed) generated the computation result is autho-
rised to compute F — that is, whether F is listed in LReg[S][1]. If not, the result is
immediately rejected.
Otherwise, the verifier next verifies that the signature on the computational result is
valid and was, indeed, generated by S. This is done using the signature verification
key stored in LReg[S][0]. Again, if this check fails, then the result is rejected.
Otherwise, the verifier checks whether the returned plaintext is correct. It applies
the one-way function g, to the first element db from the computational result and
compares to the first element of the verification key. If the results match, then
the verifier accepts the result and returns a retrieval token which is the matched
plaintext element db from the computation result. If not, the verifier checks the
result of applying g to the second returned element d1−b and comparing to the second
element of the verification key. Again, if this is a match, then d1−b is returned and
the result accepted. If neither comparison succeeds then the verifier rejects the result
and reports S for revocation.
Parno et al. [84] gave a one line remark that permuting the key pairs and ciphertexts
given out in ProbGen could give output privacy. We believe that doing so would re-
quire four decryptions in the Compute stage to ensure the correct keys have been
used (since an incorrect key, associated with different public parameters, but for a
satisfying attribute set will return an incorrect, random plaintext which is indistin-
guishable from a valid, random message). Since our construction fixes the order of
the key pairs, we do not have this issue and only require two decryptions.
In VC.Retrieve, presented in Algorithm 3.8, a verifier that has knowledge of RKF,x
can check whether the output from BVerif matches m0 or m1. If the token τθF (x) says
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Algorithm 3.7 (RTF (x), τθF (x))← BVerif(θF (x), V KF,x,PP)
1: if F ∈ LReg[S][1] then
2: if accept← Sig.Verify((db, d1−b, S), γ, LReg[S][0]) then
3: if g(mb) = g(db) then return (RTF (x) ← db, τθF (x) ← (accept, S))
4: else if g(m1−b) = g(d1−b) then return (RTF (x) ← d1−b, τθF (x) ← (accept, S))
5: else return (RTF (x) ←⊥, τθF (x) ← (reject, S))
6: (RTF (x) ←⊥, τθF (x) ← (reject,⊥))
that the result should be accepted, the verifier applies the one-way function g to the
retrieval token RTF (x) ∈ {db, d1−b} and compares to each element g(m0), g(m1) of
the verification key (note that as the verifier possesses RKF,x = b, it can resolve the
ordering of these elements in the verification key). If a match is made with g(m0)
then the function F was satisfied by the input x and the result y is set to be 1. On
the other hand, if the match is made with g(m1), then the complement function was
satisfied and y = 0.
Algorithm 3.8 y ← Retrieve(τθF (x) , RTF (x), V KF,x, RKF,x,PP)
1: if (τθF (x) = (accept, S) and g(RTF (x)) = g(m0)) then return y ← 1
2: else if (τθF (x) = (accept, S) and g(RTF (x)) = g(m1)) then return y ← 0
3: else return y ←⊥
8. VC.Revoke, presented in Algorithm 3.9, is run by the KDC and redistributes fresh
keys to all non-revoked servers. If the token τθF (x) does not specify a server S to be
revoked, then ⊥ is returned. Otherwise, the KDC first removes all functions from the
list LReg[S][1] (as S should no longer be authorised for any computations) and adds
S to the revocation list LRev. It then refreshes the time source T (e.g. increments T
if it is a counter) and samples the new time period. The ABE.KeyUpdate algorithm
is run twice (once for each ABE system) to generate new update key material for
the current time period with respect to the revocation list LRev. Finally, for all
servers, the KDC updates and redistributes the evaluation key to reflect the update
key material for non-revoked servers.
It is straightforward to see that correctness of this construction follows from the correctness
of the attribute-based encryption scheme and of the one-way function g.
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Algorithm 3.9 UM
$← Revoke(τθF (x) ,MK,PP)
1: if τθF (x) = (reject, S) then
2: LReg[S][1]← {}
3: LRev ← LRev ∪ S
4: Refresh T
5: t← T
6: UK0LRev,t
$← ABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE)
7: UK1LRev,t
$← ABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSK1ABE,MPK1ABE)
8: for all S ∈ UID do
9: Parse EKF,S as (SK
0
ABE, SK
1
ABE, UK
0
LRev,t−1, UK
1
LRev,t−1)
10: EKF,S ← (SK0ABE, SK1ABE, UK0LRev,t, UK1LRev,t)
11: return UM ← {EK(O,ψ),S′}S′∈UID
12: else
13: return UM ←⊥
3.6 Proofs of Security
Theorem 3.2. Given a revocable KP-ABE scheme secure in the sense of indistinguisha-
bility against selective-target with semi-static query attack (IND-sHRSS) [14] for a class
of (monotone) Boolean functions F closed under complement, an EUF-CMA secure sig-
nature scheme and a one-way function g. Let RPVC be the revocable publicly verifiable
computation scheme defined in Algorithms 3.1–3.9. Then RPVC is secure in the sense of
selective public verifiability, selective semi-static revocation, vindictive servers and selective
vindictive managers.
Informally, the proofs of public verifiability and vindictive managers rely on the IND-
CPA security of the underlying revocable KP-ABE scheme (note that IND-CPA security
is implied by IND-sHRSS) and the one-wayness of the function g. Revocation relies on
the IND-sHRSS security of the revocable KP-ABE scheme. Security against vindictive
servers relies on the EUF-CMA security of the signature scheme such that a vindictive
server cannot return an incorrect result with a forged signature claiming to be from an
honest server (note that chosen message attack is required since the vindictive client could
act like a client and submit computation requests to get a valid signature).
Lemma 3.1. The RPVC construction defined by Algorithms 3.1–3.9 is secure in the sense
of selective public verifiability (Game 3.7) under the same assumptions as in Theorem 3.2.
Proof. We begin by defining the following three games:
• Game 0. This is the selective public verifiability game as defined in Game 3.7;
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• Game 1. This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that in ProbGen, we
no longer return an encryption of m0 and m1. Instead, we choose another random
message m′ 6= m0,m1 and, if F (x?) = 1, we replace c1 by the encryption of m′, and
otherwise we replace c0. In other words, we replace the ciphertext associated with
the unsatisfied function with the encryption of a separate random message unrelated
to the other system parameters, and in particular to the verification keys;
• Game 2. This is the same as Game 1 except that m′ is implicitly set to be the
challenge input w in the one-way function game.
Following partially in the fashion of Parno et al. [84], we aim to show that, from the point
of view of an adversary, Game 2 is indistinguishable from Game 0 except with negligible
probability. Thus, an adversary against the selective public verifiability game can, instead,
be run against Game 2. We then show that if an adversary has a non-negligible against
Game 2 then the adversary can be used to invert a one-way function.
Game 0 to Game 1. We begin by showing that there is a negligible distinguishing
advantage between Game 0 and Game 1, both with parameters (RPVC, 1`,F). To
achieve a contradiction, let us suppose otherwise, that AV C can distinguish the two games
with non-negligible advantage δ. We show that it is possible to construct an adversary
AABE that uses AV C as a sub-routine to break the IND-sHRSS security of the indirectly
revocable KP-ABE scheme. We consider a challenger C playing the IND-sHRSS game
(Game 3.1) with AABE , who in turn acts as a challenger for AV C . Given the security
parameter and function family F , the entities interact as follows.
1. AV C declares its choice of challenge function F and challenge input x?.
2. AABE computes r = F (x?). It then transforms AV C ’s challenge parameters into its
own choice of challenge for the IND-sHRSS game. It sets x? = Ax? ∪ φ(F ) where
φ(F ) ∈ UF is the attribute representing the challenge function F , and t? = 1, and
sends these to C.
3. C runs the ABE.Setup algorithm to generate (MPKABE,MSKABE) and sendsMPKABE
to AABE .
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4. AABE sends R =  (i.e. an empty list) to C. It then simulates running VC.Setup
such that the ABE system owned by C is used as the ABE system with param-
eters (MPKrABE,MSK
r
ABE). The intuition here is that, as AABE does not hold
MSKABE generated by C, it will need to issue queries to oracles provided by C in
order to generate valid parameters to pass to AV C . However, to avoid trivial wins
in the IND-sHRSS game, AABE is prevented from querying the KeyGen oracle for
a function that evaluates to 1 on the challenge input x? (to prevent decryption of
the challenge ciphertext).
Now, recall that in the VC.Certify algorithm (Algorithm 3.4), a decryption key for the
function F is generated using the ABE parameters (MSK0ABE,MPK
0
ABE) associated
to the first ABE system that was initialised, while the key for the complement
function F is generated using the parameters (MSK1ABE,MPK
1
ABE) for the second
ABE system.
Thus, if F (x?) = 1, then the policy F ∧ φ(F ) will also be satisfied by x? = Ax? ∪
φ(F ). Therefore, one cannot make a KeyGen oracle query to C for the policy F ∧
φ(F ). In this case, we must ensure that the ABE system “owned” by C is in fact
(MPK1ABE,MSK
1
ABE) so that AABE itself holds (MPK0ABE,MSK0ABE) and can
therefore generate a key for F ∧ φ(F ) itself.
On the other hand, if F (x?) = 0 then the function F ∧ φ(F ) may not be queried to
the KeyGen oracle. The key associated with this function should, according to Algo-
rithm 3.4 be generated using the parameters (MSK1ABE,MPK
1
ABE). Therefore, we
require AABE to “own” these parameters and that C “owns” (MPK0ABE,MPK0ABE).
Notice that in both cases, C must own the parameters (MPKrABE,MPKrABE) where
r = F (x?).
AABE simulates running VC.Setup by running Algorithm 3.1 as written, with the
exception of Line 2 and 3 where it sets MPKrABE to be that provided by C, and
implicitly sets MSKrABE to be that held by the challenger (by ‘implicitly’, we mean
that any subsequent uses of MSKrABE will be simulated using oracle queries to C,
but from the point of view of AV C , MSKrABE will appear to have been generated
by AABE).
5. AABE runs VC.FnInit as written and must then generate a challenge for AV C . To do
so, it samples three distinct messages m0,m1 and m
′ uniformly at random from the
messagespace, and flips a random coin RKF,x? = b
$← {0, 1}. It submits m0 and m1
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as its choice of challenge plaintexts to C, and receives back the encryption, CT ?, of
one of these messages (mb? for b
? $← {0, 1}), under attributes x? and time t?.
AABE must assign CT ? to be one of the ciphertexts cb, c1−b that form the encoded
challenge input σF,x? according to the correct ABE systems parameters (decryption
will fail if the wrong parameters are used). If r = 0, then AABE sets cb to be CT ?.
Otherwise, r = 1 and AABE sets c1−b to be CT ?.
AABE generates the remaining ciphertext (c1−b or cb respectively) itself by running
ABE.Encrypt(m′, x? = (Ax? ∪ φ(F )), t? = 1,MPK1−rABE).
Finally, AABE chooses a random bit s $← {0, 1} (intuitively, s is a guess of the
value b? chosen by C). It forms a verification key correctly ordered according to
RKF,x? = b. Let V Kb = g(ms) and V K1−b = g(m′). Then the verification key
V K = (V K0, V K1, LReg).
6. AV C is given all outputs from the above ProbGen simulation, and is given oracle
access, to which AABE can respond as follows:
• Queries to VC.FnInit and VC.Register are performed as in Algorithms 3.2 and 3.3
respectively (as these do not rely on ABE parameters held by C).
• Queries of the form VC.Certify(S, F ′,MK,PP): AABE runs Algorithm 3.4 as
written with the exception that the KeyGen and KeyUpdate operations for the
ABE system with parameters (MSKrABE,MPK
r
ABE) (owned by C) are replaced
by queries to the corresponding oracles provided by C.
To generate SKrABE, AABE queries the ABE.KeyGen oracle. If r = 0, the query
is of the form OKeyGen(S, F ′ ∧ φ(F ′),MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE), and if r = 1, the
query is of the form OKeyGen(S, F ′∧φ(F ′),MSK1ABE,MPK1ABE). In both cases,
C will return the decryption key unless x? satisfies the queried policy.
Notice that if the queried function F ′ is not the challenge function F then, due
to the bijective mapping φ, φ(F ′) 6= φ(F ). Thus, neither of the possible queries
(which both require the presence of φ(F ′)) will be satisfied. If, however, the
query is for F , recall that we chose the ABE system owned by the challenger to
be unsatisfied by exactly this queried policy. Hence the first check performed
in Oracle 3.1 will never evaluate to true and therefore C will always be able to
return a valid key in response to a KeyGen query.
To generate UKrLRev,t, AABE makes a query to the ABE.KeyUpdate oracle of
the form OKeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSKrABE,MPKrABE). C returns a valid update
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key unless the current time is the challenge time (which AABE chose to be 1)
and the queried revocation list does not contain the challenge revocation list
R which AABE chose to be empty. Since, R =  is a subset of any LRev, the
second clause will not be satisfied and C may generate a valid update key.
Thus, AABE can request valid decryption keys and update keys from C and can
simulate Algorithm 3.4 exactly.
• Queries of the form VC.Revoke(τθF (x) ,MK,PP): AABE runs Algorithm 3.9 as
written with the exception of generating UKrLRev,t on line 6 or 7. To simulate
this line, AABE queries for OKeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSKrABE,MPKrABE). C returns
a valid update key unless t = 1 and the queried revocation list does not contain
the challenge revocation list R. However, as AABE chose R = , this second
clause is never satisfied and a valid update key is returned.
7. Eventually, AV C outputs a guess θ?. Let y be the non-⊥ plaintext contained in θ?.
If g(y) = g(ms), AABE outputs a guess b′ = s. Else, AABE guesses b′ = 1− s.
Notice that if s = b? (the challenge bit chosen by C), then the distribution of the above
coincides with Game 0 since the verification key comprises g(m′) and g(ms) where m′
and ms are the plaintexts corresponding to the ciphertexts in the encoded input (exactly
one of which AV C may recover). Otherwise, s = 1− b? and the distribution coincides with
Game 1 since the verification key comprises the one-way function applied to a legitimate
plaintext m′ and a random message m1−s that is unrelated to both ciphertexts.
Now, we consider the advantage of this constructed adversaryAABE playing the IND-sHRSS
game: Recall that by assumption, AV C has a non-negligible advantage δ in distinguishing
Game 0 from Game 1 — that is
|Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 0AV C
[
RPVC, 1`,F
]]
− Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 1AV C
[
RPVC, 1`
]
,F
]
| > δ
where ExpGame iAV C
[RPVC, 1`,F] denotes running AV C in Game i.
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The probability of AABE guessing b? correctly, by the law of total probability, is:
Pr[b′ = b?] = Pr [s = b?] Pr
[
b′ = b?|s = b?]+ Pr [s 6= b?] Pr [b′ = b?|s 6= b?]
=
1
2
Pr [g(y) = g(ms)|s = b?] + 1
2
Pr [g(y) 6= g(ms)|s 6= b?]
=
1
2
Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 0AV C
[
RPVC, 1`,F
]]
+
1
2
(1− Pr [g(y) = g(ms)|s 6= b?])
=
1
2
Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 0AV C
[
RPVC, 1`,F
]]
+
1
2
(
1− Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 1AV C
[
RPVC, 1`,F
]])
=
1
2
(
Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 0AV C
[
RPVC, 1`,F
]]
− Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 1AV C
[
RPVC, 1`,F
]]
+ 1
)
≥ 1
2
(δ + 1)
Hence,
AdvAABE ≥
∣∣∣∣Pr [b? = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
≥ δ
2
Since δ is assumed to be non-negligible, δ2 is also non-negligible. If AV C has advantage
δ at distinguishing these games then AABE can win the IND-sHRSS game with non-
negligible probability. Thus since we assumed the ABE scheme to be IND-sHRSS secure,
we conclude that AV C cannot distinguish Game 0 from Game 1 with non-negligible
probability.
Game 1 to Game 2. The transition from Game 1 to Game 2 is to simply set the value
of m′ to no longer be random but instead to correspond to the challenge w in the one-way
function inversion game (Game 2.12). We argue that the adversary has no distinguishing
advantage between these games since the new value is independent of anything else in
the system bar the verification key g(w) and hence looks random to an adversary with
no additional information (in particular, AV C does not see the challenge for the one-way
function as this is played between C and AABE).
Final Proof We now show that using AV C in Game 2, AABE can invert the one-way
function g — that is, given a challenge z = g(w), AABE can recover w. Specifically, during
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ProbGen, AABE chooses the messages as follows:
• if F (x?) = 1, we implicitly set m1−b to be w and the corresponding verification key
component to be z. We randomly choose mb and compute the remainder of the
verification key as usual.
• if F (x?) = 0, we implicitly set mb to be w and set the verification key component to
z. m1−b is chosen randomly and the remainder of the verification key computed as
usual.
Now, if AV C is successful, it will output a forgery comprising the plaintext that was
encrypted under the unsatisfied function (F or F ). By construction, this will be w (and
the adversary’s view is consistent since the verification key is simulated correctly using z).
AABE can therefore forward this result to C in order to invert the one-way function with
the same non-negligible probability that AV C has against the selective public verifiability
game.
We conclude that if the ABE scheme is IND-sHRSS secure and the one-way function is
hard-to-invert, then the RPVC as defined by Algorithms 3.1–3.9 is secure in the sense of
selective public verifiability.
Lemma 3.2. The RPVC construction defined by Algorithms 3.1–3.9 is secure in the sense
of selective, semi-static revocation (Game 3.8) under the same assumptions as in Theorem
3.2.
Proof. We perform a reduction from selective, semi-static revocation to the IND-sHRSS
security of the underlying revocable KP-ABE scheme. To achieve a contradiction, let us
suppose that AV C is an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the selective,
semi-static revocation game (Game 3.8) when instantiated by Algorithms 3.1–3.9. We
show that we can construct an adversaryAABE that usesAV C as a sub-routine to break the
IND-sHRSS security of the indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme. Let C be a challenger
playing the IND-sHRSS game (Game 3.1) with AABE , who in turn acts as a challenger
for AV C . Given the security parameter, function family F and qt, the number of queries
that AV C will make to the Revoke oracle, the entities interact as follows.
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1. AV C selects its challenge inputs F and x?.
2. AABE initialises QRev =  (an empty list) and t = 1. It then forms its own challenge
input to be t? = qt and A
? = Ax ∪φ(F ) where Ax is the attribute encoding of x and
φ(F ) ∈ UF is the attribute representing the function F , and sends these to C.
3. C runs ABE.Setup and returns the resulting parameters MPKABE to AABE .
4. AABE simulates running Setup by running Algorithm 3.1 as written with the excep-
tion of line 2. It sets MPK0ABE to be MPKABE generated by C, and implicitly sets
MSK0ABE to be that held by the challenger. As it does not possess MSKABE, it
will make use of oracle queries to C wherever MSK0ABE is required. AABE also runs
FnInit as written.
5. AV C is given PKF and PP and chooses a challenge revocation list R, which AABE
forwards to C.
6. AV C may now make oracle queries to which AABE can respond as follows:
• Queries to VC.FnInit and VC.Register are run as written in Algorithms 3.2
and 3.3.
• Queries of the form VC.Certify(S, F ′,MK,PP): AABE runs Oracle 3.8. If F ′ is
the challenge function F and S is not listed in R then it returns ⊥ to AV C . It
also returns ⊥ if the current time is the challenge time period qt and there is a
server (other than S) that is not currently revoked but should be in accordance
with the challenge revocation list. Otherwise, it removes S from QRev and
simulates running Certify. To do so, it runs Algorithm 3.4 as written with the
exception of lines 4 and 6.
To simulate line 4, AABE queries C for a query of the form OKeyGen(S, F ′ ∧
φ(F ′),MSK0ABE,MPK
0
ABE). C returns the decryption key unless the policy
F ′ ∧ φ(F ′) is satisfied by A? = Ax ∪ φ(F ) and S /∈ R′. First, observe that this
policy will never be satisfied unless F ′ = F (since φ is a bijective mapping and
φ(F ′) is required for the policy to be satisfied). Hence, C will always return a
valid key if F ′ 6= F .
On the other hand, if the queried function F ′ = F , then by the checks performed
by AABE at the beginning of Oracle 3.8, S is included on R (else ⊥ would have
been returned prior to this point). Therefore, even if the challenge function is
queried, C will return a key. In particular, note that C never returns ⊥ in a
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manner inconsistent with that expected by AV C in accordance with the Certify
oracle.
To simulate line 6, AABE queries OKeyUpdate(QRev, t,MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE). C
returns a valid update key unless the current time is the challenge time qt and
the queried revocation list does not contain the challenge revocation list R.
However, if this was the case then AABE would already have returned ⊥ by the
second clause of the if statement in Oracle 3.8. Hence, C will always return a
key which AABE can use to successfully simulate the Certify algorithm.
• Queries of the form VC.Revoke(τθF (x) ,MK,PP): As specified in Oracle 3.9,
AABE first increments t. If the token does not identify a server to revoke,
it outputs ⊥ (as would the Revoke algorithm). If the current time is qt, then
AABE returns ⊥ if QRev does not contain all servers listed on the challenge
revocation list R. Otherwise, S is added to QRev. AABE now simulates run-
ning the VC.Revoke algorithm by running Algorithm 3.9 as written with the
exception of line 6. To simulate this line, AABE makes a query of the form
OKeyUpdate(QRev, t,MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE). C returns a valid update key unless
t = qt and the queried revocation list does not contain the challenge revocation
list R. However, if this was so, AABE would have returned ⊥ above, and so a
valid update key is always returned which AABE can forward to AV C .
7. Eventually (after qt Revoke queries), AV C finishes the query phase. AABE checks
if AV C has made suitable Revoke queries. If there exists an entity in R that is not
currently revoked (listed in QRev), it returns 0 and stops.
8. AABE must now generate the challenge for AV C . It chooses three distinct, equal
length messages m0,m1 and m
′ uniformly at random, and chooses a random bit
RKF,x? = b
$← {0, 1}. It sends m0 and m1 to C as its choice of challenge. C chooses
a random bit b?
$← {0, 1} and returns
CT ? ← ABE.Encrypt(mb? , A? = (x? ∪ φ(F )), qt,MPK0ABE).
AABE sets cb = CT ? and
c1−b ← ABE.Encrypt(m′, A? = (x? ∪ φ(F )), qt,MPK1ABE).
AABE selects another bit s $← {0, 1} and, if b = 0, sets V KF,x? = (g(ms), g(m′), LReg).
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Otherwise, V KF,x? = (g(m
′), g(ms), LReg). Note that s is AABE ’s guess for b?.
9. The resulting parameters from ProbGen are sent to AV C who is also given oracle
access. These queries are handled in the same way as previously, and eventually
AV C outputs its guess θ?.
10. Let y be the non-⊥ plaintext returned in θ?. If g(y) = g(ms), AABE guesses b′ = s.
If g(y) = g(m′), AABE makes a random guess b′ = b˜ $← {0, 1} (as AV C did not forge a
result for either m0 or m1 and hence is of no use in breaking the IND-sHRSS game).
Else, AABE aborts (since AV C did not succeed, it could be that AV C simply did
not win against the correctly formed challenge or AABE guessed incorrectly which
message was chosen by C and issued a malformed challenge to AV C).
Now, consider the advantage of AABE playing the IND-sHRSS game: By assumption,
AV C has a non-negligible advantage δ against the selective, semi-static revocation game.
That is, Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] + Pr [g(y) = g(m
′)] = δ. Therefore, by the law of total proba-
bility,
Pr
[
b′ = b?
]
= Pr
[
b′ = b?|g(y) = g(ms)
]
Pr [g(y) = g(ms)]
+ Pr
[
b′ = b?|g(y) = g(m′)]Pr [g(y) = g(m′)]
= Pr [s = b?] Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] + Pr
[
b˜ = b?
]
Pr
[
g(y) = g(m′)
]
=
1
2
Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] +
1
2
Pr
[
g(y) = g(m′)
]
=
1
2
(Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] + Pr
[
g(y) = g(m′)
]
)
=
δ
2
.
Hence,
AdvAABE ≥
∣∣∣∣Pr [b? = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣δ2 − 12
∣∣∣∣
≥ 1
2
(δ − 1).
Since δ is non-negligible, 12(δ−1) is also non-negligible. If AV C has advantage δ at breaking
the selective, semi-static revocation game then AABE can win the IND-sHRSS game with
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non-negligible probability. However, since the ABE scheme was assumed IND-sHRSS
secure, such an AV C cannot exist. We conclude that if the ABE scheme is IND-sHRSS
secure then the RPV C scheme defined by Algorithms 3.1–3.9 is secure in the sense of
selective, semi-static revocation.
Lemma 3.3. The RPVC construction defined by Algorithms 3.1–3.9 is secure against
vindictive servers (Game 3.5) under the same assumptions as in Theorem 3.2.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that AV C is an adversary with non-negligible advan-
tage against the vindictive servers game (Game 3.5) when instantiated by Algorithms 3.1–
3.9. We show that an adversary ASig with non-negligible advantage δ in the EUF-CMA
signature game (Game 2.11) can be constructed using AV C as a subroutine. ASig interacts
with the challenger C in the EUF-CMA security game and acts as the challenger for AV C
in the security game for vindictive servers for a function F as follows. The basic idea is
that ASig can create an RPVC instance and play the vindictive servers game with AV C
by executing Algorithms 3.1–3.9 himself. ASig will guess a server identity that he thinks
the adversary will select to vindictively revoke. The signature signing key that would be
generated during the Register algorithm for this server will be implicitly set to be the
signing key in the EUF-CMA game and any signatures for this identity will be formed
using oracle queries to C. Then, assuming that ASig guessed the correct server identity,
AV C will output a forged signature that ASig may output as its guess in the EUF-CMA
game.
1. C initialises Q ←  to be an empty list of messages queried to the Sig.Sign oracle.
It runs Sig.KeyGen(1`) to generate a challenge signing key SK and verification key
V K, and sends V K to ASig.
2. ASig initialises the revocation list QReg ←  and S˜ to be ⊥. Furthermore, it chooses
a server identity from UID which will be denoted by S. S will be a guess of the target
identity S˜ that AV C shall choose later. If this guess is correct, then any signing
operations related to S can be performed using the oracle provided by C, and hence
when AV C attacks this identity, his output can be used to break the EUF-CMA
game.
3. ASig runs VC.Setup and gives the resulting public parameters to AV C . AV C is also
provided with oracle access to which ASig can respond as follows
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• Queries to VC.FnInit, VC.Register2, VC.Certify and VC.Revoke can all be handled
simply by running the relevant algorithm as these do not require signatures.
• Queries to VC.Register: Queries for a server S 6= S can be handled by ASig
running Oracle 3.5 as written. Note that ⊥ is returned if the query is for the
target server S˜. If, on the other hand, S = S, then C aborts the game, since
AV C may not choose its target server S˜ to be a server for which it previously
learnt the signing key, to avoid trivial wins. Therefore, AV C cannot choose
S˜ = S = S and hence, ASig’s guess of the target identity was wrong and
the EUF-CMA challenge parameters have been embedded incorrectly in the
reduction.
4. Eventually, AV C finishes this query phase and outputs its choice of challenge pa-
rameters F and x?. ASig runs VC.FnInit(F,MK,PP), as specified in Algorithm 3.2
and VC.ProbGen on the challenge x? as in Algorithm 3.5.
5. AV C is given the resulting values and oracle access which is handled as above. AV C
eventually outputs a target server identity S˜. If AV C has previously queried for the
signing key SKS˜ from the Register oracle then ASig returns ⊥.
6. If S˜ 6= S then ASig outputs ⊥ and stops, as it guessed incorrectly. Else, AV C
continues with oracle access as in Step 5 as well as a Compute oracle. AV C submits
queries OCompute(σF ′,x, EKF ′,S˜ , SKS˜ ,PP) for its choice of computation F ′(x) (note
that AV C may generate a valid σF ′,x using the public delegation key). If S 6= S then
ASig simply follows Algorithm 3.6 using the decryption and signing keys generated
during the oracle queries. Otherwise, S = S and ASig does not have access to the
signing key SKS . Thus, he runs the ABE.Decrypt operations correctly to generate
plaintexts db and d1−b, and submits m ← (db, d1−b, S) as a Sig.Sign oracle query to
C. C adds m to the list Q and returns γ $← Sig.Sign(m,SK), which ASig uses to
return θF (x) ← (db, d1−b, S, γ), as a valid response to the Compute query.
7. AV C finally outputs θ? = (d?b , d?1−b, S˜, γ) which appears to be an invalid result com-
puted by S˜. Thus, Verify will output a reject token for S˜. However, accept ←
Sig.Verify((d?b , d
?
1−b, S˜), γ, V K). Thus, γ is a valid signature under key SKS˜ = SK.
8. ASig outputs m? = (d?b , d?1−b, S˜) and γ? = γ to C.
Note that due to the check performed on line 1 of Oracle 3.7, Compute was not simulated
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(i.e. ASig did not make use of the Sig.Sign oracle provided by C) for the computation F (x?).
Thus the forgery (m?, γ?) output by ASig will satisfy the requirement in Game 2.11 that
m? /∈ Q. We argue that, assuming S = S˜ (i.e.ASig correctly guessed the challenge identity)
then ASig succeeds with the same non-negligible advantage δ as AV C . We assume that
n = |UID| is polynomial (else the KDC could not efficiently search the list LReg). The
probability that ASig correctly guesses S = S˜ is 1n and
AdvASig > Pr
[
S = S˜
]
AdvAV C
> 1
n
AdvAV C
> δ
n
> negl(`)
We conclude that, since n is polynomial, if AV C has a non-negligible advantage δ in the
vindictive servers game then ASig has non-negligible advantage in the EUF-CMA game,
but since the signature scheme is assumed EUF-CMA secure, AV C may not exist.
We note that we lose a polynomial factor in the advantage due to having to guess the
server S˜ that the adversary will attempt to revoke. This factor could be removed if we
formulated the security model in a selective fashion such that AV C must declare up front
which server he will target, and then ASig can implicitly set the signing key for that server
(in the Register step) to be the challenge key in the EUF-CMA game and forward any
Compute oracle requests to the challenger.
Lemma 3.4. The RPVC construction defined by Algorithms 3.1–3.9 is secure in the sense
of selective vindictive managers (Game 3.9) under the same assumptions as in Theorem
3.2.
Proof. This proof proceeds in a similar way to that of selective public verifiability. We
begin by defining the following three games:
• Game 0. This is the selective vindictive managers game as defined in Game 3.9.
• Game 1. This is the same as Game 0 except that in ProbGen, a random message
m′ 6= m0,m1 is chosen and, if F (x?) = 1, we replace c1 by the encryption of m′,
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and otherwise we replace c0. In other words, the ciphertext associated with the
unsatisfied function is replaced by the encryption of a separate random message
unrelated to the verification keys.
• Game 2. This is the same as Game 1 with the exception that instead of choosing a
random message m′, we implicitly set m′ to be the challenge input w in the one-way
function game.
We show that, from the adversarial point of view, Game 2 is indistinguishable from
Game 0 except with negligible probability. Thus, an adversary can be run against Game
2. We show that if an adversary has a non-negligible advantage against Game 2 then the
adversary can be used to invert a one-way function.
Game 0 to Game 1. We begin by showing that there is a negligible distinguishing
advantage between Game 0 and Game 1, both with parameters (RPVC, 1`,F). For a
contradiction, let us suppose that AV C can distinguish the two games with non-negligible
advantage δ. We construct an adversary AABE that uses AV C as a sub-routine to break
the IND-sHRSS security of the indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme. We consider a
challenger C playing the IND-sHRSS game (Game 3.1) with AABE , who in turn acts as
a challenger for AV C :
1. AV C declares its choice of challenge inputs F and x?.
2. AABE transforms this into its own challenge input x? = Ax? ∪ φ(F ) where Ax? is
the characteristic tuple of attributes representing x? and φ(F ) ∈ UF is the attribute
representing the challenge function F . It then sends this choice to C along with a
challenge time period t? = 1. It also computes r = F (x?) which will determine
which of the two ABE systems will be used for ‘positive’ functions and which for the
complement functions (since C will not issue a decryption key for a function satisfied
by the challenge input and so AABE must be sure that it will only be queried for
the non-satisfied function). In the following, we use the notation Fr as follows:
• If r = 0 then Fr = F and F1−r = F ;
• If r = 1 then Fr = F and F1−r = F .
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That is, we choose r such that Fr(x
?) = 0. In other words, F0 = F and F1 = F and
we select between them based on r.
3. C runs ABE.Setup algorithm to generate MPKABE,MSKABE and sends MPKABE
to AABE .
4. AABE returns an empty challenge revocation list R =  to C.
5. AABE simulates running VC.Setup by running Algorithm 3.1 as written, with the
exception that one of the sets of ABE system parameters is assigned to be those
generated by the challenger. Recall that r = F (x). AABE sets MPKrABE to be the
public parameters issued by C and MSKrABE is implicitly set to be that held by C
(any subsequent use of MSKrABE will be simulated using oracle access to C). It runs
ABE.Setup to generate MPK1−rABE,MSK
1−r
ABE as usual.
6. AABE runs VC.FnInit as written. It must then generate a challenge encoded output
and to do so it must simulate a computation server. It first picks a server S uniformly
at random and runs Algorithm 3.3 as written to register S. It must then simulate
running the Certify algorithm for the sever S and challenge function F . However, as
it does not hold the full master secret key MK, it must use the oracle access provided
by C. It runs Algorithm 3.4 as written with the following exceptions:
• SKrABE is generated querying the ABE.KeyGen oracle with a query of the form
(S, Fr∧φ(F ),MSKrABE,MPKrABE). C will return a valid decryption key unless
x? ∈ Fr ∧ φ(F ) and S /∈ R.
Clearly, S is never in R as this was set to be empty so the second clause is
always satisfied. However, we chose r specifically such that Fr(x
?) = 0. Hence
Ax? /∈ Fr and x? = Ax? ∪ φ(F ) /∈ Fr ∧ φ(F ). Thus, C will return a valid
decryption key.
• SK1−rABE is generated by AABE running ABE.KeyGen using MSK1−rABE for the
function F1−r ∧ φ(F ) as usual.
• UKrLRev,t is generated by making a query to the ABE.KeyUpdate oracle for
parameters (LRev, t,MSK
r
ABE,MPK
r
ABE). C returns a valid update key unless
the current time period t is the challenge time t? and R 6⊆ QRev. Now, t? was
chosen to be 1 and therefore, as no Revoke operations have been performed, t
does indeed equal t?. However, as R was chosen to be empty, R is certainly
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a subset of LRev (in fact, both are empty). Therefore, C will return a valid
update key.
• UK1−rLRev,t is generated by AABE running ABE.KeyUpdate using MSK1−rABE as
usual.
7. AABE must now run ProbGen to generate a challenge for either Game 0 or Game
1. To do so, it samples three distinct messages m0,m1 and m
′ uniformly at random
from the message space, and flips a random coin RKF,x? = b
$← {0, 1}. It submits
m0 and m1 to C as its challenge, and receives back the encryption, CT ?, of one of
these messages (mb? for b
? $← {0, 1}), under attributes x?, time t? = 1 and public
parameters MPKrABE. If r = 0, then AABE sets cb to be CT ?. Otherwise, r = 1
and AABE sets c1−b to be CT ?.
AABE generates the remaining ciphertext itself by running ABE.Encrypt(m′, x? =
(Ax? ∪ φ(F )), t? = 1,MPK1−rABE).
AABE then selects a random bit s $← {0, 1} which functions as AABE ’s guess of the
bit b? chosen by C. Let V Kb = g(ms) and V K1−b = g(m′). Then AABE computes
the verification key V K = (V K0, V K1, LReg).
8. AABE now simulates the server S performing the computation to output θF (x?) by
running Algorithm 3.6 as written, since valid keys have been generated for S in the
preceding steps.
9. AV C is given σF,x? , θF (x?), V KF,x? , PKF and PP, as well as oracle access which is
handled as follows:
• Queries to VC.FnInit and VC.Register are performed as in Algorithms 3.2 and 3.3.
• Queries of the form VC.Certify(S, F ′,MK,PP): AABE runs Algorithm 3.4 with
the following exceptions. To generate SKrABE, AABE queries the ABE.KeyGen
oracle for OKeyGen(S, F ′r∧φ(F ′),MSKrABE,MPKrABE) C will return the decryp-
tion key unless x? satisfies the queried policy.
Notice that if the queried function F ′ is not the challenge function F then, due
to the bijective mapping φ, φ(F ′) 6= φ(F ). Thus, neither of the possible queries
(which both require the presence of φ(F ′)) will be satisfied. If, however, the
query is for F , recall that we chose the ABE system owned by the challenger to
be unsatisfied by precisely this queried policy. Hence the first check performed
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in Oracle 3.1 will never evaluate to true and therefore C will always be able to
return a valid key in response to a KeyGen query.
To generate UKrLRev,t, AABE makes a query to the ABE.KeyUpdate oracle of
the form OKeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSKrABE,MPKrABE). C returns a valid update
key unless the current time is the challenge time (which AABE chose to be 1)
and the queried revocation list does not contain the challenge revocation list R
which AABE chose to be empty. Since, R =  is always a subset of any LRev,
the second clause will not be satisfied and C may generate a valid update key.
Thus, AABE can request valid decryption keys and update keys from C and can
simulate Algorithm 3.4 exactly.
• Queries of the form VC.Revoke(τθF (x) ,MK,PP): AABE runs Algorithm 3.9
as written except that, to form UKrLRev,t, AABE makes a query of the form
OKeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSKrABE,MPKrABE). C returns a valid update key unless
t = 1 and the queried revocation list does not contain the challenge revocation
list R. However, as AABE chose R = , this second clause is never satisfied and
a valid update key is returned.
10. Eventually, AV C finishes this query phase and outputs its guesses RTF (x) and τθF (x) .
If g(RTF (x)) = g(ms), AABE outputs a guess b′ = s. Else, AABE guesses b′ = 1− s.
Notice that if s = b? (the challenge bit chosen by C), then the distribution of the above
coincides with Game 0 (since the verification key comprises g(m′) where m′ is the message
a legitimate server could recover, and g(ms) where ms is the other plaintext). Otherwise,
s = 1 − b? the distribution coincides with Game 1 (since the verification key comprises
the legitimate message and a random message m1−s that is unrelated to the ciphertexts).
Now, we consider the advantage of this constructed adversaryAABE playing the IND-sHRSS
game: recall that by assumption, AV C has a non-negligible advantage δ in distinguishing
between Game 0 and Game 1 — that is
∣∣∣Pr [1 $← ExpGame 0AV C [RPVC, 1`,F]]− Pr [1 $← ExpGame 1AV C [RPVC, 1`] ,F]∣∣∣ > δ
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where ExpGame iAV C
[RPVC, 1`,F] denotes running AV C in Game i.
Pr[b′ = b?] = Pr [s = b?] Pr
[
b′ = b?|s = b?]+ Pr [s 6= b?] Pr [b′ = b?|s 6= b?]
=
1
2
Pr
[
g(RTF (x)) = g(ms)|s = b?
]
+
1
2
Pr
[
g(RTF (x)) 6= g(ms)|s 6= b?
]
=
1
2
Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 0AV C
[
RPVC, 1`,F
]]
+
1
2
(
1− Pr [g(RTF (x)) = g(ms)|s 6= b?])
=
1
2
Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 0AV C
[
RPVC, 1`,F
]]
+
1
2
(
1− Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 1AV C
[
RPVC, 1`,F
]])
=
1
2
(
Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 0AV C
[
RPVC, 1`,F
]]
− Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 1AV C
[
RPVC, 1`,F
]]
+ 1
)
≥ 1
2
(δ + 1)
Hence,
AdvAABE ≥
∣∣∣∣Pr [b? = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
≥ δ
2
Since δ is assumed to be non-negligible, δ2 is also non-negligible. If AV C has advantage
δ at distinguishing these games then AABE can win the IND-sHRSS game with non-
negligible probability. Thus since we assumed the ABE scheme to be IND-sHRSS secure,
we conclude that AV C cannot distinguish Game 0 from Game 1 with non-negligible
probability.
Game 1 to Game 2. The transition from Game 1 to Game 2 is to simply set the
value of m′ to no longer be random but to implicitly be the challenge w in the one-way
function inversion game (Game 2.12). We argue that the adversary has no distinguishing
advantage between these games since the new value is independent of anything else in
the system bar the verification key g(w) and hence looks random to an adversary with
no additional information (in particular, AV C does not see the challenge for the one-way
function as this is played between C and AABE).
Final Proof We now show that using AV C in Game 2, AABE can invert the one-way
function g — that is, given a challenge z = g(w) AABE can recover w. Specifically, during
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ProbGen, AABE chooses the messages as follows:
• if F (x?) = 1, we implicitly set m1−b to be w and the corresponding verification key
component to be z. We randomly choose mb and compute the remainder of the
verification key as usual.
• if F (x?) = 0, we implicitly set mb to be w and set the verification key component to
z. m1−b is chosen randomly and the remainder of the verification key computed as
usual.
Now, if AV C is successful, it will output a retrieval key comprising the plaintext that was
encrypted under the unsatisfied function (F or F ). By construction, this will be w (and
the adversary’s view is consistent since the verification key is simulated correctly using
z). AABE can therefore forward this result to C in order to invert the one-way function
with the same non-negligible probability that AV C has against the selective vindictive
managers game.
We conclude that if the ABE scheme is IND-sHRSS secure and the one-way function is
hard-to-invert, then the RPVC as defined by Algorithms 3.1–3.9 is secure in the sense of
selective vindictive managers.
Theorem 3.2 follows as a corollary of Lemmas 3.1–3.4.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced the new notion of RPVC and provided a rigorous
framework that we believe to be more realistic than the purely theory oriented models of
prior work, especially when the KDC is an entity responsible for user authorisation within
a organisation. We believe our model more accurately reflects practical environments and
the necessary interaction between entities for PVC. Each server may provide a computation
service for many different functions and for many different clients and any client may
submit multiple requests to any available servers, whereas prior work considered just one
server able to compute just a single function.
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The consideration of this new model leads to new functionality as well as new security
threats. We have shown that by using a revocable KP-ABE scheme we can revoke mis-
behaving servers such that they receive a penalty for cheating and that, by permuting
elements within messages, we achieve output privacy (as hinted at by Parno et al., al-
though seemingly with two fewer decryptions than their brief description implies). We
have shown that this blind verification could be used when a manager runs a pool of
servers and rewards correct work — he needs to verify correctness but is not entitled to
learn the result. We have extended previous notions of security to fit our new defini-
tional framework, introduced new models to capture additional threats (e.g. vindictive
servers using revocation to remove competing servers), and provided a provably secure
construction.
We believe that this work is a useful step towards making PVC practical in real en-
vironments and provides a natural set of baseline definitions from which to add future
functionality. For example, in Chapter 4 we will introduce an access control framework
(using our scheme as a black box construction) to restrict the set of functions that clients
may outsource, or to restrict (using the blind verification property) the set of verifiers
that may learn the output. In this scenario, the KDC entity may, in addition to certifying
servers and registering clients, determine access rights for such entities.
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This chapter extends the model of revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation
introduced in Chapter 3, in order to enforce access control policies over delegators, servers
and verifiers such that entities are restricted over which operations they may perform within
the system. We discuss policies of interest in this setting and provide a solution with a
pragmatic blend of symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic enforcement mechanisms,
where attribute-based encryption is used as a proof of correctness for computations while
symmetric key assignment schemes are used to enforce access control policies.
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we introduced revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation (RPVC)
which includes a trusted key distribution centre (KDC) that is an authority on entities and
performs expensive setup operations and key management duties. This leads to a more
decentralised system architecture comprising a pool of delegators and a pool of servers (the
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manager model), with the delegator not necessarily knowing the server chosen to perform a
computation. Any delegator can submit a request for work (or job) to the server pool and
some system-dependent mechanism allocates it to an available server (based on availability,
suitability or on some bidding process if operating on a price per computation basis). This
contrasts with prior models where the delegator chose a single server with whom to set
up a verifiable computation (VC) system; in such settings, the server could be explicitly
selected and authenticated beforehand. Comparatively, then, delegators now have less
control over the servers that perform work on their behalf and that may access their data
or computation results.
As with any multi-user setting, we may wish to control access to resources in an RPVC
system. The contribution of this chapter, therefore, is to show that not only is this setting
of multi-user VC well-suited to the cryptographic enforcement of access control policies,
but that such policies fulfil a natural and vital role in protecting outsourced computations.
Specifically in the setting of multi-user VC, we may wish to (i) restrict the computations
that may be outsourced by delegators; and (ii) restrict the computations a server may
perform. The first need stems from separation of duties and the observation that, within
an organisation, it is extremely unlikely that all users have equal, uncontrolled access to
all functionality. We may restrict the set of delegators that may outsource a computation
to those that would be authorised to compute it (if given sufficient resources) by the
organisation’s policies. The second requirement arises from the fact that in the RPVC
setting, delegators may not be able to authenticate servers beforehand. The sensitivity of
the data or other requirements, such as the physical location or resources of the server,
may limit the servers that should be permitted to perform the computation.
Some VC settings, as in Chapter 3, distinguish between delegators and verifiers. Delegators
(or distinguished verifiers) may learn the result of the computation, whereas standard
verifiers may only confirm that the result was computed correctly; this is characterised by
the blind verification property for standard verifiers. Again, in a multi-user VC setting,
we may wish to restrict the users authorised to: (i) verify the result; and (ii) learn the
result. When operating on sensitive data, this second restriction ensures that read access
to the generated results is limited to those that satisfy the access control policy, e.g. only
entities that may read the input data may read the output.
A third motivation for access control in the VC setting is that computational services
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may be charged for (e.g. in subscription-based utility computing [65,85]) and that service
providers may offer different levels of service to different clients (e.g. different subscription
tiers may provide access to different functions or computational resources). We must
ensure that only valid subscribers may access each tier of service.
In many multi-user settings for access control to stored data [29,87], servers enforce access
control policies by authenticating users and granting or denying access based on access
control lists or capability lists (see Section 2.3). This reference monitor approach is not
appropriate in the multi-user VC setting since the servers are assumed to be untrusted
and may have a vested interest in violating the policies. We instead use cryptographic
mechanisms to enforce access control policies, where cryptographic keys are used to en-
crypt objects and thereby restrict access to only authorised users —- the access control
mechanism thus reduces to the appropriate distribution of keys to authorised entities. We
use the trusted key distribution centre (KDC) introduced in the revocable PVC model
(RPVC) and, as an authority on entities within the system, we extend its duties to also
instantiate the access control mechanism. In RPVC, the KDC issued keys that enable
the delegation and evaluation of particular functions; we additionally require it to issue
keys appropriate to the access control policy that enable read and write access to certain
components of the RPVC system. For example, input data for particular functions may
be protected such that only authorised servers may read the data and hence perform the
computation.
Note that in an RPVC scheme, the KDC implicitly provides some access control in that
servers are certified to perform specific functions through the generation of evaluation
keys. However, no access control is applied to delegators — any entity can outsource an
evaluation of any function for which the KDC has published delegation information (es-
sentially due to the use of asymmetric cryptographic primitives). In particular, a delegator
may request a computation that the delegator itself is not authorised to perform locally.
Cryptographic enforcement mechanisms are particularly appropriate when objects and
policies are relatively static (so object re-encryption and user revocation are rare events).
In the context of verifiable computation, we may assume that the set of functions that
may be evaluated is fixed (a given VC construction can implement a specified family of
functions, F) and that the input data to each function is also static (limited to the set of
‘valid’ inputs to that function). Thus, the set of objects (function evaluations in VC) is
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static, and policies will primarily be specified in terms of these computations. Thus multi-
user VC is a very natural setting in which to use cryptographic access control. However,
VC leads to a somewhat novel application of these mechanisms as we will see in Section
4.2.
We begin by briefly reviewing some related work. Clear et al. [43] considered access control
policies over delegators only and in a non-verifiable, multi-input outsourced computation
setting using homomorphic ciphertext-policy ABE and fully homomorphic encryption. In
independent and concurrent work, Xu et al. [96] also addressed the necessity for access
control in the setting of verifiable computation, but limited their scope to non-public verifi-
able computation (i.e. not the full multi-user setting) enforcing access control on delegators
only. We believe that the PVC setting also necessitates that delegators may specify access
control requirements on those servers that may be selected for a given computation and,
especially, limits must be placed on verifiers that may learn the output. Xu et al. discuss
their notion purely in terms of using CP-ABE as the enforcement mechanism and did
not discuss the form of the policies; in contrast, we discuss in detail the types of policies
that may be of interest in these settings and present these in terms of generic graph-based
access control policies. Such policies may be enforced by a variety of enforcement mecha-
nisms, including symmetric KASs as used here (which may well be more efficient than the
pairing-based CP-ABE approach). We believe that we present a more generic treatment
which, importantly, extends to the multi-user PVC setting.
In Section 4.2, we discuss example access control policies that are relevant to the setting of
multi-user VC. We formulate policies in a generic fashion (irrespective of the cryptographic
enforcement mechanism employed) in terms of authorisation labels and graph-based poli-
cies over entities and computations. Then, in Section 4.3, we extend the work of Chapter 3
to formally define a framework for revocable PVC with access control (PVC-AC). This
results in novel security notions that we introduce in Section 4.4. Finally, in Section 4.5,
we provide an example construction that generically extends any RPVC scheme to use a
symmetric Key Assignment Scheme (KAS), and in 4.6 show that this construction meets
the stated security goals.
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4.2 Access Control Policies for PVC Environments
We consider graph-based policies where “objects” to be protected are not data files, as
in traditional access control policies, but outsourced computations and their results. The
“user” population comprises the sets of delegators C, computational servers S, and ver-
ifiers V. We are interested in specifying and enforcing policies that restrict: (i) which
computations a delegator may outsource; (ii) which computations a server may evaluate;
(iii) which outputs a verifier may read. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, we
distinguish between entities that may learn a computational result and those that may
only verify correctness (using the blind verification property from Chapter 3). In this
chapter, we assume that any entity may perform the blind verification step but that only
a restricted subset of verifiers should be able to retrieve the actual output value.1
There has been considerable research in recent years on the cryptographic enforcement of
access control policies [1,44,46,51]. Informally, access is regulated in a distributed fashion
by issuing appropriate cryptographic keys to authorised subjects, rather than a centralised
reference monitor mediating all attempts to access protected resources. Cryptographic
access control generally focuses on read access and is regarded as being particularly ap-
propriate when the protected content is read often but written rarely (since this would
require re-encryption). In the context of verifiable computation, we will use cryptographic
access control in somewhat unusual ways. Rather than storing static encrypted data,
we will encrypt dynamic messages within a protocol execution. In particular, to enforce
policies restricting the computations that may be outsourced, a delegator must use an
appropriate key to encrypt input data. Without the appropriate encryption, the input
will be discarded by the server. The enforcement of policies for performing computations
is achieved by distributing keys to servers that can be used to decrypt the (encrypted)
inputs. Without decryption, the server will be unable to read the input data and evaluate
the function; an unauthorised server cannot determine anything about the input data and
so we additionally achieve input privacy in this case. The enforcement of (read) policies
on outputs uses cryptographic access control in a more conventional fashion; results are
published and protected via encryption with an appropriate key.
Cryptographic access control has been particularly widely studied in the context of in-
1The same techniques that we present could also be applied to protect the (blind) verification keys to
restrict the entities that may validate correctness of a computation.
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formation flow and graph-based access control policies (see Section 2.3). We restrict our
focus to graph-based policies as these have been shown to encompass many notions of
access control that are desirable in practice including information flow policies, role-based
access control and attribute-based access control [44]. Recall that we define the “user”
population as the sets of delegators C, computational servers S, and verifiers V. We define
a security labelling function λ : C ∪S ∪V ∪O → L where O is the family of computations
that may be outsourced and (L,6) is a poset of security labels. This function assigns a
label from L, representing the security classification, to each delegator, server and com-
putation in the PVC-AC system. The access control policy requires that λ(E) > λ(o), for
an entity E ∈ C ∪ S ∪ V attempting to operate on a computation o ∈ O.
Throughout this chapter, we refer to computations as o = (F, x, aux) ∈ O (in reference
to their role as protected objects in the access control system). Each computation o
specifies all information required to formulate the access control policy: the function F
to be computed, the input data x, and any relevant contextual information, which we
denote by aux. Thus, the labelling function λ considers all these factors, including any
specified contextual information, when determining the security label λ(o). Observe that
it may not always be the case that a computation may be considered purely in terms
of the function and input data alone. Indeed, although the evaluation result will be
uniquely determined by such factors, the level of protection required may depend on other
contextual information. As a simple motivating example, consider a summation function
over the integers. The semantic meaning of the integers in question may determine the
overall classification of this computation — if the integers are city populations then this
may not be classified at all, but troop deployments in different regions may be much more
sensitive.
Although the format of access control policies, throughout this chapter, remains constant
(requiring λ(E) > λ(o)), different choices for the sets O and L support different types
of policies, particularly in terms of granularity. In Section 4.2.1, we consider several dif-
ferent choices for these sets to restrict the computations a delegator may outsource and
that a server may compute. We begin by examining the simple case where policies are
defined only over the choice of functions — that is, O = F . Thus entities are authorised
to operate on sets of functions, similarly to how servers are certified to compute specific
sets of functions in RPVC. We then, in Section 4.2.1.2, consider more fine-grained policies
defined over functions and input data to restrict entities to only operating on specific, au-
133
4.2 Access Control Policies for PVC Environments
thorised functions with specific inputs. This provides a general solution for settings where
contextual information regarding computations is not relevant in terms of formulating ac-
cess control policies. Finally, in Section 4.2.1.3, we consider the integration of additional
contextual information when defining objects, and also consider alternative definitions for
the poset of security labels, L, to integrate with existing access control policies operated
by an organisation; thus, outsourced computations can be protected in the same way that
internal operations are protected.
In Section 4.2.2, we discuss policies that restrict the results a verifier may learn. We
differentiate between computation policies over delegators and servers, defined in terms of
a labelling function λC(·), and verification policies over delegators and verifiers, defined
in terms of λV (·). For ease of notation, we use λ to denote λC in Section 4.2.1, and to
denote λV in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Delegation and Computation Policies
4.2.1.1 Policies over Functions
We begin by considering a simple case where policies are formulated purely in terms of
the functions being computed. Specifically, in this section, objects (or computations)
are synonymous with functions (O = F) while security labels represent sets of function
(L = 2F ). In simple terms, a computation o ∈ O is labelled by the function being
computed, and we associate each delegator C and server S with a set of functions λ(C) ⊆ F
and λ(S) ⊆ F respectively. We define a correctness criterion that states that C should be
able to prepare inputs for all functions F ∈ λ(C) (and similarly for S); i.e. entities should
be able to perform all operations that they are authorised for. We also define a security
criterion that requires λ(C) ⊇ λ(o) and λ(S) ⊇ λ(o) in order to delegate or compute
the computation o respectively, and that a set of unauthorised entities cannot collude to
perform an operation that any of them couldn’t perform alone.
More formally, we define the set of security labels L to be 2F (the power set of all considered
functions). Then, λ(C) ⊆ F defines the set of functions that a delegator C may outsource
an evaluation of, λ(S) ⊆ F denotes the functions a server S may compute, and λ(o) = {F}
labels the computation of F ∈ F . Then, for any x, y ∈ L we define an order relation <
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{F, G}
{F, H}
{G, H}
{F, G, H}
{G}
{F}
{H}
(a) L = 2{F,G,H}
({F, G}, 11)
({F}, 11) ({G}, 11)
({F, G}, 01)
({F}, 01) ({G}, 01)
({F, G}, 10)
({F}, 10) ({G}, 10)
({F, G}, 00)
({F}, 00) ({G}, 00)
(b) L = 2{F,G} × {0, 1}2
(1GB, 1core) (1GB, 2core)
(2GB, 1core) (2GB, 2core)
(1GB, 32core)
(16GB, 16core)
(32GB, 32core)(32GB, 1core)
GoldSilverBronze
(c) Subscription based computation: L = ({1GB, . . . , 32GB} ×
{1core, . . . , 32core}) ∪ {Gold, Silver, Bronze}
Figure 4.1: Example posets for publicly verifiable outsourced computation with access
control
such that x < y if and only if x ∈ F , y ⊆ F and x ∈ y; that is, x must be a singleton
set (or in our case, a computation for a particular function), y must be a set of functions
(i.e. be a label assigned to an entity authorising it to compute the functions in y), and x
must be a subset of y (to ensure the entity is authorised for the particular function x).
The corresponding Hasse diagram with F = {F,G,H} is shown in Figure 4.1a.2 Any
entity E authorised for λ(E) is, by the correctness criterion, authorised to operate on all
computations o labelled by λ(o) < λ(E). For example, in Figure 4.1a, if λ(E) = {F,G}
then E is authorised for the functions F andG as expected. In a cryptographic enforcement
mechanism, each label l ∈ L will be associated with a key κl. To outsource a computation,
o, of F (x), C prepares the encoding of x using the key κo = κ{F} associated to the label
{F} which, by the security criterion, C knows if and only if λ(C) > λ(o) i.e. if and only
if {F} ∈ λ(C). To compute F (x), S uses the corresponding key κo; S may do this if and
only if {F} ∈ λ(S).
2Nodes for empty sets are excluded from these figures.
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4.2.1.2 Policies over Function Inputs
As well as limiting the functions that may be outsourced, we may wish to implement a
more fine-grained access control policy determined by input values to functions. For ease
of exposition let us assume that all functions have the same domain — for all F ∈ F ,
Dom(F ) = {0, 1}n for a positive, non-zero integer n.3 We then redefine the security
function such that “objects” (computations) are now considered to be pairs (F, x) where
F ∈ F and x ∈ Dom(F ) — that is, λ : C ∪ S ∪ (F × {0, 1}n)→ L.
Different settings may require different access control functionality, which can be achieved
through different choices of security labels. For example, the first choice of poset we present
in this section corresponds to the idea of assigning a data range to each delegator and
then authorising them to outsource a specific set of functions on that data. For instance,
a Chinese wall policy may result in employees being provided with separate partitions of
a database. Then, depending on the employee’s role, they are permitted to evaluate a
specific set of functions on that data partition. The second choice of poset we present is
more fine-grained and authorises delegators to outsource a single, specified computation
— that is, it permits the entity to evaluate F (x) for a specific choice of function and input
data. For example, one could imagine an employee being given restricted access to some
sensitive data to perform only a particular task, and they should not be able to use the
data for other purposes.
For the first case, where entities are assigned a set of data and are authorised to compute
specific functions on that data, we could define L to be 2F × {0, 1}n. To define the order
relation on L we must first define an ordering on the input data. One choice is to define
a co-ordinatewise ordering on {0, 1}n; that is (x1, . . . , xn) 6 (y1, . . . , yn) if and only if
xi 6 yi for all i ∈ [n]. Then, for two labels (G, x) and (G′, x′) in L, (G, x) 6 (G′, x′) if and
only if G = {F} for some F ∈ F , F ∈ G′ and x 6 x′.
For an entity E, we define λ(E) = (G, x), where G ⊆ F and x ∈ {0, 1}n. For a computation
o of F on input x, we define λ(o) = ({F}, x). Then E is authorised to operate on G(y)
for all G ∈ G and all y 6 x. The Hasse diagram for this poset with F = {F,G} and
n = 2 is shown in Figure 4.1b. Different choice of orderings over inputs lead to different
3If this is not the case then we can define n = maxF∈F |Dom(F )| and then redefine all functions F
with Dom(F ) < n to satisfy the required property by, for example, adding fixed points F (x) = x for all
x ∈ {0, 1}n \ Dom(F ).
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restrictions; for example, one could consider bit strings as integers and use the natural
ordering over integers for x 6 y.
For the second case, where entities are authorised to compute functions on specific inputs,
define L to be the power set 2F×{0,1}n . Then each function may be associated with a
different range of permissible inputs. An entity E, is labelled by a set of pairs, each com-
prising a function label and an associated input label — λ(E) = {(F1, x1), . . . , (Fm, xm)}.
A computation of F (x) is labelled λ(o) = ({F}, x). Then, for any two labels,
{(F1, x1), . . . , (Fm, xm)} 6 {(F ′1, x′1), . . . , (F ′m′ , x′m′)}
if and only if m = 1 (the first label is a single pair), F1 = F
′
i for some i ∈ [m′] and x1 6 x′i.
Finally, we observe that the choice of L = 2F × 2{0,1}n extends this second case to a
situation where each function can be associated with an arbitrary set of input values.
4.2.1.3 Policies for Other Security Labels
We have seen how sets of functions and inputs can be mapped to a graph-based access
control policy to restrict the functions a delegator may outsource and that a server may
compute. However, in practical applications, outsourced computation functionality will
be required to integrate with existing workflows and existing access control policies. As
an example, consider a company that operates role-based access control (RBAC) (see
Section 2.3.2) on their local network and wishes to provide access to an external VC
system. The company must ensure that the same access control requirements are adhered
to within this new environment.
As mentioned in Section 4.2, it is not always appropriate to classify computations based
purely on the function and input — other contextual information may be required. We
now briefly discuss how to formulate access control policies for multi-user VC settings
that incorporate additional security labels relying on the environment or external access
control policies.
We can use any poset of security labels to classify each outsourced computation. Consider
the total order M = {Top-Secret, Secret, Classified, Unclassified} representing the
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Bell-LaPadula clearance levels [22], and let K be a set of need-to-know categories. Then
we can enforce the security function λ : C ∪ S ∪ O → M × 2K where K specifies the
nature, and M specifies the sensitivity, of the computation o ∈ O. To delegate or compute
F (x), we require that the entity E’s clearance level is at least the classification of the
computation: λ(E) > λ(o).
It has been shown [44] that the set of roles for a role-based access control policy can be
encoded as a poset. Thus, we could similarly define L to be this role poset to integrate
with existing RBAC policies within an organisation.
As well as changing the set of security labels, we could also add additional criteria in
the mapping to security labels. For example, we could formulate policies dependent on
time by setting λ : C ∪ S ∪ (F × T ) → L, where T is a set of time periods. We could
then set L = 2F×T to allow entities to operate on specific functions only during specified
time periods. On the other hand, by defining L = M × 2K as above, certain functions
can be more highly protected during certain times of the day. In place of a temporal
poset T we could also apply a geo-spatial poset to classify function evaluations differently
depending on location data;, e.g. a function may be more sensitive if being outsourced from
a battlefield as opposed to within a secured building. Finally, policies over function inputs
can be extended to include characteristics of the input data (as in the summation example
in Section 4.2, contextual information often changes the level of protection required).
Recall that we define computations o ∈ O in terms of F , x and some auxiliary information
aux which provides contextual information regarding the computation that may be relevant
in determining the classification of the computation, e.g. the semantic meaning of input
data. Then, if A is the set of possible auxiliary information and L is defined to be
2F×({0,1}n×A), for example, then the same input data to the same function can be classified
differently, and hence require different authorisation from the delegator and the server,
based on contextual information.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, one interesting setting for RPVC is when
users pay for computation-as-a-service [65,85]. Users may pay a price per computation, in
which case they could be issued a relevant key such as those discussed in Section 4.2.1.2,
perhaps with a short time window in which to perform the computation. Then, when
outsourcing the computation, it is protected by this key to prove that the user has paid
for this particular computation. An alternative model [65] would be for a server to allow
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subscriptions to different tiers of service. A user may pay more to subscribe to a higher tier,
and then may submit multiple computations relating to this tier or lower. For example,
consider a set T = {Gold, Silver, Bronze} comprising tiers that users may subscribe to;
Gold service may allow access to more computational resources, or access during busier
periods, than Silver, and so on. For simplicity, suppose the resources to be considered
are just RAM capacity and the number of processor cores available, and let R and C
be sets comprising the available quantities of each. Then, the set of security labels L is
set to be L = (R × C) ∪ T —- that is, the cartesian product of the available resources,
with the addition of labels for each service tier. A user that pays for Gold membership
can be assigned the label λ(C) = {Gold}. Each computation is labelled by the resources
that it requires. The poset ordering over L allows each tier to access different subsets of
resources (e.g. if a computation is particularly memory intensive then it may require a
higher subscription fee to compute), as illustrated in Figure 4.1c.
4.2.2 Verification Policies
Thus far, we have discussed policies restricting the entities that may delegate and evaluate
given computations. In the multi-user VC setting, it is equally important to apply access
control to the act of verifying the results and learning the computational output. Clearly,
when considering computations over confidential data, it is not always appropriate to
publish the results as in a publicly verifiable computation scheme. As a trivial example,
outsourcing the identity function could “legitimately” leak confidential data. In Chapter 3,
we distinguished between the actions of blind verification (to ensure correctness) and
output retrieval (to learn results). In this chapter, we assume that all entities are able to
blindly verify a result, but the set of entities that may learn the actual output should be
restricted4. Thus, the set of verifiers we refer to in the following are just those distinguished
verifiers that are able to retrieve computation results, and we wish to restrict the results
that each may read.
In this section, we consider two forms of verification policy:
1. The notion of “no write down” is an important property in many traditional access
control policies. In the VC setting, this amounts to ensuring that any verifier should
4However, we could use the same techniques to restrict blind verification if desired.
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have at least the access rights of the delegating or computing entity, that is λ(C) 6
λ(V ) and λ(S) 6 λ(V ). In short, a verifier may not read a result arising from
input data that he is not also authorised to read. We consider this form of policy in
Section 4.2.2.1.
2. In some cases, however, the KDC may decide that the results of some computations
are not as highly classified as the input data, or indeed the act of computing it. For
example, statistics of company spending averaged across all departments may be
less sensitive than the spending of the research department alone. Alternatively, the
results of a computation over classified data may be included in a public document,
despite the input data remaining classified.
In these cases, the encoded output from the computation may be published along
with a public verification key so that recipients can very the legitimacy of the com-
putational result; however, the retrieval key can also be published alongside the com-
putation, but be cryptographically protected (encrypted) such that only authorised
verifiers (e.g. trusted reviewers of a document) may access it and therefore retrieve
the actual output of the computation. This setting is explored in Section 4.2.2.2.
4.2.2.1 Enforcement of No Write Down Policies
As mentioned, “no write down” is an important requirement of many access control poli-
cies. It ensures that an entity C may not write (encrypt) an object to a lower classification
level λ(o) < λ(C) as this could constitute a leak of classified data. It is, of course, possible
for a delegator to write the result at his (maximal) clearance level and then any verifiers
with higher access rights, by the correctness criterion of the cryptographic enforcement
mechanism, will be able to read the result. However, we may want to protect a result at
a higher classification level (write up), e.g. when preparing a report that should only be
read by management.
To enforce no-write down policies, we encrypt the retrieval key RKo for the computation
under a suitable key according to the verification policy. Recall from Chapter 3 that, in an
RPVC scheme, the retrieval key is generated by the delegator during the ProbGen stage,
and is used in the Retrieve algorithm run by a verifier to reveal the actual output value of
the computation.
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Within a PVC-AC system, we define two posets: a computation poset PC = (L,6) (as
per Section 4.2.1) to encode computational access control policies, and a verification poset
PV which encodes the no-write down verification policy. PV is constructed by inverting
the order relation on PC — that is, if PC = (L,6) then PV = (L,>) where x > y in PV if
and only if x 6 y in PC . Then, delegation and computation of o ∈ O are performed using
a key associated to λC(o) ∈ PC . To retrieve the result of a computation, a verifier must
recover the retrieval key which is encrypted using a key related to λV (o) ∈ PV . Thus, a
verifier V may successfully decrypt, and recover, RKo and hence read the computation
result if and only if λV (V ) > λV (o).
4.2.2.2 Published Retrieval Key
In the second form of verification policy we consider in this section, where retrieval keys
are published according to a more general policy that may allow write-down, we can use
similar posets and security functions to those in Section 4.2.1. The security function is
defined to be λV : V∪C∪O → L, where O is the set of outsourced computations and (L,6)
is a poset of security labels. The user population is the set of delegators C and verifiers
V, and objects, o ∈ O are retrieval keys for particular computations. We will protect
(encrypt) the retrieval key for each computation using an appropriate key. We require the
verifier to satisfy the verification policy in order to derive the corresponding decryption key
— that is, we require λ(V ) > λ(o) for o ∈ O. Since the delegator generates the retrieval
key, and hence may also use it to retrieve the output, we also assume λ(C) > λ(o). This
is reasonable given that the delegator must have the right to compute any function that
he outsources and hence (resources permitting) could certainly learn the result locally.
As before we can extend the definition of λ and of L to accommodate more fine-grained
policies over outputs if required.
4.3 PVC with Access Control
We now formally define the notion of PVC-AC to enforce graph-based access control
policies over delegators, servers and verifiers. Recall that we wish to impose restrictions
on three activities: first, we wish to specify a (write) policy determining the computations a
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client is authorised to delegate — this means restricting the inputs a client may correctly
prepare; second, we specify a (read) policy that determines the computations a server
may compute — that is, encoded inputs he may access; lastly, we specify a (read) policy
dictating the outputs a verifier may read. We differentiate between computation policies
over delegators and servers, denoted λC(·), and verification policies over delegators and
verifiers, denoted λV (·). We may also use λ(·) to denote both labels where no ambiguity
arises. Finally, PC and PV denote posets encoding the computation and verification
policies respectively. Recall that the set of outsourced computations is denoted by O.
A computation o ∈ O comprises the function F , the input data x and possibly some
additional contextual information.
The entities and trust relations remain the same as in Chapter 3. We extend the function-
ality of the KDC from Chapter 3 to grant access control credentials to delegators, servers
and verifiers. We may split the responsibilities between two KDCs: a computation KDC
(CKDC) that generates function keys for the VC functionality, and an authorisation KDC
(AKDC) that manages access control policies. The AKDC could be a trusted authority
on entities to grant relevant permissions, and may be used by multiple systems (e.g. as a
form of federated identity management [36]). For ease of exposition, here we use only one
KDC that performs both duties.
Definition 4.1. A revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme with access
control (PVC-AC) comprises the following algorithms:
• (PP,MK) $← Setup(1`,F ,PC ,PV ): run by the KDC to generate public parameters
PP for the PVC-AC system as well as secret information MK used to generate keys.
The inputs to this algorithm are the security parameter, the family of functions F
that may be outsourced, and the computational and verification posets encoding the
graph-based access control policies to be enforced;
• PKF $← FnInit(F,MK,PP): run by the KDC to generate a delegation key, PKF ,
that enables the outsourcing of computations for a function F ;
• SKID $← Register(ID, λ(ID),MK,PP): run by the KDC to issue a key SKID for an
entity with identifier ID5 which grants access rights for the label λ(ID) according to
the computation or verification policy;
5In future algorithms this will be S, C or V to denote a server, delegator or verifier respectively.
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• EKF,S $← Certify(S, F,MK,PP): run by the KDC to create an evaluation key EKF,S
that enables a server S to compute a function F ;
• (σo, V Ko, RKo) $← ProbGen(x, SKC , PKF , λ(C), λ(o),PP): run by a delegator C
to outsource the computation o of F (x). The algorithm takes the input x, C’s
secret key SKC , the public delegation key PKF for F , the security label λ(C) of
the delegator, the security label λ(o) of the computation to be outsourced and the
public parameters PP. If C satisfies the computation policy (i.e. λC(C) > λC(o))
then the algorithm outputs a valid encoded input σo, a public verification key V Ko
to verify correctness, and a protected output retrieval key RKo which only verifiers
satisfying λV (V ) > λV (o) may use to read the result F (x);
• θo $← Compute(σo, EKF,S , SKS , λC(S), λC(o),PP): run by a server S, this algorithm
takes as input an encoded input σo for a computation F (x), an evaluation key for
F , a secret key SKS , the security labels of the server and computation and the
public parameters. It generates a valid encoding, θo, of the result F (x) if and only
if λC(S) > λC(o);
• (y, τθo) ← Verify(θo, SKV , V Ko, RKo, λV (V ), λV (o),PP): verification comprises two
steps:
– (RTo, τθo) ← BVerif(θo, V Ko,PP): run by any verifier holding an encoded
output and a verification key to produce a retrieval token RTo and a token
τθo = (accept, S) for a correct result, or τθo = (reject, S) to signify a cheating
server S;
– y ← Retrieve(SKV , RTo, τθo , V Ko, RKo, λV (V ), λV (o),PP): run by a verifier V
in possession of the retrieval token RTo from BVerif and the output retrieval
key RKo. If λ
V (V ) > λV (o) then V should be able to read the actual result
y = F (x) or ⊥ (if the result is incorrect);
• UM $← Revoke(τθo , F,MK,PP): if a verifier reports a misbehaving server (i.e. Verify
returned τθo = (reject, S)), the KDC issues updated evaluation keys UM = EKF,S′
to all servers, preventing S from performing further computations. If τθo = (accept, S)
then this algorithm should output UM =⊥;
Intuitively, we say that a publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme with access
control (PVC-AC) is correct if, when all algorithms are run honestly in any arbitrary
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execution sequence by authorised entities and the result is computed by a non-revoked
server, the verifying party always accepts the returned result and the result is correct..
As in Chapter 3, we can model this as a game played between a challenger and a PPT
adversary.
For each algorithm in Definition 4.1, we define an oracle which executes the corresponding
algorithm on arguments provided by the adversary, and returns the output of the algorithm
to the adversary, as well as maintaining some internal lists, which we shall detail below.
The adversary may query the Setup oracle only once (before making any other oracle
queries), but can thereon call the remaining oracles any number of times and in any order.
The challenger maintains two lists, LReg and LF . LReg is a list of tuples of the form
(ID, SKID) of entity identifiers with the associated signing key; these are added by the
Register oracle. LF , on the other hand, comprises tuples of the form (S, F,EKF,S) denoting
that EKF,S was generated as a result of the server S being queried to the Certify oracle
for the function F — that is, S has been certified to compute F . If the adversary queries
the Revoke oracle with an input τθF (x) = (reject, S) for some S, the challenger removes all
entries of the form (S, ·, ·) (i.e. all entries for S for any function) from LF .
The challenger also creates and maintains a table T which records the parameters and
values relating to each computation performed through the oracle queries. T is updated
in the following oracles:
• ProbGen: if λC(C) > λC(o), the challenger creates a new row in T comprising
8 components, all of which are initialised to be empty; it then assigns x, F , the
result F (x) (computed by the challenger itself), σF,x, V KF,x and RKF,x to the first
6 components;
• Compute: if λC(S) > λC(o), the challenger first searches T for all rows that contain
the queried σF,x in the 4
th component and where the 7th component is empty (i.e.
those rows relating to computations on this encoded input that have not yet been
performed).
For each such row, r, the challenger takes the second component (the function
identifier, F˜ ), and checks that there exists a server identity S˜ such that the tu-
ple (S˜, SKS˜) ∈ LReg (where SKS˜ is that given as input to the Compute oracle) and
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such that the tuple (S˜, F˜ , EKF,S˜) ∈ LF (where EKF,S˜ is also that given as input to
the Compute oracle). This check ensures that there is a currently un-revoked server
(as the entries of LF for S˜ have not been removed) that holds the signing key and
evaluation key being used to perform the computation and which is certified for a
function F˜ for which the encoded input σF,x for this computation was generated.
The challenger then performs the Compute algorithm on the queried σF,x, EKF,S
and SKS to produce an output θF (x). For each of the rows r of T found above, the
challenger writes θF (x) and S˜ to the 7
th and 8th components of r respectively. Thus,
a row of T will only have a (non-empty) value in the 7th component if there exists a
non-revoked, certified, authorised server to perform the computation for which σF,x
was generated.
Thus, when complete, the entries of T will be of the form
(x, F, F (x), σF,x, V KF,x, RKF,x, θF (x), S).
Note that the oracles only update entries in T when the given arguments relate to an
authorised entity for the computation (we are not interested in the output of algorithms
run by unauthorised entities as these should be rejected in accordance with the security
models we define shortly).
After a polynomial number of queries, the adversary will return a value θ?F (x) which he
believes either encodes an incorrect computational result or which encodes a correct com-
putational result yet which the Verify algorithm will reject. The challenger first performs a
look up in T for all entries containing θ?F (x) in the 7
th position of the tuple, and stores any
such entries as another table T˜ . Note that this means that θ?F (x) must have been honestly
generated by the Compute oracle (else it would not be in T ).
For each such row, the challenger uses the 5th and 6th components of the row (the verifica-
tion key and retrieval key) to run Verify on θ?F (x) to generate the outputs y and τθF (x)
6. The
challenger first checks whether y matches the 3rd component of the row (that is, whether y
is the correct computational result F (x)). If so, it then checks whether τθF (x) = (reject, S),
and if so it ends the game by returning 1 to indicate that the adversary has won the game
(the adversary has found a valid encoding of a correct result, computed by a certified,
6Note that the challenger can simulate a verifier that is authorised to perform this verification.
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authorised, non-revoked server, that the Verify algorithm is incorrectly rejecting).
On the other hand, if y did not match the correct value of F (x), the challenger also ends
the game by returning 1 to indicate that the adversary has won the game (the adversary in
this case has found an incorrect result that was computed honestly by authorised entities).
If no row in T˜ allows the adversary to win, then the challenger outputs 0 to indicate that
the adversary has lost.
A PVC-AC scheme is correct if, for all PPT adversaries, the probability that the adversary
wins the game described above is 0.
4.4 Security Models
We now introduce several security models capturing requirements of PVC-AC. These
models capture the intuition that (i) only authorised entities can perform each type of
restricted operation, and (ii) unauthorised servers learn nothing about the input data.
These are important both to ensure that the enforcement mechanism for the access con-
trol policies correctly captures the required properties, and that the access control mech-
anism and the PVC implementation (if built from separate primitives) interact securely.
As noted by Ferrara et al. [51], it is not always immediate that (probabilistic) cryp-
tographic enforcement mechanisms can safely implement access control policies, which
are generally specified in absolute terms; hence formally defining and proving the re-
quired security goals is necessary. Notions of public verifiability, revocation and vindictive
servers follow naturally from Chapter 3 with additional inputs for policy declarations.
As these do not rely on the access control properties, the proofs follow naturally, and
we do not replicate them here. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, the nota-
tion AO denotes an adversary A being given oracle access to the following functions:
FnInit(·,MK,PP), Register(·, ·,MK,PP), Certify(·, ·,MK,PP), ProbGen(·, SK(·), ·, ·, ·,PP),
Compute(·, ·, SK(·), ·, ·, PP ) and Revoke(·, ·,MK,PP). Each oracle, unless otherwise given
alongside the game, simply runs the relevant algorithm.
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Game 4.1 ExpAuthOA
[PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ]
1: LR ← , LP ← , o←⊥
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F ,PC ,PV )
3: o = (F, x, aux)
$← AO(PP)
4: for all λC(vi) ∈ LR do
5: if (λC(o) 6 λC(vi)) then return 0
6: for all λC(o′) ∈ LP do
7: if (λC(o′) = λC(o)) then return 0
8: (S, V )
$← UID × UID s.t. λC(S) > λC(o) and λV (V ) > λV (o)
9: SKS
$← Register(S, λC(S),MK,PP)
10: SKV
$← Register(V, λV (V ),MK,PP)
11: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
12: EKF,S
$← Certify(S, F,MK,PP)
13: (σo, V Ko, RKo)
$← AO(o, λ(o), PKF ,PP)
14: θo
$← Compute(σo, EKF,S , SKS , λC(S), λC(o),PP)
15: (y, τθo)← Verify(θo, SKV , V Ko, λV (V ), λV (o),PP)
16: if ((y, τθo) 6= (⊥, (reject, ·))) then return 1
17: else return 0
Oracle 4.1 ORegister(ID, λ(ID),MK,PP)
1: if (o 6=⊥) and (λ(ID) > λC(o)) then
2: return ⊥
3: LR ← LR ∪ λ(ID)
4: return Register(ID, λ(ID),MK,PP)
Oracle 4.2 OProbGen(x′, SKC , PKF ′ , λ(C), λ(o′),PP)
1: if (λC(o′) = λC(o)) then return ⊥
2: LP ← LP ∪ λ(o′)
3: return ProbGen(x′, SKC , PKF ′ , λ(C), λ(o′),PP)
4.4.1 Authorised Outsourcing
The notion of authorised outsourcing formalises that a delegator may not outsource
any computation for which he is not authorised — that is, any computation o where
λC(o) 6 λC(C). Clearly, within our framework we cannot make any guarantees about
what an entity may do externally. For instance, we cannot enforce that a client does
not circumvent the access control policies using an external server not subject to these
controls; however we do enforce that to use the provided functionality (i.e. to contract an
available server registered in this system) they must prove authorisation. This assumption
seems reasonable, taking into consideration organisational boundaries — external control
should perhaps be enforced by limiting external communication channels (e.g. using a
strict firewall). Similarly, we cannot enforce that an entity does not share key content, but
we do ensure that such collusion does not enable access that either entity alone could not
access. Due to the revocation functionality introduced in Chapter 3, it may be undesirable
for a server to share key material as he must trust the additional server not to cheat.
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The authorised outsourcing game is presented in Game 4.1 and uses Oracles 4.1 and
4.2. First the challenger initialises an empty list LR of security labels that have been
registered, an empty list LP of computations that have been given as input to ProbGen,
and a challenge computation o which is initially set to a distinguished symbol ⊥. It runs
the Setup procedure for the scheme and gives the adversary the public parameters and
oracle access as specified in Section 3.4.
Eventually, the adversary outputs its choice of challenge outsourced computation o to
attack, which specifies F and x and any auxiliary information that should be considered
when computing its security label. On line 4, we ensure that no security label that A has
queried to the Register oracle may allow the derivation of a key for λC(o) as this would be
a trivial win, and we return 0 since the adversary has not found a valid attack target. We
also require that any ID that A queries to its oracles must previously have been queried to
the Register oracle i.e. SKID will be well-defined for any ID queried to an oracle since ID
will already have been queried to Register (which is in keeping with realistic operation).
On line 6, we check that the ProbGen oracle has not been queried on the chosen challenge
computation o as the oracle output could be used to trivially win the game.
The challenger then selects two entities S and V at random such that S is a server
authorised to compute the challenge computation, and V is a verifier authorised to verify
the challenge computation. These will be used by the challenger to simulate processing
the challenge computation. It registers both entities, initialises the challenge function F
and certifies S to compute F . The adversary is then challenged, given all information that
a real attacker may learn and oracle access, to output an encoded input that the Compute
and Verify algorithms will accept — that is, an unauthorised adversary must produce an
input that is accepted and computed on by honest entities.
In Oracle 4.1, the challenger checks that the security label for the queried identity is not
an ancestor of the challenge computation label and returns ⊥ otherwise; if such a key
was issued then the adversary would be able to use it to legitimately act on the challenge
computation and trivially win. If ⊥ was not returned, the security label is added to the
list LR and the challenger returns the output of running Register. Similarly, in Oracle 4.2,
the challenger returns ⊥ if queried for a computation with the challenge computation
label λC(o) as the resulting values would form a winning adversarial output. Otherwise,
the queried computation is added to the list LP and the results of running ProbGen are
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returned.
Definition 4.2. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the AuthO game for an PVC-
AC construction, PVCAC, for a family of functions F and computational and verification
access control posets PC and PV respectively, is defined as:
AdvAuthOA (PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpAuthOA
[RPVC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ]].
An PVC-AC scheme, PVCAC, is secure with respect to authorised outsourcing if, for all
PPT adversaries A,
AdvAuthOA (PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ) 6 negl(`).
4.4.2 Authorised Computation
Authorised computation, given in Game 4.2 and Oracles 4.3 and 4.4, proceeds in a similar
way to the authorised outsourcing game and captures the notion that a computational
result should only be considered valid if generated by an authorised party.
Game 4.2 ExpAuthCA
[PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ]
1: L← , o←⊥
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,PC ,PV )
3: o = (F, x, aux)
$← AO(PP)
4: for all λC(vi) ∈ L do
5: if (λC(o) 6 λC(vi)) then return 0
6: (C, V )
$← UID × UID s.t. λC(C) > λC(o) and λV (V ) > λV (o)
7: SKC
$← Register(C, λC(C),MK,PP)
8: SKV
$← Register(V, λV (V ),MK,PP)
9: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
10: (σo, V Ko, RKo)
$← ProbGen(x, SKC , PKF , λ(C), λ(o),PP)
11: θo
$← AO(σo, V Ko, o, λC(o), PKF , RKo,PP)
12: (y, τθo)← Verify(θo, SKV , V Ko, λV (V ), λV (o), RKo,PP)
13: if (((y, τθo) 6= (⊥, (reject, ·)))) then return 1
14: else return 0
The game begins with the challenger setting up the system and providing oracle access
for the adversary. A chooses a target computation o that it is not authorised to compute
by any of the keys it holds. The challenger then simulates two entities: a delegator and a
verifier that are authorised for this computation, and creates an encoded input by running
ProbGen on the adversary’s target computation. This is given to A who must produce an
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Oracle 4.3 ORegister(ID, λ(ID),MK,PP)
1: if (o 6=⊥) and (λ(ID) > λC(o)) then
2: return ⊥
3: LR ← LR ∪ λ(ID)
4: return Register(ID, λ(ID),MK,PP)
Oracle 4.4 OCompute(σo′ , EKF ′,S , SKS , λC(S), λC(o′),PP)
1: if (o′ = o) then return ⊥
2: return Compute(σo′ , EKF ′,S , SKS , λ
C(S), λC(o′),PP)
encoded output that is accepted by the verifier. Note that although the adversary chooses
the input to the computation, and therefore can certainly compute F (x), it still should
not be able to convince the verifier to accept (since the Verify algorithm should enforce
the computational access control policy and reject responses from unauthorised servers).
The Register oracle is identical to that for authorised outsourcing and prevents the adver-
sary learning a secret key for the challenge label (or any ancestors that enable derivation
of the challenge label). The Compute oracle, in Oracle 4.4, returns ⊥ if queried for the
challenge computation as this would trivially verify correctly and win the game.
Definition 4.3. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the AuthC game for an PVC-
AC construction, PVCAC, for a family of functions F and computational and verification
access control posets PC and PV respectively, is defined as:
AdvAuthCA (PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpAuthCA
[RPVC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ]].
An PVC-AC scheme, PVCAC, is secure with respect to authorised computation if, for all
PPT adversaries A,
AdvAuthCA (PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ) 6 negl(`).
4.4.3 Authorised Verification
In Game 4.3 and Oracles 4.5 and 4.6, we capture the notion that an unauthorised verifier
should not be able to learn the output of a computation. This is formulated in an indis-
tinguishability game, where the adversary, on line 3, chooses two computations o0 and o1
to give to the challenger. To avoid a trivial win, we require that neither of the associated
labels in the verification poset are less than or equal to a label queried to the Register ora-
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Game 4.3 ExpAuthVA
[PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ]
1: L← , o0 ←⊥, o1 ←⊥
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,PC ,PV )
3: (o0, o1)
$← AO,Retrieve(PP)
4: for all λV (vi) ∈ L do
5: if ((λV (o0) 6 λV (vi)) or (λV (o1) 6 λV (vi))) then return 0
6: b
$← {0, 1}
7: (C, S)
$← UID × UID s.t. λC(C) > λC(ob) and λC(S) > λC(ob)
8: SKC
$← Register(C, λC(C),MK,PP)
9: SKS
$← Register(V, λC(S),MK,PP)
10: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
11: EKF,S
$← Certify(S, F,MK,PP)
12: (σob , V Kob , RKob)
$← ProbGen(x, SKC , PKF , λ(C), λ(ob),PP)
13: θob
$← Compute(σob , EKF,S , SKS , λC(S), λC(ob),PP)
14: b′ $← AO,Retrieve(θob , V Kob , RKob , λ(o0), λ(o1), PKF ,PP)
15: return b′ = b
Oracle 4.5 ORegister(ID, λ(ID),MK,PP)
1: if ((ob 6=⊥) and ((λ(ID) > λV (o0)) or (λ(ID) > λV (o1))) then
2: return ⊥
3: L← L ∪ λ(ID)
4: return SKID
$← Register(ID, λ(ID),MK,PP)
Oracle 4.6 ORetrieve(SKV , RTo′ , τθo′ , V Ko′ , RKo′ , λV (V ), λV (o′),PP)
1: if ((o′ = o0) or (o′ = o1)) then return ⊥
2: return Retrieve(SKV , RTo′ , τθo′ , V Ko′ , RKo′ , λ
V (V ), λV (o′),PP)
cle (otherwise, the adversary is in fact authorised to verify the chosen computation). The
challenger chooses one of these at random and simulates outsourcing and computing this
computation. To do so, on line 7, the challenger chooses two random entities, one to act
as a delegator and one to act as a server. These identities will be registered in the system
and used to simulate running ProbGen and Compute as in a real system. The adversary
is provided with the encoded output from this computation, along with the verification
keys and other public information, and must guess which computation was chosen. As
the adversary chose both computations, it can certainly work out the results; however,
no information about the result should leak from the encoded output unless the verifier
is authorised, and hence the adversary should be unable to tell which result the output
corresponds to.
As with the other games in this chapter, the adversary is given oracle access to the functions
FnInit(·,MK,PP), Register(·, ·,MK,PP), Certify(·, ·,MK,PP), ProbGen(·, SK(·), ·, ·, ·,PP),
Compute(·, ·, SK(·), ·, ·, PP ) and Revoke(·, ·,MK,PP), which is denoted by O. As previ-
ously, the Register oracle, given in Oracle 4.5, returns ⊥ if queried for a label that would
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authorise the adversary for the challenge computation. Unlike prior Register oracles, this
check is performed on the verification poset rather than the computational poset, and
checks against both challenge computations o0 and o1 (otherwise, the adversary could
determine which computation was chosen based on which labels are restricted in these
queries). The adversary is also given access to a Retrieve oracle, specified in Oracle 4.6, so
that it can observe outputs for the challenge label. However, to avoid giving the adversary
the information required to form a trivial win or to reveal which computation was chosen,
the challenger returns ⊥ if queried for either challenge computation o0 or o1.
Definition 4.4. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the AuthV game for an PVC-
AC construction, PVCAC, for a family of functions F and computational and verification
access control posets PC and PV respectively, is defined as:
AdvAuthVA (PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpAuthVA
[RPVC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ]]− 12 .
An PVC-AC scheme, PVCAC, is secure with respect to authorised verification if, for all
PPT adversaries A,
AdvAuthVA (PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ) 6 negl(`).
4.4.4 Weak Input Privacy
The notion of weak input privacy, captured in Game 4.4 and Oracles 4.7 and 4.8, is not as
strong as the input privacy often considered in PVC settings where computational servers
learn nothing about the data they are working on. Instead, we are interested in ensuring
that servers (or other entities) that are not authorised to access (compute on) the input
data may not learn x. If full input privacy is required then the underlying PVC scheme,
such as the KP-ABE based one used as a black box in the construction, could be replaced
by one built from a predicate encryption scheme for the same class of functions.
The game begins in a similar way to the authorised verification game with the adversary
selecting two computations that he is not authorised to compute by any key that he
has queried to the Register oracle (Oracle 4.7). The Compute oracle in Oracle 4.8 can
be queried for any input except the challenge inputs. The challenger then simulates the
outsourcing of one of these computations using a simulated delegator C, and gives the
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Game 4.4 ExpwIPA
[PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ]
1: L← , o0 ←⊥, o1 ←⊥
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,PC ,PV )
3: (o0, o1)
$← AO(PP)
4: for all λC(vi) ∈ L do
5: if ((λC(o0) 6 λC(vi)) or (λC(o1) 6 λC(vi))) then return 0
6: b
$← {0, 1}
7: C
$← UID s.t. λC(C) > λC(ob)
8: SKC
$← Register(C, λC(C),MK,PP)
9: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
10: (σob , V Kob , RKob)
$← ProbGen(x, SKC , PKF , λ(C), λ(ob),PP)
11: b′ $← AO(σob , V Kob , λ(o0), λ(o1), PKF ,PP)
12: return (b′ = b)
Oracle 4.7 ORegister(ID, λ(ID),MK,PP)
1: if ((o0, o1 6=⊥) and ((λ(ID) > λC(o0)) or (λ(ID) > λC(o1)))) then
2: return ⊥
3: LR ← LR ∪ λ(ID)
4: return Register(ID, λ(ID),MK,PP)
Oracle 4.8 OCompute(σo′ , EKF ′,S , SKS , λC(S), λC(o′),PP)
1: if (o′ = o) then return ⊥
2: return Compute(σo′ , EKF ′,S , SKS , λ
C(S), λC(o′),PP)
adversary the resulting encoded input. The adversary must guess which computation the
input corresponds to; i.e. which input data is encoded in the input.
Definition 4.5. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the wIP game for an PVC-
AC construction, PVCAC, for a family of functions F and computational and verification
access control posets PC and PV respectively, is defined as:
AdvwIPA (PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpwIPA
[RPVC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ]]− 12 .
An PVC-AC scheme, PVCAC, is secure with respect to weak input privacy if, for all PPT
adversaries A,
AdvwIPA (PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ) 6 negl(`).
4.5 Construction
We now provide an instantiation of PVC-AC that is provably secure with respect to the
security definitions in Section 3.4. The approach we take makes generic, black-box use
of any RPVC scheme, such as that presented in Chapter 3, and introduces the use of a
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symmetric key assignment scheme (KAS) (see Section 2.4) to restrict the behaviour of
entities.
4.5.1 Informal Overview
The graph-based access control policies discussed in Section 4.2 assign labels to each entity
and outsourced computation. The ordering relation and the correctness criterion ensures
that entities are authorised for all appropriate computations (those that are descendants
of their label in the Hasse diagram of the poset). A KAS is designed to enforce such
policies, and assigns a key to each label. Each entity is provided with a key corresponding
to their label, and they may derive keys for all descendants. As per the security criterion,
users may not collude to derive keys for which they are not authorised.
In our setting, we restrict the computations a delegator may outsource, the computations
a server may perform, and the results a verifier may learn. We use two independent
KASs instantiated over the computation and verification posets, PC and PV respectively.
Delegators and servers are issued a key according to their label in the computation poset,
while delegators and verifiers are given a key from the verification KAS.
Appropriate keys from the computation KAS are used to encrypt the encoded input for a
computation. To encode an input in a manner that will be accepted by a server, delegators
must encrypt the encoded input using the key, κλC(o), associated to the computation within
the computation poset. To do so, the delegator must be able to derive κλC(o) and hence
must hold a key at that level or higher i.e. λ(C) > λ(o) — delegators must be authorised
by the KDC to outsource the computation. Similarly, only authorised servers can derive
the decryption key to access the encoded input and perform the computation. By the
IND-CPA security of the symmetric encryption scheme used, no information about the
encoded input is learnt by an unauthorised entity.
To enforce verification policies, delegators generate a retrieval key during delegation, and
encrypt this using an appropriate key from the verification KAS. Then, only verifiers that
can derive this key may decrypt the ciphertext to recover the retrieval key and learn the
output.
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4.5.2 Instantiation
Let RPVC = (RPVC.Setup, RPVC.FnInit, RPVC.Register, RPVC.Certify, RPVC.ProbGen,
RPVC.Compute, RPVC.BVerif, RPVC.Retrieve, RPVC.Revoke) be an RPVC scheme, as
defined in Chapter 3, for a class of functions F . Let SE= (SE.KeyGen, SE.Encrypt,
SE.Decrypt) be an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme secure in the sense
of IND-CPA ∧ INT-PTXT, and let KAS = (KAS.MakeKeys, KAS.MakeSecrets,
KAS.MakePublicData, KAS.GetKey) be a key assignment scheme secure in the sense
of strong-key indistinguishability7 whose keys are compatible with SE (i.e. the
keys generated in the KAS have the same distribution as those generated by
SE.KeyGen). Finally, let PC denote the poset encoding computation policies (e.g.
(L,6)), and similarly let PV denote the poset encoding verification policies (e.g.
(L,>))8. Then, for the same class of functions F , there is a PVC-AC scheme
PVCAC = (PVCAC.Setup, PVCAC.FnInit, PVCAC.Register, PVCAC.Certify, PVCAC.ProbGen,
PVCAC.Compute, PVCAC.BVerif, PVCAC.Retrieve, PVCAC.Revoke) defined in Algorithms
4.1-4.9 which operates as follows.
1. PVCAC.Setup, presented in Algorithm 4.1, runs the setup algorithm for the under-
lying RPVC scheme. It also instantiates two KASs: one for the computational
poset PC and one for the verification poset PV . These will form the cryptographic
enforcement mechanisms for computational and verification access control policies
respectively. The public parameters for the PVC-AC system comprise the RPVC
public parameters and the public labels for the two KASs. The master secret key
for the PVC-AC system comprises the master secret of the RPVC scheme and the
keys and secrets for the two KASs.
2. PVCAC.FnInit, presented in Algorithm 4.2, simply outputs the public delegation key
for the RPVC scheme.
3. PVCAC.Register, presented in Algorithm 4.3, differs based on whether the queried
identity ID is a delegator, server, or verifier. If ID is a server, then it must be
registered in the underlying RPVC system (servers are the only entities that need
7It has been shown that S-KI is equivalent to KI [35]. We make use of the additional queries in the
S-KI game, but due to the equivalence this is not a strengthening of the assumptions. It is interesting to
note that the form of the S-KI game is useful as a proof technique besides the original motivation to reflect
realistic attacks.
8We use κPC to denote the set of all keys generated by the KAS for the computation poset PC and,
for a label λC(ID) ∈ PC, the associated key is κλC(ID) ∈ κPC .
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Algorithm 4.1 (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,PC ,PV )
1: (PP′,MK′) $← RPVC.Setup(1`)
2: κPC
$← KAS.MakeKeys(1`,PC)
3: ωPC
$← KAS.MakeSecrets(1`,PC)
4: PubPC
$← KAS.MakePublicData(1`,PC)
5: κPV
$← KAS.MakeKeys(1`,PV )
6: ωPV
$← KAS.MakeSecrets(1`,PV )
7: PubPV
$← KAS.MakePublicData(1`,PV )
8: PP← (PP′, PubPC , PubPV )
9: MK← (MK′, κPC , ωPC , κPV , ωPV )
Algorithm 4.2 PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
1: PKF
$← RPVC.FnInit(F,MK′,PP′)
registering in RPVC). The secret key for the server comprises the signing key pro-
duced by the RPVC Register algorithm, as well as the KAS key and secret for the
computational label of the server (such that it can derive keys for all computations
it is authorised to compute).
If ID is a delegator then it must be able to encrypt both encoded inputs (protected by
computational policies over PC) and retrieval keys (protected by verification policies
over PV ). Therefore, it is issued the KAS keys and secrets for the security labels
assigned to ID in both KASs.
Finally, if ID is a verifier, it must be able to decrypt ciphertexts using KAS keys
associated to the verification poset (to recover valid retrieval keys). Therefore, it is
issued the KAS key and secret for the label of ID in the verification poset.
Algorithm 4.3 SKID
$← Register(ID, λ(ID),MK,PP)
1: if ID is a server then
2: SK ′ID
$← RPVC.Register(ID,MK′,PP′)
3: SKID ← (SK ′ID, κλC(ID), ωλC(ID))
4: else if ID is a delegator then
5: SKID ← (κλC(ID), ωλC(ID), κλV (ID), ωλV (ID))
6: else
7: SKID ← (κλV (ID), ωλV (ID))
4. PVCAC.Certify, presented in Algorithm 4.4, simply runs the Certify algorithm of the
underlying RPVC scheme as the cryptographic enforcement mechanism is not re-
quired to certify servers for particular functions.
5. PVCAC.ProbGen, presented in Algorithm 4.5, first runs the ProbGen algorithm for
the underlying RPVC scheme. It must then protect the resulting encoded input and
retrieval key in accordance with the computational and verification access control
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Algorithm 4.4 EKF,S
$← Certify(S, F,MK,PP)
1: EKF,S
$← RPVC.Certify(S, F,MK′,PP′)
policy respectively. To do so, it derives the keys for the labels λC(o) and λV (o)
from the secret issued to the delegator running the algorithm. If both keys are
derived successfully (i.e. the delegator is authorised to outsource this computation)
then these keys are used to encrypt the encoded input and retrieval key respectively
using the symmetric encryption scheme.
Algorithm 4.5 (σo, V Ko, RKo)
$← ProbGen(x, SKC , PKF , λ(C), λ(o),PP)
1: (σ′o, V Ko, RK
′
o)
$← RPVC.ProbGen(x, PKF ,PP′)
2: κλC(o) ← KAS.GetKey(λC(C), λC(o), ωλC(C),PP)
3: κλV (o) ← KAS.GetKey(λV (C), λV (o), ωλV (C),PP)
4: if (κλC(o) 6=⊥) and (κλV (o) 6=⊥) then
5: σo ← (λC(o),SE.Encrypt(σ′o, κλC(o)))
6: RKo ← (λV (o),SE.Encrypt(RK ′o, κλV (o)))
6. PVCAC.Compute, presented in Algorithm 4.6, first attempts to derive the key κλC(o)
for the computation, using the secret issued to the server by the KDC. If derivation
is unsuccessful then the algorithm terminates as the server is unauthorised for the
computation. Otherwise, the encoded input is decrypted and the resulting plaintext
used as input to the Compute algorithm of the underlying RPVC scheme.
Algorithm 4.6 θo
$← Compute(σo, EKF,S , SKS , λC(S), λC(o),PP)
1: Parse σo as (λ
C(o), c)
2: κλC(o) ← KAS.GetKey(λC(S), λC(o), ωλC(S),PP)
3: if (κλC(o) =⊥) then
4: return θo ←⊥
5: else
6: σ′o ← SE.Decrypt(c, κλC(o))
7: if (σ′o =⊥) then return θo ←⊥
8: else θo
$← RPVC.Compute(σ′o, EKF,S , SKS , PP ′)
7. PVCAC.BVerif, presented in Algorithm 4.7, simply runs the corresponding algorithm
of the underlying RPVC scheme, as any entity is authorised to perform this step in
our model.
8. PVCAC.Retrieve, presented in Algorithm 4.8, first attempts to derive the key asso-
ciated to the verification label λV (o) of the computation. If unsuccessful, then the
verifier is unauthorised and the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, the derived key
is used with the symmetric decryption algorithm to recover the retrieval key which
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Algorithm 4.7 (RTo, τθo)← BVerif(θo, V Ko,PP):
1: (RTo, τθo)← RPVC.BVerif(θo, V Ko,PP′)
can then be used in the RPVC.Retrieve algorithm to produce the output of the com-
putation.
Algorithm 4.8 y ← Retrieve(SKV , RTo, τθo , V Ko, RKo, λV (V ), λV (o),PP):
1: Parse RKo as (λ
V (o), e)
2: κλV (o) ← KAS.GetKey(λV (V ), λV (o), ωλV (V ),PP)
3: if κλV (o) =⊥ then
4: return y ←⊥
5: else
6: RK ′o ← SE.Decrypt(e, κλV (o))
7: y ← RPVC.Retrieve(RTo, τθo , V Ko, RK ′o,PP′)
9. PVCAC.Revoke, presented in Algorithm 4.9, simply runs the RPVC.Revoke algorithm.
As this is run by the KDC, access control restrictions do not need to be applied.
Algorithm 4.9 UM
$← Revoke(τθo , F,MK,PP)
1: return RPVC.Revoke(τθo , F,MK,PP
′)
It is straightforward to see that correctness of this construction follows from the correctness
of the RPVC scheme.
Theorem 4.1. Given any strong-key-indistinguishability secure KAS, any RPVC scheme
secure in the sense of public verifiability and revocation for a class of functions F ,
and an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme secure in the sense of IND-CPA ∧
INT-PTXT, let PVCAC be the PVC-AC scheme defined in Algorithms 4.1-4.9. Then
PVCAC is secure in the sense of public verifiability, revocation, authorised outsourcing,
authorised computation, weak input privacy, and authorised verification for the same class
of functions F .
4.6 Proofs of Security
Informally, the security proofs follow from the security of the underlying RPVC scheme
and the S-KI, INT-PTXT and IND-CPA security properties. The proofs for public veri-
fiability and revocation are similar to the proofs given in Chapter 3 up to some syntactical
changes, and so we do not replicate these here.
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Lemma 4.1. Given a secure RPVC scheme, a symmetric authenticated encryption scheme
secure in the sense of IND-CPA∧ INT-PTXT and a KAS secure with respect to strong-
key indistinguishability, let PVCAC be the PVC-AC scheme defined in Algorithms 4.1–4.9.
Then PVCAC is secure in the sense of authorised outsourcing (Game 4.1).
Proof. Let ASE be an adversary playing the IND-CPA game with a challenger C against
SE . We first transition to a slightly modified version of the authorised outsourcing game,
showing a negligible difference between the two. We can then use an adversary against
this modified game to break the IND-CPA security of the symmetric encryption scheme.
• Game 0. This is the authorised outsourcing game as defined in Section 4.4.1.
• Game 1. This is identical to Game 0, except that we replace the key κλC(o) for
the challenge computation o with a key κ? drawn uniformly at random from the
keyspace.
Game 0 to Game 1 This game hop relies on the strong key indistinguishability (S-KI)
of the KAS. Suppose, for a contradiction, that an adversaryAV C exists that can distinguish
Game 0 from Game 1 with non-negligible advantage δ. Then we show that there exists
an adversary ASE that, using AV C as a sub-routine, breaks the S-KI of the KAS also
with advantage δ. AV C will play either Game 0 or Game 1 with ASE acting as the
challenger, and must guess correctly which game he is playing. ASE in turn will play the
S-KI game with a challenger C. This reduction is important to ensure that no additional
information about the encryption key is leaked through the construction.
1. C begins by selecting a bit b $← {0, 1} which will determine whether the challenge
key is real or random, and hence whether AV C plays Game 0 or Game 1. C
continues by instantiating the KAS in lines 2 to 5 of Game 2.4 and giving the public
information to ASE .
2. ASE runs lines 1 and 2 of the authorised outsourcing game to initialise LR, LP , o
and the PVC-AC system, and sends AV C the generated public parameters. During
the Setup algorithm in line 2, ASE will not run lines 2 to 4 of Algorithm 4.1. Instead,
it will set PubPC to be the challenge public information from the S-KI challenger C
and will make use of oracle queries to C for the remaining parameters.
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3. AV C is then given oracle access. Queries to the FnInit, Certify and Revoke functions
can be answered simply by running the corresponding algorithm. Queries to the
remaining algorithms may need to make use of KAS derived keys. ASE can use
its knowledge of the verification poset and the corresponding KAS (which it owns),
where appropriate, but it does not know anything other than the public information
for the computational poset, because this is the challenge poset for the S-KI game.
Thus, ASE will issue Corrupt oracle queries to retrieve the necessary keys and secret
information for the queried identity label. Since AV C has not yet chosen a challenge
computation o, and ASE has not yet chosen a challenge node v?, the Corrupt oracle
will always return a valid key and secret pair, which ASE can use to form a full,
valid response for AV C .
4. Eventually, AV C will output a challenge computation o. ASE will output 0 and
end the game if this choice is invalid — that is, if AV C is authorised to outsource
o by any key λC(vi) queried to the Register oracle. ASE will send λC(o) to C as
the challenge node v? for the S-KI game. Note that this is a valid challenge in the
S-KI game because the only queries made to the Corrupt oracle were as a result of
queries to the Register, ProbGen and Compute queries. Recall that we require any
identity ID queried to an oracle to have previously been queried to Register such
that SKID is well-defined (as it would be in a realistic system evolution). Therefore,
any KAS key for a label λC(ID) required in a ProbGen or Compute oracle query,
would previously have been queried to Register. Now, in the authorised outsourcing
game, AV C may not choose a challenge computation o for which he is authorised —
that is, any o such that λC(o) 6 λC(vi) for any λC(vi) queried to the Register oracle.
This corresponds precisely to the condition on the choice of v? in the S-KI game.
C will return a key κ? which corresponds either to the real key κλC(o) or a random
key from the keyspace, chosen according to the bit b chosen at the beginning of the
game.
5. ASE must now simulate a server and a verifier. It does this by first registering
two such entities, S and V respectively, that are authorised to compute and verify o
respectively. It chooses a random S such that λC(S) = λC(o) and hence κλC(S) = κ
?.
Note that this is the only part of SKS that is required, and in particular ωλC(S) is
not required (as this is only needed for deriving keys, and S will only need to use
κ?). To register S, ASE runs Register and sets SKS = (SK ′S , κ?,⊥). Furthermore,
to register V , ASE sets SKV = (κλV (V ), ωλV (V )).
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6. ASE then runs lines 11 and 12 as written in the authorised outsourcing game (Game
4.1) to initialise F and certify the selected server S for F . AV C is given PKF and
oracle access. As before, for queries to FnInit, Certify and Revoke, ASE simply runs
the corresponding algorithm.
For queries to Register for an identity ID, ASE will return ⊥ if λ(ID) > λC(o)
as specified in Oracle 4.1 (since AV C should not be authorised to outsource o).
Otherwise, ASE will issue a Corrupt oracle query for (λ(ID), λC(o)). Now, since ASE
did not output ⊥ already, v? 6 vi in the S-KI game (or equivalently, λC(o) 6 λ(ID))
and hence C will always return a valid key and secret pair which ASE can use to
simulate running Register.
For queries to ProbGen, observe that only the KAS keys and not the KAS secrets
are required to form a correct output, and that Oracle 4.2 returns ⊥ if queried for
λC(o) which is the challenge label in the S-KI game. The Corrupt oracle (Oracle 2.3)
returns (at least) a key for all queries except the challenge label. Therefore, for all
queries that AV C does not return ⊥ for, C will be able to provide a key that can be
used to simulate running ProbGen.
Finally, for queries to Compute, again observe that only the KAS key for the queried
label is required to form a valid output, and not the KAS secret. The Corrupt oracle
will issue a valid key for all labels but the challenge label λC(o), and so in these cases,
ASE can successfully simulate the Compute algorithm. If, on the other hand, a query
is made to the Compute oracle for the challenge computation, then the adversary
has either submitted a malformed encoded input (and ⊥ should be returned), or the
adversary has submitted a correctly formed encoded input, and hence has already
won the game and needn’t make this query.
7. Eventually, AV C outputs its encoded output, verification key and retrieval key for
the challenge computation. ASE runs the Compute algorithm as written, as it knows
κλC(o) from κλC(C), and the Verify algorithm as written since it owns the verification
KAS. ASE can therefore return the result of the game to AV C as expected.
Now, AV C has been provided all information that an adversary against the authorised
outsourcing game would be given and will guess which game he is playing with advantage
δ. Notice that the distribution of the game generated by ASE is precisely that of Game
0 if b = 0 (i.e. the real KAS key is used), and is precisely that of Game 1 otherwise
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(i.e. a random key was chosen). Thus, ASE can simply forward AV C ’s guess to C as its
guess in the S-KI game. We conclude that if AV C guesses correctly with non-negligible
advantage δ, then ASE can break the strong-key indistinguishability of the KAS also with
non-negligible advantage δ. However, since we assumed the KAS was S-KI secure, such
an adversary cannot exist and hence Game 0 is indistinguishable from Game 1 except
with at most a negligible advantage  6 1− δ.
Reduction to INT-PTXT We have shown that, from the adversary’s point of view,
Game 1 is almost (with negligible distinguishing advantage) identical to Game 0. Thus,
we may run the adversary against Game 1 instead with at most an  loss in the tightness
of the reduction. In essence, we have now removed any information leakage from the KAS.
We now consider the security of Game 1. To achieve a contradiction, suppose AV C is an
adversary with non-negligible advantage δ in Game 1. We show that, using this adversary
AV C as a subroutine, we can construct an adversary ASE that breaks the INT-PTXT
security of the authenticated symmetric encryption scheme SE . Let C be the INT-PTXT
challenger for ASE who in turn acts as the challenger in Game 1 for AV C .
1. C begins by initialising the list L and running SE.KeyGen(1`) to generate a key κ?,
as specified in Game 2.7. It sends the security parameter 1` to ASE .
2. ASE must now initialise Game 1 for AV C . Informally, it will set the KAS key for
the label λC(o) to be the random key κ? chosen by C. However, the challenge label is
unknown until AV C chooses it, whilst the public parameters and oracle access must
be provided before this choice. Thus, we require ASE to guess the challenge label
during Setup so that the correct key can be implicitly set to be the INT-PTXT
challenge key (and all encryptions under that key can be formed using oracle access
to C). If the number of labels in the poset is N , where N is polynomial in the
security parameter (as the scheme must be efficiently instantiable), then ASE may
guess λC(o) with probability at least 1N . Assuming that the guess is correct, we
proceed as follows.
3. ASE runs PVCAC.Setup as given in Algorithm 4.1 with the modification that the
key for the guessed label in the computation poset, κλC(o) is implicitly set to be the
key generated by C in the IND-CPA game and the KAS is constructed in such a
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way to be consistent with this choice. Of course, ASE does not hold κλC(o), but
will ensure that any operations using it will be performed using its oracles to C.
Since the challenge key, and hence any corresponding secret derivation information,
is unknown, it is not trivial to construct a KAS incorporating this key. However,
notice that the authorised outsourcing game (and by extension Game 1) does not
permit the adversary to query any label that is an ancestor of the challenge label
in the computation poset. Thus, KAS keys for the set of ancestors will not be
needed, and a KAS can simply be instantiated over the remaining nodes (and the
public information for the ancestor set simulated; as the keys cannot be derived,
the public information need not be functionally correct). Remaining keys (for the
set of ancestors of the challenge label) can simply be generated using the security
parameter and the symmetric KeyGen algorithm. From the adversarial point of view,
this will be indistinguishable from the real games.
4. AV C is given the generated public parameters and oracle access which ASE may
respond to as follows:
• FnInit, Certify, and Revoke queries can be handled by simply calling the relevant
algorithm as these have no dependence on the KAS.
• If a Register query is made for a label λ(ID) > λC(o) as guessed by ASE then
ASE aborts the game since AV C would not then be able to choose λC(o) as
its challenge computation; hence ASE ’s guess was incorrect. Otherwise, ASE
holds the relevant KAS keys and may respond by running as specified in Oracle
Query 4.1.
• By the restriction specified on line 6 of the authorised outsourcing game, AV C
may not choose a challenge computation whose label has been queried to the
ProbGen oracle. Hence, if such a query is made at this point, then λC(o)
could not be chosen as the challenge computation and ASE ’s guess would be
incorrect; therefore, if this occurs, the game is aborted. For any other choice
of computation queried to the ProbGen oracle, ASE holds the KAS key (or
generated symmetric key) and may run Algorithm 3.5 as written.
• Observe that if a query is made to the Compute oracle for the challenge com-
putation, then the adversary has either submitted a malformed encoded input,
and ⊥ should be returned, or the adversary has submitted a correctly formed
encoded input, and hence has already won the game. For all other query inputs,
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ASE can use one of the keys it holds to respond to the challenge by running
Algorithm 3.6 as written.
5. AV C eventually outputs a choice of challenge computation, and if this is not the
computation chosen by ASE at the beginning of the game, the game is aborted.
Otherwise, the choice of computation label is valid since the game has not already
been aborted during the oracle queries.
6. ASE should now register two entities: a computational server S and a verifier V .
However, these will not be required in the following, so ASE can simulate registering
them with labels λC(o) and λV (o) respectively and update the public parameters
accordingly without actually requiring the correct keys for these entities (as the
adversary will not see any output from these entities other than their presence in
the lists in the public parameters). ASE can also run the FnInit and Certify algorithms
as written.
7. AV C is then provided with all relevant information and is given oracle access again.
Queries can be handled as above, but Register queries now return ⊥ if the queried
label is an ancestor of the computation label in the poset i.e. exactly when ASE does
not hold a KAS key for the queried label.
8. AV C finally outputs a forged encoded input σo.
Now, observe that from the point of view of AV C , the game has been simulated correctly
up to this point and that ASE has not made any queries to its Encrypt oracle in the
INT-PTXT game. Thus, if the ciphertext c within σo decrypts successfully (which it
must for AV C to win the authorised outsourcing game), then the verification oracle Ver(c)
will output 1 and the decrypted message has certainly not been queried to the Encrypt
oracle, and thus ASE can forward c as its answer in the INT-PTXT game and win with
exactly the advantage of AV C in the authorised outsourcing game. Thus, for a poset of
polynomial size N , the advantage of ASE is δN which is non-negligible if AV C has non-
negligible advantage δ in the authorised outsourcing game. However, since we assumed
the authenticated symmetric encryption scheme to be secure, such an adversary with
non-negligible advantage against the authorised outsourcing game cannot exist.
Thus, we conclude, the overall advantage against the authorised outsourcing game is the
sum of the distinguishing advantage between Game 0 and Game 1, and the advantage
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in the reduction to INT-PTXT, both of which we have shown to be negligible. Therefore,
the overall advantage against the authorised outsourcing game is negligible.
We remark that in the above proof we required ASE to correctly guess the label that
AV C would select ahead of time. This is very similar to the notions of security commonly
found in functional encryption primitives, particularly identity-based encryption [32] and
attribute-based encryption [27,66]. In these settings, it is common to refer to the method
of guessing the correct label as complexity leveraging which results in a polynomial loss
in the tightness of the reduction. An alternative, which could equally be taken here,
is to formulate a weaker selective notion of security in which the adversary must select
the challenge label at the beginning of the game before seeing the public parameters
(in a similar fashion to the selective notions of security for ABE schemes discussed in
Section 2.8.5).
We also note that the restriction on queries to the ProbGen oracle (i.e. that the challenge
computation cannot be queried) is stronger than required for our particular construc-
tion due to the Encrypt oracle available in the INT-PTXT game. An alternative would
be to allow queries to ProbGen for the challenge computation but require that the final
adversarial output is distinct from those given in response to these queries.
The remaining proofs follow a similar line of argument and can be found in Appendix A.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 follows as a corollary of Lemma 4.1 and Lemmas A.1 to A.3.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have motivated the need for the cryptographic enforcement of access
control policies in the setting of outsourced computation, particularly in the multi-user
setting that we developed in Chapter 3. As developments in VC continue towards such
settings, it is vital to enable restrictions to be placed on: the computations that delegators
can outsource (both from the perspective of separation of duties, and considering a server
providing differing levels of service for different users); the computations a server may
perform (such that certain computations, over sensitive data say, may only be performed
by a server satisfying a policy); and the verifiers that may learn the output of the result
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(e.g. ensuring that read access to the newly generated data is handled in a way that is
consistent with the sensitivity of the inputs). We have shown example graph-based access
control policies for these scenarios, as well as providing a formal definitional framework,
security models, and a provably secure construction built from key assignment schemes.
It may also be interesting to consider alternative enforcement mechanisms, such as authen-
tication protocols that enforce graph-based authorisation policies to achieve ticket-based
access control to a computational service. Such protocols have been explored by Alder-
man and Crampton [2] where they show that standardised authentication protocols can
be easily extended (for example, using a KAS) to authenticate a user as possessing a cer-
tain set of access rights rather than to authenticate individual identities. They also show
that this model of authentication can lead to novel authentication protocols by choosing
appropriate posets of security labels. In Chapter 6, we will consider the use of dual-policy
ABE to outsource computations (using the KP-ABE policy) and enforcing access control
(using the CP-ABE policy).
Specific VC scenarios may lead to interesting access control models. One particularly
applicable setting for the enforcement of access control policies is verifiable searchable en-
cryption [37, 99]. Consider a remote database host that returns verifiably correct results
to user queries (computations). In practice it is unlikely that all users should have un-
restricted access to the entire database. It is imperative that only authorised users may
perform specific queries (those relating solely to their duties and to data for which they
have clearance) and that results remain protected to prevent data leakage.
166
Chapter 5
Verifiable Delegable Computation
Contents
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.3 Verifiable Delegable Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.4 Potential Applications for VDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
5.5 Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
5.6 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
5.7 Proof of Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
5.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
In this chapter, we explore a novel form of publicly verifiable computation which we call
VDC. Here, rather than clients submitting input data to computational servers, the servers
themselves hold data which they allow to be verifiably queried by delegators. We see that
this setting has natural applications such as verifiable queries on remote data and verifiable
MapReduce operations. In Chapter 3, we explored techniques to achieve publicly verifiable
outsourced computation using key-policy attribute-based encryption. In this chapter, we
consider the similar primitive of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE)
which, too, was originally designed as a cryptographic enforcement mechanism for access
control policies. We see that CP-ABE can be used to construct VDC.
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider an alternate model of outsourced computation which we call
verifiable delegable computation (VDC). VDC can be considered as a reversal of the usual
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model for publicly verifiable computation in which remote servers make available a static
database over which any delegator may request computations (or queries) to be performed.
Data is static and stored by the server and may be embedded in a server’s secret key,
whilst the computation of many different functions can be requested by using only public
information. Thus, in this setting, the servers act as the data owners and delegators are
more akin to data users, whereas in PVC, the delegators are the data owners and request
servers to perform work on their behalf. The relationship between servers and delegators
in VDC is more akin to the traditional client-server model.
We also see that VDC has very natural applications. For example, VDC can be used
to perform verifiable queries on remote databases without access to the data itself, or
to construct verifiable MapReduce operations for parallel computing problems. In the
latter case, worker nodes hold some input data whilst multiple delegators can request each
worker to compute some “sub-problem” F on their data portion. Verifiably correct results
are returned to the delegator who can aggregate the results to form a correct result for
the entire dataset. Note that it is not necessary to distribute the data to each delegator
to allow them to request computations. We explain these example applications in more
detail in Section 5.4.
Recall, from Chapter 3, that key-policy attribute-based encryption can be used to provide a
proof mechanism for the correctness of outsourced computations. KP-ABE was designed,
primarily, as a cryptographic enforcement mechanism for access control policies. Data
objects to be protected are associated with a descriptive set of attributes and are encrypted,
whilst users are issued a key corresponding to policies (i.e. Boolean formulae) defined over
attributes. Users may decrypt an object, and thereby gain read access, if and only if the
policy associated to their key is satisfied by the attributes associated to the object. The
key insight of Parno et al. [84] was to observe that successful decryption of a ciphertext
can be used as a proof that a Boolean formula F is satisfied by a set of attributes x (that
is, that F (x) = 1), and can therefore be used for verifiable computation. In this setting,
computational servers are certified to compute certain functions by being issued a KP-ABE
decryption key for the policy representing F , whilst delegators outsource computations by
encrypting random messages (which act as verification tokens) using attributes encoding
the input data x.
Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption has very similar functionality to KP-ABE,
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with the association of attribute sets and policies to ciphertexts and keys reversed. In
this chapter, we see that CP-ABE can also be meaningfully employed in the verifiable
computation setting to achieve VDC.
The efficiency requirement for this model is very different from the classical PVC setting:
outsourcing a computation is no longer merely an attempt to gain efficiency since the
delegator is never in possession of the input data and cannot execute the computation
himself (even if it had the necessary resources). Thus, although a scheme should aim
to be efficient, we do not have the stringent efficiency requirement present in PVC (that
outsourcing and verifying computations be more efficient than performing the computation
itself, to make outsourcing a worthwhile investment). Indeed, in the similar setting of
Backes et al. [17], the efficiency requirement is simply that verification of a result is more
efficient than computing it. We believe that CP-ABE behaves reasonably well in this
setting. Our solution achieves constant time public verification and the communication
costs to delegate computations depends on the function F , while the size of the server’s
response depends only on the size of the computational result itself and not on the size of
the input which may be large, particularly when querying remote databases. Future work
in this area should focus on reducing the cost of outsourcing computations.
We begin this chapter by reviewing related work. In Section 5.3, we describe and formally
define our model of publicly verifiable delegable computation. In Section 5.4, we consider
several example applications for VDC: namely, verifiable MapReduce operations, verifiable
queries on remote databases and three-party computations as introduced by Backes et
al. [17]. We consider security of VDC in terms of public verifiability and blind verification
in Section 5.5. We provide an example construction based on CP-ABE in Section 5.6,
which is relevant to our hybrid model of publicly verifiable computation (Chapter 6).
Finally, we prove that our construction is secure according to our security models.
5.2 Related Work
Work from the realm of authenticated data also lends itself to the concept of verifiable
computations over outsourced data. Backes et al. [17] consider computations over out-
sourced data based on privacy-preserving proofs over authenticated data outsourced by
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a trusted client, which we refer to as three-party computation. In this setting, a trusted
source produces and authenticates some data which is given to a server. Other parties,
that do not trust this server, can then request computations on this data and efficiently
verify the results, but should learn nothing more than the computation results and their
validity (i.e. should not learn the data itself). In our setting, the source can be thought
of as the trusted KDC and then the same trust relations hold between the parties in both
VDC and in three-party computations. The solution of Backes et al. [17] makes uses of ho-
momorphic MACs and succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) [78]. Similar results
were presented in [91] using public logs. It is notable that the work by [17] and [30] also
achieve the notion of public verifiability. In this chapter, we too achieve public verifiabil-
ity but using very different techniques; we use the decryption mechanism of the CP-ABE
scheme to achieve the same goal as the SNARGs.
Chung et al. [42] introduced memory delegation where a client uploads his memory to a
server who can update and compute a function F over the entire memory. In our setting,
the data owner need not be the client and computations can be performed on a subset
of the data, but we only consider static data. Backes et al. [18] consider a client that
outsources a large amount of data and requests computations on a data portion. The
client can efficiently verify the correctness of the result without holding the input data.
Most work in this realm of outsourced data requires the client to know the data to verify,
e.g. in SNARG-based approaches [25, 30, 58] and signatures of correct computation [81].
Apon et al. [7] propose a notion of verifiable oblivious storage to ensure data confidentiality,
access pattern privacy, integrity and freshness of data accesses.
5.3 Verifiable Delegable Computation
Informally, a VDC scheme for a family of functions F comprises a set of n computation
servers Si, 1 6 i 6 n. Each server Si owns a dataset Di comprising mi data points —
that is, Di = {xi,j}mij=1. Si publishes a unique descriptive label l(xi,j) of each data point
xi,j ∈ Di.
Si may also specify a list of functions Fi ⊆ F that it is willing to compute, on behalf of any
delegator, on specified portions of its data set (those data points that are in the domain of
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Table 5.1: Example database for VDC
User ID Name Age Height
001 Alice 26 165
002 Bob 22 172
Table 5.2: Example list Fi
F Dom(F)
Average Age of record 1, Height of record 1, Age of record
2, Height of record 2
Most common
value
Name of record 1, Age of record 1, Height of
record 1, Name of record 2, Age of record 2,
Height of record 2
a given function). As delegators are not the data owners, labels should not reveal the data
values themselves in order to preserve the confidentiality of Di. Delegators may select
servers and data using only knowledge of these labels. Delegators may ask Si to compute
F (X) for any function F ∈ Fi on a set of data points X ⊆ Dom(F ) by specifying the
set of labels {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X . Note that F has |X| inputs, e.g. if X = {x1, x3, x7} then the
server computes F (x1, x3, x7).
Example 5.1. Consider a server Si that owns the database shown in Table 5.1. The
dataset Di represents this database as the set of field values for each record in turn —
Di = {001,Alice, 26, 165, 002,Bob, 22, 172}.
Si publishes a list of data labels {User ID of record 1, Name of record 1, Age of record 1,
Height of record 1, User ID of record 2, Name of record 2, Age of record 2, Height of record
2}. Si also publishes a list of functions Fi that it is willing to compute over Di along with
the domain of each function, as in Table 5.2.
A delegator may then query for the “Average” on the data labelled by the set X = {Age of
record 1, Age of record 2}.
Note that, although it may be tempting to suggest that Si simply caches the results of
computing each F ∈ Fi on its dataset, the choice of data points X ⊆ Dom(F ) for each
computation could vary; hence the number of results that must be cached could be large,
making this an unattractive solution.
Also note that the list Fi could be defined to include computations such as “Average height
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of entities over the age of 21” whereby the list of available inputs Dom(F ) is filtered by
the server to only include such records. However, in these cases, care must be taken that
these lists of data labels, with associated queries for which they are acceptable inputs,
do not leak too much information about the data or allow data items to be linked across
multiple queries — by observing the same data label satisfying multiple queries, it may be
possible to learn detailed information about the data item. In these cases, the data labels
could be randomised per function by hashing the data and the function identifier with a
pre-image resistant hash function.
A VDC scheme begins with a key distribution centre (KDC) (e.g. a trusted third party
as in Chapter 3, a trusted data source or a delegator) running Setup to produce public
parameters and a master secret key. The KDC also registers each server Si to provide a
private signing key SKSi , and publishes a public delegation key PKF for each function of
interest F ∈ F .
Each server, Si enrols with the KDC using the Certify algorithm to make their dataset
Di available for computations. The KDC issues a (single) evaluation key EKDi,Si which
enables Si to perform computations on Di (or, indeed, subsets of Di). As the server is
the data owner in the setting of VDC, it should be able to specify which functions are
(i) meaningful on their dataset (some data may not be in the domain of all functions in
F), and (ii) permissible in accordance with their own access control policies — that is,
servers may not wish to evaluate and reveal the results of all computations over their data.
Thus, each server provides a list of functions, Fi ⊆ F , that they are willing to evaluate on
their data. In some settings, such as the MapReduce example, Fi may well be the full set
F since the delegator is the original data owner (of the entire input dataset) and issues
each worker with a static portion of that data. In this case, the delegator should be able
to request any meaningful computation from the worker nodes. However when servers
are remote data providers, they themselves own the input dataset and should be able to
specify what that data be used for.
Furthermore, not all data points xi,j ∈ Di may be appropriate for each function (e.g. if
F ∈ F is an averaging function, then only numeric data in Di should be used as input).
For the purposes of this chapter, we define the set Fi to comprise elements of the form
(F,
⋃
xi,j∈Dom(F ) l(xi,j)) describing each function and the associated permissible inputs.
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Throughout this chapter, we also assume (to aid the client in encoding the function F in
our construction), that the set of labels {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di reveals the order of each data point
as stored in the server’s memory and the size of each data point when represented as a
bitstring; thus, clients may know the memory location from which data should be used,
but do not know the value of each bit. Note that data can be padded to achieve a uniform
length so that revealing the size of each data point also does not reveal information about
the data value.
To request a computational result from a server, a delegator runs the ProbGen algorithm.
The delegator chooses a function F ∈ Fi and a set of data points X ⊆ Dom(F ). In the
MapReduce example, ProbGen would be run once per worker for the same function F
(which is acceptable by all workers because Fi = F for all i ∈ [n]). ProbGen generates an
encoded input σF,X , verification key V KF,X and output retrieval key RKF,X . A server
Si uses their evaluation key EKDi,Si to compute θF (X) encoding the computational result
F (X).
Verification is divided into two algorithms. We consider public verifiability where any
party (including an adversary) may verify a result. An example motivation of where public
verifiability may be useful is in a grid computing environment where some management
software ensures results are correct before returning them to the user. Blind verification is
performed by any user using a verification key V KF,X to verify correctness. It generates a
retrieval token RTF (X) for valid outputs (or ⊥ if the output is invalid) but does not reveal
the actual output value. Finally, Retrieve takes a (non-⊥) token RTF (X) and the output
retrieval key RKF,X to reveal the final result yF (X) = F (X). This is also illustrated and
compared to publicly verifiable outsourced computation in simplified form in Figure 5.1.
More formally:
Definition 5.1. A publicly verifiable delegable computation (VDC) scheme comprises the
following algorithms1:
• (PP,MK) $← Setup(1`,F): run by the KDC to initialise the system. The input
values are the unary representation of the security parameter, 1`, and the family of
functions, F , that may be outsourced;
• PKF $← FnInit(F,MK,PP): run by the KDC to generate a public delegation key
1We retain the algorithm names from prior PVC schemes for consistency.
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Figure 5.1: Comparison between PVC and VDC
PKF allowing clients to request computations of a function F ;
• SKSi $← Register(Si,MK,PP): run by the KDC to enrol a computational server Si
in the system and to generate a signing key SKSi for Si;
• EKDi,Si $← Certify(Si, Di, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di ,Fi,MK,PP): run by the KDC to generate
an evaluation key EKDi,Si which enables the server Si to perform computations of
all functions F ∈ Fi chosen by the server, on the server’s input data Di = {xi,j}mij=1,
comprising mi data points, each uniquely labelled by l(xi,j);
• (σF,X , V KF,X , RKF,X) $← ProbGen(F, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X , PKF ,PP): run by a client to
request the computation of the function F on a set of data points X ⊆ Di belonging
to the server Si. The input values are the function F to be computed, a set of
labels identifying each data point xi,j ∈ X to be computed on (note that the data
itself is not required), the public delegation key PKF for the function and the public
parameters. The output values are an encoded input σF,X , a public verification key
V KF,X , and a retrieval key RKF,X ;
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• θF (X) $← Compute(σF,X , EKDi,Si , SKSi ,PP): run by a server Si to compute F (X).
The input values are the encoded input σF,X prepared by a client for a set of input
data points X ⊆ Di, an evaluation key EKDi,Si permitting Si to compute on its
dataset Di, a signing key SKSi for the server, and the public parameters. The
algorithm produces an encoded output θF (X) of F (X);
• yF (X) ← Verify(θF (X), V KF,X , RKF,X ,PP): verification comprises two sub-
algorithms as follows. These could be performed together as a single Verify algorithm
if blind verification is not required:
– (RTF (X), τθF (X)) ← BVerif(θF (X), V KF,X ,PP): run by a verifier in possession
of the encoded output θF (X), a verification key for the computation and the
public parameters. The output of this algorithm is a retrieval token RTF (X)
encoding the actual output value of the computation (this can be thought of
as a partial translation from θF (X) to F (X)) and a token τθF (X) , the value of
which is accept if θF (X) is a valid server response for F (X) and reject otherwise.
Note that the verifier learns only whether τθF (X) is correct, it cannot learn the
value of F (X);
– yF (X) ← Retrieve(RTF (X), τθF (X) , V KF,X , RKF,X ,PP): run by an authorised
verifier (i.e. a verifier holding the retrieval key RKF,X) generated by the client
during ProbGen, the verification key V KF,X and the outputs from the BVerif
stage. This algorithm returns the actual computational result yF (X) which is
either yF (X) = F (X) if the server performed correctly, or a distinguished failure
symbol yF (X) =⊥ otherwise.
We do not consider revocation here but observe that an indirectly revocable CP-ABE
scheme could be employed in a similar fashion to the indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme
in Chapter 3. In Chapter 6, we will introduce a hybrid scheme which incorporates VDC
functionality with a revocation mechanism. Although not explicitly stated, the KDC may
update the public parameters PP during any algorithm, in order to reflect changes in the
user population (e.g. servers are added or removed from the system, or granted the ability
to compute additional functions).
In this model, the server must provide its input data to the trusted KDC in order to
be certified. In some application settings, this is expected behaviour. For example, if
the manager of an organisation acts as the KDC and divides a database according to a
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separation of duty policy between different servers. A similar partitioning and distribution
of data also occurs in MapReduce applications. In the three-party computation model
introduced by Backes et al. [17], a trusted data source acts as the KDC and issues data
directly to the server.
In other settings, the server may be the data owner and may have to trust the KDC with
its data (but not the delegators). By requiring a trusted KDC to issue keys, servers are
prevented from creating a key for data they do not own (or indeed a subset of their data).
Future work will attempt to relax this requirement.
Intuitively, we say that a VDC scheme is correct if all arbitrary execution sequences of the
algorithms where a computational result is honestly computed by a non-revoked server
results in the verification algorithm accepting the correct result of the computation. We
can model this as a cryptographic game between a challenger and a PPT adversary; the
adversary aims to find an (honestly generated) encoded output which either does not
encode the correct result or which does encode the correct result but which will not be
accepted by the verification algorithm. For each algorithm in Definition 5.1, we define
a corresponding oracle that executes the algorithm on inputs provided by the adversary,
and returns the output of the algorithm to the adversary. The adversary may query the
Setup oracle only once (before making any other oracle queries), but can thereon call the
remaining oracles any number of times and in any order.
The challenger maintains two lists, LReg and LF ; LReg is a list of tuples comprising
server identities, Si, and the resulting signing keys, SKSi , that have been queried to the
Register oracle, whilst LF comprises tuples of the form (Si, Di, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di ,Fi, EKDi,Si)
denoting that the server Si has been queried to the Certify oracle for the set of functions
Fi and the data set Di, and that EKDi,Si was generated.
The challenger also creates and maintains a table T which records the parameters relating
to each computation performed through the oracle queries. T is updated in the following
oracles:
• ProbGen: the challenger creates a new row in T comprising 8 components, all of
which are initialised to be empty; it then assigns X (which can be found as a subset
of Di in LF ), F , the result F (X) (computed by the challenger itself), σF,X , V KF,X
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and RKF,X to the first 6 components;
• Compute: the challenger first searches T for all rows that contain the queried σF,X
in the 4th component and where the 7th component is empty (i.e. those rows relating
to computations on this encoded input that have not yet been performed). For each
such row, r, the challenger takes the second component (the function identifier, F˜ ),
and checks that there exists a server identity S˜i such that the tuple (S˜i, SKS˜i) ∈ LReg
(where SKS˜i is that given as input to the Compute oracle) and such that the tuple
(S˜i, ·, ·,Fi, EKDi,Si) ∈ LF , where EKDi,Si is also that given as input to the Compute
oracle and where F˜ ∈ Fi. This check ensures that there is a server that holds the
signing key and evaluation key being used to perform the computation and which is
certified for a function F˜ for which the encoded input σF,X was generated.
The challenger then performs the Compute algorithm on the queried σF,X , EKDi,Si
and SKSi to produce an output θF (X). For each of the rows r of T found above, the
challenger writes θF (X) and S˜ to the 7
th and 8th components of r respectively.
Thus, when complete, the entries of T will be of the form
(x, F, F (X), σF,X , V KF,X , RKF,X , θF (X), Si).
After a polynomial number of queries, the adversary will return a value θ?F (X) which he
believes encodes a correct computational result, yet which the Verify algorithm will reject
(that is, an output for which the protocol execution will not be correct). The challenger
first performs a look up in T for all entries containing θ?F (X) in the 7
th position of the
tuple, and stores any such entries as another table T˜ . Note that this means that θ?F (X)
must have been honestly generated by the Compute oracle (else it would not be in T ).
For each such row, the challenger uses the 5th component (the verification key) to run
BVerif on θ?F (X) to generate the outputs RTF (X) and τθF (X) , and then uses the 5
th and 6th
components (the verification key and retrieval key) and τθF (X) to run Retrieve on θ
?
F (X) to
generate yF (X).
The challenger first checks whether yF (X) matches the 3
rd component of the row (that
is, whether yF (X) is the correct computational result F (x)). If so, it then checks whether
τθF (x) = (reject, S), and if so it ends the game by returning 1 to indicate that the adversary
has won the game (the adversary has found a valid encoding of a correct result, computed
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by a certified server, that the Verify algorithm is incorrectly rejecting).
On the other hand, if yF (X) did not match the correct value of F (x), the challenger
also ends the game by returning 1 to indicate that the adversary has won the game (the
adversary in this case has found an incorrect result that was computed honestly by the
algorithms).
If no row in T˜ allows the adversary to win, then the challenger outputs 0 to indicate
that the adversary has lost. An VDC scheme is correct if, for all PPT adversaries, the
probability that the adversary wins the game described above is 0.
5.4 Potential Applications for VDC
We consider the following example applications to motivate our study of VDC.
• MapReduce [50] (or Hadoop [93]) is a programming model for the parallel pro-
cessing of large computations using a cluster or grid of computers (nodes) which can
take advantage of the locality of data to decrease transmission costs. Each set of
worker nodes each compute subproblems on portions of the data and report to a
manager who combines the results. A MapReduce problem comprises two stages:
– Map: a master node (or manager) takes the input and divides it into smaller
sub-problems which are distributed to the worker nodes. The worker computes
the function associated with the sub-problem and passes the result back to the
manager;
– Reduce: the manager collects the answers to all sub-problems and combines
them to form the output to the original problem.
VDC enables verifiable MapReduce such that only valid results are combined. The
manager acts as the key distribution centre (KDC) to distribute evaluation keys for
partitions of the data to workers. He can then request multiple sub-problems to be
solved over this data partitioning.
• Verifiable queries on remote databases. Servers may also act as remote
database providers and register with a KDC to provide a verifiable querying ser-
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vice. Any delegator may use public information to query any function allowed by
the server (within the family allowed by the VDC scheme) on these databases. Data
is remotely stored and delegators see nothing more than the results of queries which
they are assured are correct.
Alternatively, in this setting, the data owner could act as the KDC to outsource its
data to an untrusted server. Due to the public delegation and verification properties,
other data users can query the outsourced data and verify the correctness of the
results. It is important to note that the data owner is not required to retain any
knowledge of the data after it has been outsourced.
• Three-party computation. The model of Backes et al. [17] considers a trusted
data source that provides authenticated data to a service provider who can then
provide verifiably correct results to computations requested by third parties. As
mentioned in Section 5.2, in the context of VDC, the source can be thought of as
the KDC, the service provider as the computational server and the third parties as
delegators.
Backes et al. [17] considered several applications for this model of computation.
Firstly, trusted sensors could be placed in client premises (e.g. a smart energy meter
or a sensor placed in a car to monitor driving habits) or worn by the client (e.g. a
wearable health band). These sensors collect data which is authenticated (due to
the trusted nature of the collection devices) and given to the client who acts as the
service provider. Because this data could be sensitive (e.g. revealing the habits and
lifestyle of the client), the service provider may be reluctant to release the data to
third parties. Nevertheless, there exist legitimate business cases that require access
to compute on the data (e.g. for billing purposes, or to produce an insurance quote
if the sensor is a health monitor or monitors driving habits). Therefore, these third
parties may request appropriate computations on the data from the service provider
itself, and can verify that the service provider performs the computation correctly
on the correct data.
Secondly, Backes et al. suggest a company whose finances must be periodically au-
dited. The trusted sensor in this setting would be the official bookkeeper for the
company who is legally responsible for maintaining correct financial records. The
company keeps the records private as they are business-critical, but provides verifi-
able computational results to the auditors.
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Game 5.1 ExpPubVerifA
[VDC, 1`,F]
1: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
2: (F,X?, {l(xj)}xj∈X?) $← AO(PP)
3: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
4: (σF,X? , V KF,X? , RKF,X?)
$← ProbGen(F, {l(xj)}xj∈X? , PKF ,PP)
5: θ?
$← AO(σF,X? , V KF,X? , RKF,X? , PKF ,PP)
6: (RTF (X?), τθ?)← BVerif(θ?, V KF,X? ,PP)
7: yF (X?) ← Retrieve(RTF (X?), τθ? , V KF,X? , RKF,X? ,PP)
8: if (((yF (X?), τθ?) 6= (⊥, reject)) and (yF (X?) 6= F (X?))) then
9: return 1
10: else return 0
5.5 Security Model
In the context of VDC, we consider security in the sense of public verifiability to ensure
that a server cannot return incorrect results without being detected. This is a natural
extension of that discussed in Chapter 3; we do not require the other notions introduced
in Chapter 3 as we do not consider revocation in this chapter.
The notion of public verifiability is captured in Game 5.1 to ensure that a server (even
having corrupted other servers and holding verification keys) may not cheat by returning an
incorrect result without being detected, even without the original delegator or the verifier
possessing the input data. The game begins with the challenger setting up the system and
providing the resulting public parameters to the adversary. The adversary is also given
oracle access, denoted O, to the following functions: FnInit(·,MK,PP), Register(·,MK,PP)
and Certify(·, ·, ·, ·,MK,PP).
The adversary will select the challenge inputs which are the function F to be computed,
the input data points X? to be computed on, and the labels l(xj) for each data point
xj ∈ X? (as the adversary is acting as a malicious server, it creates and owns the data
X? available to be computed on and may query the Certify oracle for a data set D ⊇ X?).
The challenger runs FnInit to initialise the challenge function F and forms a challenge
by running ProbGen on the challenge input labels and function. It sends the resulting
parameters to A and again provides oracle access as above. The adversary wins the game
if it is able to produce an encoded output that verifies correctly but does not correspond
to the actual result F (X?).
Definition 5.2. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the PubVerif game for a VDC
construction, VDC, for a family of functions F is defined as:
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AdvPubVerifA (VDC, 1`,F) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpPubVerifA
[VDC, 1`,F]].
A VDC scheme, VDC, is secure with respect to public verifiability if, for all PPT adver-
saries A,
AdvPubVerifA (VDC, 1`,F) 6 negl(`).
5.6 Construction
Informally, our construction to compute the family of (monotone) Boolean formulas, closed
under complement, operates similarly to that for RPVC in Chapter 3.
As with our RPVC construction, to encode an n-bit binary input string ~x = x1x2 . . . xn
as an attribute set Ax, we define a universe Ux = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} of n attributes and let
xi ∈ Ax if and only if the ith bit of the input string is 1 — that is, Ax = {xi : xi = 1}.
Note that the inputs to our computations are sets of input data points X ⊆ Di belonging
to the server Si; Di can be thought of as a bitstring made from the concatenation of the
bitstring representation of each input data point xi,j ∈ Di, and then Di can be encoded
as above. Again, as in Section 3.2.1, we may include attributes representing 0 bit values
if desired.
To request a computation of F (X), a client must encode a function F ∈ Fi in terms of
attributes, and in particular those attributes that encode X ⊆ Di — that is, a meaningful
computation will require particular input values to be used at particular points and hence,
when encoding F , the client must be able to specify these inputs. Recall that we assumed
that the set of labels {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di published by the server including information about
the size of each data point xi,j ∈ Di and its order within the dataset. Thus, since ADi is
the concatenation of the binary representation of these ordered data points, clients may
encode Boolean functions (which operate on the binary data points) in terms of the bit
positions within the concatenated bitstring, or equivalently, in terms of the attributes
{x1, x2, . . . , x∑
xi,j∈Di |xi,j |
} ∈ Ux. Note that the delegator does not need to know the value
of each attribute (or whether the server holds that attribute) in order to form this function.
The delegator will choose a random message from the message space M to act as a
verification token and encrypt this using a CP-ABE scheme under the Boolean function
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F to be evaluated. Each server is given a decryption key for the data Di that they hold.
The server attempts to decrypt the ciphertext and learns the chosen message if and only
if F (Di) = 1. By the security of the CP-ABE scheme, servers learn nothing about the
message if F (Di) = 0 since this corresponds to an access structure not being satisfied.
Thus, if the correct message is returned, the delegator is convinced that F (Di) = 1.
If, however, F (Di) = 0, the decryption will return ⊥. This is insufficient for verification
since any server can return ⊥ to convince a delegator of a false negative result. Thus,
we produce two CP-ABE ciphertexts. As above, one corresponds to F , whilst the other
corresponds to F = F (X) ⊕ 1. Thus, if F (Di) = 0 then, necessarily, F (Di) = 1. Hence,
the server’s key for data Di will decrypt exactly one ciphertext and the returned message
will distinguish whether F or F was satisfied, and therefore the value of F (X), where X
is the subset of Di that the function is actually required to operate over. Note that the
function F is encoded in terms of attributes, and is specific to each input (that is, the
encoding of a function F will differ to compute F (X) and F (X ′)). As a result, if the
function F is evaluated on an input set X ′ ⊃ X then the server will discard the additional
data points x ∈ X ′ \X and the outcome of the computation remains F (X).
A well formed response, (d0, d1), from a server, therefore, satisfies the following:
(d0, d1) =

(m0,⊥), if F (Di) = 1;
(⊥,m1), if F (Di) = 0.
(5.1)
If the returned plaintext does not match one of the chosen random messages then the
server has returned an incorrect result (also if both results are ⊥ but no rational malicious
server would return this).
Public verifiability is achieved by publishing a token comprising the output of a one-way
function g applied to each plaintext. Any entity can apply g to the server’s response
and compare with this token to check correctness. For blind verification, a random bit b
chosen by the delegator permutes the ciphertexts, hiding whether the matched plaintext
is associated with F or F . The public parameters contain a two-dimensional array LReg
with two columns: the first column, LReg[Si][0], is indexed by server identities and contains
signature verification keys; the second column, LReg[Si][1], lists functions and labels for
which Si is certified.
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Let U = Ux ∪ Ul ∪ UID, where Ul is a disjoint (from Ux) universe comprising attributes
representing each unique data label, l(xi,j), and UID comprises server identities.2 If such
a universe becomes too large it is, of course, possible to use a large universe CP-ABE
scheme [66] where attributes need not be defined ahead of time. However, it is very likely
that, for efficiency of the system, the inputs and number of servers will be polynomially
sized in the security parameter and can therefore be accommodated by a small universe.
As we consider adversaries that have access to multiple keys, we must ensure that a key
for different data cannot produce a response that will be accepted as valid. We do this by
labelling each data point xi,j ∈ Di with a unique (across the entire system) label l(xi,j) and
define an attribute in Ul for each label; for ease of exposition, we refer to these attributes
simply as l(xi,j) as well — in practice, one could hash the text label into the bilinear group
to form the attribute.
For a data set Di, the decryption key for a server Si is formed over the attribute set
(ADi ∪
⋃
xi,j∈Di l(xi,j)). During ProbGen for a computation of F (X) for a set of data
points X ⊆ Dom(F ), X ⊆ Di for some i, the encryption uses the access structure encoding
of the conjunction (F ∧ ∧xi,j∈X l(xi,j)) specified in terms of attributes corresponding to
the required input data (and similarly for the complement function F ). Thus, decryption
only succeeds if F (Di) = 1 (i.e. F (X) = 1 as the remaining xi,j /∈ X are ignored by
the decryption procedure) and all the labels l(xi,j), for xi,j ∈ X, are matched in the key
and ciphertext — a key for different data will not include the correct labels. Note that,
because the encoding of the function specifies the attributes that should be provided for
the function to be evaluated and because the evaluation key is formed over the entire
(ordered) dataset, the server may not use different data points within his own dataset to
forge a result either.
Our instantiation of VDC is more efficient than that for PVC since we do not require the
setup of two independent ABE systems or two (expensive) key generations. However, in
contrast to PVC, the delegator must perform work roughly equivalent to performing the
computation itself twice, in order to prepare an encoded input (that is, to encrypt two
messages with the access structure corresponding to F or F using a CP-ABE scheme).
Whereas in PVC environments, this would be unacceptable (as it negates the purpose of
2We assume that the following algorithms check, where relevant, that all functions and input data are
formed over Ux and each additionally contains exactly one attribute/clause over the label universe Ul.
183
5.6 Construction
outsourcing to more powerful servers), in the context of VDC, this is not such an issue —
the delegator does not possess the input data but would like to learn F (X); clearly, it is
not possible for it to compute F (X) itself without the data, but the delegator can perform
approximately the same amount of work as computing F (X) to request the computation
from the data owner.
Let CPABE = (ABE.Setup, ABE.KeyGen, ABE.Encrypt and ABE.Decrypt) define a CP-
ABE encryption scheme over the universe U for a class of Boolean functions F closed
under complement. We also make use of a signature scheme with algorithms Sig.KeyGen,
Sig.Sign and Sig.Verify, and a one-way function g. Then Algorithms 5.1–5.8 define a VDC
scheme for the class of functions F , which operates as follows:
1. VDC.Setup, presented in Algorithm 5.1, first forms the attribute universe for the
function family, accommodating all possible input labels and server identities. It then
initialises the CP-ABE system by calling the ABE.Setup algorithm, and initialises the
two-dimensional array LReg indexed by server identities — for a server S, LReg[S][0]
will store a signature verification key for S and LReg[S][1] will store a list of functions
that S is willing to compute. The public parameters for the VDC system comprise
the public parameters of the CP-ABE scheme and the array LReg. The master secret,
MK, for the system is the master secret of the CP-ABE scheme.
Algorithm 5.1 (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
1: U ← Ux ∪ Ul ∪ UID
2: (MPKABE,MSKABE)
$← ABE.Setup(1`,U)
3: for Si ∈ UID do
4: LReg[Si][0]← , LReg[Si][1]← {}
5: PP← (MPKABE, LReg), MK← (MSKABE)
2. VDC.FnInit, presented in Algorithm 5.2, simply outputs the public parameters for
the VDC system, and is the same for all functions. In our particular construction,
this step is not required due to the use of public key CP-ABE — the delegation of
all functions F ∈ F simply use the public parameters of the CP-ABE scheme.
Algorithm 5.2 PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
1: PKF ← PP
3. VDC.Register, presented in Algorithm 5.3, creates a key pair using the digital signa-
ture KeyGen algorithm. The signing key is issued to the server Si being registered,
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and the verification key is added to the public array LReg so that anyone can verify
signatures produced by Si.
Algorithm 5.3 SKSi
$← Register(Si,MK,PP)
1: (SKSig, V KSig)
$← Sig.KeyGen(1`)
2: SKSi ← SKSig
3: LReg[Si][0]← V KSig
4. VDC.Certify, presented in Algorithm 5.4, certifies that a server Si may provide com-
putational services on the dataset Di and is willing to perform any computation in
the set Fi ⊆ F . The data set Di comprises mi data points xi,j , each of which is
uniquely represented by an attribute l(xi,j) ∈ Ul. For each function F ∈ Fi, the pair
(F,
⋃
xi,j∈Dom(F ) l(xi,j)) is added to the array LReg[Si][1] to indicate to prospective
clients that Si is willing to compute F on any set comprising data points xi,j ∈ Di
which are in the domain of F . The algorithm then generates a CP-ABE decryption
key for the attribute set ADi ∪
⋃
xi,j∈Di l(xi,j) that forms the evaluation key for the
server.
Algorithm 5.4 EKDi,Si
$← Certify(Si, Di, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di ,Fi,MK,PP)
1: for F ∈ Fi do
2: LReg[Si][1]← LReg[Si][1] ∪ (F,
⋃
xi,j∈Dom(F ) l(xi,j))
3: SKABE,Di
$← ABE.KeyGen((ADi ∪
⋃
xi,j∈Di l(xi,j)),MSKABE,MPKABE)
4: EKDi,Si ← SKABE,Di
5. VDC.ProbGen, presented in Algorithm 5.5, chooses two messages uniformly at ran-
dom from the message space and a random bit b. For a computation request for F (X)
to a server Si, where X ⊆ Di and X ⊆ Dom(F ), the algorithm forms two CP-ABE
ciphertexts that encrypt the chosen messages under the policies (F ∧∧xi,j∈X l(xi,j))
and (F ∧ ∧xi,j∈X l(xi,j)) respectively. These ciphertexts form the encoded input
σF,X while the bit b forms the retrieval key RKF,X . The verification key for the
computation is created by applying the one-way function g to each chosen message.
Algorithm 5.5 (σF,X , V KF,X , RKF,X)
$← ProbGen(F, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X , PKF ,PP)
1: (m0,m1)
$←M×M
2: b
$← {0, 1}
3: cb
$← ABE.Encrypt(mb, (F ∧
∧
xi,j∈X l(xi,j)),MPKABE)
4: c1−b
$← ABE.Encrypt(m1−b, (F ∧
∧
xi,j∈X l(xi,j)),MPKABE)
5: σF,X ← (cb, c1−b), V KF,X ← (g(mb), g(m1−b)), RKF,X ← b
6. VDC.Compute, presented in Algorithm 5.6, first decrypts both CP-ABE ciphertexts
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in the encoded input using the decryption key issued as the evaluation key forDi ⊇ X
to server Si. It then signs the resulting plaintexts using the server’s signing key and
returns the plaintexts, server ID and signature as the encoded output. Note that
the recovered plaintexts are (mb,⊥) if F (X) = 1 or (⊥,m1−b) if F (X) = 0 (ordered
according to the random bit RKF,X = b chosen in VC.ProbGen).
Algorithm 5.6 θF (X)
$← Compute(σF,X , EKDi,Si , SKSi ,PP)
1: Parse σF,X as (cb, c1−b)
2: db ← ABE.Decrypt(cb, EKDi,Si ,MPKABE)
3: d1−b ← ABE.Decrypt(c1−b, EKDi,Si ,MPKABE)
4: γ
$← Sig.Sign((db, d1−b, Si), SKSi)
5: θF (X) ← (db, d1−b, Si, γ)
7. VDC.BVerif, presented in Algorithm 5.7, first checks that the signature over the
encoded output verifies correctly under the verification key for the server Si. It then
applies the one-way function g to each plaintext returned in θF (X) and compares it
to the corresponding element of the verification key. If neither comparison matches,
then the verifier outputs RTF (X) =⊥ and τθF (X) = reject to show that the server
did not provide a valid computational result, and otherwise outputs the matched
plaintext as the retrieval token and τθF (X) = accept.
Algorithm 5.7 (RTF (X), τθF (X))← BVerif(θF (X), V KF,X ,PP)
1: Parse V KF,X as (V K, V K
′) and θF (x) as (d, d′, Si, γ)
2: if accept← Sig.Verify((d, d′, Si), γ, LReg[S][0]) then
3: if (V K = g(d)) then return (RTF (X) ← d, τθF (X) ← accept)
4: if (V K ′ = g(d′)) then return (RTF (X) ← d′, τθF (X) ← accept)
5: return (RTF (X) ←⊥, τθF (X) ← reject)
8. VDC.Retrieve, presented in Algorithm 5.8, orders the verification key according to
the bit b that forms the retrieval key. It can then determine whether m0 or m1 was
matched in VDC.BVerif, and hence whether F (X) = 1 or F (X) = 0 respectively.
Algorithm 5.8 yF (X) ← Retrieve(RTF (X), τθF (X) , V KF,X , RKF,X ,PP)
1: Parse V KF,X as (g(mb), g(m1−b)) and RKF,X as b
2: if (g(RTF (X)) = g(m0)) then return yF (X) ← 1
3: if (g(RTF (X)) = g(m1)) then return yF (X) ← 0
4: return yF (X) ←⊥
It is straightforward to see that correctness of this construction follows from the correctness
of the attribute-based encryption scheme and of the one-way function g.
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Theorem 5.1. Given an IND-CPA secure CP-ABE scheme for a class of Boolean func-
tions F closed under complement, a one-way function g, and a signature scheme secure in
the sense of EUF-CMA, let VDC be the verifiable delegable computation scheme defined
in Algorithms 5.1–5.8. Then VDC is secure in the sense of selective public verifiability
(Game 5.1).
5.7 Proof of Security
Informally, public verifiability relies on the IND-CPA property of the CP-ABE encryption
and the one-wayness of g. The proof proceeds by showing that, for the unsatisfied function
F or F , an adversary cannot observe if the plaintext is altered. Thus, the verification key
can be the one-way function challenge g(w) and the plaintext can implicitly be set to w.
Proof. We begin by defining the following three games:
• Game 0. This is the public verifiability game as defined in Game 5.1.
• Game 1. This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that in ProbGen,
we no longer return an encryption of m0 and m1. Instead, we choose an-
other random message m′ 6= m0,m1 and, if F (X?) = 1, we replace c1 by
ABE.Encrypt(m′, (F ∧ ∧xj∈X? l(xj)),MPKABE). Otherwise, we replace c0 by
ABE.Encrypt(m′, (F ∧∧xj∈X? l(xj)),MPKABE). In other words, we replace the ci-
phertext associated with the unsatisfied function with the encryption of a separate
random message unrelated to the other system parameters, and in particular to the
verification keys.
• Game 2. This is the same as Game 1 with the exception that instead of choosing a
random message m′, we implicitly set m′ to be the challenge input w in the one-way
function game (Game 2.12).
We show that an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the public verifiability
game can be used to construct an adversary that may invert the one-way function g.
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Game 0 to Game 1. We begin by showing that there is a negligible distinguishing
advantage between Game 0 and Game 1. Suppose, for a contradiction, that AV DC
can distinguish the two games with non-negligible advantage δ. We then construct an
adversary AABE that uses AV DC as a sub-routine to break the IND-CPA security of
the CP-ABE scheme. We consider a challenger C playing the IND-CPA game (Game
2.8) with attribute universe U with AABE , who in turn acts as a challenger in the public
verifiability game for AV DC :
1. C runs the ABE.Setup algorithm on the security parameter and U to generate
MPKABE and MSKABE. He gives MPKABE to AABE .
2. AABE now simulates running VDC.Setup such that the outcome is consistent with
MPKABE. It initialises the list LReg and sets PP = (MPKABE, LReg). The master
key is implicitly set to be MSKABE, and will be simulated using oracle queries to C.
3. AV DC is given PP and oracle access, which AABE can handle as follows.
• FnInit(·,MK,PP) and Register(·,MK,PP) can be run as written.
• Certify(·, ·, ·, ·,MK,PP): To generate the evaluation key for a queried data set
Di, AABE makes use of the KeyGen oracle in the CP-ABE game. It first
updates LReg as in lines 1–2 of the Certify algorithm. Then it sets D
′ =
(ADi∪
⋃
xi,j∈Di l(xi,j)) and makes an oracle query to C for OKeyGen(D′,MK,PK).
C shall generate a CP-ABE decryption key SKD′ if and only if D′ 6∈ A?. How-
ever, since at this point A? is still initialised to {∅}, C may generate the key,
which AABE will receive as EKDi,Si .
4. Eventually, AV DC outputs its choice of challenge parameters: the function F and
input data X? comprising data points with labels {l(xj)}xj∈X? .
5. AABE runs FnInit as given in the construction. To generate the challenge input,
AABE begins by choosing a random bit b, three equal length random messages m0,
m1 and m
′ from the message space, and another random bit t.
It must then choose its challenge access structure for the CP-ABE IND-CPA game.
It first computes r = F (X?). If r = 0, it sets A? = (F ∧∧xj∈X? l(xj)). Otherwise,
it sets A? = (F ∧ ∧xj∈X? l(xj)). AABE sends the messages m0 and m1, as well as
A? to C as the challenge parameters for the CP-ABE game. Note that A? is a valid
challenge access structure as the only queries made to the KeyGen oracle resulted
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from Certify oracle queries to AABE . Now, due to the inclusion of the (unique) labels
{l(xj)}xj∈X? in the challenge access structure, no Certify query for input data points
X ′ ⊂ X?, with labels {l(xj)}xj∈X′ ⊂ {l(xj)}xj∈X? , would result in a KeyGen query
for attributes that satisfy A?.
If queried for a dataset X ′ ⊇ X?, observe that A? is chosen specifically such that it
is unsatisfied on this input. Thus, KeyGen is never queried for an attribute set that
satisfies A?, and therefore the challenge is valid.
C chooses a random bit c and returns CT ? $← Encrypt(mc,A?,MPKABE).
• If r = 1 (that is, A? = (F ∧∧xj∈X? l(xj)), AABE generates
cb
$← Encrypt(m′, (F ∧
∧
xj∈X?
l(xj)),MPKABE)
and sets c1−b = CT ? (formed over A? by C). It also sets V Kb = g(m′) and
V K1−b = g(mt).
• Else r = 0, and AABE sets cb = CT ? and computes
c1−b
$← Encrypt(m′, (F ∧
∧
xj∈X?
l(xj)),MPKABE).
It sets V Kb = g(mt) and V K1−b = g(m′).
AABE sets σF,X? = (cb, c1−b), V KF,X? = (V Kb, V K1−b) and RKF,X? = b.
6. AABE sends the output from ProbGen along with the public information to AV DC ,
who is also given oracle access to which AABE responds as follows:
• FnInit(·,MK,PP) and Register(·,MK,PP) can be run as written.
• Certify(·, ·, ·, ·,MK,PP): For a query for a dataset Di, AABE first updates LReg
as in lines 1–2 of the Certify algorithm. It sets D′ = (ADi ∪
⋃
xi,j∈Di l(xi,j)) and
makes an oracle query to C for OKeyGen(D′,MK,PK).
C shall generate a CP-ABE decryption key SKD′ for Di if and only if D′ 6∈ A?.
By the definition of A? and the uniqueness of data labels, D′ will satisfy A?
only if {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di ⊇ {l(xj)}xj∈X? , hence only if X? ⊆ Di. Now, if X? ⊆ Di,
then additionally, Di must satisfy either F or F to satisfy A?. However, this
was chosen specifically such that X? (and therefore Di, as F will simply select
the elements of X? to evaluate on) does not satisfy the function, and therefore
D′ 6∈ A? and C may generate the key, which AABE will receive as EKDi,Si .
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7. Eventually, AV DC outputs θF (X?), which it believes is a valid forgery (i.e. that it
will be accepted yet does not correspond to the correct value of F (X?)).
8. AABE parses θF (X?) as (db, d1−b, Si, γ) and using the retrieval key RKF,X? = b, finds
d0 and d1. One of d0 and d1 will be ⊥ (by construction) and we denote the other
value by Y .
Observe that, if AV DC is successful against the selective public verifiability game,
the non-⊥ value, Y , that it will return the plaintext mc since the challenge access
structure was always set to be unsatisfied on the challenge input.
Thus, if g(Y ) = g(mt), AABE outputs a guess c′ = t and otherwise guesses c′ = 1−t.
If t = c (the challenge bit chosen by C), we observe that the above corresponds to Game
0 (since the verification key comprises g(m′) where m′ is the message a legitimate server
could recover, and g(mc) where mc is the other plaintext). Alternatively, t = 1 − c and
the distribution of the above experiment is identical to Game 1 (since the verification
key comprises the legitimate message and a random message m1−c that is unrelated to
the ciphertext).
Now, we consider the advantage of this constructed AABE playing the IND-CPA game
for CP-ABE. By assumption, AV DC has a non-negligible advantage δ in distinguishing
between Game 0 and Game 1 :
∣∣∣Pr [1 $← ExpGame 0AVDC [VDC, 1`,F]]− Pr [1 $← ExpGame 1AVDC [VDC, 1`,F]]∣∣∣ > δ,
where ExpGame iAVDC
[VDC, 1`,F] denotes running AV DC in Game i.
The probability of AABE guessing c correctly, by the law of total probability, is:
Pr[c′ = c] = Pr [t = c] Pr
[
c′ = c|t = c]+ Pr [t 6= c] Pr [c′ = c|t 6= c]
=
1
2
Pr [g(Y ) = g(mt)|t = c] + 1
2
Pr [g(Y ) 6= g(mt)|t 6= c]
=
1
2
Pr
[
1
$← Exp0AVDC
[
VDC, 1`,F
]]
+
1
2
(1− Pr [g(Y ) = g(mt)|t 6= c])
=
1
2
Pr
[
1
$← Exp0AVDC
[
VDC, 1`,F
]]
+
1
2
(
1− Pr
[
1
$← Exp1AVDC
[
VDC, 1`,F
]])
=
1
2
(
Pr
[
1
$← Exp0AVDC
[
VDC, 1`,F
]]
− Pr
[
1
$← Exp1AVDC
[
VDC, 1`,F
]]
+ 1
)
> 1
2
(δ + 1)
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Hence,
AdvAABE >
∣∣∣∣Pr [c = c′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
> δ
2
Hence, if AV DC has advantage δ at distinguishing these games then AABE can win the
IND-CPA game for the CP-ABE scheme with non-negligible probability. Thus, since we
assumed the CP-ABE scheme to be secure, we conclude that AV DC cannot distinguish
Game 0 from Game 1 with non-negligible probability.
Game 1 to Game 2. The transition from Game 1 to Game 2 is simply to set the value
of m′ to no longer be random but instead to correspond to the challenge w in the one-way
function inversion game. We argue that the adversary has no distinguishing advantage
between these games since the new value is independent of anything else in the system
bar the verification key g(w) and hence looks random to an adversary with no additional
information (in particular, AV DC does not see the challenge for the one-way function as
this is played between C and AABE).
Final Proof. We now show that using AV DC in Game 2, AABE can invert the one-way
function g — that is, given a challenge z = g(w) we can recover w. Specifically, during
ProbGen, we choose the messages as follows:
• if F (X?) = 1, we implicitly set m1−b to be w and set the verification key component
V K1−b = z. We choose mb and V Kb randomly as usual.
• if F (X?) = 0, we implicitly set mb to be w and set the verification key component
V Kb = z. We choose m1−b and V K1−b randomly as usual.
AV DC will output a forgery comprising the plaintext encrypted under the unsatisfied
function (F or F ). By construction, this will be w (and the adversary’s view is consistent
since the verification key is simulated correctly using z). AABE can therefore forward this
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result to C in order to invert the one-way function with the same non-negligible probability
that AV DC has against Game 2.
We conclude that if the ABE scheme is IND-CPA secure and the one-way function is
hard-to-invert, then VDC as defined by Algorithms 5.1–5.8 is secure in the sense of public
verifiability.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that CP-ABE can be used in the setting of verifiable outsourced
computation in a similar fashion to the use of KP-ABE to construct PVC schemes. The
resulting system model reverses the role of the delegator and the server as the data owner,
in a similar way that the assignment of attribute sets changes from the key to ciphertexts
in CP-ABE compared to KP-ABE. In PVC, the delegator is the data owner and employs
a server to perform work that it does not have the resources to do itself. In VDC, the
server itself acts as the data owner (or is provided with data from a trusted source), and
clients simply request the verifiably correct results of computations on the data held by
each server.
We have seen that VDC can have natural applications and is also similar to, although
arguably more general than, existing models of verifiable computation developed by Backes
et al. [17]. Our VDC construction, however, uses attribute-based encryption as a proof
method, whereas Backes et al. considered the use of succinct non-interactive arguments
(SNARGs) and homomorphic MACs. In future work, we would like to compare these
solutions more closely and investigate whether ABE can fully provide the functionality of
SNARGs, as well as to investigate methods to allow dynamic updates of the data owned
by servers as a result of computations.
Future work could also look at imposing cryptographic access control mechanisms on the
queries that may be made to a server. It may be that by including some cryptographic
key material in the set Fi, a delegator would be unable to form a valid computation
request for F (X) if both F and X are not permissible according to Fi. In this regard,
the application to querying on remote databases could lead to interesting solutions when
considering sensitive data — only computations that retain a certain degree of anonymity
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are permitted. Of course, even with the solution presented in this chapter, a server can
manually validate any requested function to ensure it complies with its own access control
policy.
The motivation for this chapter was primarily to extend the work of Chapter 3 to use an
alternative ABE primitive and to see whether the resulting solution yielded meaningful
applications of verifiable outsourced computation. We have seen that, indeed, it does,
and in Chapter 6 we will combine this notion of VDC with RPVC to provide a flexible
solution to verifiable outsourced computation, again using a different form of attribute-
based encryption as the proof mechanism.
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This chapter draws together the work from the previous chapters of this thesis, to provide a
flexible system for publicly verifiable computation. In large multi-user systems, individual
user requirements may be diverse and change over time. We therefore introduce HPVC
which, with a single set up, allows entities to both outsource computations and provide
computation services as required.
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we extended the PVC construction of Parno et al. [84] to create a revo-
cable, publicly verifiable outsourced computation (RPVC) scheme built on KP-ABE. In
Chapter 4, we motivated the need for access control in multi-user PVC environments and
provided a construction using key assignment schemes. Finally, in Chapter 5, we switched
the attribute-based encryption scheme, which acts as the proof mechanism, from KP-ABE
to CP-ABE and saw that it yielded a verifiable computation system wherein servers hold
data and make it available for verifiable, public querying. Thus, we have seen that cryp-
tographic primitives designed to act as enforcement mechanisms for access control policies
can be used, instead, in the context of verifiable computation. The VC systems that arise
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can be viewed as large, multi-user systems comprising many servers and many delegators.
However, in such systems, the individual user requirements may be diverse and require
different forms of outsourced computations whereas current PVC schemes support only a
single form.
Consider the following scenarios: (i) employees with limited resources (e.g. using mobile
devices when out of the office) need to delegate computations to more powerful servers.
The workload of the employee may also involve responding to computation requests to
perform tasks for other employees or to respond to inter-departmental queries over re-
stricted databases. (ii) Entities that invest heavily in outsourced computations could find
themselves with a valuable, processed dataset that is of interest to other parties, and
hence want to to selectively share this information by allowing others to query the dataset
in a verifiable fashion. (iii) database servers that allow public queries may become over-
whelmed with requests, and need to enlist additional servers to help (essentially the server
acts as a delegator to outsource queries with relevant data). Finally, (iv) consider a form
of peer-to-peer network for sharing computational resources – as individual resource avail-
ability varies, entities can sell spare resources to perform computations for other users
or make their own data available to others, whilst making computation requests to other
entities when resources run low.
Current PVC solutions do not handle these flexible requirements particularly well; al-
though there are several different proposals in the literature that realise some of the
requirements described above, each requires an independent (potentially expensive) setup
stage. In this chapter, we introduce Hybrid PVC (HPVC) which is a single mechanism
(with the associated costs of a single setup operation and a single set of system parameters
to publish and maintain) which simultaneously satisfies all of the above requirements. En-
tities may play the role of both delegators and servers, in the following modes of operation,
dynamically as required:
• Revocable PVC (RPVC) where clients with limited resources outsource computations
on data of their choosing to more powerful, untrusted servers using only public information.
Multiple servers can compute multiple functions. Servers may try to cheat to persuade
verifiers of incorrect information or to avoid using their own resources. Misbehaving servers
can be detected and revoked so that further results will be rejected and they will not be
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rewarded for their effort;
• RPVC with access control (PVC-AC) which restricts the servers that may perform
a given computation. Outsourced computations may be distributed amongst a pool of
available servers that are not individually authenticated and known by the delegator. In
Chapter 4, we used symmetric primitives and required all entities to be registered in the
system (including delegators) but here we achieve a fully public system where only servers
need be registered (as usual in PVC);
• Verifiable Delegable Computation (VDC) where servers are the data owners and
make a static dataset available for verifiable querying. Clients request computations on
subsets of the dataset using public, descriptive labels.
Continuing our investigation of the use of attribute-based encryption in verifiable com-
putation settings, we consider a third form of ABE, namely dual-policy attribute-based
encryption [16] (see Section 2.6.3). We see that HPVC provides a natural application for
DP-ABE, which combines both KP- and CP-ABE.
DP-ABE has previously attracted relatively little attention in the literature, which we
believe to be primarily due to its applications being less obvious than for the single-
policy ABE schemes. Whilst KP- and CP-ABE are generally considered in the context of
cryptographically enforced access control (where objects are encrypted and can only be
read by users holding keys satisfying some decryption policy), it is unclear that the policies
enforced by DP-ABE are natural choices for access control. Thus an interesting side-effect
of this work is to show that additional applications for DP-ABE exist. In independent and
concurrent work, Shi et al. [90] considered a similar use of DP-ABE to combine keyword
search on encrypted data with the enforcement of an access control policy.
As DP-ABE combines both KP- and CP-ABE, it is not so surprising that it is possible to
use DP-ABE to capture RPVC and VDC. However, we observe that this does not use the
full power of DP-ABE; instead, it merely uses the ability of DP-ABE to separately enforce
key and ciphertext policies. We show that, by using both forms of policy simultaneously,
we can enforce access control policies in a similar fashion to Chapter 4 (where the data
owner specifies the policy).
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In Section 6.2, formally introduce our hybrid model of publicly verifiable outsourced com-
putation. As the notions of security for HPVC primarily combine the games seen in the
previous chapters, we defer them to Appendix B.2. In Section 6.3.2, we provide a construc-
tion of an HPVC scheme. To implement the RPVC functionality, we first must develop
a new form of DP-ABE that includes the ability to revoke entities and prevent further
decryptions. Hence, in Section 6.3.1, we combine the revocation techniques from the in-
directly revocable KP-ABE scheme [14] we used in Chapter 3 with the DP-ABE scheme
of Attrapadung and Imai (see Section 2.6.3). We define the primitive and security model
in Section 6.3.1, and give a concrete construction and proof of security in Appendix B.1.
Finally, we proof our HPVC scheme secure in Appendix B.3.
6.2 Hybrid Publicly Verifiable Computation
We now define our umbrella framework of hybrid publicly verifiable computation (HPVC).
This is a single system (with the associated costs of a single setup operation and system
parameters) that supports multiple modes of operation. Thus, a single KDC may initialise
an HPVC system that provides functionality for many users with diverse requirements.
Our construction in Section 6.3.2 is based on a novel use of DP-ABE. The key observation
is that DP-ABE can, using special attribute tokens, implement KP-ABE, CP-ABE or
DP-ABE policies. In more detail, we capture the following functionality:
• RPVC: uses objective (KP-ABE) policies only to achieve RPVC as introduced in
Chapter 3. Clients with limited resources available may outsource computations to
more powerful entities within the system and receive verifiably correct results. Mul-
tiple servers can enrol within the system and each may evaluate multiple functions.
Entities that misbehave and return incorrect computational results can be detected
and prevented from further operating within the system;
• RPVC with access control: uses both subjective (CP-ABE) and objective (KP-
ABE) policies to achieve RPVC with restrictions on the servers that may perform
a computation. This can be seen as an alternative to PVC-AC introduced in Chap-
ter 4. Within a large system comprising many servers, delegators may have limited
knowledge about the server selected to perform a given computation. The set of
servers that may evaluate a given computation can therefore be restricted based on
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factors such as sensitivity of the input data, physical server location etc. The con-
struction in Chapter 4, although able to enforce a wider range of policies, required
all entities to be registered in the system (including delegators); with HPVC, we
achieve a fully public system where only servers need be registered (as required in
usual publicly verifiable outsourced computation);
• VDC: uses subjective (CP-ABE) policies only to allow entities to make a dataset
available over which other entities may request particular computations (or queries)
be performed, as discussed in Chapter 5.
Note that within an HPVC system, entities may play the role of both delegators and
servers as required. This provides a flexible solution to interactions between different
entities within a large system or organisation where individual workflows may require
different forms of outsourced computation.
6.2.1 Informal Overview
An HPVC scheme for a family of functions F begins with a trusted key distribution centre
(KDC) (e.g. a trusted third party) setting up the system by producing public parameters
and a master secret key. For each function of interest F , the KDC provides a public
delegation key PKF . Next, the KDC registers each entity Si, that wishes to act as a
server, by deriving a private signing key SKSi .
The Certify algorithm generates an evaluation key EK(O,ψ),Si that enables a server Si to
evaluate computations either of the function O or on the input data ψ, depending on the
mode in which the algorithm is run. The server Si is able to choose a set of labels Li
— in RPVC or PVC-AC modes Li will uniquely represent the function F that the server
is certified to compute; in VDC mode on the other hand, Li will be a set of labels, each
representing a data point contained in the server’s dataset Di. Si also provides a list of
computations Fi he is willing to evaluate.
A delegator runs ProbGen to make a request for the computation of F (X) from a server
Si; again the input values depend on the mode. The delegator provides a set of labels
LF,X ⊆ Li. In RPVC or PVC-AC modes, LF,X simply represents the function F that
should be computed on the provided inputs; in VDC mode, LF,X represents the data points
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Table 6.1: Parameter definitions for different modes
mode O ψ ω S
RPVC F {TS} X {{TS}}
VDC {{TO}} Di {TO} F
PVC-AC F s X P
mode Li LF,X Fi
RPVC {l(F )} {l(F )} {F}
VDC {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X {F,
⋃
xi,j∈Dom(F ) l(xi,j)}mi=1
PVC-AC {l(F )} {l(F )} {F}
X ⊆ Di, X ⊆ Dom(F ) held by the server that should be computed on. The algorithm
generates an encoded input σF,X , a public verification key V KF,X and an output retrieval
key RKF,X .
A server may use the encoded input with its evaluation key EK(O,ψ),Si to compute an
output θF (X) encoding the computational result F (X). Verification comprises two steps.
Blind verification is performed by any user using the verification key V KF,X to verify cor-
rectness of the result without learning the output value, and generates an output retrieval
token RTF (X). The algorithm also generates a token τF (X) indicating the correctness and
the server ID. If verification failed, this token is sent to the KDC and the server is revoked
from performing further evaluations and hence incurs a penalty. Otherwise, RTF (X) can
be used in the Retrieve algorithm to reveal the final result yF (X) = F (X).
6.2.2 Supporting Different Modes
We define HPVC generically in terms of objective (RPVC) and subjective (VDC) policies
(O and S) with corresponding attribute sets (ω and ψ respectively). The values of these
parameters depend upon the mode in which an algorithm is being run, and are detailed
in Table 6.1. We define two additional parameters TO and TS . The meaning of these will
become clearer in Section 6.3.2; for now, it suffices to think of them as dummy objects
where {TS} ∈ {{TS}} and so the subjective function S = {{TS}} is always trivially satisfied
by the input ψ = {TS}, and similarly for TO. These parameter choices will be used to
“disable” the functionality of a mode if not required.
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6.2.2.1 RPVC
For RPVC functionality, only the objective access structure O and the objective attribute
set ω are required, and are set to be F and the input X respectively to outsource the
computation of F (X); in this context, X is a set comprising a single element, corresponding
to the single input data point x in Chapter 3. The unneeded subjective parameters S and
ψ are defined in terms of the dummy parameter TS such that S is trivially satisfied. The
set of functions Fi that a server is certified for during a single run of the Certify algorithm
is simply the function F , and the sets of labels Li and LF,X both comprise a single element
labelling F . Note that in this setting, the label l(F ) corresponds to the bijective mapping
φ : F → UF defined in Section 3.5.1.2.
6.2.2.2 VDC
For VDC functionality, on the other hand, only the subjective policy S and attribute set
ψ are required. S is set to represent a function F that is queried to a server, whilst ψ is
defined to be the dataset Di held by the server Si comprising mi data points — that is,
Di = {xi,j}mij=1. The remaining objective parameters are defined in terms of the dummy
parameter TO to be trivially satisfied. The set of functions Fi is defined to be a set of
functions that the server is willing to compute on behalf of queriers along with the labels of
each permissible input to the function (which is given as input to the Certify algorithm).
Finally, the set of labels Li comprise a data label labelling each data point xi,j ∈ Di
held by the server (that is, all data points in ψ), whilst the set of labels LF,X ⊆ Li
represent data points that a particular computation should be performed over (i.e. the
input X ⊆ Di, X ⊆ Dom(F ) to the computation F (X)).
6.2.2.3 PVC-AC
The above parameter choices allow us to define a single HPVC system to support both
RPVC and VDC functionality. However, we can also use both sets of parameters (objective
and subjective) simultaneously to achieve a form of PVC-AC such that only servers that
meet an authorisation policy attached to the encoded input may produce valid (acceptable)
results (and hence be rewarded for their effort).
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Recall that, in Chapter 4, we introduced PVC-AC with the motivation that servers could
be selected from a (large) pool of available servers based on a system-dependent mechanism
(e.g. resource availability or a bidding process). (This contrasts with prior models [84]
where a client chose a server up-front with which to set up a PVC system.) Thus, in this
setting, delegators have less knowledge about the selected server and may not authenticate
them beforehand. The PVC-AC construction in Chapter 4 used symmetric encryption
and key assignment schemes as the cryptographic enforcement mechanisms, such that
only authorised entities could derive decryption keys. However, delegators and verifiers
had to be registered by the KDC. This is partly due to the policies being enforced (e.g.
such that delegators may outsource only certain computations) but also due to the use
of symmetric primitives — to encrypt an input that only authorised servers can decrypt,
delegators must be privately issued the symmetric key. Thus, the scheme is not strictly
publicly delegable — any entity may be registered as a delegator but delegation does not
depend only on public information, and similarly for verification.
Here, we give a more relaxed framework that retains public verifiability and public delega-
bility, but for a limited class of access control policies placing restrictions only on the set
of servers that may compute a given outsourced computation. In some sense, servers are
already authorised for functions by virtue of being issued evaluation keys. However, we
believe not all outsourced computations should be considered purely in terms of functions
and that access control policies in this setting should allow for additional context. For
example, a government contractor that subscribes to a verifiable software-as-a-service sys-
tem may, due to the nature of its work, require that servers be physically located within
the same country. Alternatively, as discussed in Chapter 4, the semantic meaning of input
data may affect the access control requirements.
Informally, to define PVC-AC in the context of an HPVC system, we use the objective
policy to evaluate an outsourced computation (as in Section 6.2.2.1 for RPVC) whilst
the subjective policy will additionally be used to enforce access control on the server.
Servers are assigned both an evaluation key for a function F and a set of descriptive at-
tributes describing their authorisation rights, s ⊆ US , where US is a universe of attributes
used solely to define authorisation — in the terminology of Chapter 4, λC(S) = (F, s).
ProbGen operates on both the input data X and an authorisation policy P ⊆ 2US \ {∅}
which dictates the sets of necessary authorisation attributes to perform this computa-
tion — again, in the terminology of Chapter 4, λC(o) = (X,P ) for the computation
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o. A server may produce a valid output that is accepted by the Verify algorithms if
and only if s ∈ P — that is, the server satisfies the authorisation policy. For exam-
ple, s may be {Country = UK, Capacity = 3TB} to describe the location and resources of
the server, while P = (Country = UK) ∨ ((clearance = Secret) ∧ (Country = USA)) =
{{UK},{clearance = Secret, Country = USA}} defines a policy dictating the necessary
clearances for servers in different locations.
It is interesting to note that by discussing DP-ABE policies in terms of a labelling function,
it becomes clear that this is not the same as the dual-policy graph-based access control
policies discussed by Crampton [44]. Here the range of the labelling function is 22
UC ×22US
(where US is the universe of attributes used to describe access control policies, as discussed
above, and UC comprises attributes from which functions and computational inputs can
be formed), whilst Crampton used the range 22
UC×US . There, instead of assigning to each
entity an access structure and an attribute set, each entity is instead given just a policy
and access is granted if and only if there exists an attribute set that satisfies both policies.
In the VDC setting, we could allow the subjective policy to specify the function F whilst
the objective policy contains the authorisation policy P . Then, delegators may request a
computation only if they can provide certain attributes (e.g. those authorised to learn the
computational results over sensitive data). As this mechanism is symmetric to that for
PVC-AC, we do not discuss it in detail here.
6.2.3 Formal Definition
Definition 6.1. A hybrid publicly verifiable computation (HPVC) scheme for a family of
functions F comprises the following algorithms:
1. (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F) : Run by the KDC to establish public parameters PP and
a master secret key MK for the system. The inputs are the security parameter and
the family of functions F that may be computed;
2. PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP): Run by the KDC to generate a public delegation key,
PKF , allowing entities to outsource or request computations of F ;
202
6.2 Hybrid Publicly Verifiable Computation
3. SKSi
$← Register(Si,MK,PP): run by the KDC to enrol an entity Si within the
system to act as a server. It generates a personalised signing key SKSi ;
4. EK(O,ψ),Si
$← Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,MK,PP): run by the KDC to generate
an evaluation key EK(O,ψ),Si enabling the server Si to compute on the pair (O, ψ).
If mode is VDC then ψ is a dataset owned by Si comprising mi data points. Each
data point xi,j ∈ ψ is uniquely represented by a label in the set Li = {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈ψ.
Fi is a set of functions that Si is willing to compute on subsets of ψ. Otherwise,
O represents a function F , the set of labels Li comprises just a single element l(F )
representing F , and Fi = {F};
5. (σF,X , V KF,X , RKF,X)
$← ProbGen(mode, (ω,S), LF,X , PKF ,PP): run by an entity
to request a computation of F (X) from a server Si.
The inputs are the mode (RPVC, PVC-AC or VDC), the pair (ω,S) representing
the computation request, a set of labels LF,X ⊆ Li, the public delegation key for F
and the public parameters.
If mode is VDC then the labels LF,X = {l(xj)}xi,j∈X ⊆ Li represent the data items
X ⊆ Di, X ⊆ Dom(F ) held by a server Si which form the inputs to F . Otherwise,
the set of labels comprises a single label labelling F which should be computed on
the provided inputs ω. The outputs of this algorithm are an encoded input σF,X , a
verification key V KF,X and an output retrieval key RKF,X ;
6. θF (X)
$← Compute(mode, σF,X , EK(O,ψ),Si , SKSi ,PP): run by an entity Si to perform
a computation. The inputs are the mode (RPVC, PVC-AC or VDC), an encoded
input, an evaluation key and signing key for Si and the public parameters. The
output is θF (X) which encodes the result of the computation;
7. yF (X) ← Verify(θF (X), V KF,X , RKF,X ,PP): verification consists of two steps.
• (RTF (X), τF (X)) ← BVerif(θF (X), V KF,X ,PP): run by any verifier possessing
an encoded output and verification key for a computation, and the public pa-
rameters. It produces a retrieval token RTF (X) encoding the actual output of
the computation, and a token τF (X) which is (accept, Si) if θF (X) is a correct
result computed by the entity Si, or (reject, Si) if Si misbehaved;
• y ← Retrieve(RTF (X), τF (X), V KF,X , RKF,X ,PP): run by a verifier holding the
outputs from BVerif, the verification key and retrieval key for the computation
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of F (X) and the public parameters. This algorithm produces a result y = F (X)
if the result was computed correctly, or y =⊥ otherwise;
8. UM
$← Revoke(τF (X),MK,PP): run by the KDC if a verifier reports a misbehaving
server i.e. that Verify returned τF (X) = (reject, Si). If the algorithm is run with
τF (X) = (accept, Si) then it returns UM =⊥ as no entity is to be revoked. Otherwise,
all evaluation keys EK(·,·),Si for the server Si are rendered non-functional. The
update material UM is a set of updated evaluation keys {EK(O,ψ),S′} which are
issued to all servers.
The KDC may additionally update the public parameters PP during any algorithm to
reflect any changes in the user population.
We say that an HPVC scheme is correct if, when all algorithms are run honestly in any
order and the result is computed by a non-revoked server, the result is correct and the
verification algorithm accepts the result. We can model this as a cryptographic game
between a challenger and a PPT adversary; the adversary aims to find an encoded output
(generated honestly by a non-revoked server) which either does not encode the correct
result, or which does encode the correct result yet which will not be accepted by the
verification algorithm.
The adversary is given access to a set of oracles; for each algorithm in Definition 6.1, we
define a corresponding oracle which executes the corresponding algorithm on arguments
provided by the adversary, and returns the output of the algorithm to the adversary. The
adversary may query the Setup oracle only once (before making any other oracle queries),
but can thereon call the remaining oracles any number of times and in any order.
The challenger maintains two lists, LReg and LF . LReg is a list of tuples comprising server
identities, Si, and the resulting signing keys, SKSi , that have been queried to the Register
oracle. LF comprises tuples of the form (Si, ψ, Li,Fi, EK(O,ψ),Si) denoting that the server
Si has been queried to the Certify oracle for the set of functions Fi and that EK(O,ψ),Si
was generated. When the adversary makes a Revoke query with a revocation token that
identifies a server Si to be revoked (that is, if τθF (x) = (reject, S) is given as input to the
Revoke oracle), the challenger removes all entries of the form (Si, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·) (i.e. all entries
for Si for any function) from LF .
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The challenger also creates and maintains a table T which records the parameters and
values relating to each computation performed through the oracle queries. T is updated
in the following oracles:
• ProbGen: the challenger creates a new row in T comprising 8 components, all of which
are initialised to be empty; it then assigns X (which is either given explicitly in ω
or can be found by searching LF for the labels LF,X), F , the result F (x) (computed
by the challenger itself), σF,X , V KF,X and RKF,X to the first 6 components;
• Compute: the challenger first searches T for all rows that contain the queried σF,X
in the 4th component and where the 7th component is empty (i.e. those rows relating
to computations on this encoded input that have not yet been performed). For each
such row, r, the challenger takes the second component (the function identifier, F˜ ),
and checks that there exists a server identity S˜i such that the tuple (S˜i, SKS˜i) ∈ LReg
(where SKS˜i is that given as input to the Compute oracle) and such that the tuple
(S˜i, ·, ·,Fi, EK(O,ψ),Si) ∈ LF (where EK(O,ψ),Si is also that given as input to the
Compute oracle) and where F˜ ∈ Fi. This check ensures that there is a currently
un-revoked server (as the entries of LF for S˜i have not been removed) that holds the
signing key and evaluation key being used to perform the computation and which is
certified for a function F˜ for which the encoded input σF,X was generated.
The challenger then performs the Compute algorithm on the queried σF,X , EK(O,ψ),Si
and SKSi to produce an output θF (X). For each of the rows r of T found above,
the challenger writes θF (X) and S˜i to the 7
th and 8th components of r respectively.
Thus, a row of T will only have a (non-empty) value in the 7th component if there
exists a non-revoked, certified server to perform the computation for which σF,X was
generated.
Thus, when complete, the entries of T will be of the form
(X,F, F (X), σF,X , V KF,X , RKF,X , θF (X), S).
After a polynomial number of queries, the adversary will return a value θ?F (X) which
he believes either encodes an incorrect computational result or which encodes a correct
computational result yet which the Verify algorithm will reject (that is, an output for
which the protocol execution will not be correct). The challenger first performs a look
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up in T for all entries containing θ?F (X) in the 7
th position of the tuple, and stores any
such entries as another table T˜ . Note that this means that θ?F (X) must have been honestly
generated by the Compute oracle (else it would not be in T ).
For each such row, the challenger uses the 5th component (the verification key) to run
BVerif on θ?F (X) to generate the outputs RTF (X) and τθF (X) , and then uses the 5
th and 6th
components (the verification key and retrieval key) and τθF (X) to run Retrieve on θ
?
F (X) to
generate y.
The challenger first checks whether y matches the 3rd component of the row (that is,
whether y is the correct computational result F (X)). If so, it then checks whether τθF (X) =
(reject, Si), and if so it ends the game by returning 1 to indicate that the adversary has
won the game (the adversary has found a valid encoding of a correct result, computed by
a certified, non-revoked server, that the Verify algorithm is incorrectly rejecting).
On the other hand, if y did not match the correct value of F (X), the challenger also ends
the game by returning 1 to indicate that the adversary has won the game (the adversary
in this case has found an incorrect result that was computed honestly by the algorithms).
If no row in T˜ allows the adversary to win, then the challenger outputs 0 to indicate
that the adversary has lost. An HPVC scheme is correct if, for all PPT adversaries, the
probability that the adversary wins the game described above is 0.
6.3 Construction
Before giving our construction of HPVC, we must first introduce a new cryptographic
primitive which will form the basic building block of our construction.
6.3.1 Revocable Dual-policy Attribute-based Encryption
In Section 2.6.3 we reviewed the notation and properties of dual-policy ABE, introduced
by Attrapadung and Imai [16], that conjunctively combines KP-ABE and CP-ABE such
that both the decryption key and the ciphertext comprise an attribute set and an access
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structure. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, Attrapadung and Imai [14] introduced the formal
notion of revocation in ABE schemes supporting two different modes: direct revocation
and indirect revocation. Direct revocation allows users to specify a revocation list at
the point of encryption such that periodic re-keying is not required but encryptors must
have knowledge of the current revocation list. In contrast, indirect revocation requires a
time period to be specified at the point of encryption and an authority to issue updated
key material at each time period to enable non-revoked entities to update their key to
be functional during that time period. As in Chapter 3, with the setting of verifiable
outsourced computations in mind, we choose to focus on indirect revocation to minimise
the workload of the client devices in terms of maintaining synchronised revocation lists.
To implement a revocation mechanism in the KP-ABE setting, Attrapadung and Imai
amended the policy of the ABE scheme to include an identifier of the entity owning the
key, and then embedded the current time period into the ciphertext. Update keys were
issued for all non-revoked identities at each time period which were used in combination
with the decryption key to decrypt ciphertexts formed for particular time periods —
only if the entity was issued an update key for time t (i.e. was not revoked) could they
decrypt ciphertexts formed using t. We observe that, to define a revocable DP-ABE
scheme, the revocation mechanism can be embedded either, as above, in the KP-ABE
functionality or in the CP-ABE functionality. In more detail, decryption in DP-ABE is
successful if and only if both attribute sets satisfy their corresponding access structure.
In order to prevent decryption, therefore, at least one attribute set should not satisfy the
corresponding access structure. Here we present a formal definition of revocable DP-ABE
using indirect revocation in the key-policy. It will be the subject of future work to compare
the efficiency of the two approaches.
We refer to the access structure associated to a decryption key as an objective access
structure, denoted O, and the attribute set associated to the ciphertext as an objective
attribute set, denoted ω; these are associated with the KP-ABE functionality. Similarly,
the access structure associated to a ciphertext is referred to as a subjective access structure,
denoted S, and the attribute set associated to the key as an subjective attribute set, denoted
ψ; these are associated with the CP-ABE functionality.
Definition 6.2. A revocable key dual-policy attribute-based encryption scheme (rkD-
PABE) comprises five algorithms:
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• (PP,MK) $← Setup(1`,U): takes the security parameter and the attribute universe
as input and generates public parameters PP for the system and a master secret key
MK;
• CT(ω,S),t $← Encrypt(m, (ω,S), t,PP): takes as input a message to be encrypted,
an objective attribute set ω, a subjective policy S, a time period t and the public
parameters. It outputs a ciphertext that is valid for time t;
• SK(O,ψ),ID $← KeyGen(ID, (O, ψ),MK,PP): takes an identity ID, an objective access
structure O, a subjective attribute set ψ, as well as the master secret key and the
public parameters. It outputs a secret decryption key SK(O,ψ),ID;
• UKR,t $← KeyUpdate(R, t,MK,PP): takes a revocation list R that contains the
identities of revoked entities, the current time period, as well as the master secret
key and public parameters. It outputs updated key material UKR,t which makes the
decryption keys SK(O,ψ),ID, for all non-revoked identities ID 6∈ R, functional to be
able to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted for the time t.
• PT ← Decrypt(CT(ω,S),t, (ω,S), SK(O,ψ),ID, (O, ψ), UKR,t,PP): takes as input a ci-
phertext formed for the time period t and the associated pair (ω,S) comprising an
objective attribute set and a subjective access structure, a decryption key for entity
ID and the associated objective access structure O and subjective attribute set ψ,
an update key for the time t and the public parameters.
It outputs a plaintext PT which is the encrypted message m, if and only if the
objective attributes ω satisfies the objective access structure O and the subjective
attributes ψ satisfies the subjective policy S and the value of t in the update key
matches that specified during encryption. If not, PT is set to be a distinguished
failure symbol ⊥.
Definition 6.3. An rkDPABE scheme is correct if for all messages m ∈M, for all access
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Game 6.1 ExpIND-sHRSSA
[RKDPABE , 1`,U]
1: (t?, (ω?,S?)) $← A(1`,U)
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,U)
3: R
$← A(PP)
4: (m0,m1)
$← AOKeyGen(·,(·,·),MK,PP)OKeyUpdate(·,·,MK,PP)(PP)
5: if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then return 0
6: b
$← {0, 1}
7: CT ?
$← Encrypt(mb, (ω?,S?), t?,PP)
8: b′ $← AOKeyGen(·,(·,·),MK,PP)OKeyUpdate(·,·,MK,PP)(CT ?,PP)
9: return b′ = b
Oracle 6.1 OKeyGen(ID, (O, ψ),MK,PP):
1: if ((ω? ∈ O) and (ψ ∈ S?) and (ID /∈ R˜)) then return ⊥
2: return KeyGen(ID, (O, ψ),MK,PP)
Oracle 6.2 OKeyUpdate(R, t,MK,PP):
1: if ((t = t?) and (R˜ 6⊆ R)) then return ⊥
2: return KeyUpdate(R, t,MK,PP)
structures O,S ⊆ 2U \ {∅}, and for all attribute sets ω, ψ ⊆ U where ω ∈ O and ψ ∈ S,
Pr[(PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,U),
SK(O,ψ),ID
$← KeyGen(ID, (O, ψ),MK,PP),
CT(ω,S),t
$← Encrypt(m, (ω,S), t,PP),
UKR,t
$← KeyUpdate(R, t,MK,PP),
m← Decrypt(CT(ω,S),t, (ω,S), SK(O,ψ),ID, (O, ψ), UKR,t,PP)]
= 1− negl(`).
The security model for rkDPABE is a natural extension of the IND-sHRSS game for an
indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme (see Section 3.2.2), and is presented in Game 6.1
and Oracles 6.1 and 6.2.
Definition 6.4. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the IND-sHRSS game for an
rkDPABE construction RKDPABE is defined as:
AdvIND-sHRSSA (RKDPABE , 1`,U) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpIND-sHRSSA
[RKDPABE , 1`,U]]− 12 .
An rkDPABE scheme is secure in the sense of indistinguishability against selective-target
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with semi-static query attack (IND-sHRSS) if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvIND-sHRSSA (RKDPABE , 1`,U) 6 negl(`).
In the remainder of this chapter, we shall use an rkDPABE scheme in a black-box manner;
therefore to comprehend the rest of the chapter, it is sufficient to refer to Definitions 6.2
and 6.4 only. For completeness, we provide a construction and security proof for an
rkDPABE scheme in Appendix B.1.
6.3.2 Instantiation of HPVC
We construct a HPVC scheme for a family F of monotone Boolean formulas closed under
complement using a revocable key dual-policy ABE in a black-box manner. Consider a
function to be delegated F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and its complement function F = F (x)⊕ 1.
As in Section 5.6, n-bit binary input strings x are encoded as attribute sets Ax ⊆ Ux. Let
Ul be a set of attributes (disjoint from Ux) that uniquely label each function and each data
item, and let UID represent server identities. Let g be a one-way function and DPABE =
(DPABE.Setup, DPABE.Encrypt, DPABE.KeyGen, DPABE.KeyUpdate, DPABE.Decrypt) be
a revocable key DP-ABE scheme for F (see Section 6.3.1) with attribute universe U =
Ux ∪ Ul ∪ UID ∪ TO ∪ TS .
TO and TS allow a DP-ABE scheme to efficiently function as either KP-ABE or CP-
ABE [15]. For KP-ABE, the subjective policy S = {{TS}} is satisfied by the presence in
ψ of the special attribute TS — thus, S is always trivially satisfied and decryption only
depends on the objective attributes and policy. Similarly, for CP-ABE, ω = {TO} and
O = {{TO}}. We will initialise two independent DP-ABE systems over U . Hence, we
define a total of four additional attributes: T 0O, T
0
S relating to the first DP-ABE system,
and T 1O, T
1
S for the second DP-ABE system. We denote the complement functions in
different modes as follows: In RPVC and PVC-AC, O = F and S = {{T 0S}}; we define
O = F and S = {{T 1S}}. Similarly, for VDC, O = {{T 10 }} and S = F .
Each mode operates by encrypting a pair of random messages and issuing keys such that
the recovery of one message implies whether the ciphertext was linked to F or F , and hence
if F (X) = 1 or 0. Ciphertext indistinguishability ensures an adversary cannot cheat by
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returning the other message.
1. Setup, presented in Algorithm 6.1, initialises two revocable DP-ABE schemes over
the universe U , an empty two-dimensional array LReg, a list of revoked servers and a
time source T (e.g. a networked clock or counter updated by Revoke) to index update
keys.
Algorithm 6.1 (PP,MK)
$← HPVC.Setup(1`,F)
1: (MPK0ABE,MSK
0
ABE, T
0
O, T
0
S)
$← DPABE.Setup(1`,U)
2: (MPK1ABE,MPK
1
ABE, T
1
O, T
1
S)
$← DPABE.Setup(1`,U)
3: for Si ∈ UID do
4: LReg[Si][0]← , LReg[Si][1]← {}
5: Initialise T
6: LRev ← 
7: PP← (MPK0ABE,MPK1ABE, LReg, T 0O, T 1O, T 0S , T 1S ,T)
8: MK← (MSK0ABE,MSK1ABE, LRev)
2. FnInit, presented in Algorithm 6.2, sets the public delegation key PKF to be the
public parameters for the system (since we use public key primitives). This algorithm
is the same for all functions F .
Algorithm 6.2 PKF
$← HPVC.FnInit(F,MK,PP)
1: PKF ← PP
3. Register, presented in Algorithm 6.3, runs a signature KeyGen algorithm and adds
the verification key to LReg[Si][0]. Signatures ensure that honest servers are neither
impersonated nor maliciously revoked.
Algorithm 6.3 SKSi
$← HPVC.Register(Si,MK,PP)
1: (SKSig, V KSig)
$← Sig.KeyGen(1`)
2: SKSi ← SKSig
3: LReg[Si][0]← LReg[Si][0] ∪ V KSig
4. Certify, presented in Algorithm 6.4, first adds an element (F,
⋃
lj∈Li lj) to the list
LReg[Si][1] for every F ∈ Fi; this publicises the computations that Si is able to
perform (either the functions in RPVC and PVC-AC modes, or the functions and
data labels in VDC mode). The algorithm then removes Si from the revocation
list, initialises the time source T and runs KeyGen for the first DP-ABE system to
generate a decryption key for (O, ψ ∪⋃lj∈Li lj).
The inclusion of the labels lj ∈ Ul as additional attributes ensures that a key may
not be used to evaluate computations that do not correspond to these labels. In
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the RPVC and PVC-AC settings, this means that a key for a function G may not
be used to evaluate a computation on input X? when the delegator outsources the
computation of F (X?). In VDC, this means that the evaluation key used by the
server to produce a computational result must have been issued for a dataset Di that
includes (at least) the specified input data X?. We note that it is sufficient to only
include the labels on the subjective attribute set without also adding them to the
objective policy; as these labels are a security measure against a misbehaving server,
we can amend the servers key (in the subjective attributes) but need not take similar
measures against the delegator. Delegators can then specify, in the subjective policy
that they create, the labels that are required. Even though the subjective attribute
set is defined to be a dummy parameter in RPVC and PVC-AC modes, we still add
the additional attributes — then the delegator can specify the required labels during
ProbGen and these labels must still be present in the server’s key for a successful
evaluation (decryption) to occur. (Trivially applying the labels to both the objective
and subjective policies would require Li to equal LF,X? in order for both policies to
be satisfiable.)
The KDC should check that the label actually corresponds to the input (for example,
by defining and applying a one-way, injective label mapping from F × Ux to Ul) to
ensure that a server does not fraudulently advertise data that he does not actually
own. It also generates an update key for the current time period to prove that Si is
not currently revoked. If operating in a publicly verifiable outsourced computation
mode, another pair of keys is generated using the second DP-ABE system for the
complement inputs.
Algorithm 6.4 EK(O,ψ),Si
$← HPVC.Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,MK,PP)
1: for F ∈ Fi do
2: LReg[Si][1]← LReg[Si][1] ∪ (F,
⋃
lj∈Li lj)
3: LRev ← LRev \ Si, t← T
4: SK0ABE
$← DPABE.KeyGen(Si, (O, Aψ ∪
⋃
lj∈Li lj),MSK
0
ABE,MPK
0
ABE)
5: UK0LRev,t
$← DPABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE)
6: if (mode = RPV C) or mode = PVC-AC) then
7: SK1ABE
$← DPABE.KeyGen(Si, (O, Aψ ∪
⋃
lj∈Li lj),MSK
1
ABE,MPK
1
ABE)
8: UK1LRev,t
$← DPABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSK1ABE,MPK1ABE)
9: else
10: SK1ABE ←⊥, UK1LRev,t ←⊥
11: EK(O,ψ),Si ← (SK0ABE, SK1ABE, UK0LRev,t, UK1LRev,t)
5. ProbGen, presented in Algorithm 6.5, first chooses two messages m0 and m1 uni-
formly at random from the message space. A random bit b randomly permutes
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the messages such that a verifier that does not know b does not know which mes-
sage was recovered and hence the value of F (X). Message mb is encrypted with
(Aω,S ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X lj) and the first system parameters (where Aω is the attribute set
encoding of the input ω), whilst m1−b is encrypted using the complement policy and
either the first system parameters for VDC or the second for RPVC (the attribute set
remains the same as it is either the same input data X in RPVC, or the same special
attribute T 0O in VDC). The verification key is computed by applying the one-way
function g to the messages (the one-wayness allows the key to be published), and b
forms the output retrieval key (as this reveals the order of the decrypted results and
hence the output).
Algorithm 6.5 (σF,X , V KF,X , RKF,X)
$← HPVC.ProbGen(mode, (ω, S), LF,X , PKF ,PP)
1: (m0,m1)
$←M×M
2: b
$← {0, 1}
3: t← T
4: cb
$← DPABE.Encrypt(mb, (Aω,S ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X lj), t,MPK
0
ABE)
5: if mode = V DC then c1−b
$← DPABE.Encrypt(m1−b, (A,S ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X lj), t,MPK
0
ABE)
6: else c1−b
$← DPABE.Encrypt(m1−b, (Aω,S ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X lj), t,MPK
1
ABE)
7: return σF,X ← (cb, c1−b), V KF,X ← (g(mb), g(m1−b), LReg), RKF,X ← b
6. Compute, presented in Algorithm 6.6, decrypts the two ciphertexts and signs the
results, again ensuring that the different modes use the correct system parameters.
Algorithm 6.6 θF (X)
$← HPVC.Compute(mode, σF,X , EK(O,ψ),Si , SKSi ,PP)
1: Parse EK(O,ψ),Si as (SK
0
ABE, SK
1
ABE, UK
0
LRev,t
, UK1LRev,t) and σF,X as (c, c
′)
2: db ← DPABE.Decrypt(c, SK0ABE,MPK0ABE, UK0LRev,t)
3: if mode = V DC then d1−b ← DPABE.Decrypt(c′, SK0ABE,MPK0ABE, UK0LRev,t)
4: else d1−b ← DPABE.Decrypt(c′, SK1ABE,MPK1ABE, UK1LRev,t)
5: γ
$← Sig.Sign((db, d1−b, Si), SKSi)
6: θ(ω,S),(O,ψ) ← (db, d1−b, Si, γ)
7. BVerif, presented in Algorithm 6.7, verifies the signature using the verification key
for the server Si. If correct, it applies g to each plaintext in θF (X) and compares the
results to the components of the verification key. If either comparison results in a
match (i.e. the server successfully recovered a message), that plaintext is returned as
the retrieval token and the output token is accept. Otherwise the result is rejected
and the server is reported for revocation.
8. Retrieve, presented in Algorithm 6.8, orders the components of the verification key
according to the retrieval key RKF,X = b and checks which message was returned
correctly, and hence determines the result of the computation. If m0 was returned
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Algorithm 6.7 (RTF (X), τF (X))← HPVC.BVerif(θF (X), V KF,X ,PP)
1: Parse V KF,X as (V K, V K
′, LReg) and θF (X) as (d, d′, Si, γ)
2: if accept← Sig.Verify((d, d′, Si), γ, LReg[Si][0]) then
3: if V K = g(d) then return (RTF (X) ← d, τF (X) ← (accept, Si))
4: else if V K ′ = g(d′) then return (RTF (X) ← d′, τF (X) ← (accept, Si))
5: else return (RTF (X) ←⊥, τF (X) ← (reject, Si))
6: return (RTF (X) ←⊥, τF (X) ← (reject,⊥))
then F (X) = 1 as m0 was encrypted for the non-complemented input set; if m1 was
returned then F (X) = 0.
Algorithm 6.8 y ← HPVC.Retrieve(RTF (X), τF (X), V KF,X , RKF,X ,PP)
1: Parse V KF,X as (g(mb), g(m1−b), LReg), θF (X) as (db, d1−b, Si, γ), RKF,X as b
2: if (τF (X) = (accept, Si) and g(RTF (X)) = g(m0)) then return y ← 1
3: if (τF (X) = (accept, Si) and g(RTF (X)) = g(m1)) then return y ← 0
4: return y ←⊥
9. Revoke, presented in Algorithm 6.9, first checks whether a sever should in fact be
revoked. If so, it deletes the list LReg[S][1] of computations that the server, Si, to
be revoked, may perform. It also adds Si to the revocation list, and refreshes the
time source. It then generates new update keys for all non-revoked entities according
to the updated revocation list, and distributes updated evaluation keys such that
non-revoked keys are still functional in the new time period.
Algorithm 6.9 UM
$← HPVC.Revoke(τF (X),MK,PP)
1: if (τF (X) 6= (reject, Si)) then return UM ←⊥
2: LReg[S][1]← {}, LRev ← LRev ∪ Si
3: Refresh T, t← T
4: UK0LRev,t
$← DPABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE)
5: if (mode = RPV C) or mode = PVC-AC) then
6: UK1LRev,t
$← DPABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSK1ABE,MPK1ABE)
7: for all S′ ∈ UID do
8: Parse EK(O,ψ),S′ as (SK
0
ABE, SK
1
ABE, UK
0
LRev,t−1, UK
1
LRev,t−1)
9: EK(O,ψ),S′ ← (SK0ABE, SK1ABE, UK0LRev,t, UK1LRev,t)
10: return UM ← {EK(O,ψ),S′}S′∈UID
It is straightforward to see that correctness of this construction follows from the correctness
of the attribute-based encryption scheme and of the one-way function g.
Theorem 6.1. Given a secure IND-sHRSS rkDPABE scheme for a class of Boolean
functions F closed under complement, a one-way function g, and a signature scheme
secure against EUF-CMA, then HPVC, defined by Algorithms 6.1 to 6.9, is secure in the
sense of selective public verifiability and selective semi-static revocation.
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A proof of Theorem 6.1 can be found in Appendix B.3.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have drawn together the work of previous chapters to create a unified
notion of verifiable outsourced computation, HPVC, which supports multiple modes of
operation to meet the diverse user requirements of a large multi-user system. We capture
the notions of RPVC, RPVC with access control on servers (maintaining public delegability
and verification), and VDC. We have seen that HPVC leads to a natural and novel use of
DP-ABE.
In future work, we will consider the use of multiple key generation authorities (or KDCs)
in a DP-ABE scheme such that, in an HPVC scheme, the responsibilities for assigning
function evaluation keys and for assigning security attributes are not borne by a single
entity. We believe that in practice, it is more likely that entities will be authoritative
on only one of these areas (and that the KDC that assigns security attributes could also
be used in other systems as a form of federated identity management). This amounts to
splitting the KeyGen operations for the KP- and CP- parts of the DP-ABE scheme, yet
ensuring that the scheme remains secure by tying these keys together by using a global
identifier [38,77]. We will also further investigate our revocable DP-ABE scheme to com-
pare the efficiency of revoking the key- and ciphertext-policies. Finally, interesting open
questions are whether predicate encryption could enable private information retrieval [41],
and whether multi-authority techniques could allow servers themselves to generate eval-
uation keys for only their own data. Furthermore we will investigate techniques allowing
updatable data to be stored on the server.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Throughout this thesis, we have considered methods in which attribute-based encryption
can be employed, not just as a cryptographic enforcement mechanism for access control
policies, but to enable the delegation of computation to external entities. We have tried
to develop results that are interesting in practical settings, considering the system models
and the necessary interactions between parties, whilst still maintaining formal and rigorous
cryptographic security notions and proofs.
Whilst verifiable computation has recently attracted intense interest in the theoretical
community, the motivation for this area of research remains firmly entrenched in the
practical, real-world requirements of available computational resources. As user devices
become increasingly mobile-oriented (and as a result, possibly weaker), and communication
channels over mobile networks become faster and more widely available, the notion of
outsourcing intensive processes to more capable servers is only going to become more
attractive. Indeed, already much processing on smart-phones is outsourced to external
servers; for example, Apple’s Siri [8, 94] and Google Voice Search [64], amongst many
other popular services, transmit user requests to powerful data centres in order to be
processed, and results are returned to the user device. When the network that such
requests and results are transmitted over is insecure or may introduce faults, or when
the data centre may not be trusted, it is vital to efficiently verify the results of such
computations before presenting information to the user. It is therefore important that
research in this area maintains a focus on practical system models and not just theoretically
interesting cryptographic results. Of course, a rigorous security treatment is still absolutely
necessary to ensure the security of systems once deployed.
We began this thesis by considering the work of Parno et al. who first realised that KP-
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ABE could be used as a verifiable proof mechanism for the satisfaction a Boolean formula.
We considered this notion of publicly verifiable outsourced computation with a view to the
practical environments in which such systems may be deployed. As such, we developed
a system model wherein multiple servers can be certified to compute multiple functions,
and where misbehaving servers can be removed from the system to act as a deterrent and
to avoid wasting delegator resources. We considered two example architectures, namely
the standard model and the manager model. In the case of the latter, servers can be
selected from a large pool based on availability or other desirable properties (e.g. resources,
location, latency or cost). We formalised the notion of blind verification to allow the
manager to verify the work of these servers before returning the results to the client, and
also considered novel security models arising from the revocation mechanism — both to
ensure that the cryptographic revocation achieved the desired properties and to prevent
vindictive entities from “gaming” the system to revoke otherwise honest servers.
In Chapter 4, we observed that we had transitioned to a potentially large, multi-user dis-
tributed system and, as such, our setting of RPVC was a natural environment in which to
apply cryptographic access control mechanisms. We discussed several forms of policy that
are of interest in these settings, defined generically in terms of graph-based information
flow policies. We also defined appropriate security models to ensure that only authorised
entities could participate in valid interactions and gave a provably secure instantiation
built on symmetric key assignment schemes.
Chapter 5 considered the use of CP-ABE in the setting of verifiable computation. We
observed that the resulting system model, although somewhat different to PVC built on
KP-ABE, had very natural applications to verifiable parallel processing of large datasets,
verifiable queries to remote databases and to another interesting line of research into
three-party computation on authenticated data.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we brought together the work of the previous chapters to create
a single unified publicly verifiable outsourced computation system in which entities may
outsource computations to servers with available resources, as well as providing computa-
tional services on its own local data. We saw that the use of DP-ABE allowed for both
RPVC and VDC functionality, and also enabled a form of access control to be applied to
the set of servers that may perform a given outsourced computation, using only public
key primitives.
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Throughout the thesis, we have highlighted, where appropriate, possible directions for fu-
ture work. One particularly important task would be to implement the schemes developed
in this work and to compare the efficiency of the different approaches and to evaluate the
schemes against other work in the literature. Another important area to focus future at-
tention on, if these schemes were to be deployed, would be to strengthen the primitives on
which we base our constructions so that we can achieve the full, ideal, notions of security.
Several of our currently achievable security notions include selective or semi-static restric-
tions, which could be removed by developing fully secure [76] and adaptive revocable ABE
schemes. Finally, formal security models based on indistinguishability games should be
developed to prove that the blind verification mechanism used in our constructions does
indeed provide the level of security required.
Furthermore, it would be nice to explore further applications of VDC, which appears
to be a flexible computational model, particularly with regards to searching on remote
databases. Searchable encryption is one research area that has looked at this problem,
and requires additional privacy properties that we have not considered for VDC in this
thesis.
Another important area for future research is general-purpose verifiable outsourced com-
putations. Many current VC schemes are limited to very specific operations, such as
matrix multiplication or polynomial evaluation [53, 98] or, as in this thesis, to the evalu-
ation of restrictive classes of function. In this thesis, we have restricted our attention to
(monotone) Boolean formulae. Whilst these are important results, and cover many useful
functions that may be of interest in particular outsourcing applications, it is hard to en-
visage verifiable computation being widely deployed until a broad range of computations
can be efficiently supported. Indeed, an ultimate goal may be to transparently compile
applications designed to be executed locally into secure, verifiable programs that can be
outsourced.
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Appendix A
Additional Material for Access Con-
trol in Publicly Verifiable Outsourced
Computation
This appendix includes additional security proofs for the revocable publicly verifiable
outsourced computation scheme with access control introduced in Chapter 4. These largely
follow a similar pattern to the proof of Lemma 4.1.
A.1 Proof of Authorised Computation
Lemma A.1. Given a secure RPVC scheme, an authenticated symmetric encryption
scheme secure in the sense of IND-CPA∧ INT-PTXT and a KAS secure against strong
key-indistinguishability, let PVCAC be the PVC-AC scheme defined in Algorithms 4.1–4.9.
Then PVCAC is secure in the sense of authorised computation (Game 4.2).
Proof. Let AV C be an adversary with non-negligible advantage δ in the authorised com-
putation game and let ASE be an adversary playing the IND-CPA game with a challenger
C against SE . We define the following sequence of games and show that we can perform a
sequence of game hops with negligible difference between each successive pairs of games,
and thereby construct an adversary ASE that, using AV C as a subroutine, can break the
IND-CPA property with non-negligible advantage.
• Game 0. This is the authorised computation game as defined in Section 4.4.2.
• Game 1. This is identical to Game 0, except that we replace the key κλC(o) for
230
A.1 Proof of Authorised Computation
the challenge computation o with a key κ? drawn uniformly at random from the
keyspace.
• Game 2. This is the same as Game 1 with the modification that, in ProbGen, the
encoded input is generated by either encrypting the proper encoded input from the
RPVC functionality σ′o, or a random message of the same length as σ′o.
Game 0 to Game 1 This game hop relies on the strong key-indistinguishability of
the KAS and is very similar to the corresponding hop in the proof of Lemma 4.1. As
such, we do not reproduce it here. If A distinguishes Game 0 from Game 1 with
non-negligible advantage δ, then an adversary can use A as a subroutine to break the
strong key-indistinguishability of the KAS also with non-negligible advantage δ. Since
the KAS is assumed S-KI secure, such an adversary cannot exist and hence Game 0 is
indistinguishable from Game 1 except with at most a negligible advantage  6 1− δ.
Game 1 to Game 2 We have shown that, from the adversary’s point of view, Game 1
is almost (with negligible distinguishing advantage) identical to Game 0. Thus, we may
run the adversary against Game 1 instead to remove any information leakage from the
KAS. We now show that an adversary cannot distinguish Game 1 from Game 2 with
more than a negligible probability, which then removes any information leakage from the
encrypted, encoded input. Suppose, for a contradiction, that an adversary AV C exists that
can distinguish Game 1 from Game 2 with non-negligible advantage δ. Then we show
that there exists an adversary ASE that breaks the IND-CPA security of the symmetric
encryption scheme SE also with advantage δ. AV C will play either Game 1 or Game
2 with ASE acting as the challenger, and must guess correctly which game he is playing.
ASE in turn will play the IND-CPA game with a challenger C.
1. C begins by choosing a random bit b (which ultimately will determine which of Game
1 and Game 2 is being played) and running SE.KeyGen(1`) to generate a key κ?. It
sends the security parameter 1` to ASE .
2. ASE must now initialise Game b+1 for AV C . Informally, it will set the KAS key for
the label λC(o) to be the random key κ? chosen by C. However, the challenge label is
unknown until AV C chooses it, whilst the public parameters and oracle access must
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be provided before this choice. Thus, we require ASE to guess the challenge label
during Setup so that the corresponding key can be implicitly set to be the IND-
CPA challenge key (that is, the key for the guessed label will be defined to be the
IND-CPA challenge key but, because ASE does not hold this key, all encryptions
under it shall be formed using oracle queries to C). If the number of labels in the
poset is N , where N is polynomial in the security parameter (as the scheme must
be efficiently instantiable), then ASE may guess λC(o) with probability at least 1N .
Assuming that the guess is correct, we proceed as follows.
3. ASE runs PVCAC.Setup as given in Algorithm 4.1 except that the key for the guessed
label in the computation poset, κλC(o) is implicitly set to be κ
? (i.e. any use of κ?
must be performed using oracle queries to C) and the KAS is constructed to be
consistent with this choice. Note that the authorised computation game (and by
extension Game b+1) does not permit the adversary to query any label that is
an ancestor of the challenge label in the computation poset. Thus a KAS can be
instantiated over the remaining nodes (and the public information for the ancestor
set simulated — as the keys cannot be derived, the public information need not be
functionally correct). Remaining keys can simply be generated using the security
parameter. From the adversarial point of view, this will be indistinguishable from
the real games.
4. AV C is given the generated public parameters and oracle access which ASE responds
to as follows:
• FnInit, Certify, and Revoke queries can be handled by simply calling the relevant
algorithm.
• If a Register query is made for a label λ(ID) > λC(o) then ASE aborts the game
since AV C would not then be able to choose λC(o) as its challenge computation,
and hence ASE ’s guess was incorrect. Otherwise, ASE holds the relevant KAS
keys and may respond by running Oracle Query 4.1.
• ProbGen queries for a computation labelled by the challenge label λ(o) can
be handled by running Algorithm 3.5 with the exception that lines 2 and 5 are
simulated as follows. Line 2 is not run at all as ASE does not hold the challenge
key, and line 5 is run using an oracle query to the IND-CPA LoR oracle for
the choice of messages m0 = m1 = σ
′
o (which will return the encryption of σ
′
o as
both message options are the same). For any other queried computation, ASE
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holds the KAS key (or generated symmetric key) and may run Algorithm 3.5
as written.
• Observe that by the INT-PTXT property of the authenticated symmetric en-
cryption scheme, AV C cannot form a valid ciphertext (one that will decrypt to
anything other than ⊥) without holding the encryption key. The encryption
keys that AV C may hold are precisely those revealed through Register queries,
and since queries may not be made for labels λ(ID) > λC(o), each query to the
Compute oracle will be for a label belonging to the KAS instantiated by ASE .
Hence, if λ(ID) > λC(o), ASE returns ⊥ and otherwise it uses its knowledge
of the KAS to construct a genuine response (by running Algorithm 3.6).
5. AV C eventually outputs a challenge computation, and if this is not the computa-
tion chosen by ASE in Step 2, then the game is aborted. Otherwise, the choice of
computation label is valid since the game has not already been aborted during the
oracle queries.
6. ASE should now register two entities: a delegator C and a verifier V . However, these
will not be required in the following, so ASE may simulate registering them with
labels λC(o) and λV (o) respectively and update the public parameters accordingly,
without actually requiring the correct keys for these entities (as the adversary will
not see any output from these entities other than their presence in the lists in the
public parameters). ASE can also run the FnInit algorithm as written.
7. ASE must now run ProbGen for the challenge computation o to generate an encoded
input σo. To do so, it will make use of the LoR oracle provided by C in the IND-
CPA game. ASE will run lines 1, 3 and 4 as written to generate a problem encoding
σ′o. It sets m0 = σ′o and chooses another message m1 of the same length uniformly
at random from the message space. These are queried to the LoR oracle which will
return the encryption of message mb for the challenger’s choice of b from Step 1.
ASE can then use this response to form σo and form RKo using the verification
KAS key which it holds.
8. All relevant information is passed to AV C who is also given oracle access. This is
again handled in the same manner as in Step 4. Eventually, AV C will produce a
challenge output, which ASE can verify using previously generated parameters.
Observe that if the challenger’s random bit b = 0, then this is precisely Game 1 (since the
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real encoded input was encrypted by C). If, on the other hand, b = 1 then AV C is provided
with the encryption of a random message which does not relate to the computation at all,
which is precisely the setting of Game 2. Now, we assumed that AV C could distinguish
Game 1 from Game 2 with non-negligible probability δ. Since these two games corre-
spond directly to the challenger’s choice of bit b, ASE can simply forward AV C ’s guess
b′ to C and win the IND-CPA game with non-negligible advantage δ. However, as we
assumed that SE was IND-CPA ∧ INT-PTXT secure, this is a contradiction and hence
an adversary with non-negligible distinguishing advantage cannot exist.
Reduction to public verifiability We have shown negligible distinguishing advantages
in the transitions from the authorised computation game to Game 2. Thus we may
run an adversary against Game 2 instead. By moving to this modified game, we have
removed any information leakage from the KAS and from the ciphertext encrypting the
encoded input. Thus the only information that remains that could aid an adversary
in the authorised computation game is the verification key and the output retrieval key.
Intuitively, however, the underlying RPVC scheme is designed such that these components
do not leak information that aids the adversary in producing a fraudulent result.
We now show that, since the adversary is not authorised for the challenge computation,
even if it holds a valid evaluation key it cannot produce a valid response in Game 2. If
it could do so, then an adversary could be constructed to break the public verifiability of
the RPVC scheme. More formally, to achieve a contradiction, let AV C be an adversary
with non-negligible advantage δ against Game 2. Then we construct an adversary APV
that breaks the public verifiability of the RPVC scheme with advantage δ2 . Let C play
the public verifiability game (Game 3.2) with APV who acts as the challenger for AV C in
Game 2.
1. C runs RPVC.Setup on the security parameter and gives APV the resulting public
parameters PP′ and oracle access.
2. APV initialises the list L and the variable o and must then simulate running the
PVCAC.Setup algorithm. It uses the public parameters given by C and implicitly sets
MK′ to be that generated by C (oracle queries will be made to C whenever MK′ is
required in the following stages). It sets up the KASs in the same manner as in the
transition from Game 1 to Game 2 (i.e. by guessing the correct challenge label
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with probability at least 1N ).
3. APV sends AV C the public parameters PP and provides oracle access as follows:
• Queries to the FnInit, Certify and Revoke oracles can be forwarded to C and the
response returned to AV C .
• Queries to the Register oracle can be run as in Oracle 4.3 with the exception of
line 2 of the Register algorithm for which APV makes a RPVC.Register oracle
query for the queried identity.
• Queries to the ProbGen oracle can be handled simply by running Algorithm 3.5.
Note that APV owns all information related to SKC for all delegators, and the
RPVC.ProbGen algorithm only requires public information.
• Queries to the Compute oracle can be run as written in Oracle 4.4 using pa-
rameters generated in other oracle queries.
4. Eventually, AV C outputs a choice of challenge computation o, including the function
F and input data x. If this is not the same as the guess made by APV in Step 2
then the game is aborted. Otherwise, APV checks that the label of this computation
is valid in accordance with the queries made above. If so, it forwards x to C as the
challenge input x? in the public verifiability game. APV also computes F (x). If
F (x) = 0 then it sends F ? = F as its challenge function to C. Otherwise, it sends
F ? = F , the complement function, to C. In other words, APV chooses the unsatisfied
function as its challenge input. Thus, by the winning condition of Game 2 (and by
extension, the authorised computation game), AV C will, if successful, output a result
for the correct value of F (x), which he is unauthorised to compute. To win the public
verifiability game, APV must output a valid response for the unsatisfied function (i.e.
an incorrect result), which is exactly the output that AV C provides; APV will be
able to simply forward the output of AV C to C to win the public verifiability game
with the same (non-negligible) advantage δ of AV C .
5. C runs RPVC.FnInit for F ? and RPVC.ProbGen on x? and gives the resulting param-
eters to APV and again provides oracle access.
6. APV must now register a delegator and a verifier to act in the following stages. To
do so, it simply runs Algorithm 3.3 since it knows all required information from the
KASs it instantiated. It simulates running FnInit either using the PKF ? provided
by C in Step 2 (if F ? = F ) or by querying the RPVC.FnInit oracle (if F ? 6= F ).
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Finally, APV runs ProbGen as given in Algorithm 3.5 with the exception of choosing
a random message instead of the encoded input, as per Game 2. All generated
parameters are passed to AV C , and oracle access is provided as before.
7. Eventually, AV C finishes querying and outputs θo which it believes will appear to
be a valid result despite being unauthorised. APV forwards θo to C as its guess in
the public verifiability game.
Now, in order for APV to win the public verifiability game, it must produce a valid output
for the unsatisfied function F or F on input x?. Assuming that AV C is a successful
adversary against Game 2, θo is a valid result with non-negligible probability δ. Thus, if
the game is not aborted (i.e. APV guessed the challenge computation label correctly), APV
wins with probability Pr[1
$← ExpGame 2AV C [PVCAC, 1`,F ,PC ,PV ]] = δ. Thus the overall
probability of APV winning, including guessing the computation correctly is at least δN
which is non-negligible if δ is non-negligible, as assumed. However, since we assumed the
underlying RPVC scheme to be secure in the sense of public verifiability, such an adversary
AV C with non-negligible advantage in Game 2 cannot exist.
Finally, we observe that each transition to Game 2 had a negligible distinguishing ad-
vantage and the final reduction showed a negligible advantage against Game 2, and so
we conclude that the scheme is secure in the sense of authorised computation.
A.2 Proof of Authorised Verification
Lemma A.2. Given a secure RPVC scheme, a KAS secure in the sense of strong-key
indistinguishability and an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme secure in the sense
of IND-CPA∧INT-PTXT, let PVCAC be the PVC-AC scheme defined in Algorithms 4.1–
4.9. Then PVCAC is secure in the sense of authorised verification (Game 4.3).
Proof. Suppose AV C is an adversary with non-negligible advantage δ in the authorised
verification game and ASE is an adversary playing the IND-CPA game with a challenger
C against SE . We first define the following modified game and show that an adversary
has negligible distinguishing advantage between the two. We can therefore employ an
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adversary against this modified game to break the IND-CPA security of the symmetric
encryption scheme.
• Game 0. This is the authorised verification game as defined in Section 4.4.3.
• Game 1. This is identical to Game 0, except that we replace the key κλV (o) for
the challenge computation o in the verification poset with a random key κ? drawn
uniformly from the keyspace.
Game 0 to Game 1 This transition relies on the strong key-indistinguishability of the
KAS. The proof is very similar to that given in the proof of Lemma 4.1, and so we omit
the details. If A can distinguish Game 0 from Game 1 with non-negligible advantage δ,
then an adversary using A as a subroutine can break the strong key-indistinguishability of
the KAS with the same non-negligible advantage δ. However, as the KAS is assumed S-KI
secure, such an adversary may not exist and Game 0 is indistinguishable from Game 1
except with at most a negligible advantage  6 1− δ.
Reduction to IND-CPA Suppose, for a contradiction, that AV C is an adversary with
non-negligible advantage against the authorised verification game. We show that we can
construct an adversary ASE that breaks the IND-CPA security (Game 2.5) of the sym-
metric encryption scheme SE using AV C as a subroutine. From the adversary’s point of
view, Game 1 is indistinguishable from Game 0 with negligible distinguishing advantage.
Therefore, ASE may simulate Game 1 instead to remove any information leakage from
the KAS. Let C be the IND-CPA challenger for ASE who in turn acts as the challenger
in Game 1 for AV C who succeeds with non-negligible probability δ.
1. C first chooses a bit β uniformly at random1 and generates a key κ? $← SE.KeyGen(1`).
It sends the security parameter 1` to ASE .
2. ASE must now initialise Game 1 for AV C . It will implicitly set the KAS key for
the label λV (ob) to be κ
?. However, as AV C has not yet chosen his challenge labels,
ASE must guess one of these labels in order to generate the public parameters and
1Note that β corresponds to the challenge bit b in Game 2.5, but we use the notation β in this proof
to avoid a notational conflict with the bit b which selects a challenge computation in Game 1 (and by
extension, the authorised verification game in Game 4.3).
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provide oracle access. ASE may guess λV (ob) with probability at least 2N (as AV C
will select two labels, and ASE must match one of them) for a poset comprising N
nodes. Assuming that the guess is correct, we proceed as follows.
3. ASE runs PVCAC.Setup as given in Algorithm 4.1 except that the key for the guessed
label in the verification poset, κλV (o) is implicitly set to be κ
? (i.e. any subsequent
use of κ? will be simulated using oracle queries to C), and the KAS is constructed in
a manner consistent with this choice. Note that in the authorised verification game
(and by extension Game 1) the adversary may not query any label that is an ances-
tor of the challenge label λV (ob) in the verification poset. Thus ASE can instantiate
a KAS over the remaining nodes and simulate the public information for the ances-
tor set — as keys for this set cannot be derived, the public information need not be
functionally correct. ASE can also use the security parameter to generate remaining
keys in this set. From the adversarial point of view, this is indistinguishable from
the real games.
4. ASE sends the resulting public parameters to AV C and provides oracle access as
follows:
• For queries to FnInit, Certify, and Revoke, ASE can simply call the relevant
algorithm.
• If a Register query is made for a label λ(ID) such that λ(ID) > λV (o0) and
λ(ID) > λV (o1) then ASE aborts the game as AV C will not be able to choose
λV (ob) as one of its challenge computations, and hence ASE ’s guess was incor-
rect. Otherwise, ASE holds the relevant KAS keys and may respond by running
Oracle 4.5.
• A ProbGen query for a computation labelled λV (o) can be handled by running
Algorithm 4.5 with the exception of lines 3 and 6 which are simulated by making
an oracle query to the IND-CPA LoR oracle for the message pair m0 = m1 =
RK ′o. For all other queries, ASE holds the correct keys and may honestly run
Algorithm 4.5.
• Compute queries can be handled by running Algorithm 4.6 since it relies only
on the computation poset which is owned by ASE .
5. Eventually, AV C chooses two challenge computations o0 and o1 and, if neither is the
same as that chosen earlier by ASE , the game is aborted. Otherwise, the choices are
238
A.2 Proof of Authorised Verification
valid since the game has not already been aborted during the oracle queries. Instead
of choosing the bit b at random, it can be set such that ob corresponds to ASE ’s
guess of challenge computation.
6. ASE now simulates registering two entities: a delegator C and a server S. However,
as these will not be required in the following, ASE may simulate registering the
delegator with label λC(ob) and update the public parameters accordingly without
requiring valid keys for the delegator (as the adversary will not see any output from
the delegator other than being listed in the public parameters). For the server, ASE
runs Register and sets SKS = (SK
′
S , κ
?,⊥) ASE can also run the FnInit and Certify
algorithms as written.
7. ASE now runs ProbGen for the challenge computation ob to encode σob . It runs
lines 1, 2, 4 and 5 as written to generate a problem encoding σo and retrieval key
RK ′o. It sets m0 = RK ′o and randomly chooses another message m1 of the same
length from the message space. These are given as input to the LoR oracle which
returns the encryption of message mβ for the challenger’s random choice of β. Using
this response, ASE can create RKob .
8. ASE must finally run Compute on the resulting encoded input, which it can do hon-
estly as the algorithm does not rely on the verification poset. AV C then receives all
relevant information and oracle access, which is again handled as before. Eventually,
AV C outputs a guess b′ of b.
Observe that if ASE guessed the challenge label correctly, and β = 0, then this is precisely
Game 1, and AV C wins with non-negligible probability δ. Thus ASE wins with non-
negligible probability 2δN . If β = 1, on the other hand, the encoded input provided to AV C
is the encryption of a random message completely unrelated to the retrieval key. In this
case, by the blind verification property of the underlying RPVC construction, AV C may
only have a negligible advantage  (over random guessing) at learning the result of the
computation. Thus, if AV C outputs b′ = b, then ASE should output a guess of β′ = 0, and
otherwise should guess β′ = 1. If β = 0 then ASE wins with probability 2δN , and if β = 1
then ASE wins with probability 1− . Thus, ASE wins in both cases with non-negligible
probability. However, as the symmetric encryption scheme was assumed to be IND-CPA
secure, an adversary AV C with non-negligible advantage cannot exist.
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The overall advantage against the authorised verification game is the sum of the distin-
guishing advantage between Game 0 and Game 1, and the advantage in the reduction to
IND-CPA, both of which we have shown to be negligible. Therefore, the overall advantage
against the authorised verification game is negligible.
A.3 Proof of Weak Input Privacy
Lemma A.3. Given a secure RPVC scheme, a KAS secure in the sense of strong-key
indistinguishability and an IND-CPA secure symmetric encryption scheme, let PVCAC
be the PVC-AC scheme defined in Algorithms 4.1–4.9. Then PVCAC is secure in the sense
of weak input privacy (Game 4.4).
Proof. Assume that AV C is an adversary with non-negligible advantage δ in the weak
input privacy game. We show that we can use this to construct an adversary, ASE , with
non-negligible advantage in the IND-CPA game. Let C be the challenger for ASE and let
ASE act as the challenger for AV C . We first transition to a modified version of the weak
input privacy game, and show that AV C has negligible distinguishing advantage between
these games. We then construct ASE which uses AV C against this modified game to break
the IND-CPA security of the symmetric encryption scheme.
• Game 0: This is the weak input privacy game as given in Game 4.4.
• Game 1: This is identical to Game 0 except that the key κλC(ob) for the challenge
computation ob is replaced by a random key κ
? drawn uniformly from the keyspace.
Game 0 to Game 1 This game hop relies on the strong-key indistinguishability of the
KAS and is very similar to that given in the proof of authorised outsourcing in Lemma 4.1;
as such, we do not replicate this proof in full here. Intuitively, suppose an adversary
AV C exists that can distinguish Game 0 from Game 1 with non-negligible advantage .
Then we construct an adversary AKI that breaks the S-KI security of the KAS also with
advantage . A challenger C will choose either Game 0 or Game 1 and interact with
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AKI in the S-KI game; AKI will act as the challenger in either Game 0 or Game 1 for
AV C who must guess which game he is playing. AKI will choose one of AV C ’s challenge
computation choices at random (as expected in the weak input privacy game) and forward
this to C as its own challenge in the S-KI game.
Reduction to IND-CPA Given that no adversary can distinguish between Game 0
and Game 1 with non-negligible advantage, we may run an adversary against Game 0
against Game 1 instead with at most a negligible loss  in the tightness of the reduction.
That is, we can use a truly random key to form the challenge ciphertext which removes
any information leakage from the KAS. Let us now suppose, for a contradiction, that
AV C is an adversary with non-negligible advantage δ against Game 1. We construct an
adversary ASE that breaks the IND-CPA security of the symmetric encryption scheme
using AV C as a subroutine. Let C be the IND-CPA challenger for ASE who in turn acts
as the challenger for AV C .
1. C chooses a bit β $← {0, 1} and generates a key κ? by running SE.KeyGen. It sends
the security parameter to ASE and provides oracle access to the LoR function.
2. ASE must now initialise Game 1 for AV C . Informally, it will set the challenge KAS
key κλC(oβ) to be the random κ
? chosen by C. However, as this label is currently
unknown and the public parameters and oracle access must be granted before the
choice is made, ASE must make a guess, λ˜C(oβ), for the correct challenge label to
assign the random key to. This choice is correct with probability at least 1N where
the computation poset comprises N labels and where N is polynomial in the security
parameter (to enable efficient instantiation).
3. ASE initialises the parameters L and o, and also initialises an empty list Q that
will be used to store messages queried to the LoR oracle in the IND-CPA game. It
runs Setup as written with the following modification. The KAS key for the guessed
challenge label λ˜C(oβ) is implicitly set to be κ
? and the rest of the computational
KAS is made consistent with this choice. Since the adversary in Game 1 is not
permitted to query the Register function for any label that is an ancestor of the
challenge label, keys for ancestors of the challenge label will not need to be derivable
and can simply be generated from SE.KeyGen. Therefore, a KAS can simply be
instantiated over the remaining (non-ancestor) nodes and the public information
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for ancestor nodes can be simulated (as keys will not be derived, this need not be
functionally correct but must appear to be distributed correctly).
4. AV C is given the resulting public parameters and access to oracle functionality which
ASE responds to as follows:
• Queries to FnInit, Certify and Revoke can be handled by simply running the
relevant algorithms.
• If AV C queries Register for a label λ(ID) > λ˜C(oβ), as guessed by ASE , then
ASE will abort the game (since AV C would no longer be able to choose λ˜C(oβ)
as a valid challenge label and hence ASE ’s guess was incorrect). For any other
Register query, ASE has generated and holds the relevant KAS keys and may
respond honestly.
• A query to ProbGen for anything other than a computation labelled with λ˜C(oβ)
can be run honestly using the keys he generated during Setup. A computation
labelled by λ˜C(oβ) will require an encryption of σo under κλ˜C(oβ)
which is not
known to ASE as it is the challenge key in the IND-CPA game. Therefore,
ASE must make a query to the LoR oracle provided by C where m0 = m1 = σo
to receive a valid ciphertext CT . ASE also adds the pair (σo, CT ) to the list
Q.
• By the restriction on Compute oracle queries, ⊥ is returned if AV C queries for
the challenge inputs. By the INT-PTXT property of the symmetric encryption
scheme, AV C is unable to form a valid ciphertext for the challenge label without
making use of the Encrypt oracle. Thus, if the input to the Compute oracle is
for the challenge computation label, then the ciphertext is either malformed
(and ⊥ should be returned), or the encoded input was previously queried to
the LoR oracle and ASE may look up the received ciphertext in the list Q to
recover the encrypted input σo. For any other computation label, ASE holds
the corresponding KAS keys and can run the Compute algorithm honestly.
5. AV C eventually outputs a choice of two computations o0 and o1. If neither computa-
tion matches with the label λ˜C(oβ) chosen by ASE earlier, then the game is aborted.
Otherwise, ASE will use the matching computation henceforth. It first checks the
labels for validity and aborts if not valid.
6. ASE must now register a delegator C. However, the role of C will be substituted by
oracle queries to C in the following, so ASE may simply simulate registering C with
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label λ˜C(oβ) by updating any relevant public information. ASE can also run FnInit
as written.
7. ASE must now run ProbGen to generate the challenge input. To do so, it runs
RPVC.ProbGen on both inputs x0 and x1 dictated by o0 and o1 respectively, to gen-
erate two encoded inputs labelled m0 = σo0 and m1 = σo1 . It then submits m0 and
m1 to the IND-CPA LoR oracle provided by C. C will return the encryption of mβ
corresponding to σoβ , under the key κλC(oβ). ASE can also encrypt the verification
key V Koβ for the oβ matching its guess, using the verification KAS keys that it
owns.
8. The (encrypted) encoded input and the verification key are given to AV C along with
oracle access. Queries are handled as above but Register now returns ⊥ if the queried
label is an ancestor of either λC(o0) or λ
C(o1) (i.e. precisely when ASE does not hold
the relevant KAS keys). AV C eventually outputs a guess b′ that ob′ was chosen.
Now, ASE can simply forward the guess b′ to C as its guess for β. Observe that if ASE
correctly guessed λ˜C(oβ), then from AV C ’s point of view the distribution of the above
game is precisely that of Game 1. Thus, if AV C can successfully distinguish which
computation was chosen (by C), then it implicitly can decide which plaintext (encoded
input) was encrypted during the IND-CPA game. ASE can correctly guess the challenge
label that will be chosen by C with probability at least 1N . Thus, since we assumed that
AV C had non-negligible advantage δ against Game 1, we have shown how to construct an
adversary ASE with non-negligible advantage δN against the IND-CPA game. However,
as the symmetric encryption scheme is assumed to be IND-CPA secure, such an adversary
against Game 1 may exist, and since there is a negligible distinguishing advantage between
Game 0 and Game 1, no adversary with non-negligible advantage against the weak input
privacy game may exist either.
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Appendix B
Additional Material for Hybrid Pub-
licly Verifiable Outsourced Computa-
tion
This appendix includes additional material corresponding to our Hybrid PVC scheme
introduced in Chapter 6. Firstly, we give a construction and security proof for our notion
of revocable dual-policy attribute-based encryption, upon which our HPVC construction
is based. Then, we give security notions and proofs for our HPVC instantiation, which in
general are formed by combining those of the previous chapters and adapting the notation
to our more general format.
B.1 Construction of Revocable Dual-policy Attribute-based En-
cryption
Our revocable DP-ABE scheme will be based on a combination of DP-ABE [16], which
itself is a combination of CP-ABE [92] and KP-ABE [66], and an ABE scheme supporting
revocation [14]. We represent a subjective access structure S by a linear secret sharing
scheme (LSSS, see Appendix 2.6.4.1) which we denote by (M,ρ) and represent an objective
access structure O as an LSSS denoted by (N, pi).
Let Us and Uo be the universe of subjective and objective attributes respectively. The
objective attribute universe comprises disjoint sub-universes N , T ,M and UID referring
to standard ABE attributes, time periods, messages and user identities respectively. UID
is set to be the set of leaves in a complete binary tree X = {1, . . . , n}. Without loss of
generality, we assume that T ∩ X = ∅ (note that this can be achieved by using a collision
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resistant hash function and using distinct prefixes to map elements from T and X ). The
attribute set for the DP-ABE scheme is defined to be U = Us ∪ Uo. Let us define m to be
the maximum size of a subjective attribute set assigned to a key, i.e. we restrict |ψ| 6 m,
and similarly define n to be the maximum size of an objective attribute set associated
with a ciphertext, i.e. |ω| 6 n. Furthermore we denote the maximum number of rows of
a subjective access structure matrix M to be ls,max. Now let m
′ = m + ls,max − 1 and
n′ = n− 1. Finally, let d be the maximum of |Cover(R)| for all R ⊆ UID, where Cover(R)
is defined as in Appendix 2.1.1.
We construct each algorithm of the rkDPABE scheme as follows:
• Setup(1`,U): The algorithm first picks a random generator g ∈ G and random exponents
γ, α ∈ Zp. It then defines three functions Fs : Zp → G, Fo : Zp → G and P : Zp → G by
first randomly choosing h0, . . . , hm′ , q1, . . . , qn′ , u1, . . . , ud and setting
Fs(x) =
m′∏
j=0
hx
j
j , Fo(x) =
n′∏
j=0
qx
j
j , P (x) =
d∏
j=0
ux
j
j . (B.1)
The public parameters are defined as
PP = (g, e(g, g)γ , gα, h0, . . . , hm′ , q1, . . . , qn′ , u1, . . . , ud).
For each node label x ∈ X in the tree, it randomly chooses ax ∈ Zp and rx ∈ Zp
to define a first degree polynomial fx(z) = axz + αrx + γ. The master key is
MK = (γ, α, {ax, rx}x∈X ).
• Encrypt(m, (ω,S), t,PP): The encryption algorithm takes as input a LSSS access struc-
ture (M,ρ) for the subjective policy S and an objective attribute set ω ⊂ Uo. De-
note the dimensions of M as ls × ks matrix. The algorithm randomly chooses val-
ues s, y2, . . . , yks ∈ Zp and sets u = (s, y2, . . . , yks). It computes λi = Mi · u (for
i = 1, . . . , ls), where Mi is the vector corresponding to the ith row of M . The cipher-
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text is then computed as CT = (C,C(1), {C(2)k }k∈ω, {C(3)i }i=1,...,ls , C(4)), where
C = m · (e(g, g)γ)s, C(1) = gs,
C
(2)
k = Fo(k)
s, C
(3)
i = g
αλiFs(ρ(i))
−s,
C(4) = P (t)s.
Intuitively, C masks the message by a group element in the target group of the bilin-
ear map formed from the master secret γ and an encryption secret s (to randomise
the encryption procedure). Decryption will have to compute this mask to recover the
message.
C(1) provides the encryption secret s (although, clearly, without revealing the value
itself, unless one can solve the discrete logarithm problem which is thought to be hard).
C
(2)
k embeds each attribute in the objective set ω into the ciphertext, incorporating
the encryption secret s such that attributes from prior ciphertexts cannot be used to
break the security of this encryption. Similarly, C
(3)
i embeds the subjective policy S
into the ciphertext using the shares of s divided according to S — that is, s is shared
over the set of attributes such that any set of attributes that satisfies S can be used to
reconstruct the encryption secret s. Finally, C(4) links the encryption secret (and hence
this particular ciphertext) to the specified time period t such that an update key for t
is required to decrypt the ciphertext; this enables the revocation mechanism.
• KeyGen(ID, (O, ψ),MK,PP): The key generation algorithm takes as input a LSSS access
structure (N, pi) for the objective policy O and a subjective attribute set ψ ⊂ Us. Let
the dimensions of N be denoted lo × ko. The algorithm also takes an identity ID ∈ U
which is a leaf in the binary tree.
For all x ∈ Path(ID), the algorithm first shares fx(1) using the LSSS (N, pi). To do
so, it randomly chooses zx,2, . . . , zx,ko ∈ Zp and sets vx = (fx(1), zx,2, . . . , zx,ko). For
i = 1, . . . , lo, it calculates the share σx,i = Ni · vx, where Ni is the vector corresponding
to the ith row of N .
The algorithm then randomly chooses rx,1, . . . , rx,lo ∈ Zp and rx ∈ Zp for all x ∈
Path(ID), and outputs the private key
SK(N,pi),ID = ((D
(1)
x,i , D
(2)
x,i )x∈Path(ID),i=1,...,lo , (Dx, {D(3)k }k∈ψ)x∈Path(ID)),
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where
Dx = g
rx , D
(1)
x,i = g
rx,i ,
D
(2)
x,i = g
σx,iFo(pi(i))
rx,i , D
(3)
k = Fs(k)
rx .
Intuitively, rx and rx,i for each x ∈ Path(ID) randomises the key for the user ID (so that
users may not collude, as their key components shall be formed using different random
values). Dx and D
(1)
x,i allow use of these random key values during decryption. D
(2)
x,i
embeds the shares of fx(1) = ax +αrx + γ, distributed over the attribute universe such
that only the authorised sets according to O will be able to reconstruct fx(1). Finally,
D
(3)
k embeds the attributes in ψ with the randomness chosen for this particular key. By
linking these parameters to the path in a tree, only users for whom a valid update key
has been issued (i.e. the non-revoked users) will be able to make use of these parameters
to compute fx(1) for a node x; fx(1) is required as it contains the master secret γ which
is used to cancel with the ciphertext component C to recover the message.
• KeyUpdate(R, t,MK,PP): The algorithm first computes Cover(R) to find a minimal
node set that covers U \ R. For each x ∈ Cover(R), it randomly chooses rx ∈ Zp and
sets the update key as UK(R, t) =
{
U
(1)
x , U
(2)
x
}
x∈Cover(R)
, where
U (1)x = g
fx(t)P (t)rx , U (2)x = g
rx .
Intuitively, each update key component is randomised by rx and linked to a particular
node x in the tree (covering only non-revoked users). The use of P (t) is to embed
the current time period and will match with the ciphertext component C(4). We also
embed a point of the polynomial fx(t); given this point, and the point fx(1) (which can
be recovered from the decryption key components D
(2)
x,i given a satisfying set of objective
attributes ω), one can perform Lagrange interpolation to recover the point fx(0) which
will yield use of the master secret γ to cancel with the ciphertext component C.
• Decrypt(CT(ω,S),t, (ω,S), SK(O,ψ),ID, (O, ψ), UKR,t,PP): The decryption algorithm takes
as an input the ciphertext CT which contains a subjective access structure (M,ρ) for S
and a set of objective attributes ω, and a decryption key SK(N,pi),ID which contains a
set of subjective attributes ψ and an objective access structure (N, pi) for O. Suppose
that the set ψ for subjective attribute satisfies (M,ρ), the set ω satisfies (N, pi), and
that ID /∈ R (so that decryption is possible).
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Let Is = {i : ρ(i) ∈ ψ} and Io = {i : pi(i) ∈ ω}. The algorithm computes sets
of reconstruction constants {(i, µi)}i∈Is and {(i, νi)}i∈Io using the LSSS reconstruction
algorithm. Since ID /∈ R, the algorithm also finds a node x such that x ∈ Path(ID) ∩
Cover(R). Finally, it computes the following
C ·
∏
i∈Is
(
e(C
(3)
i , Dx) · e(C(1), D(3)ρ(i))
)µi
(∏
j∈Io
(
e(D
(2)
x,j ,C
(1))
e(C
(2)
pi(j)
,D
(1)
x,j)
)νj) tt−1 (
e(U
(1)
x ,C(1))
e(C(4),U
(2)
x )
) 1
1−t
= m.
We verify the correctness of the decryption as follows. Let us write the decryption com-
putation as C · C′K , where K = (K ′)
t
t−1 (K ′′)
1
1−t , and then consider each part in turn.
Intuitively, C ′ is similar to a standard ABE decryption operation to match attributes to
the policies, whilst K ′ and K ′′ combine the two components of a functional decryption key
(namely, a secret key and an update key) and perform a Lagrange interpolation to form a
group element e(g, g)s(γ+αrx) = e(g, g)sγ · e(g, g)sαrx . The second part of this product will
cancel the result of computing C ′ whilst the first part will cancel with C to leave only the
message m, as required.
C ′ =
∏
i∈Is
(
e(C
(3)
i , Dx) · e(C(1), D(3)ρ(i))
)µi
=
∏
i∈Is
(
e(gαλiFs(ρ(i))
−s, grx) · e(gs, Fs(ρ(i))rx)
)µi
=
∏
i∈Is
(
e(g, g)αλirx · e(g, Fs(ρ(i)))−rxs · e(g, Fs(ρ(i)))rxs
)µi
= e(g, g)αrx
∑
i∈Is µiλi
= e(g, g)αrxs.
The second equality follows by substituting the values from the construction; the third
equality follows from the properties of bilinear maps; the fourth equality simply moves
the product into the exponent; and the final equality follows from the properties of the
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reconstruction constants of the LSSS, namely that
∑
i∈Is µiλi = s.
K ′ =
∏
j∈Io
 e(D(2)x,j , C(1))
e(C
(2)
x,pi(j), D
(1)
x,j)
νj
=
∏
j∈Io
(
e(gσx,jFo(pi(j))
rx,j , gs)
e(Fo(pi(j))s, grx,j )
)νj
=
∏
j∈Io
(
e(g, g)σx,js · e(g, Fo(pi(j)))rx,j ,s
e(g, Fo(pi(j)))rx,j ,s
)νj
= e(g, g)s
∑
j∈Io νjσx,j
= e(g, g)sfx(1).
The second equality follows directly from the construction; the third equality follows from
the properties of bilinear maps; the fourth equality stems from moving the product into
the exponent; and the last equality follows from the set of LSSS reconstruction constants
with
∑
j∈Io νjσx,j = fx(1) = ax + αrx + γ.
K ′′ =
e(U
(1)
x , C(1))
e(C(4), U
(2)
x )
=
e(gfx(t)P (t)rx , gs)
e(P (t)s, grx)
=
e(g, g)fx(t)s · e(g, P (t)rxs)
e(g, P (t)rxs
= e(g, g)fx(t)s
Then,
K = (K ′)
t
t−1 (K ′′)
1
1−t
= (e(g, g)sfx(1))
t
t−1 (e(g, g)fx(t)s)
1
1−t
= (e(g, g)s)fx(1)
t
t−1+fx(t)
1
1−t
Notice that fx(1)
t
t−1 + fx(t)
1
1−t is in fact a Lagrange interpolation for the two points
(1, fx(1)), (1, fx(t)) for the first degree polynomial fx (see Appendix 2.6.4.1). Thus,
fx(1)
t
t−1 + fx(t)
1
1−t = fx(0) = αrx + γ. Hence, K = e(g, g)
s(αrx+γ). Combining all of
these results, we obtain the result of the decryption operation
C · C
′
K
= m · e(g, g)sγ · e(g, g)
αsrx
e(g, g)s(αrx+γ)
= m · e(g, g)sγ · e(g, g)
αsrx
e(g, g)sγ · e(g, g)αsrx = m.
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B.1.1 Proof of Security
Theorem B.1. The rkDPABE construction presented in Appendix B.1 is secure
with respect to Indistinguishability against selective-target with semi-static query attack
(IND-sHRSS), as presented in Game 6.1, assuming that the Decision q-BDHE problem
is hard.
The proof follows the methodology from a combination [14] and [15] with some adjustment
in the simulation of the private keys. We show that if an adversary can break the rkDPABE
scheme with advantage  in the IND-sHRSS game with a challenge subjective access
structure matrix of size l?s × k?s , then a simulator with advantage  in solving the Decision
q-BDHE problem can be constructed, where m+ k?s 6 q.
Proof. Suppose, to achieve a contradiction with Theorem B.1, that there exists an adver-
sary A that has an advantage  in attacking the rkDPABE scheme. We build a simulator
B that solves the Decisional q-BDHE problem (see Definition 2.21) in G. Recall that we
denote ga
j
by gj . The simulator B is given a random q-BDHE challenge (g, h,yg,a,q, Z)
where yg,a,q = (g1, . . . , gq, gq+2, . . . , g2q) where Z is either e(gq+1, h) or a random element
in G1. B acts as the challenger for A in the IND-sHRSS game as follows.
1. A begins by selecting its challenge parameters (t?, ω?, S?) where S? is represented by
an LSSS (M?, ρ?). Let the matrix M? be of size l?s × k?s , where m+ k?s ≤ q and let
l?s = ls,max and |ω?| = n.
2. B now simulates running Setup for the rkDPABE scheme, and embeds the challenge
policy into the public parameters. It first chooses γ′ $← Zp and implicitly defines
γ = γ′ + aq+1 by defining
e(g, g)γ = e(g1, gq) · e(g, g)γ′
= e(ga, ga
q
) · e(g, g)γ′
= e(g, g)γ
′+aq+1 .
It also sets gα = g1 = g
a.
It then must define the polynomials Fs, Fo and P (as in [14] and [15]).
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To define Fs, B begins by defining Fs(x) = gp(x), where p is a polynomial in Zp[x]
of degree m+ l?s − 1 which is implicitly defined in the following manner. It chooses
k?s +m+ 1 polynomials p0, . . . , pk?s+m in Zp[x], each of degree m+ l
?
s − 1, such that
for all x = ρ?(i) for some i (i.e. all x in the image of ρ?, of which there are exactly
l?s since ρ
? is an injective mapping):
pj(x) =

M?i,j for j ∈ [1, k?s ]
0 for j ∈ [k?s + 1, k?s +m]
(B.2)
The polynomial p0 is chosen randomly, and for all other x (not in the image of ρ
?),
pj is defined randomly by randomly choosing values at m other points).
By writing the coefficients of each polynomial as pj(x) =
∑m+l?s−1
i=0 pj,i · xi, one can
define the polynomial p(x) to be
p(x) =
k?s+m∑
j=0
pj(x)a
j . (B.3)
Then, B sets hi =
∏k?s+m
j=0 g
pj,i
j for i ∈ [0,m+ l?s − 1] Finally, as we assumed l?s =
ls,max, note that m
′ = m+ ls,max − 1 = m+ l?s − 1,
Fs(x) =
m′∏
i=0
hx
i
i (by B.1)
=
m′∏
i=0
k?s+m∏
j=0
g
pj,i
j
xi (by definition of hxii )
=
m′∏
i=0
k?s+m∏
j=0
gpj,ia
j
xi (by definition of gj = gaj )
= g
∑k?s+m
j=0
∑m′
i=0 pj,ix
iaj = g
∑k?s+m
j=0 pj(x)a
j
= gp(x) (by B.3)
To define Fo, B randomly picks a polynomial f ′(x) =
∑n−1
j=0 f
′
jx
j in Zp[x] of degree
n − 1. It then defines f(x) = ∏k∈ω?(x − k) = ∑n−1j=0 fjxj (which can be computed
entirely from ω?); note that f(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ ω?. It defines qj = gfjq gf ′j for
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j = [0, n− 1]. Finally,
Fo(x) =
n−1∏
j=0
q
(xj)
j = g
f(x)
q g
f ′(x).
To define P , B defines
pˆ(y) = yd−1 · (y − t?) =
d∑
j=0
pˆjy
j .
This ensures pˆ(t) = 0 if and only if t = t? for t ∈ T , and that for x ∈ X , pˆ(x) 6= 0
since we assumed T ∩ X = ∅.
B then randomly picks a degree d polynomial ρ(y) = ∑dj=0 ρjyj in Zp[x] and lets
uj = (g
a)pˆjgρj for j = 0, . . . , d. Thus,
P (y) =
d∏
j=0
uy
j
j = (g
a)pˆ(y)gρ(y). (B.4)
The public key PK for the DPABE scheme is defined to be PK =
(g, e(g, g)γ , gα, h0, . . . , hm′ , q1, . . . , qn′ , u1, . . . , ud), which is given to A. Observe that
due to the randomness of the q-BDHE challenge (g, h,yg,a,q, Z) and the indepen-
dently chosen randomness used in the construction of the polynomials pj , f
′, and ρ,
the public parameters are distributed as expected.
3. A declares its list R and is then given oracle access to the KeyGen and KeyUpdate
functions. Let XR = {x ∈ Path(ID) : ID ∈ R}. For each node label x ∈ X in the
tree, B randomly chooses a′x ∈ Zp and implicitly defines
ax =

a′x − αrx − γ if x ∈ XR
a′x − αrx−γt? if x /∈ XR
(B.5)
Hence,
fx(1) = ax + αrx + γ = a
′
x − αrx − γ + αrx + γ = a′x if x ∈ XR (B.6)
fx(t
?) = axt
? + αrx + γ = (a
′
x −
αrx − γ
t?
)t? + αrx + γ = a
′
xt
? if x /∈ XR (B.7)
To simulate KeyGen queries for an objective access structure (N, pi), a subjective
attribute set ψ and an identity ID, we consider the following cases:
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• (ω? ∈ O) and (ID ∈ R) :
For each x ∈ Path(ID), B does the following. First note that for all such x, since
ID ∈ R, x ∈ XR. Hence, from (B.6), B can compute fx(1) for all x ∈ Path(ID).
B can therefore compute the key components precisely as in the construction
by sharing the value of fx(1).
• (ω? /∈ O) and (ID ∈ R) :
For each x ∈ Path(ID), B does the following. First note that for all such x, since
ID ∈ R, x ∈ XR. Hence, from (B.6), B can compute fx(1) for all x ∈ Path(ID).
B randomly choses rx ∈ Zp. It then lets Dx = grx , and for all k ∈ ψ lets
D
(3)
k = Fs(k)
rx as in the construction. Recall that the dimensions of N are
l0×k0. Since ω? does not satisfy N for this case of the query, and by Proposition
2.1, there exists a vector ax = (a1, . . . , ako) ∈ Zkop such that a1 = −1 and
Ni · ax = 0 for all i where pi(i) ∈ ω?.
B randomly chooses z′x,2, . . . , z′x,ko ∈ Zp and defines v′x = (0, z′x,2, . . . , z′x,ko). It
then implicitly defines a vector vx = −(a′x)ax+v′x (by using B.2) which will be
used for creating the share of fx(1) = γ +αrx + ax (note that the first element
of vx is indeed fx(1) by (B.6)), as in our construction.
Now, for all i such that pi(i) ∈ ω?, B randomly chooses rx,i ∈ Zp and computes
D
(1)
x,i = g
rx,i and
D
(2)
x,i = g
Ni·v′xFo(pi(i))rx,i = gNi·vxFo(pi(i))rx,i ,
where the last equality holds because Ni · ax = 0. Note that σx,i = Ni · vx in
our construction and hence D
(2)
x,i is of the valid form.
For all other i, such that pi(i) /∈ ω?, B randomly chooses r′x,i ∈ Zp. Observe
that
Ni · vx = Ni · (−(a′x)ax + v′x)
= Ni · (v′x − (a′x)ax)
Note that, unlike [15], due to our definition of ax, we do not have a term in
aq+1 here, and B can generate D(2)x,i = gNi·vxFo(pi(i))rx,i and D(1)x,i = grx,i .
• (ψ /∈ S?) and (ID /∈ R) :
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For each x ∈ Path(ID), B does the following. Since ψ does not satisfy M?,
by Proposition 2.1, there exists a vector wx = (w1, . . . , wk?s ) ∈ Z
k?s
p such that
w1 = −1 and Mi ·wx = 0 for all i where ρ(i) ∈ ψ?. Now, by our definition of
pj(x) in (B.2), we have that (p1(x), . . . , pk?s (x)) · (w1, . . . , wk?s ) = 0.
B then computes one possible solution of variables wk?s+1, . . . , wk?s+m for the
system of |ψ| equations: for all x ∈ ψ
(p1(x), . . . , pk?s+m(x)) · (w1, . . . , wk?s+m) = 0,
which is possible as |ψ| 6 m.
B then randomly chooses r′x ∈ Zp and implicitly defines
rx = r
′
x + w1(
t?
t? − 1) · α
q + w2(
t?
t? − 1) · α
q−1 + · · ·+ wk?s+m(
t?
t? − 1) · α
q−(k?s+m)+1
by setting the key Dx = g
r′x
∏k?s+m
k=1 (gq+1−k)
wk(
t?
t?−1 ) = grx . Then, since γ =
γ′ + αq+1 and as x /∈ XR, we have
fx(1) = γ + αrx + ax
= γ′ + αq+1 + αrx + ax
= γ′ + αq+1 + αrx + a′x −
αrx − γ
t?
by (B.5)
= γ′ + a′x +
γ
t?
+ αq+1 + (α(
t? − 1
t?
))rx
= γ′ + a′x +
γ
t?
+ αq+1 + (α(
t? − 1
t?
)(r′x + w1(
t?
t? − 1) · α
q
+ w2(
t?
t? − 1) · α
q−1 + · · ·+ wk?s+m(
t?
t? − 1) · α
q−(k?s+m)+1)
= γ′ + a′x +
γ
t?
+ (αr′x + w2(
t?
t? − 1) · α
q + · · ·+ wk?s+m(
t?
t? − 1) · α
q−(k?s+m)+2)
where the αq+1 term in γ has canceled out. The simulator now randomly
chooses zx,2, . . . , zx,ko ∈ Zp and implicitly lets vx = (γ+αrx+ax, zx,2, . . . , zx,ko)
as in the construction.
B also randomly chooses rx,1, . . . , rx,lo ∈ Zp and computes for i = 1 to lo the
key D
(1)
x,1 = g
rx,i . The other keys are computed in the following way. We have
D
(2)
x,i =
gγ′+a′x+ γt? · gr′x1 k
?
s+m∏
k=2
(gq−k+2)wk
Ni,1 · ko∏
j=2
gNi,jzjFo(pi(i))
rx,i
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which can be computed since gq+1 is not required and, by collecting the expo-
nents, it can be verified that D
(2)
x,i = g
Ni·vx · Fo(pi(i))ri .
Recall that (p1(k), . . . , pk?s+m(k)) · (w1, . . . , wk?s+m) = 0 for all k ∈ ψ.
D
(3)
k = D
p0(k)
x
k?s+m∏
j=1
gr′xj ∏
k∈[1,k?s+m],k 6=j
(gq+1−k+j)wk
pj(k)
= (grx)p0(k)
k?s+m∏
j=1
(grx)α
jpj(k)
= (grx)p(k)
= Fs(k)
rx ,
where the second equality holds by observing that
D
(3)
k = D
(3)
k (gq+1)
(p1(k),...,pk?s+m(k))·(w1,...,wk?s+m)
since (gq+1)
(p1(k),...,pk?s+m(k))·(w1,...,wk?s+m) = (gq+1)0 = 1 (see [15]).
• (ω? /∈ O) and (ψ ∈ S?) and (ID /∈ R) :
For each x ∈ Path(ID), B does the following. B randomly choses rx ∈ Zp. It
then lets Dx = g
rx , and for all k ∈ ψ lets D(3)k = Fs(k)rx as in the construction.
Recall that the dimensions of N are l0 × k0. Since ω? does not satisfy N
for this case of the query, and by Proposition 2.1, there exists a vector ax =
(a1, . . . , ako) ∈ Zkop such that a1 = −1 and Ni · ax = 0 for all i where pi(i) ∈ ω?.
B randomly chooses z′x,2, . . . , z′x,ko ∈ Zp and defines v′x = (0, z′x,2, . . . , z′x,ko). It
then implicitly defines a vector vx = −(a′x − αrx−γt? + αrx + γ)ax + v′x which
will be used to create the share of fx(1) = γ + αrx + ax (note that the first
element of vx is indeed fx(1) by (B.5)), as in our construction.
Now, for all i such that pi(i) ∈ ω?, B randomly chooses rx,i ∈ Zp and computes
D
(1)
x,i = g
rx,i and
D
(2)
x,i = g
Ni·v′xFo(pi(i))rx,i = gNi·vxFo(pi(i))rx,i ,
where the last equality holds because Ni · ax = 0. Note that σx,i = Ni · vx in
our construction and hence D
(2)
x,i is of the valid form.
For all other i, such that pi(i) /∈ ω?, B randomly chooses r′x,i ∈ Zp. Observe
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that
Ni · vx = Ni · (−(a′x −
αrx − γ
t?
+ αrx + γ)ax + v
′
x)
= Ni · (−(a′x −
αrx − (γ′ + aq+1)
t?
+ αrx + (γ
′ + aq+1))ax + v′x)
= Ni · (v′x − (a′x + γ′(
1
t?
+ 1))ax) + (rx(
1
t?
− 1)Ni · ax)α
− (( 1
t?
+ 1)Ni · ax)aq+1
contains a term in aq+1 and hence we cannot compute this value (as aq+1 is the
gap in the q-BDHE game). Instead, we will use the ri term in Fo(pi(i))
rx,i to
cancel the unknown value aq+1. B implicitly defines rx,i = r′x,i −
a( 1
t?
+1)Ni·ax
f(pi(i)) .
To do so, it defines
D
(2)
x,i = g
(
rx(
1
t?
−1)Ni·ax−( 1t?+1)
Ni·axf ′(pi(i))
f(pi(i))
)
1 · gNi·(v
′
x−(a′x+γ′( 1t?+1)))axFo(pi(i))r
′
x,i
To see that D
(2)
x,i is valid, we observe
D
(2)
x,i = g
( 1
t?
+1)Ni·ax
q+1 ·D(2)x,i · g
−( 1
t?
+1)Ni·ax
q+1
= g
( 1
t?
+1)Ni·ax
q+1 · g
rx(
1
t?
−1)Ni·ax
1 · gNi·(v
′
x−(a′x+γ′( 1t?+1)))ax
·
(
g
−( 1
t?
+1)Ni·ax
q+1 g
−( 1
t?
+1)
Ni·axf ′(pi(i))
f(pi(i))
1
)
· Fo(pi(i))r′x,i
= gNi·vx
(
gf(pi(i))q g
f ′(pi(i))
)−a( 1t? +1)Ni·ax
f(pi(i)) · Fo(pi(i))r′x,i
= gNi·vx · Fo(pi(i))
−a( 1
t?
+1)Ni·ax
f(pi(i)) · Fo(pi(i))r′x,i by (B.4)
= gNi·vx · Fo(pi(i))rx,i
B also defines
D
(1)
x,i = g
r′x,ig
− (
1
t?
+1)Ni·ax
f(pi(i))
1 = g
rx,i
Note that f(pi(i)) 6= 0 since pi(i) /∈ ω?, and so D(1)x,i and D(2)x,i are well defined.
To simulate KeyUpdate queries for time period t and revocation list R, we consider
the following cases:
• t = t? and R ⊆ R:
For each x ∈ Cover(R), B chooses a random rx ∈ Zp and computes U (1)x =
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(ga
′
xt
?
)P (t?)rx and U
(2)
x = grx . Both keys are valid because since R ⊆ R and
thus for all x ∈ Cover(R) we have x /∈ XR. Hence, by (B.7), fx(t?) = a′xt?.
• t 6= t?:
For each x ∈ Cover(R), B chooses a random r′x ∈ Zp
– If x ∈ Cover(R) ∩ XR, it defines
U (1)x = (g
a′x)t(gγ
′
)(1−t)(gr
′
x
1 )
(1−t)g
− ρ(t)(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t
q P (t)
r′x
U (2)x = (g
r′x)(gq)
− 1−t
pˆ(t)+1−t
Note that pˆ(t) 6= 0 for t 6= t? so this is well defined. We claim that these
keys look valid according to the construction with implicit randomness
rx = r
′
x − a
q(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t .
Note that, in this case, x ∈ XR and hence by (B.5)
fx(t) = axt+ αrx + γ
= (a′x − αrx − γ)t+ αrx + γ
= a′xt+ αrx(1− t) + γ′(1− t) + aq+1(1− t)
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Then,
U (1)x = g
fx(t)P (t)rx by the construction
= ga
′
xt+arx(1−t)+γ′(1−t)+aq+1(1−t)gapˆ(t)rxgρ(t)rx by fx(t) and (B.4)
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)garx(1−t)gapˆ(t)rxgρ(t)rx
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)ga(1−t)r
′
xg−a(1−t)Bgapˆ(t)r
′
xg−apˆ(t)Bgρ(t)r
′
xg−ρ(t)B
by rx = r
′
x −B
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
xg−a(1−t)Bg−apˆ(t)Bg−ρ(t)B by (B.4)
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
xg−ρ(t)Bg−Ba(1−t)+apˆt
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
xg
−ρ(t)( aq(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t )(ga)
−( aq(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t )
(1−t)+pˆt
by B =
aq(1− t)
pˆ(t) + 1− t
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
xg
−ρ(t)( aq(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t )(ga)−(a
q(1−t))
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
xg
−ρ(t)( aq(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t )g−a
q+1(1−t)
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
xg
−ρ(t)( aq(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t )
= (ga
′
x)t(gγ
′
)(1−t)(gr
′
x
1 )
(1−t)g
− ρ(t)(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t
q P (t)
r′x as we defined
– If x ∈ Cover(R) \ XR, it defines
U (1)x = (g
a′x)t(gγ
′
)(
t
t?
+1)(g
r′x
1 )
(1− t
t?
)g
− ρ(t)(1+
t
t?
)
pˆ(t)+1− t
t?
q P (t)
r′x
U (2)x = (g
r′x)(gq)
− 1+
t
t?
pˆ(t)+1− t
t?
In this case, by (B.5), ax = a
′
x − αrx−γt? . By a similar argument as above,
these keys look valid according to the construction with implicit random-
ness rx = r
′
x −− a
q(1+ t
t?
)
pˆ(t)+1− t
t?
.
4. A selects two messages m0 and m1. B chooses b $← {0, 1} and creates a ciphertext
C = mb ·Z ·e(h, gγ′), C(1) = h, and for k ∈ ω? we write C(2)k = hf
′(x). We write h = gs
for some unknown s. The simulator then chooses random elements y′2, . . . , y′k?s ∈ Zp
and lets y′ = (0, y′2, . . . , y′k?s ). It defines C
(3)
i = (g1)
M?i ·y′ · (gs)−p0(ρ?(i)) for i =
1, . . . , l′s and C(4) = (gs)ρ(t
?), to implicitly share the secret s via the vector
vx = (s, sα+ y
′
2, sα
2 + y′3, . . . , sα
k′s−1 + y′k′s).
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We claim that if Z = e(gq+1, h) then the created ciphertext is a valid challenge. The
validity of C(1) = h = gs comes from the implicit definition of h. To see that C is
valid, recall that γ = γ′ + aq+1. Then,
C = mb · Z · e(h, gγ′) = mb · e(gq+1, h) · e(h, gγ′) = mb · e(g, g)saq+1 · e(g, g)sγ′
= mb · e(g, g)s(γ′+aq+1) = mb · e(g, g)sγ .
For all k ∈ ω?, we defined f(k) such that f(k) = 0, and hence
C
(2)
k = h
f ′(k) = (gs)f
′(k) = (gf(k)q g
f ′(k))s = Fo(k)
s.
For i = 1, . . . , l′s, we have
C
(3)
i = (g1)
M?i ·y′ · (gs)−p0(ρ?(i))
= (gα)M
?
i ·y′
k?s∏
j=1
gM
?
i,jsα
j · (gs)−p0(ρ?(i))
k?s∏
j=1
(gs)−M
?
i,jα
j
= gαM
?
i ·vx · (gs)−p(ρ?(i)) = gαM?i ·vx · Fs(ρ?(i))−s,
Finally, since pˆ(t?) = 0, C(4) = (gs)ρ(t
?) = ((ga)pˆ(t
?)gρ(t
?))s = P (t?)s.
5. The challenge ciphertext is given to A along with oracle access which is handled as
in Step 3.
6. A eventually outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1} as its guess of b. If b = b′ then B outputs 1 to guess
that Z = e(gq+1, h). Otherwise, B outputs 0 to guess that Z is random in GT .
If (g, h,yg,a,q, Z) is sampled from RBDHE then Pr[B(g, h,yg,a,q, Z) = 0] = 12 since
A was given a malformed challenge and hence can only guess the value of b. On
the other hand if (g, h,yg,a,q, Z) is sampled from PBDHE then we formed a valid
challenge ciphertext and, as A is assumed to have non-negligible advantage  in
the IND-sHRSS game, |Pr[B(g, h,yg,a,q, Z) = 0] − 12 | ≥ . It follows that B has
advantage at least  in solving q-BDHE problem in G. Hence, as we assume that the
decisional q-BDHE problem is hard, an adversary with non-negligible advantage in
the IND-sHRSS game cannot exist.
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Game B.1 ExpsPubVerifA
[HPVC, 1`,F]
1: (ω?,O?, ψ?,S?, LF,X? , mode)
$← A(1`,F)
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
3: if ((mode = V DC)) then (F ← S?, X? ← ψ?)
4: else (F ← O?, X? ← ω?)
5: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
6: (σ?, V K?, RK?)
$← ProbGen(mode, (ω?,S?), LF,X? , PKF ,PP)
7: θ?
$← AO(σ?, V K?, RK?, PKF ,PP)
8: (y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, V K?, RK?,PP)
9: if (((y, τθ?) 6= (⊥, (reject, ·))) and (y 6= F (X?))) then
10: return 1
11: else return 0
B.2 Security Models
In this section we discuss some security models which are of interest in HPVC, namely
modified versions of public verifiability, revocation and authorised computation. These
notions are motivated by the same scenarios considered in the previous chapters and,
as in Chapter 3, we must include some additional restrictions on the public verifiability
and revocation games in order to accommodate similar restrictions stemming from our
current rkDPABE primitive. For brevity, we do not discuss these restrictions in detail
here, but refer the reader to the discussion in Section 3.4.2. We also do not provide
ideal notions of each game, as we did in Chapter 3 for RPVC, as they can be easily seen
by adapting the notation in the ideal notions for RPVC to accommodate the additional
HPVC parameters. Notions for vindictive servers and vindictive managers can also be
easily adapted from Chapter 3 if desired.
B.2.1 Selective Public Verifiability
In Game B.1, we combine the public verifiability games of Chapters 3 and 5, to formalise
in the HPVC model that no server may return an incorrect result for a computation with-
out being detected. We allow the adversary to corrupt other servers, generate arbitrary
computations, and to perform verification steps himself.
As with Game 3.7, this is a selective notion and, as such, the adversary first selects its
challenge parameters, including the mode it wishes its challenge to be generated in and
the labels associated to its choice of inputs. Note that we ask the adversary to output
choices for ω?,O?, ψ? and S?, despite only ω? and S? forming the challenge input. This
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Game B.2 ExpsSS-RevA
[HPVC, 1`,F , qt]
1: (ω?,O?, ψ?,S?, LF,X? , mode?)
$← A(1`,F , qt)
2: if ((mode? = V DC)) then (F ← S?, X? ← ψ?)
3: else (F ← O?, X? ← ω?)
4: QRev ← 
5: t← 1
6: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
7: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
8: R
$← A(PKF ,PP)
9: AO(PKF ,PP)
10: if (R 6⊆ QRev) then return 0
11: (σ?, V K?, RK?)
$← ProbGen(mode?, (ω?,S?), LF,X? , PKF ,PP)
12: θ?
$← AO(σ?, V K?, RK?, PKF ,PP)
13: if ((y, (accept, S))← Verify(θ?, V K?, RK?,PP) and (S ∈ R)) then
14: return 1
15: else return 0
is a notational convenience that allows us to define the challenge computation in terms
of F and X? in line 3; note that the same information can, however, be gleaned from the
choice of mode and the set of labels LF,X? , so this is not a weakening of the game — this
information has already been determined by the choices of the adversary.
The challenger runs Setup and FnInit to create a public delegation key for the chosen
challenge function F . The challenger then runs ProbGen on the challenge inputs to create
the challenge parameters for the adversary, which are given to A along with the public
information. The adversary is also given oracle access to the functions FnInit(·,MK,PP),
Register(·,MK,PP), Certify(·, ·, (·, ·), ·, ·,MK,PP) and Revoke(·,MK,PP), denoted by O.
The adversary wins the game if it creates an encoded output that verifies correctly yet
does not encode the correct value F (x).
Definition B.1. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the sPubVerif game for an
HPVC construction, HPVC, for a family of functions F is defined as:
AdvsPubVerifA (HPVC, 1`,F) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpsPubVerifA
[HPVC, 1`,F]].
An HPVC scheme, HPVC, is secure with respect to selective public verifiability if, for all
PPT adversaries A,
AdvsPubVerifA (HPVC, 1`,F) 6 negl(`).
B.2.2 Selective, Semi-static Revocation
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Oracle B.1 OCertify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,MK,PP)
1: if ((LF,X? ⊆ Li and Si /∈ R) or (t = qt and R 6⊆ QRev \ Si)) then return ⊥
2: QRev ← QRev \ S
3: return Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,MK,PP))
Oracle B.2 ORevoke(τF ′(X),MK,PP))
1: t← t+ 1
2: if (τF ′(X) = (accept, ·)) then return ⊥
3: if (t = qt and R 6⊆ QRev ∪ Si) then return ⊥
4: QRev ← QRev ∪ S
5: return Revoke(τF ′(X),MK,PP)
The notion of revocation requires that if a server is detected as misbehaving, i.e. the BVerif
algorithm outputs τF (X) = (reject, Si), then any subsequent evaluations by Si should be
rejected. As in Chapter 3, this notion inherits the selective, semi-static restrictions from
the revocation mechanism of the underlying primitive in our construction. Hence, the
adversary must first select its challenge parameters, which the challenger can parse to
learn F and X? for the challenge computation. The challenger maintains a time period
t which is incremented during Revoke oracle queries, and a list QRev of currently revoked
entities. On line 4, the adversary (before receiving oracle access) must choose a list R of
servers to be revoked during the challenge generation (which we assume will be at time
qt, where qt is given as an input to the game).
The adversary is then given oracle access to the functions FnInit(·,MK,PP),
Register(·,MK,PP), Certify(·, ·, (·, ·), ·, ·,MK,PP) and Revoke(·,MK,PP), denoted by O.
Certify and Revoke queries are handled as specified in Oracles B.1 and B.2. Note that
the Certify oracle returns ⊥ if the resulting evaluation key would enable evaluation of the
challenge computation. After finishing this query phase (and in particular after qt Revoke
queries), the challenge is created. The adversary wins if it outputs any result (even a
correct encoding of F (X?)) that is accepted as a valid response from any server that was
revoked at the time of the challenge.
Definition B.2. The advantage of a PPT adversary A making a polynomial number,
q, of oracle queries, of which qt are Revoke queries, in the sSS-Rev game for an HPVC
construction, HPVC, for a family of functions F is defined as:
AdvsSS-RevA (HPVC, 1`,F , qt) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpsSS-RevA
[HPVC, 1`,F , qt]].
An HPVC scheme, HPVC, is secure with respect to selective semi-static revocation if,
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for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvsSS-RevA (HPVC, 1`,F , qt) 6 negl(`).
B.2.3 Selective Authorised Computation
The notion of selective authorised computation, presented in Game B.3, ensures that only a
server that satisfies the additional authorisation policy specified in the encoded input may
perform a given computation and hence be rewarded for correct work; this is similar to the
authorised computation notion given in Game 4.2. A result generated by an unauthorised
server should be rejected (even if the result itself is correct). Note that this game is only
meaningful when the challenge parameters are generated in PVC-AC mode.
Game B.3 ExpsAuthCA
[HPVC, 1`,F]
1: (F,X?, P )
$← A(1`)
2: (PP,MK)
$← Setup(1`,F)
3: PKF
$← FnInit(F,MK,PP)
4: (σ?, V K?, RK?)
$← ProbGen(PVC-AC, (x, P ), {l(F )}, PKF ,PP)
5: θ?
$← AO(σ?, V K?, RK?, PKF ,PP)
6: (RT ?, τ?)← BVerif(θ?, V K?,PP)
7: if (τ? 6= (reject, ·)) then return 1
8: else return 0
This is a selective notion due to the selectively secure revocable key DP-ABE primitive we
use in our construction; as such, the game begins with the adversary choosing a challenge
function F , a challenge input X? and an authorisation policy P . The challenger initialises
the system and generates an encoded input for the challenge computation. The adversary is
given the resulting parameters and oracle access to FnInit(·,MK,PP), Register(·,MK,PP),
Certify(·, ·, (·, ·), ·, ·,MK,PP) and Revoke(·,MK,PP), denoted by O. The Certify oracle is
handled as specified in Oracle B.3. It returns a failure symbol ⊥ if the queried attributes
ψ satisfies the authorisation policy P , else the adversary could trivially produce a valid
response as an authorised entity. Otherwise, the result of running the Certify algorithm is
returned.
The adversary must return a result which is accepted by a verifier.
Definition B.3. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the sAuthC game for an
HPVC construction, HPVC, for a family of functions F is defined as:
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Oracle B.3 OCertify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,MK,PP)
1: if (ψ ∈ P ) then return ⊥
2: return Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,MK,PP)
AdvsAuthCA (HPVC, 1`,F) = Pr
[
1
$← ExpsAuthCA
[HPVC, 1`,F]].
An HPVC scheme, HPVC, is secure with respect to selective authorised computation if,
for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvsAuthCA (HPVC, 1`,F) 6 negl(`).
B.3 Proofs of Security
Informally, public verifiability and revocation reduce to the indistinguishability of cipher-
texts within the rkDPABE scheme which allows us to replace the message for the unsatis-
fied function (which cannot be decrypted) with the challenge for a one-way function game.
Then an adversary against these games can attack the verification token for this message.
B.3.1 Proof of Public Verifiability
Lemma B.1. The HPV C construction defined by Algorithms 6.1–6.9 is secure with re-
spect to selective public verifiability (Game B.1) under the same assumptions as in Theo-
rem 6.1.
One way to view this proof is to reduce, based on the mode to either the RPVC or VDC
public verifiability game. Observe that the choice of dummy attributes and a dummy
policy that is trivially satisfied by the presence of that dummy attribute means that one
type of policy is always trivially satisfied, and hence decryption hinges entirely on the
remaining policy. Thus we are in the setting of the single mode games.
We now give a unified proof.
Proof. Let AV C be an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the selective public
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verifiability game (Game B.1) when instantiated with Algorithms 6.1–6.9. We define the
following three games:
• Game 0. This is the correct selective public verifiability game as in Game B.1.
• Game 1. This differs from Game 0 in that ProbGen no longer returns an encryption
of m0 and m1. Instead, we choose a random message m
′ 6= m0,m1. Note that there
are two ciphertexts created during ProbGen (being the encryption of m0 and m1)
and that one of these will be associated with the function F , and the other with the
complement function F . Now, only one of F and F will be satisfied by the input
data X?. We replace the plaintext associated with the unsatisfied function by m′
which is unrelated to m0,m1 and the verification keys.
• Game 2. This is the same as Game 1 with the exception that instead of choosing a
random message m′, we implicitly set m′ to be the challenge input w in the one-way
function game.
By hopping from Game 0 to Game 2, we show that an adversary with non-negligible
advantage against public verifiability can be used to construct an adversary that inverts
the one-way function g.
Game 0 to Game 1. We begin by showing that there is a negligible distinguishing
advantage between Game 0 and Game 1. Suppose otherwise, that AV C can distinguish
the two games with non-negligible advantage δ. We construct an adversary AABE that
uses AV C as a sub-routine to break the IND-sHRSS security of the rkDPABE scheme
(Game 6.1). In this proof, we consider the PVC-AC mode to be a special case of the
RPVC mode (since we assume the adversary can be authorised to evaluate the challenge
computation); therefore we focus only on RPVC and VDC modes. We consider a chal-
lenger C playing the IND-sHRSS game with AABE , who in turn acts as a challenger in
the selective public verifiability game for AV C :
1. AV C is given the security parameter, and declares its choice of challenge input pa-
rameters (ω?,O?, ψ?,S?, ), a set of labels LF,X? and the mode in which the challenge
should be generated.
265
B.3 Proofs of Security
2. AABE must send a challenge input (ω˜, S˜) and a challenge time period t˜ to the chal-
lenger. It first sets t˜ = 1. Observe that in VDC mode, S? corresponds to the function
F and ψ? is the challenge input data X?. In RPVC mode, O? = F and ω corre-
sponds to the challenge input X?. The other inputs are either dummy attributes
or corresponding policies, and these policies are trivially satisfied by the dummy
attribute. Now, using the relevant inputs, AABE computes r = F (X?).
• If the challenge mode is RPVC, set
ω˜ = Aω? = AX? ,
S˜ = S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X
lj = {{T 0S}} ∧ {l(F )}.
• If the challenge mode is VDC, we want to set (ω˜, S˜) such that the pair is not
satisfied by the challenge input.
– If r = 1: set
ω˜ = Aω? = {T 0O},
S˜ = S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X
lj = F ∧ {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X? .
– If r = 0: set
ω˜ = Aω? = {T 0O},
S˜ = S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X
lj = F ∧ {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X? .
3. C runs the DPABE.Setup algorithm on the security parameter to generate MPKABE
and MSKABE and gives MPKABE to AABE .
4. AABE sends R =  (i.e. an empty list) to C and simulates running HPVC.Setup
such that the outcome is consistent with MPKABE. If mode = VDC, it runs lines 3
to 5 as written, sets MPK0ABE = MPKABE as given by C, and implicitly sets
MSK0ABE = MSKABE (any use of MSK
0
ABE will be simulated using oracle queries
to C). Otherwise, it sets MPKrABE to be that issued by C, and implicitly sets
MSKrABE to be that held by the challenger.
In both cases, it also runs DPABE.Setup itself to generate a second DP-ABE system.
5. AABE runs HPVC.FnInit as written. To generate the challenge input, AABE begins
by choosing two random bits, b (which it defines to be RKF,X?) and s, and three
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random messages m0, m1 and m
′ from the message space.
AABE sends m0 and m1 to C as its challenge inputs. C chooses b? $← {0, 1} and
returns CT ? ← DPABE.Encrypt(mb? , (ω˜, S˜), t˜,MPKABE).
• In RPVC mode, AABE sets cb to be CT ? and generates
c1−b ← DPABE.Encrypt(m′, (ω˜,S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X
lj), t˜,MPK
1
ABE)
itself. It sets V Kb = g(ms) and V K1−b = g(m′).
• In VDC mode:
– If r = 1:
AABE generates
cb ← DPABE.Encrypt(m′, (ω˜,S?) ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X
lj , t˜,MPK
0
ABE)
itself, and sets c1−b to be CT ?. It sets V Kb = g(m′) and V K1−b = g(ms).
– If r = 0:
AABE sets cb to be CT ? and generates
c1−b ← DPABE.Encrypt(m′, (ω˜,S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X
lj), t˜,MPK
0
ABE)
itself. It sets V Kb = g(ms) and V K1−b = g(m′).
Finally, AABE sets σF,X? = (cb, c1−b), V KF,X? = (V Kb, V K1−b, LReg) and
RKF,X? = b. Note that s is essentially AABE ’s guess for the value of b? chosen
by C.
6. AV C is provided the output of ProbGen and given oracle access which is handled as
follows.
• FnInit(·,MK,PP) and Register(·,MK,PP) can be run as written.
• Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi, Si,MK,PP):
To generate the evaluation key for the queried parameters, AABE uses the
KeyGen oracle in the rkDPABE game. It first updates the relevant list entries
as specified. Then it sets O′ = O and ψ′ = Aψ ∪
⋃
lj∈Li lj and makes an oracle
query to C for OKeyGen(Si, (O′, ψ′),MK,PP) as in Oracle 6.1. C shall generate
a rkDPABE decryption key SKO′,ψ′ if and only if ω˜ 6∈ O′ or ψ′ 6∈ S˜ or Si ∈ R.
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Observe, that Si 6∈ R since we set R to be empty.
Now, by construction (Step 2), ψ′ ∈ S˜ only if the labels {lj}lj∈Li ⊇ {lk}lk∈LF,X? .
If the labels do not satisfy this relation, then C may generate the key, which
AABE will receive as SK0ABE.
If, on the other hand, the labels do satisfy this relation, then observe that,
because each label uniquely describes a single element (either a function or a
data point):
– In RPVC mode: as both Li and LF,X? are singleton sets, and {lj}lj∈Li ⊇
{lk}lk∈LF,X? , it must be that Li = LF,X? = {l(F )} and hence, by uniqueness
of the labels, O = O? i.e. the adversary has requested an evaluation key
for the challenge function F . However, in Step 4, we assigned the ABE
system owned by the challenger (with master secret MSKrABE) precisely
such that O? is not satisfied by the challenge input ω˜, and therefore O′ is
not satisfied either — that is, ω˜ 6∈ O′ and hence C can generate a valid key
which AABE will store as SKrABE.
– In VDC mode: {lk}lk∈LF,X? ⊆ {lj}lj∈Li ⇒ {l(xi,k)}xi,k∈X? ⊆
{l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di ⇒ X? ⊆ Di i.e. by uniqueness of the labels, the adver-
sary has requested an evaluation key for a superset of the challenge input
data — that is, Di contains X
? and possibly some additional data points.
Now, if X? ⊆ Di then, additionally Di must satisfy either F or F to satisfy
S˜. However, note that in Step 2, S˜ was chosen specifically such that it
is not satisfied by the challenge input X? and therefore by Di (as F will
simply select the elements of X? to evaluate on). Hence C may generate a
valid key which AABE will store as SK0ABE.
AABE also must request an update key by making a KeyUpdate oracle query
to C. C will return a valid key unless the current time period is t = t˜ and
R 6⊆ QRev. Observe that the second clause is never satisfied since R =  and
hence is a subset of any QRev. Hence C may always generate a valid update
key.
If in RPVC mode, AABE additionally generates a key SK1−rABE using the second
system parameters (which he owns) for (O, ψ).
• Revoke(τ(O,ψ),(ω,S), (O, ψ), (ω,S),MK,PP): In response to a Revoke query,
AABE runs Algorithm 6.9 as written except that it will make a KeyUpdate
oracle query to C for the update key for to the ABE system owned by the
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challenger (UKrLRev,t in the case of RPVC and UK
0
LRev,t
in the case of VDC).
C will generate a valid update key unless the time period is t˜ = qt and there
exists a server on R that is not currently revoked. However, as R was defined to
be an empty list, this second condition will never hold and C can always return
a valid key.
Eventually, it outputs θ? which it believes is a valid forgery (i.e. that it will be
accepted yet does not correspond to the correct value of F (X?)).
7. AABE parses θ? as (db, d1−b, Si? , γ) and using the retrieval key RKF,X? = b, finds d0
and d1. One of d0 and d1 will be ⊥ (by construction) and we denote the other value
by Y .
If g(Y ) = g(ms), AABE outputs a guess b′ = s and otherwise guesses b′ = (1− s).
If s = b? (the challenge bit chosen by C), we observe that the above corresponds to Game
0 (since the verification key comprises g(m′) where m′ is the message a legitimate server
could recover, and g(ms) where ms is the other plaintext). Alternatively, s = 1 − b? and
the distribution of the above experiment is identical to Game 1 (since the verification
key comprises the legitimate message and a random message m1−b? that is unrelated to
the ciphertext).
Now, we consider the advantage of this constructed AABE playing the IND-sHRSS game
for rkDPABE. Recall that, by assumption, AV C has a non-negligible advantage δ in dis-
tinguishing between Game 0 and Game 1 — that is
∣∣∣Pr [1 $← ExpGame 0AV C [HPVC, 1`,F]]− Pr [1 $← ExpGame 1AV C [HPVC, 1`,F]]∣∣∣ > δ
where ExpiAV C
[HPVC, 1`,F] denotes running AV C in Game i.
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Pr[b′ = b?] = Pr [s = b?] Pr
[
b′ = b?|s = b?]+ Pr [s 6= b?] Pr [b′ = b?|s 6= b?]
=
1
2
Pr [g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] + 1
2
Pr [g(Y ) 6= g(ms)|s 6= b?]
=
1
2
Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 0AV C
[
HPVC, 1`,F
]]
+
1
2
(1− Pr [g(Y ) = g(ms)|s 6= b?])
=
1
2
Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 0AV C
[
HPVC, 1`,F
]]
+
1
2
(
1− Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 1AV C
[
HPVC, 1`,F
]])
=
1
2
(
Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 0AV C
[
HPVC, 1`,F
]]
− Pr
[
1
$← ExpGame 1AV C
[
HPVC, 1`,F
]]
+ 1
)
> 1
2
(δ + 1)
Hence,
AdvAABE >
∣∣∣∣Pr [b? = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣ > δ2 .
Hence, if AV C has advantage δ at distinguishing these games then AABE can win the
IND-sHRSS game for rkDPABE with non-negligible probability. Thus since we assumed
the rkDPABE scheme to be secure, we conclude that AV C cannot distinguish Game 0
from Game 1 with non-negligible probability.
Game 1 to Game 2. The transition from Game 1 to Game 2 sets the value of m′ to
correspond to the challenge w in the one-way function inversion game (rather than be a
randomly chosen message). We argue that the adversary has no distinguishing advantage
between these games since the new value is independent of anything else in the system,
bar the verification key g(w), and hence looks random to an adversary with no additional
information (in particular, AV C does not see the challenge for the one-way function as
this is played between C and AABE).
Final Proof We now show that using AV C in Game 2, AABE can invert the one-way
function g — that is, given a challenge z = g(w) we can recover w. Specifically, during
ProbGen, we choose the messages as follows:
• if r = 1, we implicitly set m1−b to be w by setting the corresponding verification
key component to be z. We choose mb and the other verification key component
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randomly as usual.
• if r = 0, we implicitly set mb to be w by setting the corresponding verification
key component to be z. We choose m1−b and the other verification key component
randomly as usual.
Now, if AV C is successful, it will output a forgery comprising the plaintext encrypted
under the function F or F that evaluates to 0. By construction, this will be w (and
the adversary’s view in consistent since the verification key is simulated correctly using
z). AABE can forward this result to C to invert the one-way function with the same
non-negligible probability that AV C has against the selective public verifiability game.
We conclude that if the rkDPABE scheme is IND-sHRSS secure and the one-way function
is hard-to-invert, then the HPV C as defined by Algorithms 6.1–6.9 is secure in the sense
of selective public verifiability.
B.3.2 Proof of Revocation
Lemma B.2. The HPVC construction defined by Algorithms 6.1–6.9 is secure in the
sense of selective, semi-static revocation (Game B.2) under the same assumptions as in
Theorem 6.1.
Proof. We reduce the security of the selective, semi-static revocation game to the
IND-sHRSS security of the underlying revocable-key DPABE scheme (Game 6.1). To
achieve a contradiction, let AV C be an adversary with non-negligible advantage against
the selective, semi-static revocation game (Game B.2) when instantiated with Algorithms
6.1–6.9 and making qt Revoke queries. We show that, if such an AV C exists, then it can
be used to construct an adversary AABE that can break the IND-sHRSS security of the
revocable-key DPABE scheme. Again, we consider only RPVC and VDC modes here (and
view PVC-AC as a special case of RPVC) as the adversary should be authorised (in terms
of the authorisation policy, if not in terms of revocation) for the challenge computation.
Let C be a challenger for the IND-sHRSS game playing with AABE , who in turn acts as
the challenger in the selective, semi-static revocation game with AV C .
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1. AV C selects its challenge inputs (ω?,O?, ψ?,S?, LF,X? , mode?) for a challenge com-
putation of F (X?).
2. AABE initialises the list QRev =  and time parameter t = 1. It then forms its
own challenge input as follows. It sets t? = qt. Then, it sets ω˜ = Aω? and sets
S˜ = S? ∧∧lj∈LF,X? lj . It sends t?, ω˜ and S˜ to C.
3. C runs DPABE.Setup and returns the public parameters MPKABE to AABE who
stores them as MPK0ABE.
4. AABE now simulates the HPVC.Setup algorithm such that the output is consistent
with the public parameters generated by C. It runs Algorithm 6.1 as written, with
the exception of line 1, since MSK0ABE and MPK
0
ABE was already generated by C.
AABE also runs HPVC.FnInit as written, and gives the public parameters and public
delegation key to AV C .
5. AV C chooses a challenge revocation list R, which AABE forwards to C.
6. AV C is now given oracle access to which AABE can respond as follows:
• Queries to HPVC.FnInit and HPVC.Register can be run as written.
• Queries of the form HPVC.Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,MK,PP): AABE runs
Oracle B.1. To simulate running the HPVC.Certify algorithm, AABE runs Al-
gorithm 6.4 as written with the exception of lines 4 and 5, as these depend on
MSK0ABE held by C.
To simulate line 4, AABE makes an oracle query to C of the form
OKeyGen(Si, (O, Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li lk),MSK
0
ABE,MPK
0
ABE). C responds by running
Oracle 6.1 which will return a valid key unless (ω˜ ∈ O) and (Aψ∪
⋃
lk∈Li lk ∈ S˜)
and (Si /∈ R).
If (Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li lk 6∈ S˜) then C can return a valid decryption key. Otherwise, we
may observe that
(Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li
lk) ∈ (S ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X?
lj)
only if {lk}lk∈Li ⊇ {lj}lj∈LF,X? . By virtue of the fact that labels uniquely
label the objects they relate to (either functions or data points), this implies
LF,X? ⊆ Li. However, in this case, by the first check performed in Oracle B.1,
AABE would have returned ⊥ without querying KeyGen if Si 6∈ R, to avoid
certifying AV C for the challenge computation.
272
B.3 Proofs of Security
Thus, at the point of making a KeyGen query, if (Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li lk ∈ S˜) then
Si ∈ R. Therefore, C can respond to all queries made to it during this phase
with a valid key which AABE can use to simulate line 4 correctly.
To simulate line 5 of HPVC.Certify, AABE makes a query to C of the form
OKeyUpdate(QRev, t,MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE). C responds as written in Oracle 6.2
— that is, it returns a valid update key unless t = t? and R 6⊆ QRev. However,
note that AABE chose t? = qt, and at the point of calling the KeyUpdate oracle,
the list QRev = QRev \ Si. Therefore, if C would return ⊥ in response to this
query, then AABE would already have returned ⊥ as a result of the checks
performed in Oracle B.1. Hence, for all queries made to C, a valid update key
is returned and line 4 is simulated correctly.
• Queries of the form HPVC.Revoke(τF (X),MK,PP): AABE runs Oracle B.2. To
simulate running the HPVC.Revoke algorithm, AABE runs Algorithm 6.9 as
written with the exception of line 4. Instead, AABE makes a query to C of the
form OKeyUpdate(QRev, t,MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE). Note that, according to Ora-
cle B.2, AABE would have returned ⊥ if t = qt (where, recall, qt = t? by the
choice of AABE) and R 6⊆ QRev \ Si. This corresponds directly to the condi-
tions wherein C cannot form a valid update key according to Oracle 6.2 (since,
if HPVC.Revoke is called, then Si was already removed from the list QRev).
Hence, for all queries, C can form a valid update key and AABE can simulate
the expected behaviour.
7. Eventually (after qt Revoke queries), AV C finishes this query phase. AABE checks
whether the list of revoked entities is compatible with the challenge list R and returns
0 if not.
8. AABE must now generate the challenge input for AV C . To do so, it chooses three
distinct messages, m0,m1 and m
′, uniformly at random from the messagespace. It
also chooses a random bit b which it defines to be RKF,X? . It sends m0 and m1 to
C as its challenge inputs in the IND-sHRSS game. C chooses a bit b? uniformly at
random and returns CT ?
$← Encrypt(mb? , ω˜, S˜, t?,MPK0ABE). AABE sets cb to be
CT ? and generates c1−b himself by encrypting m′ as specified on lines 5 and 6 of
Algorithm 6.5.
Finally, AABE selects another bit s uniformly at random and, if b = 0, it sets
V KF,X? = (g(ms), g(m
′), LReg), or otherwise it sets V KF,X? = (g(m′), g(ms), LReg).
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Note that s can be thought of as AABE ’s guess as to the value of b?.
9. AV C is given the resulting parameters and again given oracle access which AABE
responds to as in Step 6.
10. Eventually, AV C outputs its result θ? which, in order to appear valid, should contain
exactly one non-⊥ plaintext; we denote this plaintext by y. If g(y) = g(ms), AABE
guesses b′ = s. If g(y) = g(m′), AABE guesses randomly b′ ← {0, 1} (as AV C did
not respond for either m0 or m1, it reveals no information to aid AABE). Otherwise,
AABE aborts as AV C was not successful (either for legitimate reasons or because
AABE chose s incorrectly and issued a malformed challenge).
By assumption, AV C has non-negligible advantage δ against the selective, semi-static
revocation game — that is, Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] + Pr [g(y) = g(m
′)] = δ. Therefore,
Pr
[
b′ = b?
]
= Pr
[
b′ = b?|g(y) = g(ms)
]
Pr [g(y) = g(ms)]
+ Pr
[
b′ = b?|g(y) = g(m′)]Pr [g(y) = g(m′)]
= Pr [s = b?] Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] + Pr
[
b˜ = b?
]
Pr
[
g(y) = g(m′)
]
=
1
2
Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] +
1
2
Pr
[
g(y) = g(m′)
]
=
1
2
(Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] + Pr
[
g(y) = g(m′)
]
)
=
δ
2
Hence,
AdvAABE ≥
∣∣∣∣Pr [b? = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣δ2 − 12
∣∣∣∣
≥ 1
2
(δ − 1),
which is non-negligible. However, the DPABE scheme was, in fact, assumed to be secure in
the sense of IND-sHRSS and hence such an adversary as AABE may not exist. Therefore,
our assumption on AV C must be incorrect, and no adversary with non-negligible advantage
against the selective, semi-static revocation game can exist.
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B.3.3 Proof of Authorised Computation
Lemma B.3. The HPVC construction defined by Algorithms 6.1–6.9 is secure with re-
spect to selective authorised computation (Game B.3) under the same assumptions as in
Theorem 6.1.
Proof. We reduce the security of the selective authorised computation game to the
IND-sHRSS security of the underlying revocable-key DPABE scheme (Game 6.1). To
achieve a contradiction, let AV C be an adversary with non-negligible advantage against
the selective authorised computation game (Game B.3) when instantiated with Algorithms
6.1–6.9. We show that, if such an AV C exists, then it can be used to construct an adver-
sary AABE that can break the IND-sHRSS security of the revocable-key DPABE scheme.
Note that this notion is only meaningful in PVC-AC mode. Let C be a challenger for the
IND-sHRSS game playing with AABE , who in turn acts as the challenger in the selective
authorised computation game with AV C .
1. AV C first selects its challenge inputs F,X? and the authorisation policy P .
2. AABE defines its own challenge inputs for the IND-sHRSS game by setting t? = 1,
ω? = AX? and S? = P ∧ {l(F )}, and sends these to C.
3. C runs the Setup algorithm for the DPABE scheme and returns the public parameters
MPKABE to AABE who stores them as MPK0ABE.
4. AABE now simulates the HPVC.Setup algorithm such that the output is consistent
with MPK0ABE. It runs Algorithm 6.1 as written, with the exception of line 1, since
MSK0ABE and MPK
0
ABE are defined to be those generated by C. AABE also runs
HPVC.FnInit as written and sends an empty challenge revocation list R =  to C.
5. AABE must next create the challenge input for AV C . To do so, it chooses three
distinct messages, m0,m1 and m
′, uniformly at random from the messagespace. It
also chooses a random bit b which it defines to be RKF,X? . It sends m0 and m1 to
C as its challenge inputs in the IND-sHRSS game. C chooses a bit b? uniformly at
random and returns CT ?
$← Encrypt(mb? , ω?,S?, t?,MPK0ABE). AABE sets cb to be
CT ? and generates c1−b himself by encrypting m′ as specified on lines 5 and 6 of
Algorithm 6.5.
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Finally, AABE chooses another bit s uniformly at random and, if b = 0, it sets
V KF,X? = (g(ms), g(m
′), LReg), or otherwise sets V KF,X? = (g(m′), g(ms), LReg).
6. AABEgives the resulting parameters to AV C along with oracle access which AABE
can handle as follows:
• Queries to HPVC.FnInit and HPVC.Register can be run as given in the construc-
tion.
• Queries of the form HPVC.Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,MK,PP): AABE runs
Oracle B.3. If the queried ψ satisfies the challenge authorisation policy P then
AABE returns ⊥. Otherwise it simulates running HPVC.Certify by running
Algorithm 6.4 as written with the exception of lines 4 and 5, as these depend
on MSK0ABE held by C.
To simulate line 4, AABE queries C for
OKeyGen(Si, (O, Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li
lk),MSK
0
ABE,MPK
0
ABE).
C will return ⊥ if (ω? ∈ O) and (Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li lk ∈ S?) and (Si /∈ R). However,
for the query to have been made, AABE must not have returned ⊥ in Oracle B.3,
and therefore ψ /∈ P , and hence ψ /∈ S?. Therefore, C can always return a valid
decryption key SK0ABE.
To simulate line 5 of HPVC.Certify, AABE queries C for
OKeyUpdate(QRev, t,MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE). C responds as in Oracle 6.2
and returns a valid update key unless t = t? and R 6⊆ QRev. However, as R
was chosen to be empty, R ⊆ QRev for any QRev, and hence C can create a
valid update key.
• Queries of the form HPVC.Revoke(τF (X),MK,PP): AABE runs Algorithm 6.9
as written with the exception of line 4. To simulate this line, AABE makes a
query to C of the form OKeyUpdate(LRev, t,MSK0ABE,MPK0ABE). As specified in
Oracle 6.2, C will return a valid key unless t = t? and R 6⊆ R). However, AABE
chose R to be empty and so it is certainly a subset of any R, and in particular
LRev. Hence, for all queries, C can form a valid update key and AABE can
simulate the expected behaviour.
7. Eventually, AV C finishes this query phase and outputs a result θ? corresponding
to the result of F (X?) protected by an authorisation policy P , where AV C never
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received a key for a set of authorisation attributes s ∈ P . As θ? should appear valid,
it should comprise exactly one non-⊥ element which we denote by y.
8. If g(y) = g(ms), AABE guesses b′ = s. If g(y) = g(m′), AABE randomly guesses
b′ $← {0, 1} (as AV C did not respond for either m0 or m1, it reveals no information
to aid AABE in its IND-sHRSS game). Otherwise, AABE aborts as AV C was not
successful (either for legitimate reasons or because AABE chose s incorrectly and
issued a malformed challenge).
By assumption, AV C has non-negligible advantage δ against the selective authorised com-
putation game — that is, Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] + Pr [g(y) = g(m
′)] = δ. Therefore,
Pr
[
b′ = b?
]
= Pr
[
b′ = b?|g(y) = g(ms)
]
Pr [g(y) = g(ms)]
+ Pr
[
b′ = b?|g(y) = g(m′)]Pr [g(y) = g(m′)]
= Pr [s = b?] Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] + Pr
[
b˜ = b?
]
Pr
[
g(y) = g(m′)
]
=
1
2
Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] +
1
2
Pr
[
g(y) = g(m′)
]
=
1
2
(Pr [g(y) = g(ms)] + Pr
[
g(y) = g(m′)
]
)
=
δ
2
Hence,
AdvAABE ≥
∣∣∣∣Pr [b? = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣δ2 − 12
∣∣∣∣
≥ 1
2
(δ − 1),
which is non-negligible. However, as the DPABE scheme was assumed to be IND-sHRSS
secure, such an adversary can not exist. Therefore, our assumption on AV C must be
incorrect, and no adversary with non-negligible advantage against the selective authorised
computation game can exist.
277
